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This dissertation examines how transnational flows of capital from the Persian Gulf are 
shaping the urban landscape of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seeks to answer 
the following question: what role are transnational flows of capital playing in urban 
redevelopment in Sarajevo? The thesis also investigates the following sub-questions: 
how do the residents of Sarajevo respond to such urban change? How is Sarajevo's 
changing urban space informing new conceptions of the sacred and the secular, of the 
East and the West and of the post-conflict identity of the city? What kinds of discourses 
are emerging in terms of identity? The thesis begins with an introduction followed by a 
literature review focusing on public space, sacred space, transnationality, and identity 
and Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After this, it discusses the methodology based 
on qualitative methods and discourse analysis for data interpretation. A chapter 
examining the history of the city spaces and its identity precedes the empirical chapters 
based on fieldwork undertaken in Sarajevo. The first empirical chapter analyses 
commercial developments especially in relationship to corruption and investor 
urbanism. The second empirical chapter explores sacred spaces in the city and the 
blending of the sacred and the secular in public space, and the final empirical chapter 
considers residential spaces and explores the construction of the Arab ‘other’. This 
thesis concludes that such transnational flows are urging the residents of the city to 
position themselves along the imaginary binaries of East/West, Sacred/Secular and 
Global/Local to come to terms with the processes in the city. It contributes to the 
literature on sacred space in the public sphere and identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In Sarajevo, new additions to the urban landscape affect the relationship between the 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Sarajevo and Urban Redevelopment 
 Over twenty years since the signing of the Dayton Accords ending the bloody 
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its capital city Sarajevo buzzes with tourists and 
visitors from around the globe seeking out the beauty and history of the city and its 
surrounding areas. Especially in the summer around the time of the Sarajevo Film 
Festival, the city swells with people enjoying the warm nights and outdoor cafes in the 
historic old city. Running parallel to this growth in tourism to the city is the 
redevelopment of its physical spaces, which have slowly begun to shed the remnants 
of conflict: bullet holes, marks from mortar shells and abandoned and empty spaces 
too dangerous to access. Although these scars in the urban landscape continue to 
mark and shape the city, new urban projects with funding from various transnational 
actors are pushing Sarajevo out of its post-conflict and post-socialist age into a new era 
marked by greater transnational flows of capital, people and ideas. Conspicuous 
amongst these new investments, especially in terms of their publicity, are those with 
capital originating in the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait and others. With projects ranging from commercial shopping centres to private 
villas to new mosques, funding for urban investment from Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates – is propelling development in Sarajevo and its urban future.  
 This type of investment, however, is not unique to Sarajevo. In fact, capital from 
the Persian Gulf has been financing urban projects in many major cities around the 
world, including London. It is unsurprising in the twenty-first century that such 
transnational flows appear worldwide; there has been an intensification of such capital 
exchanges and movements of people and ideas. Like no other time in history, vast 
amounts of wealth are being transferred between all corners of the globe. Although 
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these exchanges in so-called ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 2001) are neither new nor 
surprising, in Sarajevo, this phenomenon is remarkable, especially in comparison to 
other foreign direct investment and especially with an understanding that Sarajevo is a 
Muslim-majority city. Ostensibly secular spaces in Sarajevo such as shopping malls 
and hotels have increasingly been built using shari’ah compliant Islamic financing from 
Muslim countries. According to Wazir Jahan Karim (2010), ‘Islamic banks and finance 
institutions cannot receive or provide funds for projects which are concerned with or 
involve alcohol, gambling, pornography, tobacco, weapons or pork’ (110). Thus these 
buildings restrict activities in their spaces accordingly.  
 This thesis examines how such transnational flows of capital from the greater 
Muslim world, especially countries from the Persian Gulf, are shaping the urban 
landscape of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Sarajevo is a Muslim-majority city, 
although one with a multi-ethnic past, this research investigates the reception of such 
investments by the people of Sarajevo and what this means in terms of the city’s 
identity and its future development. With a focus on capital from GCC countries, it 
explores the effects of transnational flows on the social lives of city dwellers and the 
processes of becoming global in an increasingly globalising world. Outside of a ‘West-
to-rest’ conception of contemporary transnational processes, the investments arriving 
in Sarajevo are enabling the emergence of hybridity and novel new cultural forms. At 
the cusp of these globalising processes, Sarajevo is both moving beyond its history 
and conflict and still indelibly marked by the Siege of Sarajevo and the war in the 
1990s. It is at a transitional point, and the new developments are guiding this growth.  
 My interest in transnational flows of capital and people into Bosnia and 
Herzegovina began nearly fifteen years ago in 2003. As a student of architecture at the 
time, I was invited to help the reconstruction of the Karađoz Bey Mosque in Mostar with 
a group called Builders for Peace. My mother’s family is Croatian by ancestry, and I 
was focusing on post-conflict reconstruction; the project was a perfect fit for me. While 
	 11	
in Mostar, I noticed that the mosque had received funding for its reconstruction from 
Saudi Arabia, and I began to question what other governments and institutions had 
donated money and in-kind services for the redevelopment of the country. As my 
interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina grew, I continued to follow this type of capital flow, 
which led me to Sarajevo. I was fascinated by development aid originating outside of 
Western Europe or North America because at the time I had little understanding of this 
type of process or of non-‘West-to-rest’ ideas of globalisation. My interest in these flows 
brought up many questions, especially regarding how this type of phenomenon was 
understood and received by the people in the city.  
 This thesis is a continuation of that exploration into redevelopment funding in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Based on fieldwork undertaken over a year in Sarajevo, it 
analyses the overarching discourses surrounding new investments in the city. 
Following along the ideas of Alev Çinar and Thomas Bender (2007), discourses and 
imaginary binaries (or imaginaries) that are discussed in this thesis, ‘serve urban 
dwellers by locating the city and themselves in it... the city is located and continually 
reproduced through such orienting acts of imagination, acts grounded in material space 
and social practice’ (xii). Thus how city dwellers imagine and discuss the city and their 
identity constitutes both social reality and urban space. When using the terms 
‘discourse’ and ‘imaginary’ in this thesis, I refer to the ways in which Sarajevans 
imagine themselves within their urban environment, often by positioning themselves 
along binaries such as East/West.  
 Focusing on commercial developments, sacred spaces and residential projects 
with funding from GCC countries, this research argues that Sarajevan identity is 
currently in crisis, and that the residents of the city are now positioning their identity in 
reaction to the global flows of capital, people and ideas from the Arab world along three 
imaginary binaries: East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local. In order to come to 
terms with an ever-shifting and complex urban reality that is engendering multiplicity 
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and hybridity through new globalising urban projects, Sarajevans are attempting to 
maintain a stasis of identity through the discourses that polarise Sarajevo towards the 
West, the Secular and the Local. While these discourses form their own ‘regimes of 
truth’ (Lees, 2004: 102-103), the processes occurring in Sarajevo are more complex 
than such binary understandings.  
 This research contributes to academic debates in South East European studies 
and in geography. Within South East European studies, it adds to the literature on 
identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the implications of identity for post-conflict 
development. It also contributes to ethnographic analyses of the ex-Yugoslav space 
focusing on identity construction outside of ethno-religious belonging. Away from an 
area studies focus, it contributes to theoretical discussions about sacred space and 
transnationality outside of ‘global cities’. With multiple sources of novel empirical data, 
it adds to the unfolding understanding of post-conflict and post-socialist cities and their 
march toward market economies and global linkages. By analysing the responses of 
the people of Sarajevo, this thesis speaks to questions regarding how populations 
adapt and adjust to increasing transnational influences from myriad source countries. It 
also commits to maintaining the complexity of such flows without reducing or flattening 
understandings of identity and spatial production. In this, it pulls away from ideas of 
bounded categories of space and belonging.  
 
1.2 Context 
 The city of Sarajevo has a long and complex history. The Ottomans founded 
Sarajevo in the middle of the fifteenth century, and following what was called the millet 
system, they organised the different faith communities into mahalas – or 
neighbourhoods – within the city landscape. This system formed the basis for the urban 
structure of Sarajevo (Donia, 2006 and Karahasan, 1993); communities built their own 
churches and mosques within the mahalas, giving the city multi-confessional character. 
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With the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, the Vienna-
based government began to expand the city using a more Western European design, 
creating the stylistic East/West blend for which Sarajevo is known (Donia, 2006). After 
the Second World War, Socialist Yugoslavia began developing the city westward away 
from the Ottoman old city with buildings that followed a more modern design (Ibelings, 
2010: 14). The socialist government also invested in concrete blockhouses, 
reminiscent of many ex-socialist countries in Europe and Asia. At this time a pan-
Yugoslav identity was fostered, adding to the richness of belonging both in the urban 
environment and its people.  
 However, this diverse landscape soon became the battleground for nationalist 
interests. Around the 1970s and 1980s, religion regained a prominent place in society 
in tandem with the global Islamic revival (Mandaville, 2007 and Merdjanova, 2013), and 
this re-emergence coincided with a nationalist turn in Yugoslavia. When Slovenia and 
Croatia left Socialist Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Bosnia and Herzegovina fell into 
bloody conflict between its three main ethno-religious communities: the Catholic 
Croats, the Orthodox Serbs and the Muslim Bošnjaks. The Siege of Sarajevo enforced 
by Bosnian Serb troops from1992 and 1996 altered the face of Sarajevo forever. Many 
important and historic buildings and landmarks were targeted and destroyed at this 
time, scarring the remaining buildings and footpaths to this day. After the signing of the 
Dayton Accords ending the conflict, reconstruction of the urban environment 
commenced. However, Sarajevo began a dual transformation from socialism and from 
conflict, which has dictated the direction of urban redevelopment. Catherine Baker 
(2012) has referred to this dual transformation as a ‘double lens’ (868), and Bougarel, 
Helms and Duijzings (2008) explain that ‘despite the burden of the war legacy, the 
political difficulties faced by post-war Bosnia share much in common with those 
experienced by other post-socialist countries’ (32). Thus redevelopment in Sarajevo 
must be looked at in terms of both the post-socialist legacy of the city as well as its 
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post-siege aspect. Because of the population dynamics after the conflict, Sarajevo has 
become a Muslim-majority city with estimates up to 80% of the population being 
Muslim according to the latest census data (Popis, 2013).  
 Sarajevo has historically maintained what many call a ‘multicultural’, or more 
precisely multi-ethnic, identity, meaning it preserves spaces for the traditional ethno-
religious communities and their populations (Greble, 2011: 2). The post-war city, 
however, is physically morphing, caused in part by its ethnic homogenisation and the 
privatisation process after socialism. This process allowed a minority elite to claim 
majority shares in state corporations, giving the few an advantage over the many, 
leading to, among other things, perceptions of corruption in urban development 
projects (to be discussed further in this thesis). In the past twenty years, prime real 
estate in the city centre has been auctioned for redevelopment projects to various 
different global actors. I have chosen to analyse some of these projects as case 
studies, especially those with funding from countries such as Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates.  
 In this thesis, I focus on five specific case studies broken down into three 
chapters: one chapter on commercial spaces, one on sacred spaces and a third on 
residential developments. The case studies are the BBI Centar, the Sarajevo City 
Centre, the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Complex, Poljine Hills residential complex 
and the Buroj Ozone tourist and residential complex (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Case studies in Sarajevo. Map taken from Google Earth with locations of all case studies marked by yellow 
flags.  
 
Using qualitative research methods for data collection during my fieldwork in 2015, I 
interviewed project stakeholders and urban professionals in Sarajevo, approached 
people on the streets to discuss urban investments in what I call ‘field interviews’, sent 
out a survey on urban development to different internet communities and observed the 
people as they interacted with the urban environment. To triangulate my findings, I 
analysed media articles and comments on internet forums. This data has given me an 
insight into the role that these capital flows are playing in the development of Sarajevo 
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and how the city’s people are responding to such changes. As Sarajevo is undergoing 
a dual transformation from socialism and from conflict, the new urban interventions 
from GCC countries are pushing the city outside of its historical identity into new 
understandings of its place in the globalising world. I argue that in reaction of the case 
studies, the city’s population is positioning its identity towards one end of three 
imaginary binaries: East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local. I claim that this 
positioning is an attempt to regain control over their identity, which is in crisis, and over 
their city, which is being redeveloped by elite-approved market-driven forces.  
 
1.3 Research Aims 
 This thesis explores transnational flows of capital for urban development in 
Sarajevo. Since the end of the Siege of Sarajevo, the city has been redeveloping and 
reconstructing its urban spaces, and in addition to funding from bodies such as the 
European Union and the World Bank, GCC countries and the governments of states 
such as Indonesia and Malaysia have also contributed substantially to these 
processes. This study examines these flows of capital from Muslim-majority countries, 
their effect on the built environment and their reception by the city’s residents. It seeks 
to answer the following question: what role are transnational flows of capital playing in 
urban redevelopment in Sarajevo? The thesis also investigates the following sub-
questions:  
•  What kind of discourses are emerging in terms of identity and how do they 
relate to imagined binaries such as East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local?  
• How are such flows of capital embedded in local political struggles and 
agendas? 
• How is Sarajevo's changing urban space informing new conceptions of the 
sacred and the secular, of the East and the West and of the post-conflict identity 
of the city? 
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As a receiving city for transnational flows of capital from the greater Muslim world, 
Sarajevo’s context is unique. Not only is the city a post-socialist space, but it is also a 
post-conflict urban area; it is undergoing a dual transition. In order to answer the 
questions above, the complexity of the city and the current processes must be 
understood. To do so, I have used qualitative research methods along with media 
analysis to come to an understanding of the dominant discourses at work in Sarajevo. 
By focusing on the reception of the investments by the population, their role in the 
urban redevelopment can expand beyond the physical spaces of the city into the social 
lives of the city dwellers and their perceptions of the changing city.  
 
1.4 Contributions 
 This research contributes to scholarship in South East European studies, 
geographies of religion and transnationalism. Within the literature of South East 
European studies, a great deal has been said about identity and belonging in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, especially before, during and after the conflict in the 1990s (see for 
example Markowitz, 2010; Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobrić, 2001; or Robinson and 
Pobrić, 2006). This research sheds new light on contemporary conceptions of 
belonging in Sarajevo and how these conceptions are being formulated. As much of the 
literature on identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina focuses exclusively on the three ethno-
religious communities, these ideas have flattened and reduced belonging along 
national lines. Expanding beyond such bounded categories, my findings show that 
scholarship focusing on ethno-national belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina (such as 
Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobrić, 2001 and Robinson and Pobrić, 2006) misses the 
more complex nuances of identity taking place. While ethno-national belonging 
certainly does still contribute to identity formation in Sarajevo and in BiH, I show that 
identity is actually being constructed along different axes outside of this ‘identitarian 
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matrix’ (Jansen, Brković and Čelebičić, 2017: 8), which has been the focus of much of 
academic research since the conflict in the 1990s.  
 This research adds to anthropological and ethnographic works on the ex-
Yugoslav space that demonstrate how identity is formed outside of ethno-religious 
belonging through the construction of different discourses (see, for example, Bougarel, 
Helms and Duijzings, 2008; Helms, 2008; Jansen, 2015; and Jansen, Brković and 
Čelebičić, 2017). While these studies have looked at the formation of identity through 
the mobilisation of various imaginaries and dichotomies, such as urban/rural and 
East/West, my research supports and furthers such notions that identity formation in 
the region (and in Bosnia and Herzegovina specifically) is much more complex than 
identitarian politics focused on ethno-nationalism. It also furthers this corpus of 
research by looking at the discourses for identity formation within a Bosnian Muslim-
majority city and in reaction to global flows of people and capital, broadening the scope 
of such research beyond an insular focus on the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. This 
focus on global flows in the city is new to this body of literature and illuminates how 
identity is being constructed with respect to this phenomenon.    
 Within the geography literature, this thesis contributes to new conceptions of 
sacred and secular space. Building upon the research of Lily Kong (2001) and Banu 
Gökarıksel (2009), the findings in this thesis show how simultaneous realities can be 
produced at once within the same space. In terms of the sacred and the secular, this 
means that clear distinctions between the two are not always apparent and that a 
blurring or crossing over is not only possible but also probable. Outside of conceptions 
of sacred space that focus on awe and wonder (della Dora, 2011) or that see the 
sacred as produced only in juxtaposition to the profane (Kedar and Werblowsky, 1998 
and Gottschalk, 2013), this research argues for a more complex understanding of 
sacred space as it functions in tandem with the secular. This follows a conception of 
the city as produced outside of bounded categories, allowing for the existence of 
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multiple realities and spaces (Farias and Bender, 2010). Focusing on how entire public 
spaces such as shopping centres can be conceived of a being both sacred and secular 
simultaneously, my research breaks new ground in the geography literature by 
broadening the idea of this simultaneous reality outside of spaces for religious practice 
and personal expressions of this simultaneous reality.  
 This thesis also contributes to new understandings of how Islam manifests in 
the built environment. I argue that Sarajevo is becoming more Muslim in character in 
terms of city spaces and in terms of demographics, which I call the ‘Islamic shift’. 
However, more than just speaking to one monolithic idea of the Muslim community in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and more than organising solidarities for the worldwide 
Muslim community – the umma (Kusno, 2012) – the findings in this thesis argue that 
Islam can be expressed in the built environment for various different factions within the 
Muslim community and that there can be perceptions of exclusion within the Muslim 
population of one city. This research goes further than assuming one homogeneous 
and coherent idea of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in addition to that, there 
are multiple ways that Islam is produced and represented in the urban landscape. This 
conception of Islam in the built environment is less studied in the literature, especially 
scholarship on the built environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. My research goes 
beyond representations of a homogeneous and coherent community or the imaginary 
unity of the umma.  
 Finally, this research contributes to the scholarship on transnationality and 
globalising cities. Using Roy and Ong’s (2011) conception of ‘worlding cities’, I argue 
that the case studies analysed in this thesis are ‘worlding practices’, or projects 
simultaneously generating the global and the urban, ‘being at once heterogeneously 
particular and yet irreducibly global’ (9). Such projects are contributing to hybridity and 
emergent cultural forms outside of a ‘West-to-rest’ model of globalisation. The case 
studies are attempting to ‘solve’ the urban problems in Sarajevo of post-socialist and 
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post-conflict redevelopment, and they are doing so by pushing Sarajevo towards the 
globalising world. Using this theorisation of transnational flows for urban 
redevelopment, this research demonstrates how in the context of Sarajevo ‘the urban 
and the global are constitutive of one another’ (Baker and Ruming, 2014: 63). The 
problems of post-socialist and post-conflict redevelopment are being solved through 
elite-approved visions for the city emanating from GCC countries, and the city’s 
population is actively contesting these movements of ideas, people and capital. There 
have been no studies of Sarajevo using this theoretical model, and it adds to the 
‘worlding’ literature by showing how elite-approved interventions from GCC countries 
are bringing Sarajevo into the globalising world and into the global market economy.  
 
1.5 Thesis Summary 
 This thesis is made up of eight chapters. In the second chapter titled, ‘Urban 
Space, Transnationalism and Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, I review scholarship 
that is relevant to this research, arguing for certain conceptions of how to view the city, 
transnationality and identity politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Underscoring key 
literature in geography and South East European studies, I highlight scholarship that 
provides more complex understandings of both the urban environment and of identity 
and belonging in the Sarajevan context. Through this literature review, I argue for 
maintaining the complexity of the phenomena occurring and refraining from over-
simplification and the employment of bounded categories. I explore ideas present in the 
literature relating to the urban landscape, public space, sacred space, Islam and 
nationalism in the built environment, ‘global cities’ and worlding, transnationality, 
identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Islam as practiced in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 Building from this literature review, chapter three titled, ‘Research and the 
Muslim City: Studying Spatial Development and Global Flows of Capital in Sarajevo’, 
lays out the methodological foundation for this project. Focusing on qualitative research 
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methods, this chapter explains the rationale behind the methods chosen and the 
analysis of the data collected through those methods. During my fieldwork in Sarajevo, 
I employed various different qualitative methods, including: interviews with project 
stakeholders and urban professionals in the city, ‘field interviews’ (in which I 
approached people on the street to discuss urban redevelopment), a survey on urban 
development in Sarajevo sent to various internet forums and observation of the 
population of Sarajevo in urban spaces. To triangulate this data, I also analysed media 
articles and comments on internet forums. Using discourse analysis, I analysed these 
sources of data in order to understand the overarching discourses present in the city 
and how these discourses contribute to understandings of the built environment, 
identity and transnational flows of people, ideas and capital originating in GCC 
countries. In this chapter, I also explore ethical considerations of the project, my 
positionality as an American researcher in Sarajevo and the challenges and drawbacks 
that I faced while conducting my fieldwork in 2015.  
 Chapter four ‘Sarajevo’s Identity Crisis: the City’s Multi-ethnic History, the 
Islamic shift and Post-War Urban Processes’ gives a broad overview of the current 
context of Sarajevo. In this chapter, I give a breakdown of Sarajevo’s history in terms of 
its urban development and the forces that have forged its multi-ethnic historical identity. 
I argue that, since the end of the Siege, Sarajevo has been undergoing an identity 
crisis and that the city is becoming more Muslim in character, which I call the ‘Islamic 
shift’. The ‘Islamic shift’ is a two-pronged process in which both the demographics of 
the city are becoming more homogeneous (the last census counted 80% of Sarajevo’s 
population as Muslim) and in which the city’s spaces are also taking on a more Muslim 
character in terms of shari’ah compliant spaces and increasing numbers of mosques 
and mesjids. This chapter also looks at processes of urbanisation after the war in the 
1990s and discusses the problems associated with the privatisation of state assets. In 
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total, this chapter sets the foundation for the following three chapters, which analyse 
my empirical data focusing on the case studies in the city.  
 The first empirical chapter of this thesis, chapter five ‘Sarajevo’s Commercial 
Investments: Perceptions of Corruption and Investor Urbanism in Post-Conflict and 
Post-Socialist Urban Development’, focuses on two new shopping centres in the city: 
the BBI Centar (BBI) and the Sarajevo City Center (SCC). Concentrating on 
perceptions of corruption and market-driven urbanism, it analyses the intense public 
debates around the buildings and their connection to GCC capital. I argue that the 
people in the city view issues of corruption as particularly ‘eastern’ in opposition to 
ostensibly ‘western’ transparency, and because of this, BBI and SCC are catalysing a 
positioning of Sarajevo identity towards the ‘West’ of the East/West binary. Focusing on 
data obtained from interviews, field interviews, survey responses and media reports, I 
show how the elite-approved worlding projects that are ‘quasi-public’ spaces contribute 
to identity formation in Sarajevo, especially in reaction to perceived ‘eastern’ forces 
operating in the country.  
 Chapter six, the second empirical chapter in this thesis titled ‘Redefining 
Sarajevo’s Relationship to Islam: the Blending of Sacred and Secular Spaces’ analyses 
spaces in Sarajevo that are sacred in nature. Again using BBI and SCC as case 
studies along with the Saudi King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre, I argue that all of 
these buildings maintain a blending of sacred and secular space and the existence of 
both sacred and secular realities simultaneously. Because BBI and SCC are spaces 
where religious ritual takes place and where there are religious restrictions upon the 
activities allowed in the spaces, they cannot be understood as purely secular in nature. 
Similarly, the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre provides educational services for 
the people of Sarajevo regardless of religious affiliation, making the reality of its space 
more complex than purely sacred space in the conception of Veronica della Dora 
(2011), which focuses on awe and wonder. All three are at once both sacred and 
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secular. First, I analysed the discourses around BBI and SCC with respect to 
perceptions of conspiracies to ‘Islamise’ the city and fears of expanding shari’ah 
compliant spaces. The second part of this chapter focuses on the King Fahd Mosque 
and ideas that it spreads radicalism and preys upon poor and vulnerable populations. 
Sarajevans are reacting to these case studies by positioning their identity along the 
East/West and the Sacred/Secular binaries towards the ‘West’ and the ‘Secular’, 
viewing radicalism as ‘eastern’ and the ‘Islamisation’ of the city as against Yugoslav 
secular ideals.  
 The final empirical chapter in this thesis, chapter seven titled ‘Understanding 
Arabophobia: Residential Projects as Catalysts for New Constructions of the “Other” in 
Sarajevo’ examines new residential and tourist complexes in Sarajevo: Poljine Hills 
residential complex and Buroj Ozone tourist village. Exploring themes of the 
construction of the Arab ‘other’ and ideas surrounding neighbourliness and flows of 
people into the city, it analyses how the case studies are catalysing discourses around 
visitors and residents in Sarajevo from Arab countries, focusing on concepts such as 
exclusion, cultural colonisation, safety, clashes of behaviour and the new ‘other’. 
Drawing upon interviews, field interviews, survey responses, media analysis and an 
examination of online comments, it argues that Sarajevans are attempting to position 
their identity along the imaginary binaries of East/West and Global/Local toward the 
‘West’ and toward the ‘Local’. This chapter examines perceptions of Arabs being 
uncultured in contrast to more cultured, educated and ‘European’ Sarajevans and fears 
that Sarajevans are being excluded from the local property market by Arab buyers. It 
also highlights anxieties that the Bosnian population will have to adapt to the customs 
of the new residents instead of the reverse. These flows of people into Sarajevo can be 
seen as contributing to urban change, creating spatialised social divisions in which one 
part of the city is inhabited by the wealthy and middle class and the other by the less 
fortunate (Spirou, 2011: 196). The positioning of Sarajevan identity along the binaries is 
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thus a way to contest such processes as transnational flows of people, capital and 
ideas increase.  
 To conclude this thesis, chapter eight titled ‘Conclusion: Worlding Projects, 
Urban Problems and Identity in Crisis’ lays out the arguments and interpretations of the 
thesis and its theoretical and empirical contributions to scholarship. This thesis 
contributes to conceptions of how Sarajevan identity is developing in the contemporary 
post-socialist and post-conflict climate, especially in relation to its transforming urban 
landscape. As a whole, the discourses surrounding the case studies in this thesis can 
be read as a means for the local population to assert control over their changing built 
environment and identity. Although the ‘worlding practices’ that are the case studies 
contribute to greater hybridity and emerging cultural forms, Sarajevans are positioning 
their identity along the three binaries East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local in 
order to achieve stasis in this ever shifting environment. These findings offer new 
conceptions for sacred space, the representation of Islam in the built environment and 
the globalising effects of transnational capital flows for post-socialist and post-conflict 
reconstruction and development. This research also offers new ways of 
conceptualising Sarajevan identity and how the built environment engenders processes 
of identity formation.  
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2. Urban Space, Transnationalism and Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 This research examines urban investements in Sarajevo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with funding from the Persian Gulf. Attending to both sacred and secular 
architecture, especially buildings relying on Islamic funding from countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, this research uncovers new processes 
taking place in Sarajevo. The urban environment plays a crucial role in the formation of 
identity, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, identity has proven in the past to be a divisive 
– even deadly – concept. Yet, investments in the built environment from Muslim 
countries, often emanating from rich oil-producing nations around the Persian Gulf, 
appear in many major cities around the world. London’s Shard skyscraper, for 
example, is the result of Qatari funding and is partially owned by the State of Qatar. 
That such funding exists on a massive scale should come as no surprise in the twenty-
first century; capital flows and exchanges have reached an intensification never before 
witnessed on the planet, and vast amounts of wealth are being transferred from all 
corners of the world. While such urban interventions in so-called ‘global cities’ may 
astonish no one, in Sarajevo – a small, multi-ethnic, post-conflict and post-socialist 
European capital – the abundance of such urban interventions originating in the Middle 
East and Asia, especially in comparison to other foreign direct investment, is 
substantial. What role are transnational flows of capital playing in the urban 
redevelopment of Sarajevo? And how do the residents of the city respond to such 
change?  
 Answering these questions requires a broad investigation through multiple 
disciplines and sources of literature and a commitment to maintaining the complexity of 
the phenomena occurring. This means refraining from over-simplification in terms of 
creating bounded categories. In Sarajevo, a blurring of boundaries between different 
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spheres – the public and private and the sacred and secular – plus transnational capital 
and cultural flows are colliding with little-regulated privatisation and urbanisation 
practices to create urban interventions that produce solidarities for specific groups. 
However, such flows are also increasing hybridity and new cultural forms not only 
within the city’s multi-ethnic population, but also within singular ethno-religious groups. 
In this literature review, I will explore ideas relating to the urban landscape, public 
space, sacred space, Islam and nationalism in the built environment, ‘global cities’ and 
worlding, transnationality, identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Islam as practiced in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having a broad understanding of these literatures will be 
important for understanding the role of transnational flows of capital for urban 
redevelopment in Sarajevo and the responses of the residents to such urban change.  
 
2.2 The Urban Landscape 
 Urban centres are sites of contestation and tension. They are arenas where 
political, economic and social transformations commence and where challenges to 
structures of authority are lived out. The multitude of connections and networks 
inscribed within cities and the activities that take place within their spaces are what 
make urban centres special. Although much of the literature on the city refers to it as a 
bounded object – a concrete spatial form, an economic unit, and a cultural formation 
(Farias and Bender, 2010: 9) – cities in fact defy such categorisation in their 
heterogeneity and the complicated, chaotic and unpredictable activities that are 
produced through the enmeshing of various actors in urban areas. Building upon Bruno 
Latour’s (2005) conception of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), Farias and Bender (2010) 
have developed an alternative way of thinking about cities based on three central 
notions. The first is the ‘mode of existence’ of a city, which ‘resembles less a notion of 
“out-thereness” than one of “in-hereness”’. In other words, the practices and activities 
on site create cities, and these are varied and changing, making cities greatly diverse. 
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The second notion is that the city is ‘enacted into being in networks of bodies, 
materials, technologies, objects, natures and humans… the enactment of objects, such 
as the city, is not just social, but also material, and involves the heterogeneous 
ecologies of entities acting at sites and contexts of practice.’ Conceptualising cities in 
this manner grants agency to humans and materials alike and does not rely upon their 
construction by a ‘constructor’ – society, culture, discourse, etc. Thirdly, they see the 
city as a ‘multiple object’ where:  
different realities are being enacted at one time...touching upon the 
Bergsonian assertion of the multiplicity of reality...Through time and 
space the same object proves to be multiple...it certainly applies to cities 
being enacted in multiple different ways at different sites and time. (13-
14).  
 
This multiplicity breaks the moulds of the conception of the city as a bounded object 
and cultural formation and allows for multiple enactments of the city simultaneously.  
 By viewing cities from this perspective, the complexity of the networks and 
activities taking place in the urban environment can be maintained. Thus, instead of 
bounded objects of homogeneous economic and cultural activity, they become 
multiplex – ‘multiple spaces, multiple times and multiple webs of relations’ (Amin and 
Graham, 1997: 419). They can be ‘considered as a set of spaces where diverse ranges 
of relational webs coalesce, interconnect and fragment’ (Ibid., 418). Seeing the city 
outside the conception of ‘a bounded unit and a stable object: a spatial form, an 
economic-political entity, a cultural formation’ (Farias and Bender, 2010: 12), the 
concept of urban culture and identity can be questioned and reformed. Farias and 
Bender state: 
Looking at cities as culture raises the same type of dilemmas we 
observe above for spatial and economic understandings of cities. The 
problem lies in the stability of the object. As cultural formations, cities 
are imagined as fluid objects that remain identical despite slight 
variations from case to case. They are fluid, for their manifestations 
vary, but keep their shape and identity. Thus, while it is possible to look 
at many lively Euro-American cities as resembling expressions of a fluid 
urban culture, as soon as differences go too far between and within 
cities, one is confronted with the paradox of cities to which an urban 
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culture cannot be ascribed. And this is precisely the dilemma: 
understood as fluid cultural objects cities are either the locus of a fluid 
urban culture or they are not. Seen in this way, it is not surprising that 
authors writing in the tradition of everyday urbanism point to a profound 
gap between the city and the urban life (Ibid.). 
 
This is especially useful for Sarajevo, which has been home to various international 
actors since the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and which does not 
consist of simple ‘West-to-rest’ connections and flows. In fact, as will be discussed 
further in this dissertation, the idea of a Sarajevan city culture and identity is not just in 
flux, it is in crisis in the minds of the residents of the city. This has precisely to do with 
the ‘profound gap between the city and the urban life’ described above. If the city is re-
envisaged outside the parameters of a bounded cultural object, the true complexity of 
the processes and networks working to enact the city become visible. 
 
2.2.1 Public Space 
 As cities are sets of spaces created through the networks of human and non-
human activity on site, public spaces become arenas for intensely varied webs of 
relations. Yet there are two streams of literature on public environments: the literature 
following Jürgen Habermas on the public sphere and the geography literature on public 
space. While related, these two currents do not often overlap, depicting instead two 
quite different conceptions of the public arena. The main difference between these two 
ways of thinking is that public space is ‘explicitly spatial’ (Low and Smith, 2006: 5), and 
the public sphere literature describes ‘the sphere of private people coming together as 
a public’ (Habermas, 1989: 27). However, according to Low and Smith: 
  It would be regrettable and self-defeating if the distinction between these 
  literatures was summarily reduced to one of materialist versus idealist 
  approaches; both literatures are far too internally diverse to be  
  characterized  usefully in this way. Yet they have not really come  
  together… Where the weakness of the public space literature perhaps 
  lies in the practical means of translation from theories of political and 
  cultural economy to the materiality of public space, the public sphere 
  literature offers an historically embedded discussion of the continual 
	 29	
  making and remaking of the public vis-à-vis the state and related  
  institutions, and ideologies and modes of communication and power (6).  
 
Because the buildings in Sarajevo often inhabit spaces that blur the public and the 
private but that are accessible to the public, it will be important to merge some of the 
ideas of the public sphere and public space, especially with regard to religion in the 
public sphere.  
 Scholars have significantly discussed the idea of public space in the geography 
literature. Ali Madanipour et al (2014) see public spaces as a, ‘crossroads, where 
different paths and trajectories meet, sometimes overlapping and at other times 
colliding; they are the meeting place of politics and culture, social and individual 
territories, and instrumental and expressive concerns’ (1). While this definition allows 
for a broad view of public spaces, the term is contested. Public spaces are often 
discussed as an ideal type, and the notion conjures ideas of the Greek Agora, the 
Roman Forum, and Renaissance plazas and their link to direct democracy and the 
participation of citizens in public affairs (omitted from this image is the fact that only 
certain members of society could participate in such political activities, namely men of 
specific ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds). In this idealised image, public 
spaces serve three fundamental functions; they are places for political, economic and 
social activities (Stanilov, 2007: 269), including political protest, free trade and leisure. 
Don Mitchell (1995) has deemed this ideal image ‘true’ public space – an area in which 
people have the freedom to organise politically, exchange goods, and meet socially 
without fear of coercion or control. True public spaces ‘encourage unmediated 
interaction, a place where the power of the state can be held at bay’ (110).  
 Today, true public spaces as defined by Mitchell are rarities, as many sites 
traditionally associated with public space – parks, squares and plazas, for example – 
increasingly belong to private interests. According to Judit Bodnar (2015), 
‘Commercialisation and privatisation were identified as the two main trends in the 
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transformation of public space bringing its decline’ (2095). The lines between the public 
and the private have been blurring consistently in the past century, especially with the 
acceleration of neoliberal policies after the Second World War. In fact, this blurring of 
the public and private has had an anti-democratic effect on urban governance. Susan 
S. Fainstein and Scott Campbell (2011) explain that, ‘for cities, neo-liberalism narrows 
the options open to decision makers whether they are elected or not. Cities cannot 
afford to preserve democratic public spaces for citizens (plazas, parks, squares) when 
they can develop privatised, revenue-producing spaces for “idiots” (malls, offices, 
condominiums)’ (47). Because they can no longer be conceptualised as true public 
spaces, these urban areas become ‘quasi-public’ spaces – legally private areas that 
form part of the public sphere and that may be subject to regulation and control. In 
these ‘quasi-public’ spaces, access may become quite exclusive or may not be granted 
at all (Carmona, 2003: 111; Miljački, 2012: 187; Stanilov, 2007: 276).  
 Although public spaces in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe were often 
already highly regulated and controlled (the political and economic functions would 
have been severely curtailed), the social aspect of the spaces would have been open 
to the public without much regulation (Stanilov, 2007: 270-271) despite the fact that 
many public spaces in socialist countries were designed to prevent loitering on the 
premises (Duijzings, 2011: 139). Beginning in 1989 and reaching into the early 1990s, 
the political function of public spaces opened up as people took to the streets in 
Prague, Moscow, Belgrade and other major cities (Stanilov, 2007: 269-270). Since the 
collapse of these systems, however, privatisation has proceeded to morph these 
spaces into so-called ‘quasi-public’ spaces controlled by private interests and security 
companies. The countries of the former Eastern Bloc have not all followed the same 
trajectories with respect to post-socialist privatisations and the urban landscape, but 
there are many similarities with respect to market forces on public space (Diener and 
Hagen, 2013: 496). In Sarajevo, the war in the early 90s stalled the processes of 
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privatisation and economic transition, but new privatisations and developments are 
emerging, and surveillance cameras and private security guards control most of these 
interventions and the access granted to the citizens of the city.  
 The loss of ‘true’ public space, however – if it ever actually existed – should not 
necessarily be mourned nostalgically. As Margaret Crawford (2011) has pointed out, 
everyday public spaces exist in the form of streets, vacant lots, pavements, parking 
spaces and other such spaces, which can often be used for mostly uncontrolled 
gatherings and exist ‘somewhere in the junctures between private, commercial and 
domestic’ (347). Regan Koch and Alan Latham (2012) critique those decrying the loss 
of public life through the forces of privatisation with a case study describing the 
‘domestication’ of the Prince of Wales Junction in London. By reimagining and 
reconfiguring the junction, including exerting control over the activities taking place, the 
space became an area safe for all groups, instead of a dangerous corner housing only 
drug users and vagrants. In fact, the different publics that inhabit public spaces even 
after privatisation must negotiate the codes and rules governing the space in order to 
‘make a home in the city’ (Ibid., 1-2). Although they might be regulated by private 
security forces (which can encroach on the democratic nature of public space), 
different publics ‘keep confrontation at bay’ by maintaining certain codes and 
‘conviviality’, which according to Ash Amin (2013) is ‘not the product of civic virtue or 
interpersonal recognition, but a habit of negotiating multiplicity and the company of 
unknown other as a kind of bodily training’ (4). Anna Barker (2017) adds upon this 
conception with what she calls ‘mediated conviviality’ which argues for the facilitation of 
social order, recognising ‘the importance of safety to the development of a convivial 
public realm’ (848-849). When spaces are deliberately configured for multiple publics 
and the codes surrounding them negotiated, they come into being as public space, 
regardless of whether they can be considered ‘true’ public spaces or ‘quasi-public’ 
spaces. Thus speaking in terms of bounded categories and binaries (public/private, 
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sacred/secular, etc.) limits the notion of public space. The complexity of the space itself 
must be considered through the publics – the networks and actors – inhabiting the 
space to understand the more nuanced processes taking place. 
  
2.2.2 Sacred Space 
 More than ever, the concept of sacred space proves difficult to adequately 
define. It does not necessarily exist only within the boundaries of church, mosque, 
temple or synagogue walls, but rather blends into everyday spaces. Sacred and 
secular (or profane) are contested terms, but despite the messy nature of the sacred 
versus the secular, some scholars insist that it is, indeed, possible to demarcate where 
the sacred begins and where the secular (or profane) ends. Such conceptions focus on 
sacred spaces as sites of ritual (Finlayson, 2017: 304) or as spaces defined by their 
juxtaposition to the profane (Kedar and Werblowsky, 1998: 13 and Gottschalk, 2013: 
2). Other conceptions reach toward divine connection; according to Roger W. Stump 
(2008), sacred space is ‘a space that bears a direct connection to the superhuman 
entity or entities postulated to exist within a religious system, or that is directly involved 
in the interactions between humanity and such entities’ (26). Similarly, Veronika della 
Dora (2011) attempts to delimit sacred space from secular space by insisting that 
wonder – the awe one feels inside a sacred space – distinguishes the sacred from the 
secular (167). Although these definitions touch on elements that could separate sacred 
and secular spaces, their insistence on creating clear boundaries between the two 
signals the weakness of their analysis. Scholars such as Peter Gottschalk (2013) warn 
against simple binary distinctions between the sacred and the secular or the profane. In 
fact, elements of the sacred blur into the secular and vice-versa.  
 Some scholars argue that a shift has taken place with respect to the public 
significance of faith-based groups during modernisation, which can loosely be labelled 
secularisation (Bruce, 2011 and 2002). Secularisation has been defined as ‘the decline 
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in the social significance of religion’ (Bruce, 2011: 2), which supposedly occurred in 
many parts of the world in the last century. Secularisation, however, has been argued 
to be a plural and multiform process whose complexities signal not one secularism but 
multiple secularisms occurring simultaneously (Shakman Hurd, 2012). Other scholars, 
however, question the extent to which religion disappeared from social significance 
during the modern era (see, for example, Hjelm, 2015; Ley, 2011 and Shah, 2012), 
although the visibility of religion may have disappeared from the public sphere. 
Coincident with the decreasing visibility of religion in the modern era, some societies 
developed entire frameworks to keep religion in the private sphere, outside of politics or 
society at large. The socialist countries in Eastern Europe, including Socialist 
Yugoslavia, were just some of the countries that advanced secular ideals and pushed 
religion to the margins, attempting to keep the sacred far away from the secular. This 
decrease in visibility of religion in the public sphere did not equate to a disappearance 
of religion, but rather it signalled ‘the disengagement of religion from political power and 
rational decision-making during the modernisation process’ [emphasis in the original] 
(Cloke and Beaumont, 2012: 35).  
 At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the visibility of religion has dramatically 
re-emerged (Wilson and Steger, 2013: 481). Cloke and Beaumont have described this 
as, ‘reflecting a particular form of “crossing-over” in the public arena between the 
religious and the secular’ (28). Religion has re-emerged publicly, and:  
  not only are previously assumed divides between secular (=public) and 
  religious (=private) being challenged and rendered permeable, but the 
  current mix of neoliberal governance and postpolitical public  
  engagement is opening out opportunities for professional and voluntary 
  participation that transcends previously divisive boundaries of  
  involvement between religious and secular motivation (Ibid.).  
 
In the city (Beaumont and Baker, 2011), ‘new spaces of rapprochement between 
religious and non-religious actors’ are being created, manifesting the blurred nature of 
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the public and the private, the sacred and the secular (260) and creating transitional 
areas between comfort zones and such areas of rapprochement.  
 In the past few decades, scholars in geography have been conceptualising 
sacred space following these currents and engaging with notions of the sacred that 
transcend binary divisions. Lily Kong (2001) explains that: 
At the material, symbolic and ideological levels, the separation between 
sacred and secular is more fluid than rigid...Even while the sacred is 
often constructed, and gathers meaning in opposition to the secular, 
place is often multivalent, and requires an acknowledgement of 
simultaneous, fluctuating and conflicting investment of sacred and 
secular meanings in any one site (212). 
 
Thus the multiplicity of space allows for the simultaneous production of different 
realities, both sacred and secular and in between. Caitlin Finlayson (2017) argues that 
it is the ‘collective, emotional engagement with space that makes it sacred’, although 
the materiality of the environment may not produce the awe and wonder that Della 
Dora (2011) argues is necessary for sacred space. Finlayson’s conceptions reflect the 
ideas of embodied sacrality of Muslim women producing simultaneously sacred and 
secular spaces discussed by Banu Gökarıksel (2009). Gökarıksel further contends that: 
The ‘secular’ and the ‘religious’ are place-based, meaning that they are 
formed through the specific set of political and social relations, 
ideologies and practices in particular sites. But they are also productive 
of places, in the sense that the particular ideas and practices of the 
secular and the religious produce space – from the body to city spaces’ 
(2012: 5).  
 
Within these strains of thinking about the sacred, not only can the sacred and the 
secular blend into one another, they can co-exist within the same space.  
 With current trends in Islam, this is all the more evident, as it is increasingly 
impossible to separate the public and private in Muslim communities. According to 
Peter Mandaville (2007), ‘Islam is often represented as a “comprehensive” way of life 
that pervades all sectors of human activity and experiences among its adherents. In 
Islam it makes no sense to speak of the separateness of religion from any other 
domain of life’ (12). This notion in Islam is called tawhid, or ‘oneness’ (Ibid.). Islam, 
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especially, is present in both spatial public spaces (in the material organisation of urban 
space) as well as in the idealist public sphere (Islam governs behaviours, attitudes and 
practices in all aspects of life, not just the private life). The networks of the built 
environment and the actors in those spaces determine the activities that take place, 
creating ‘third spaces’ or ‘in-between’ areas (AlSayyad, 2001).  
 Asef Bayat (2013) argues that a greater emphasis on Muslim practices, virtue 
and visibility in Muslim communities reflects a conceptual shift that he calls post-
Islamism, which has come about with greater secularism on the political stage. Post-
Islamism ‘emphasises religiosity and rights. Yet, while it favors a civil and nonreligious 
state, it accords an active role for religion in the public sphere’ (8). The public sphere in 
Muslim communities increasingly includes Islamic values, even in politically secular 
societies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Gökarıksel and Secor (2017) state that, 
‘Instead of being confined to the spaces of mosques or formal politics, Islamic 
teachings and virtue are today being made integral to every aspect of life through ritual, 
prayer and daily conduct’ (648). This turn in Muslim societies is increasingly allowing 
for simultaneously sacred and secular spaces, and this includes places where rituals 
occur as well as spaces with multiple and conflicting meanings.  
 Sarajevo’s spaces encapsulate this complexity. Socialist Yugoslavia, (at least in 
its early years), dictated clear divides between the sacred and the secular in public life. 
Before the dissolution of the Yugoslav state and continuing thereafter, religion has 
played a very important part in the public sphere, mixing with politics and decision-
making at high levels. Although BiH is a plural society, Sarajevo’s Muslim majority 
carries with it the weight of the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica or IZ), which is 
based in the city, and also the Bošnjak (Bosnian Muslim) political party, the SDA 
(Stranka Demokratske Akcije), which runs the Cantonal government in coalition with 
the multiethnic but Bošnjak dominated SDP (Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne i 
Hercegovine). Islam in Sarajevo is not contained within the strict boundaries of mosque 
	36	
walls, and its reach extends to new spaces of rapprochement where secular and 
sacred actors meet.  
 
2.2.3 Islam and Nationalism in the Built Environment 
 Nationalism continues to play a strong role in BiH’s post-war society, including 
in its post-war urban environment. However, while other post-socialist societies 
constructed nationalism in the built environment on state-sponsored programmes 
(street name changes, removal/erection of monuments, etc. (Diener and Hagen, 
2013)), nationalism in the built environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina is somewhat 
more complex based on the presence of the three main ethno-religious groups. The 
built environment can serve as a vehicle for nationalism when its ‘semiotic functioning 
organises solidarities for a limited community’ (Kusno, 2012: 213). Through its form 
and function the built environment can ‘sell’ specific lifestyles and shape identity, 
collective memory and power structures (Vale, 2008). Examples of nationalism in the 
built environment include the Nazi architecture before and during the Second World 
War. Nazi Germany launched a campaign of ‘thorough spatial reorganisation’ in order 
to ‘re-orientate Germany's cultural, political and economic life to support the regime's 
objectives’ (Hagen, 2009: 690). The urban environment in socialist countries under 
Stalin similarly transformed to uphold the power of the regime (Tarkhanov and 
Kavtaradze, 1992: 9-10). During the Yugoslav era, public spaces and architecture 
would not have served one ethno-religious group over any other; the state sponsored 
the creation of Yugoslav nationalism and the unity of the republics. Buildings 
constructed during this era (except for mosques, churches and synagogues) would 
have belonged to all the people of the country in symbolism and function. However 
thinking in terms of state-sponsored nationalism is too simplistic, and a nation may be 
unconnected to the nation-state and have separate interests (Kusno, 2012: 214).  
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 Within Islam an overarching nation of Muslim believers ruled by shari’ah law 
exists called the umma. Although it often functions as more of a political device when 
solidarities need to be organised, the umma represents, ‘a deep horizontal 
comradeship that crosses the temporary convenience of nations’ (Simone, 2012: 206). 
The umma is, ‘a nation that exceeds the trappings of governmental and juridical 
particularity, a fundamental locus of identification and means of consolidating an 
unyielding sense of togetherness’ (Ibid., 207). The umma was employed during the 
Bosnian War of the 1990s to gather fighters from abroad for the Muslim front. The 
population of Sarajevo is officially eighty percent Muslim according to the 2013 census 
(Popis, 2013), and there is a large concentration of buildings erected with funding from 
the Muslim world in its built environment, much of which emanates from the Persian 
Gulf.  
 Interestingly for this study, the built environment in the Gulf States, but 
specifically in the United Arab Emirates, reached a level of worldwide fame for 
innovation and the ostentatious display of wealth before the financial crisis in 2008. 
Architects and city planners pushed the limits of the built environment, creating artificial 
islands, luxury villas, and towering skyscrapers (Elsheshtawy, 2009). Although there is 
no traditional idiom of Islamic architecture in these constructions – they are similar to 
new urban interventions in cities such as London and New York – the Gulf region has 
greatly impacted the vision of architecture in the Islamic world (Rabbat, 2012: 9) and 
linked it to vast oil wealth and modernity. The umma here manifests itself in such 
wealth and novelty, and, according to AbdouMaliq Simone (2012): 
  The Emirates…represent the concrete diffusion of a form of the umma 
  through massive investments in the built and financial environments of 
  the Muslim world…In other words…the Emirates cannot only intervene 
  into built environments around the world, but establish ‘parallel’ worlds 
  within them. These become in some important ways the concrete 
  machinery through which an umma is further recognized (207).  
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While traditional forms of Islamic architecture, including arches and domes, may be 
absent from these constructions, they still organise solidarities within Muslim 
communities by their pronounced displays of wealth and sleek modern touches 
interspersed with subtle Islamic touches – the inability to eat pork, gamble or drink 
alcohol on the premises, for example.  
 However, the Islamic Community in BiH remains committed to local 
interpretations of Islam despite the presence of other practices throughout the country, 
and this holds true for most Muslim communities throughout the world. The umma 
discourse has effectively been employed to call Muslims to action on behalf of their 
coreligionists (as was the case during the Bosnian war in the 1990s). Yet, time and 
again, the umma has failed to grow into a real, global movement. In fact, most Muslims 
worldwide identify on national and local terms instead of within a global community 
(Mandaville, 2007: 341), and, according to Merdjanova (2013):  
  In the Balkans, the recourse to the umma as a form of political identity 
  has been sporadic rather than systematic and has never translated into 
  an ideological program. The war-time endorsement of the image of 
  Bosnia as an outpost of the umma by the Bošnjak Party of Democratic 
  Action can be seen to a great extent as a tactical move to gain the 
  support of the Islamic world at a time when the West failed to respond 
  effectively to its plight (58).  
 
Islam in BiH will most likely continue to follow the traditional and dominant form brought 
by the Ottomans, but there are many currents at work in the country, especially in 
Sarajevo, all of which belong to the umma and which are susceptible to the 
employment of the umma discourse. Yet analysing Muslim funded buildings cannot 
simply rely on the idea of Bosnian Muslims belonging to a global nation or accepting 
different interpretations of Islam at face value; all networks of Muslims in the city are 
composed of various actors that influence how buildings are constructed, used and 
interpreted within the city. Nationalism in the built environment does exist and can 
organise solidarities for Muslims through the umma discourse, but oversimplifying such 
processes risks missing more nuanced activities, actors and interests at play.  
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2.2.4 Global Cities and ‘Worlding’ 
Since the late twentieth century, the concept of globalisation has permeated the 
urban studies and geography literature. This literature has focused extensively on the 
‘global cities’ discourse; however the ideas advanced by researchers such as Saskia 
Sassen (2001) limit the scope of what a ‘global city’ can be, embedding it in the 
concept of economic globalisation that transcends the nation-state and functions 
independently within global capitalism. This discourse overlooks cities experiencing 
global flows of ideas, people, goods and capital originating outside of North America or 
Europe. Although scholars such as Donald McNeill (2017) contend that the concept of 
‘global cities’ still holds conceptual value, within the literature there has been a move 
away from this bounded category toward ‘how the urban and the global are constitutive 
of one another’ (Baker and Ruming, 2014: 63 and Farias and Bender, 2010). Ananya 
Roy and Aihwa Ong (2011) have countered the ‘global city’ literature with the idea of 
‘worlding’. In their book Worlding Cities, they explain that: 
the city is viewed not as an exclusive site of capitalism or postcolonial 
activism, but as a milieu that is in constant formation, drawing on 
disparate connections, and subject to the play of national and global 
forces… we thus focus not on established criteria of city achievements, 
but on the ongoing art of being global (3-4).  
 
Roy and Ong view global or transnational interventions as ‘worlding practices’ or 
projects that push the boundaries of urbanism and urban situations beyond the city 
itself, ‘being at once heterogeneously particular and yet irreducibly global’ (9). It is a 
view of a world being constructed, and the interventions ‘instantiate some vision of the 
world in formation’ (11). Worlding cities do not fit neatly into the global cities 
discourses, but rather this conceptualisation allows for cities outside of the ‘New York, 
London, Tokyo’ model to act in the formation of global configurations and different 
globalisms. Roy and Ong identify three ‘styles of being global’: modeling, inter-
referencing practices and new solidarities. Worlding practices serve as urban models 
	40	
from one city to another where there is a concrete acknowledgement of a city’s 
achievements. Inter-referencing alludes to and aspires to certain practices from one 
city in another, and new solidarities are practices that use public-private partnerships to 
shape new styles of urban governance (14-21). These practices can also ‘exceed the 
domain of governing and transnational elites’ (McCann et al, 2013: 585) through 
practices such as migration and trade.  
 However, worlding practices can certainly be problematic, including in the case 
of interventions in and from Arab and Muslim countries. The wealth and novelty 
originating in the Gulf region and exported abroad have come to signify a certain 
anxiety towards Arab development and advancement. Using Dubai as the model, Roy 
explains, ‘Dubai, a desert frontier of speculation and calculation, circulates as a global 
referent. But in both academic and popular discourses, it is narrated through modes of 
hysteria, a worlding practice that signals anxieties about Arab wealth and power’ (2011: 
314). The extravagance and novelty of such constructions, both in Arab countries and 
abroad, have become a caricature. Looking at such interventions in Sarajevo as they 
inter-reference practices from Arab states in the Gulf, it will be important to remain 
aware of this hysteria and to trace the connections and actors to understand the 
processes taking place.  
 
2.3 Transnationality 
 The dawn of the twenty-first century has risen in conjunction with incredible 
changes in the flows of information, technology and cultural forms around the world. 
Although such exchanges are not necessarily new, having existed in eras of great 
development such as in the nineteenth century (Dicken, 2011: 6), the degree of the 
contemporary world’s connections and linkages has never previously existed. The 
time-space compression of what has been labelled ‘globalisation’ is a phenomenon of 
rapid-paced transfers of goods, people, ideas and technology across borders around 
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the world, including transfers of capital and ideas between Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and other countries in Western Europe, North America, the Middle East, Asia, Africa 
and Oceania. Yet the term globalisation itself has become too vast for analytical 
purposes, and many assumptions about the nature of these transfers eliminate the 
complexity of the phenomena occurring. In order to gauge how new constructions 
originating in the Muslim world are shaping the urban landscape of Sarajevo, a more 
nuanced interpretation of these flows highlighting cultural hybridity and heterogeneity 
must be taken into account. Although the networks and actors involved in such flows 
must be traced to analyse the specificity of the phenomena taking place in BiH, the 
literature on globalisation and transnationality highlights a number of more general 
processes taking place worldwide.  
 Globalisation has been analysed across multiple different academic disciplines, 
generating various definitions for the term, but throughout most of the literature, three 
main arenas for the study of global or transnational flows have emerged: the economic, 
the political and the cultural (Ong, 1999: 5; Short, 2006: 63; Sassen, 2005: 3; Thorns, 
2002: 85-86). While many scholars have focused on the economic aspect of these 
processes, especially the power of global capitalism vis-à-vis the nation-state (see, for 
example, Beck, 2003 and Strange, 1996), transnational flows are certainly not limited 
to economics, and they often involve significant implications for cultural forms around 
the globe. Many of the definitions of the term globalisation carry similar meanings, and 
the majority seem to agree that globalisation is an intensification of global processes or 
the ‘flows’ (Castells, 2010) of capital, goods, ideas and people across time and space, 
connecting networks and cultures.  
 Yet the term globalisation in its ubiquity has lost much of its analytical value. 
Globalisation focuses mostly on the capital flows that are not anchored in territorial 
states, exceeding the control of governments. According to Ulrich Beck (2003), 
‘Globalization denotes the processes through which sovereign national states are criss-
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crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, 
orientations, identities and networks’ (11). In Sarajevo, the capital flows between BiH 
and Muslim countries transcend the state and exist within the realm of globalisation. 
However, globalisation in this economic sense is not the only force at work. In order to 
overcome this analytical hurdle, some scholars have theorised concepts such as 
‘transnational’ and ‘translocal’ to describe different facets of the contemporary age’s 
time-space compression. For example, Michael Peter Smith (2001) specifies that the 
difference between globalisation and transnationalism is the role of the state. He sees 
globalisation as ‘largely decentred from specific national territories’, but he believes 
transnational processes are ‘anchored in while also transcending one or more nation-
states’ (3). Peter Mandaville (2007) elaborates on this concept and decouples the 
governments and territories, stating that ‘transnational refers to a wider range of social 
formations and transactions which are structured across the borders and spaces of 
nations, but which do not necessarily entail a primary role for sovereign governments’ 
(276). This definition allows for non-nation-state-bound groups and cultures to act 
within these processes. 
 The literature on globalisation and transnationalism is vast, and because these 
processes continue to shape the world in which we live, a constant reformation of 
concepts and competition between these perspectives exist on a large scale. Murray 
Fraser (2013) has developed five myths or fallacies about globalisation, which 
summarise much of the past and current debates surrounding the issue across 
disciplines. To Fraser, the five fallacies are: 1. the economic fallacy (that globalisation 
is all about capitalism and global markets); 2. the homogenisation fallacy (that 
globalisation is creating a homogenous world order or ‘McWorld’ (Barber, 1992)); 3. the 
origination fallacy (that the processes are about ‘Americanisation’ or ‘Westernisation’); 
4. the novelty fallacy (that globalisation is a completely new phenomenon – the current 
acceleration of these processes rests on ‘centuries-old structures of world trade and 
	 43	
imperial conquest’); and 5. the technological fallacy (that globalisation is driven by 
information flows – technology ‘can only ever be a concretisation of existing social 
relations, never a major driver in itself’) (387-388).  
For the city of Sarajevo, the economic fallacy, the homogenisation fallacy and 
the origination fallacy will prove quite important, as transnational flows in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are creating new cultural forms and cultural and spatial hybridity, and 
many of these flows are not originating in North America or Western Europe, but rather 
in the Middle East and in Asia. In short, globalisation and transnationalism are 
processes that ‘breed hybridity’ (Short, 2006: 62) but that also produce emergent 
cultural forms in their transactions and connections (Mandaville, 2003; Ong, 1999 and 
2011; Tsing, 2005). Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (2005) describes how emergent cultural 
forms develop from global encounters in her book Friction. She argues that: ‘Cultures 
are continually co-produced in the interactions I call “Friction”: the awkward, unequal, 
unstable and creative qualities of interconnection across difference’ (4). It is at this 
meeting point of encounters between diverse actors that new formations of culture and 
power develop. She believes, however, that this production of new cultural forms can 
go both ways, not simply informing new situated emergent cultural formations, but also 
global cultural formations.  
 By highlighting the hybridity and novelty created through transnational flows, 
binaries such as ‘global’ versus ‘local’ or ‘West’ versus ‘rest’ become problematic and 
hinder the understanding of the complex transactions and exchanges produced in 
these processes. Many scholars, such as Tim Edensor and Mark Jayne (2012), Murray 
Fraser (2013), Aihwa Ong (2011), and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (2005), have similarly 
underlined the necessity to back away from simplifying dichotomies. Murray Fraser 
explains: 
  Globalization can thus be conceived as a field in which a multitude of 
  actors and agencies are constantly operating, rather than the linear 
  process with unmediated flows of influence under ‘classic’ imperialism. 
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  This suggests a cultural model that rejects binary divisions such as 
  centre/periphery, global/regional or global/local – or indeed any notion 
  that a single ethnic group or country can hold some kind of truth which 
  they then ‘diffuse’ or ‘disseminate’ to others via colonisation or other 
  means. Instead, what do exist are complex trans-cultural networks of 
  exchange in which any attempt to posit a hierarchy is futile. The result of 
  all this, as many observers point out, is that the defining basis of  
  globalization is the hybrid. Above all, global hybridity creates and also 
  thrives in a condition which is heterogenic, fluid and fissured (390). 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, transnational flows are creating emergent and hybrid 
cultural forms that cannot be boxed into categories of ‘global’ or ‘local’ or ‘Western’ or 
otherwise. These processes are much too intricate to reduce to binaries and require 
more sophisticated analyses that trace the specific actors and processes taking place.  
 The collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia and the ensuing war brought numerous 
actors from around the world in the form of foreign journalists, NGOs, foreign fighters 
(mujahideen), NATO and EU forces and others. Additionally, as a post-socialist state, 
the implementation of neoliberal practices and privatisation after the war created an 
atmosphere ripe for foreign direct investment, which has also drawn investors and 
entrepreneurs from around the globe. There are Turkish Universities operating in 
English and shopping centres financed from the Persian Gulf housing the offices of Al 
Jazeera’s Balkan Service. A strikingly large international presence in Sarajevo has 
characterised the city since the siege, and all of these flows of people, goods, capital 
and ideas – far from ‘Westernising’ the country – are producing hybrid and emergent 
cultural forms and novel ways of viewing the city, its spaces and its inhabitants.  
 
2.4 Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 In the decades following the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War of the 1990s, scholars have investigated the issue of 
identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina nearly to excess. However, at the same time that 
the body of literature surrounding identity in BiH and in the former Yugoslavia has 
become unwieldy, the concept of identity in the region itself has simultaneously been 
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flattened and reduced to its most basic, ethno-religious components (Robinson and 
Pobrić, 2006: 248). There is more to identity in the Balkans than the bounded ethno-
religious categories that have developed, especially as these groups blend into one 
another and new cultural forms emerge. Historically, BiH’s three main religious groups 
developed after the Ottoman occupation of the region and mass conversions to Islam 
in the fifteenth century. After this time, the majority of people in what is today Bosnia 
and Herzegovina subscribed to one of the three main religious confessions in the 
region: Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, although a large Jewish population 
also existed in the area after their expulsion from the Iberian peninsula during the 
Spanish Inquisition. Religion and politics have become intertwined at numerous points 
in Bosnia’s history, making national belonging, which often coincides with confessional 
association, the main focus point for identity in the Balkans. This also logically follows 
from the separation of and the conflicts between the three ethno-religious groups 
before and during the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia. Because of the flattening of 
identity politics in BiH and the reduction of belonging to the three official nationalities – 
Catholic Croat, Muslim Bošnjak and Christian Orthodox Serb – a more critical 
assessment of identity construction in the country is needed in order to understand the 
influence of urban interventions on subjectivities, especially within the context of the 
city of Sarajevo.  
 Identity is a complex and fluid construction, one that involves many overlapping 
and conflicting notions of the self and others (Markowitz, 2010: 13; Ong, 1999: 20). In 
fact, Michel Foucault would argue that no person has a ‘real’ identity, but rather that 
identity is a production of discourses about one’s self that is constantly being produced 
and may shift and change over time, even significantly (Hall, 2000). The construction of 
one’s identity, including the group identities to which he or she belongs, can also be 
viewed through the exclusion of the other and differences between individuals or 
groups (Smith, 2001). However, identity is not solely established through the presence 
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of an external other, but it is also based on negotiations and contestations within 
communities (Mandaville, 2003: 106). Groups may propagate essentialising notions of 
themselves, reducing their own self-identity to fixed categories and eliminating any 
hybridity or complexity (Ibid.: 40). Because identity in the Bosnian context is so often 
only linked to ethno-religious belonging, literature frequently highlights Benedict 
Anderson’s (2006) idea of ‘imagined’ communities, which allows for the construction of 
group sameness and harks back to the development of nationalism in the eighteenth 
century along with the Enlightenment (see, for example, Hayden, 2007). While ethno-
religious identity is indeed an important indicator in the ex-Yugoslav space, it is not 
always stable (neither internally nor externally) and it is by no means the sole 
component of belonging. Additionally, in urban contexts, other social categories 
regularly become more salient determinants of identification.   
 Religious practices, notably in Sarajevo, have also historically tended to blur 
boundaries, even between Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. People officially 
belonging to one of the three constituent faiths sometimes pray and visit other religious 
edifices or adopt customs or rituals pertaining to different belief systems. A newspaper 
article from 2008 recounted the story of an old Muslim Sarajevan who frequently 
entered the Catholic cathedral to pray to St. Ante, as she believed in St. Ante’s healing 
powers (Jestrović, 2013: 189). These ‘Sarajevan beliefs’ – the crossing over between 
different faiths and sites of worship – are not exclusive to Sarajevo, but can be found in 
many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the greater Balkans, including Albania, 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro (Duijzings, 2000: 2).  
 Yet identity in BiH cannot and should not be limited to religious belonging, no 
matter how blurred and unstable it may become. By focusing on the three constituent 
religious communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the identity politics that have 
been and continue to be played out in the public sphere, group identities that still hold 
currency, particularly among older generations and mixed families, become silenced. 
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Specifically, many people continue to define themselves as either (or both) Yugoslav 
and/or Bosanac (a person from Bosnia and Herzegovina, encompassing all ethno-
religious variants). When BiH became a republic of Socialist Yugoslavia, official 
discourses developed an overarching Yugoslav identity throughout the entire country. 
Most citizens at this time assumed compound identities, which embraced both ethno-
religious affiliation and the socialist Yugoslav belonging (Robinson, Engelstoft and 
Pobrić, 2001: 961). Being a Yugoslav meant adopting anti-fascist and socialist ideals, 
often being entwined with the common South Slav language, at that time referred to as 
Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian (even though languages such as Albanian, 
Slovenian and Macedonian were also widely spoken in the country). Although the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist, the Yugoslav identity 
cultivated during its forty-seven-year life remains an important marker of belonging for 
many, especially among diaspora populations (Moll, 2013: 2).  
 In addition to the Yugoslav identity, the identity of Bosanac (Bosnian) bridges 
the fractious nationalist landscape in the country. Not to be confused with the term 
Bošnjak, which refers to Muslims, Bosanac transcends nationalist identity discourses 
and incorporates all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of faith or 
descent. This idea of belonging stems from the shared culture and history of living in 
BiH, which separated the people of BiH from the other republics of Yugoslavia. In 
Socialist Yugoslavia, Croats and Serbs in their respective republics commonly 
distanced themselves culturally and dialectically from Bosnian Croats and Bosnian 
Serbs, while at the same time, Muslims in Bosnia did not always identify with Muslims 
in other areas of Yugoslavia, including the Sandžak. Thus an overarching Bosanac 
identity allowed for the unification of all the people of the republic based on shared 
narratives, culture and history. While being Bosanac granted the children of mixed 
marriages a neutral space for belonging, often people who identified as Bosanac during 
	48	
the Socialist period did so in addition to ethno-religious affiliation, allowing for multi-
layered and complex concepts of identity (Hromadžić, 2013: 266).  
 In spite of the official Yugoslav discourse that urged a common identity based 
on anti-fascism and socialist values, the Yugoslav constitution created ‘bureaucratised 
nationalism’, officially entrenching ethno-religious differences (Robinson, Engelstoft 
and Pobrić, 2001: 961). Beginning around the 1970s when Muslims were allowed to 
identify as such on the census, these tensions began to grow, causing a steady 
homogenisation in identity politics throughout Socialist Yugoslavia. This 
homogenisation was marked by a 26.5% decrease in census numbers of people 
identifying as Yugoslav between 1981 and 1991 (Ibid.). With economic crisis and 
power struggles between the country’s leadership after Tito’s death, nationalism rose 
significantly, eventually leading to violent conflict along ethnic lines, particularly in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The post-Dayton political atmosphere, which has separated 
the country into ethno-religiously defined entities, has, unfortunately, only exacerbated 
these tendencies. Almost 90% of Bosnians and Herzegovinians live in religiously 
homogenous communities, which is a result of Dayton and official identity discourses 
(Robinson Pobrić, 2006: 248). In Sarajevo (excluding East Sarajevo which forms part of 
the Republika Srpska), the population is officially 80% Muslim.  
 Driving the official homogenisation of the country is the narrowly defined census 
categories. While the pre-war Yugoslav censuses listed at least twenty identities, 
including Yugoslav, Roma, Jew and others, the post-war census lists only four 
categories: Croat, Bošnjak, Serb and Ostali (remaining). Anecdotal evidence, 
especially in Sarajevo, suggests that other groups have not disappeared, but rather 
have been absorbed into the four official categories. Fran Markowitz’s (2010) analysis 
of identity in Sarajevo shows that census takers have reacted to unexpected diversity 
by squeezing such outliers into one of the four census groups, surprisingly not always 
Ostali. For example, Markowitz describes how a Czech woman living in Sarajevo 
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officially became a Croat on the census, since Czech people are Catholic and Catholic 
equals Croat (2010: 89). Similar processes occurred with the Roma population, who 
counted as Bošnjak because of their Islamic faith. Markowitz and others continue to 
argue for the ‘multicultural’ nature or ‘subconscious’ (Jestrović, 2013: 186) of Sarajevo, 
claiming that official homogenisation obscures the actual plurality of the city and of the 
country as a whole. The reality surrounding identification in BiH and, especially in 
Sarajevo, remains complex, multilayered and heterogeneous.  
 Looking beyond ethno-religious belonging and identity scholarship focusing on 
such categories, Sarajevo itself as an urban centre becomes a locus of multiplicity, not 
just regarding ethnicity and nationality, but also through markers based on other 
sources of social differentiation. Within the urban context, differentiation and 
compartmentalisation of various levels of identity become a ‘vial ingredient of the urban 
experience’ (Short, 2006: 9). Identity and its enactment function differently in the city 
than in rural areas, not simply because the population may contain more officially 
diverse populations, but because the anonymity of the city allows for individuals to play 
a variety of different roles in different contexts (Ibid.: 38). Ulf Hannerz’s Exploring the 
City (1980) examines ethnography in the city and the significant difference between 
ethnographic research in urban centres and in the countryside. Hannerz pays special 
attention to the fluid and shifting nature of identity in the urban context, focusing not 
only an individual’s different roles, but also on his or her changing relationships and 
networks (270). This underlines the multiple and varied roles and conceptions of self 
that urban dwellers develop depending on the different activities that they engage in 
during the day. He posits that an anthropology of the city, not just in the city, is possible 
by examining the interrelationships between the different roles that individuals perform 
and the networks in which they are engaged. Thus living in the city is distinctly different 
than living in the countryside in that each individual must construct multiple layers of 
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identity and ‘roles’ which will be presented at different times and to different audiences 
and networks.  
 With these ideas in mind, investigating identity in Sarajevo must go further than 
simply counting the number of Croats, Bošnjaks and Serbs inhabiting the city; it must 
also take into account the multiple roles that individuals assume and trace these 
networks. Social characteristics outside of ethno-religious affiliation, such as socio-
economic class, gender, sexual orientation, age and hybrid forms of some or all of 
these can not only reflect, but also shape, urban culture (Short, 2006: 47). For 
example, the city of Sarajevo has a long history of divisions pertaining to urban and 
rural origin (Stefansson, 2007: 59-77). Sarajevans have historically tried to maintain a 
cosmopolitan, ‘cultured’ and European image, excluding more conservative and 
traditional ‘peasants’ and people from the countryside, although these categories, too, 
become blurred and unstable. In fact there is a long history of a civic identity based on 
belonging to the city itself. The people from Sarajevo are referred to as Sarajlije 
(Sarajevans), and according to Emily Greble (2011) this civic identity is often more 
important than ethno-religious belonging. Discussing interwar Sarajevo, she states: 
Uniting these communities was a larger civic identity that had also 
cemented over several generations: that of the Sarajlije – or Sarajevans. 
Unlike residents of some of interwar Europe’s other multicultural cities, 
where such identities survived mainly in the hearts and souls of minority 
groups left out of nationalizing programs, in Sarajevo members of every 
confessional background still felt a personal, almost familial connection 
to their hometown… For many intellectuals, the connection to Sarajevo 
encompassed and reflected the qualities and values associated with 
cities generally – cosmopolitanism, sophistication, urbanity, civility and 
modernity (15-16).  
 
The civic identity of Sarajevo – the Sarajlije – still exists in the minds of the residents of 
the city. However, since the war in the 1990s the mass arrival of internally displaced 
people has increased the tension between urbanites and newcomers. ‘Native’ 
Sarajevans see these arrivals from the countryside as invaders, exiling the true locals 
abroad. The urban/rural divide is just one of the many different social identifiers at work 
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in Sarajevo’s urban fabric, necessitating a more critical analysis of identification in the 
city.  
 
2.4.1 Ethnography and Identity  
 Ethnographers of the region have shown how various notions of belonging, 
often outside of ethno-religious belonging, have been mobilised by the populations of 
the ex-Yugoslav region for identity construction. In these works, the ethnographers 
focus on how such ideas of belonging are constructed and employed and how these 
discourses then serve to reify or destabilise essentialised versions of identity politics. 
For example, a number of ethnographers have demonstrated how entrenched the 
urban/rural divide is when considering notions of identity in the ex-Yugoslav space. Stef 
Jansen has written extensively about ‘evocations of cosmopolitanism’ in the former 
Yugoslavia and its prominence in identity discourses in the region, especially as a 
reaction to rising ethno-nationalism (Jansen, 2005a, 2005b and 2008). In his works, 
urban dwellers mobilise notions of ‘cosmopolitanism’ as an opposition to rising 
‘hegemonising nationalisms’. In these studies, Jansen shows that city dwellers define 
their urban identities counter to newcomer, nationalist ‘peasants’ (2005a and 2005b), 
and this allows them to subvert the rising tide of ethno-nationalist politics by ‘othering’ 
these newcomer ‘peasants’ who engaged in the nationalist discourses. Bojan Bilić and 
Paul Stubbs (2015) also discuss the urban/rural divide in the post-Yugoslav space, 
arguing that ‘a line needs to be drawn between “real” rural-urban differences in former 
Yugoslavia and the “symbolic” ways these have been reinscribed as both causes and 
consequences of the wars of the Yugoslav succession’ (120). Similarly, Xavier 
Bougarel has written about the ‘Revenge of the countryside’ (1999), showing how ideas 
were mobilised that painted besieging forces as uncultured newcomers (157).  
 Outside of the urban/rural divide, another binary often mobilised for identity 
construction in the ex-Yugoslav space and in BiH in particular is the East/West binary. 
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For example, Xavier Bougarel (1999) shows that notions of East and West have been 
mobilised to differentiate Serb and Croat populations in the former Yugoslav space. He 
highlights how this notion has been employed, stating ‘in their opinion, the war in 
Croatia is a mere confrontation between two cultural areas, the Western and Catholic 
one, represented by the Croats and Slovenes, and the Eastern and Orthodox one, 
represented by the Serbs and Montenegrins.’ (160). In Sarajevo, specifically, this 
binary is often mobilised for identitarian purposes, focusing on Islam as ‘eastern’. 
Elissa Helms (2008) discusses this notion in her article ‘East and West Kiss: Gender, 
Orientalism, and Balkanism in Muslim-Majority Bosnia-Herzegovina’. In this article, she 
shows how the ideas of a ‘superior west and a backward east’ have been employed for 
identitarian politics, reaffirming ‘such dichotomous representations, masking a much 
greater complexity of global, regional, and local dynamics at play’ (90). Helms 
discusses the ‘pattern of “nesting orientalisms” in what was Yugoslavia, in which 
members of one nation have attempted to portray themselves as 
superior/western/European while casting their southern and eastern neighbours as part 
of the inferior, oriental “east”’ (91). Thus, identity discourses in the former Yugoslav 
space and in BiH employ ideas of ‘East’ and ‘West’ in order to convey specific notions 
about oneself and one’s community.  
 As a continuation of the East/West binary employed for identity discourses, 
Xavier Bougarel (2008) has shown that while Islam may be seen as part of the ‘East’ 
through the nesting orientalisms of the former Yugoslavia, within the Bosnian Muslim 
community itself, the idea of ‘European’ Islam is employed as a way to distinguish the 
Islamic tradition in Bosnia from other, ‘less tolerant’ variants. He states that:  
  The will to present Bosnian Islam as a sort of positive cultural exception 
  sometimes entails a conception of this ‘European and tolerant’ Islam as 
  homogeneous and sui generis, set in opposition to another, implicit 
  Islam, considered ‘intolerant since non-European’, which is located 
  beyond the Bosporus and the Strait of Gibraltar, or represented by the 
  ‘non-autochthonous’ Muslim populations living in Western Europe (97).  
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Ethnography, again, in this case shows how the construction of identity in the former 
Yugoslav space and in BiH in particular is much more complex than a strict adherence 
to ethno-religious nationalisms and their politics.  
 In general, many works on the anthropology of post-socialism in the former 
Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have shown that the salience of 
entho-religious belonging dissovles in many everyday contexts. For example, Stef 
Jansen’s work Yearnings in the Meantime (2015), which is an ethnography of the lives 
of residents in the Dobrinja neighbourhood of Sarajevo, goes beyond questions of 
ethno-national identity. Jansen state, ‘I contend that a focus on identiarian questions, 
important as they are, fails to account for very important dimensions of life in Sarajevo 
or, for that matter, BiH (11). Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and Ger Duijzings (eds) 
make similar claims in their book The New Bosnian Mosaic (2008). They state in the 
introduction that, ‘our intention...is to show that local-level realities defy reduction to 
such simple categories. It is not enough to presume that ethnic nationalism informs 
every aspect of Bosnian political and social life’ (19). Stef Jansen, Čarna Brković and 
Vanja Čelebičić (2017) also argue that the contribution of ethnographic studies of the 
former Yugoslavia (especially BiH) is that they go beyond the ‘identitarian matrix’. They 
explain that:  
  It is here that ethnographic studies have made their first important 
  intervention in knowledge production about BiH. Aiming to subvert 
  dominant representations of lives in the country, many of them  
  contributed to the deconstruction of the ethnonational identitarian matrix 
  as the primary one through which to understand all things Bosnian. (8) 
 
Thus, by looking at the realities of everyday life in BiH, the focus on ethno-religious 
identification can be shifted to other notions of belonging, which, in many cases, can be 
more salient to the populations involved.  
 Like these works of ethnography in the ex-Yugoslav space, in order to gauge 
the importance of new urban interventions on the population of the city, complex 
constructions of identity must be taken into account, especially outside of ethno-
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religious belonging. New forms of Islam, especially those espousing stricter moral and 
behavioural codes than those traditionally found in Sarajevo, could find more willing 
audiences in certain socio-economic classes. Other interventions could bring out 
senses of Yugoslav or Bosanac belonging amongst the population, and hybrid or 
multilayered forms of identity might allow for greater acceptance of new cultural forms 
and spaces. By understanding that urban populations maintain a multiplicity of roles, 
which they perform to different networks and audiences, the plurality of the urban fabric 
can be maintained. Sarajevo has always been a multi-ethnic city, and even though 
identity politics in the country have officially homogenised the urban centre, intricate 
and multilayered conceptions of self and others are not only possible but also apparent 
in the city. How individuals interact with architecture and public places and how these 
interventions affect their lives depends not only on ethno-religious affiliation, but also 
on education, origin, gender, sexual orientation and affiliation with various networks 
outside of the established faith-based communities. Simplifying and flattening identity in 
Sarajevo will not accurately reflect the intricate processes at work in the city and will 
only serve to continue the focus on ethnicity that is so prevalent in scholarship on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
2.5 Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 Because the urban interventions studied in this dissertation emanate from the 
Muslim world and are tied to the Islamic community in BiH, a brief evaluation of Islam in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina will help situate the new buildings within a greater religious 
context. Islam in BiH proves to be far from a monolithic entity, and this heterogeneity 
extends throughout the Muslim world. In fact, the diversity and plurality of Islam 
worldwide makes speaking of it as a singular religion quite difficult. There is no 
‘universal’ Islam, and many believe that it is more accurate to speak of ‘Islams’ in the 
plural rather than of one Islam. When speaking of multiple ‘Islams’, however, the 
	 55	
underlying unity of Muslim community worldwide, the umma, may be lost. Because of 
this unity and because most Muslims see themselves as belonging to a single Islam 
despite its diversity (Mandaville, 2003: 55-56), I will refer to Islam in the singular as a 
‘master signifier’ for the entire spectrum of Islams in existence (Ibid.).  
 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the traditional and dominant form of Islam follows 
the Hanafi Madhab (school of legal thought) within Sunni Islam, which was practiced 
widely throughout the region of the Ottoman Empire, and which continues to be 
practiced throughout Central Asia, India, Pakistan and Turkey (Karčić, 2010a). The 
Hanafi Madhab holds less fundamental beliefs than other schools of Islamic legal 
thought, such as the very conservative Hanbali Madhab found in Saudi Arabia. The 
Hanafi school is notable for its recognition and acceptance of personal opinion as well 
as for its lack of precedent (Hanafiyah). Although Islam in BiH has traditionally followed 
the Hanafi Madhab, plurality has always existed within Islam in the Balkans and in BiH, 
and there have long been influences from Shi’i groups and Sufi orders.  
 Islam first came to the region of today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina around the 
tenth or eleventh centuries when tribes from Asia began to settle in the region. 
However, mass conversion to Islam only occurred after the Ottoman conquest of the 
Balkan Peninsula in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Although some have argued 
that the Christian population of South East Europe was forced to convert to Islam at 
this time, the process was probably more complex and multiform prompted by the 
heightened social and economic status of the converted. The Ottomans did not 
regularly practice forced conversions, except for the system of child levy, or devshirme, 
in which Christian boys were taken from their families, converted to Islam and ‘trained 
as soldiers in the elite Janissary troops’ (Merdjanova, 2013: 2). In the late nineteenth 
century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied Bosnia. Under their rule, the Islamic 
Community was established to oversee all Muslim affairs in the territory, including the 
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religious hierarchy, Islamic education, shari’ah courts and religious endowments (Ibid., 
30).  
 Islam in BiH changed significantly after the Second World War with the socialist 
suppression of religious institutions, including the IZ. For the two decades following its 
establishment, the socialist government abolished the shari’ah courts, nationalised the 
religious endowments, banned the veil and closed almost all of the madrassas, or 
Islamic schools, except for the Gazi Husrev-Begova madrassa in Sarajevo (Schwartz, 
2002: 83; and Merdjanova, 2013: 31). The new government persecuted and 
imprisoned religious scholars and active members of all the religious communities, and 
some were even sentenced to death (Karčić, 2010b). 
 After two decades, due to changing foreign and domestic policies, especially 
the establishment of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 and a decentralisation of 
the state, the Yugoslav government began to liberalise its attitudes toward religion in 
the country. This liberalisation caused a revival of religious belonging in Yugoslavia, 
including within the Islamic community. The Non-Aligned Movement, which counted 
numerous countries in the Muslim world as partners, allowed far-reaching cooperation 
between Yugoslavia and the Middle East and Asia. Contracts between alliance 
partners and Yugoslavia permitted many Bosnian Muslims to work and study in other 
Muslim countries, and this flow of people and information between Yugoslavia and the 
greater Muslim world nurtured a revival of Islam in Bosnia (Bringa, 2002: 31). The re-
emergence of Islam in BiH also occurred at the same time as a global move toward 
Islamism (‘forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the 
establishment of an Islamic political order’ (Mandaville, 2007: 57)). In the 1970s, Islam 
became a powerful ‘social and political force’ globally (Merdjanova, 2013: 32), which is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Islamic Revival’, and which coincided with the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 (Mandaville, 2007: 58). The Bosnian Islamic revival similarly 
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intensified during this period, spurred by ideas from the greater Muslim community and 
by the importance of Islam within the NAM.  
 In BiH, these forces translated into a reopening of Islamic institutions and the 
reparation and reconstruction of mosques and other religious edifices, of which the IZ 
was granted control. Religious education both within and outside Bosnia expanded at 
this time, and madrassas and the Faculty of Islamic Studies opened their doors once 
again in the 1970s (Merdjanova, 2013: 32). Politically, as well, Islam emerged as a 
force within the country, bolstered by Alija Izetbegović and other Muslim intellectuals 
and pan-Islamic activists. Izetbegović even penned his Islamic Declaration, calling for 
an Islamic renewal in 1970, for which he was imprisoned in 1983 (Ibid., 33). The IZ in 
the 60s and 70s aligned closely with the priorities of the state, especially with its 
involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement, and it became the voice of all practicing 
and non-practicing Muslims within Yugoslavia. Yet during this time, Islam in BiH 
remained diverse, and according to Husrev Tabak (2017), ‘while the official Islam was 
represented by the Islamic Community, the popular Islam was, however, by [sic] the 
religio-political intellectuals (such as the members of Mladi Muslimani/Young Muslims 
[a pan-Islamist organisation]), the local clerics and Sufi orders (300).  
 The Islamic revival in BiH corresponded with growing nationalism in the country, 
and within the IZ, a national belonging linked to Islam began to take shape. This 
national identity based on Muslim heritage did not insist on the religiosity of its people, 
and an entire ‘imagined community’ developed as a counter Croat and Serb 
nationalisms. Although Muslim nationalism in BiH first came into being during the 
interwar period, it only gained official status in 1971 when Muslims could identify as 
‘Muslim in the national sense’ on the census (Merdjanova, 2013: 36). However, this 
category excluded Turkish, Roma and Albanian Muslims while including atheists of 
Muslim descent, creating the ‘understanding of Islam as a nationality or nation’ (Ibid.). 
According to Ina Merdjanova, ‘the Muslim nation was established primarily as a means 
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of countering Serbian and Croatian nationalist claims on Muslim Slavs, but also with a 
view of foreign policy interests regarding the Muslim countries in the Non-Aligned 
Movement (Ibid.). Because of its semi-privileged position vis-à-vis Yugoslavia’s foreign 
interests, the state recognised Muslims as a national category. In 1990, with the 
backing of the IZ, Alija Izetbegović and other pan-Islamists founded the Party of 
Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije or SDA), a pan-Islamist party 
representing Bosnian Muslims. In 1993, Bosnian Muslims took the national appellation 
Bošnjak instead of Muslim. Other Muslim populations in Serbia, Croatia and 
Montenegro also eventually adopted this ethnonym (Ibid., 37).  
 Throughout this process, foreign Islamic ideas continued to spread within the 
Balkans. Muslim Yugoslav students studying abroad in NAM countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, Indonesia and Malaysia brought differing interpretations of Islam back to 
Yugoslavia and transmitted these ideas amongst their communities (Karčić, 2010b). 
Although the flow of non-traditional practices intensified from the 1960s through the 
1980s, new Islamic interpretations from the global Muslim world came to an apex 
during the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation and the war in Bosnia during the 
1990s. At this time, a wave of people and organisations originating in Muslim countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt entered Bosnian territory ostensibly with the goal 
of aiding co-religionists. Many of the people who arrived in BiH did so with the intention 
of fighting on the front lines. These foreign Muslim combatants – the mujahideen – 
arrived specifically to fight jihad for the umma. This group of fighters, importantly, was 
not homogeneous, but many believed in more conservative and stringent 
interpretations of Islam (Ibid.). Islamic charitable organisations, such as the 
International Islamic Council for Da’wah and Relief, also came to BiH during the war. 
This foreign presence in the form of the mujahideen and the Islamic charitable 
organisations sometimes proselytised different interpretations of Islam and searched 
for converts within the Bosnian Muslim population. Although most of these people and 
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organisations left with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, some did remain 
and continued to proselytise, including the youth organisations Active Islamic Youth 
and al-Furqan (Bougarel, 2001: 454 and Karčić, 2010a: 165). Notably, a marginal, but 
evident, Salafi movement has been established in contemporary Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
 Today a large body of literature exists on the Salafi movement in the Balkans, 
especially in relation to extremist movements (see, for example, Deliso, 2007; 
Morrison, 2008; and Shay, 2007). However many other forms of Islam exist alongside 
the dominant Hanafi school and the marginal Salafi groups. It is worth noting that 
salafism follows the Hanbali Madhab, whose tenets include a literal interpretation of the 
Qur’an and Hadith for legal decisions and a rejection of personal opinion (Hanabilah). 
This type of conservative Islam is mostly found in Saudi Arabia today, although Salafi 
movements exist throughout the world. The term Wahhabi (Vehabi in Bosnian), is 
sometimes used synonymously with Salafi, however it has pejorative connotations, 
making its employment in scholarly texts somewhat problematic. The Salafi community 
in BiH lack the support of the majority of Bosnian Muslims, especially after the 11 
September 2001 and the attack on the American Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011. 
Importantly, while the existence of extremist movements associated with the Salafi 
community exist in BiH, these individuals represent a very small minority.  
 Outside these transnational movements of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
some scholars have discussed Islam in BiH as a ‘European Islam’, meaning a form of 
Islam that exists within a secular state and is ostensibly more tolerant (Bourgarel, 2008; 
Van Dijk and Bartels, 2012 and Jevtić, 2017). Van Dijk and Bartles ask, ‘whether a 
“local” variant of Islam is emerging in Europe, distinct from Islamic traditions found in 
other parts of the world, and whether we can call this a real “European Islam”’ (467-
468). They conclude that a form of this ‘European Islam’ surviving within a secular state 
exists in practice in Sarajevo (480). Jana Jevtić (2017), however, argues for a more 
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multiform understanding of Bosnia’s Islamic tradition outside the ‘European and 
tolerant’ model, which flattens the internal diversity of Islam as it is practiced in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. She concludes that, ‘Muslims act as a fragmented rather than a 
unified group… [different internal factions] structure their campaigns on the back of 
Europe’s ontological relevance and express them in relation to an array of postwar 
“newcomers”’ (74). While the concept of ‘European Islam’ remains present in BiH, and 
as show in the section above is mobilised as an identity marker against other forms of 
‘intolerant’ Islam (Bougarel, 2008: 97), the true nature of Islam in the country continues 
to be diverse and hybrid. 
 Like Islam globally, urban interventions in Sarajevo that have been financed by 
Muslim groups and states are similarly plural in form, originating from many different 
areas of the world and advancing various interpretations of Islam. Religious edifices 
that have been built since the war include mosques from Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan and Kuwait. Often actors from the donor countries choose the imams of these 
mosques, allowing for a certain amount of control over the teachings they advance. A 
new Sufi tekke, which was finalised in 2013, has also been constructed primarily with 
Turkish funds from the municipality of Seljuk, and the new headquarters for the Islamic 
Community received funding from Libya. However, the building remains unfinished, as 
funding abruptly ceased after the revolution in 2011 that ousted Colonel Gaddafi. 
Secular projects, too, receive financing from the greater Muslim world. A complex of 
condominiums built with Malaysian resources sits outside of the Marijin Dvor quarter of 
the city, and there are two very large shopping malls – the BBI Centre and the Sarajevo 
City Centre – which have been built with Gulf (Saudi and UAE) funding and which will 
serve as case studies later in this dissertation. There are multiple agendas at play with 
these constructions, both from local actors as well as from foreign investors, and these 
interests clash and work in harmony at various stages and within different networks.   
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2.6 Conclusion  
 This literature review has focused on a diverse set of concepts from multiple 
different fields. Collectively, it argues for an inter-disciplinary and multi-faceted 
approach in understanding different phenomena present in urban environments and 
within identity as it relates to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the currents of Islam 
practiced in Sarajevo. As capital from the Arab States of the Gulf move into the country 
for urban investments, looking toward hybridity of new cultural and global forms will 
allow for a more nuanced understanding of the processes taking place in the city, 
outside of bounded categories. Such conceptions support the existence of multiple 
realities existing simultaneously within the urban landscape, defying binaries such as 
sacred and secular, East and West, and global and local. In the following chapters, I 
will use these ideas to underscore my empirical data and analyse how transnational 
flows of capital, people and ideas are shaping the post-conflict redevelopment of 
Sarajevo and the reactions of the city’s residents to such flows.  
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3. Research and the Muslim City: Studying Spatial Development and Global 
Flows of Capital in Sarajevo 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Studying complex social, economic and political processes at work in the city 
poses the following questions: how do researchers examine, analyse and measure 
such dynamic flows and networks, especially in an urban context? What are the best 
ways to investigate such phenomena? In this chapter, I will discuss the research 
activities I undertook to analyse urban processes in Sarajevo, the rationale behind my 
choice of methods and the challenges I experienced during my fieldwork. In the first 
section – my project foundation – I will define the setting, project, research questions 
and case studies. I will then outline the methodological approach. Following upon that 
general framework, I will discuss and analyse my research design, highlighting the 
justification and rationale behind my chosen methods, which include: stakeholder 
interviews, survey, field interviews, observations and media and internet analysis. After 
discussing my methods in detail, I will explain how I processed my data and analysed 
my results. To round out the discussion, I will examine the context of Sarajevo as a 
setting, my reflexivity and ethical considerations for my project.  
 
3.2 Project Foundation 
 This project examines global flows of capital for architectural and real estate 
development in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital city, Sarajevo, focusing on 
commercial, sacred and residential urban interventions that have been built using 
Islamic financing. In the past two decades, after the siege of Sarajevo, funding has 
come into the city from all areas of the world to aid with the reconstruction of the urban 
environment and infrastructure, and since the year 2000, much investment in real 
estate and architecture has emanated from Muslim-majority countries such as Saudi 
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Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia and Kuwait. This study 
examines these flows of capital from Muslim-majority countries and the resulting 
spaces produced in the built environment of Sarajevo. It seeks to answer the following 
question: what role are transnational flows of capital playing in urban redevelopment in 
Sarajevo? The thesis also investigates the following sub-questions:  
•  What kind of discourses are emerging in terms of identity and how do they 
relate to imagined binaries such as East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local?  
• How are such flows of capital embedded in local political struggles and 
agendas? 
• How is Sarajevo's changing urban space informing new conceptions of the 
sacred and the secular, of the East and the West and of the post-conflict identity 
of the city? 
Sarajevo is a receiving city for global flows of capital from the greater Muslim world. Not 
only is the city a post-socialist space, but it is also a post-conflict urban area, making its 
transition from socialism a double or dual transition. Since the Siege of Sarajevo, the 
demographics of the city have transformed considerably, and the 2013 census 
estimates that the city of Sarajevo is over 80% Muslim or Bošnjak (Popis, 2013). This 
majority-Muslim character of Sarajevo – especially contrasted with its ‘multicultural’ or 
multi-ethnic past identity (for more about this, see chapter four on the ‘Islamic shift’) – 
plays an important role in the contemporary development of the city, especially in terms 
of foreign investment for architectural and real estate projects and in terms of new 
demographic movements in the city.  
 
3.3 Case Studies 
 The study involves three categories of case studies: commercial developments, 
sacred structures and spaces and private residential complexes and tourist villas. The 
chosen case studies demonstrate some of the more interesting and contested 
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examples of the new construction projects in Sarajevo. For commercial developments, I 
will be focusing on the BBI Centar (funding from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates) and the Sarajevo City Center (SCC), which is an investment from Saudi 
businessman Sulaiman Al-Shiddi and forms part of the Al-Shiddi group (see Figure 1 
for a map of all case studies). These two shopping centres have been integral to the 
post-conflict urban development of Sarajevo, and they occupy two main squares in the 
city and function as central meeting points for the citizens. Locally their connection to 
the Arab world is often discussed and debated. As central figures in the discourses 
about foreign, and specifically Arab, financing in Bosnia, much has been written about 
the BBI Centar and SCC in the media and on internet forums, including speculation 
about political motivations behind the structures and corruption connected to them. 
They are significant not only for the physical development of the city, but also for 
debates about attitudes about foreign financing and market-driven urbanism, Islam 
(‘our Islam’ v ‘Arab Islam’) and Arab flows of capital and people amongst the 
architectural community and everyday citizens.  
 For my chapter on sacred spaces, I will again focus on BBI and SCC, as I 
believe that they are spaces where the sacred and the secular exist simultaneously, 
but I will also examine the Saudi King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre. Since the 
Siege of Sarajevo and the breakdown of the Yugoslav state, Muslim communities from 
around the globe (including many governments) invested in the rebuilding of BiH’s 
Islamic Community’s endowment for sacred buildings and spaces, its waqf or vakuf in 
Bosnian, often building mosques where none had existed prior to the conflict. The King 
Fahd mosque is one of these spaces, and it forms part of the Saudi diplomatic 
complex. The building of mosques after the war became a subject of debate, especially 
given the existing damage to housing and non-religious infrastructure and the 
economic disparities amongst the population. The Saudi complex has been the subject 
of much controversy and media stories, and it was even showcased in the film Na Putu 
	 65	
[On the Path] (2010). Known locally as a mosque preaching a stricter, Saudi-inspired 
version of Islam (see chapter on sacred spaces for more about this), it is central to 
discussions about Islam and sacred spaces in the city. All of the case studies, 
however, bridge the sacred and the secular, reflecting the shifting dynamics of sacred 
and secular spaces in Sarajevo.  
 Because these flows of capital exist within the private domain as well as within 
the public sphere, my final empirical chapter will analyse the private gated community 
Poljine Hills, which is also an Al-Shiddi investment that targets buyers in GCC countries 
as well as elsewhere, and the proposed Arab tourist village Buroj Ozone that has 
financing from the United Arab Emirates. The chapter will look at the phenomenon of 
Arab tourists and residents who buy property in Sarajevo for holiday homes, examining 
Sarajevan attitudes towards these newcomers and ideas of neighbourliness. The local 
media has given significant coverage to both Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone, and Buroj 
Ozone in particular became enormously contested with respect to the environmental 
implications of the project and its enormity in terms of cost and land use. Tourism and 
other temporary demographic flows of people from the Arab world have increased 
dramatically in the past ten years, and local media have picked up on the phenomenon. 
Studying these projects and private villas bought by Arab families will add complexity to 
the discussion of local and international political struggles and how they are informing 
the built environment in the city. As these groups of people are more visible in a real 
sense in Sarajevo (usually by their dress), they add to discourses surrounding 
investment from Muslim-majority countries and the reaction of Sarajevo’s citizens to 
such flows.  
 
3.4 Methodological Approach 
 Qualitative methods have become widely accepted in social research, including 
in geography, since the so called paradigm wars in the 1970s and 80s (Alastalo, 2009: 
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34-35; Bryman, 2009: 1-2; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 1 and Winchester and Rofe, 
2016: 20-22), and a more interpretive idea of the social world has gained traction 
among scholars in the past decades, supporting the validity of using of such methods 
and the results they yield. Interpretive qualitative methods offer a way to study lived 
experiences, beliefs, and cultures and to gain insights into subjective social realities, 
such as the transformations taking place in Sarajevo and its urban environment. Based 
largely on an interpretivist epistemological position and a constructivist ontological 
position, qualitative research allows scholars to avoid essentialising while also being 
able to take an inductive view of the relationship between theory and research. In other 
words, qualitative research allows for the theory to be generated from the empirical 
data (Bryman, 2008: 366). In Geography, this approach can be especially appropriate 
when using case studies as ‘theory-generating endeavours’ (Baxter, 2016: 136).  
 This project required data collection using qualitative methods including semi-
structured interviews, surveys, observation and media and internet forum analysis. 
Because this project investigates interpretations of the social reality of city spaces and 
its citizens – including how international and local political struggles are played out in 
the built environment – qualitative methods are the most appropriate research tools for 
the project. According to Hilary P. M. Winchester and Matthew W. Rofe (2016), 
‘Qualitative geographical research tends to emphasise multiple meanings and 
interpretations rather than seeking to impose any one “dominant” or “correct” 
interpretation’ (8). Understanding the changing urban setting and the attitudes of the 
citizens of Sarajevo means discussing these processes with individuals in the city and 
analysing their responses to such discussions.   
 Interviews can help researchers assess an individual’s understanding of an 
issue, and it is the most widely employed method used with qualitative research 
(Bryman, 2008: 436). The format of semi-structured interviews – which follows a given 
question schedule but which allows researchers and participants flexibility regarding 
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responses – gives leeway for participants to expand on areas of interest while also 
remaining organised and focused. The semi-structured interviews that I conducted with 
42 various stake holders and urban professionals in Sarajevo (a list of which can be 
found in Annex A) best address the main research question by allowing interview 
respondents the flexibility to discuss the relationship between foreign capital and urban 
development Sarajevo.  
 This study also explores how the citizens of the city themselves – not just 
professionals engaged in the development of the city – react to new interventions in the 
urban environment and foreign financing for architectural and real estate development 
in Sarajevo. I have addressed this part of the project in two ways: through a self-
completion survey and through what I call ‘field interviews’ with everyday Sarajevans in 
public and quasi-public spaces. Self-completion questionnaires are an effective means 
of gathering qualitative data as they allow respondents the time to reflect on questions 
and answer in a convenient environment. They are similar to structured interviews, but 
they tend to have fewer open questions, and they are not subject to ‘interviewer effects’ 
that may bias the responses (McGuirk and O’Neill, 2016: 265). However, there are 
drawbacks to using this method; it is impossible for researchers to probe for more 
information, questions have to be limited, and there is a greater risk of missing data.  
 Anonymous field interviews were conducted in both true public spaces (on the 
walkways and green spaces in the neighbourhood of Alipašino Polje) as well as quasi-
public spaces (in BBI and SCC shopping centres). They involved ‘inhabiting’ or 
spending significant time within the buildings and spaces in question and asking users 
about their feelings regarding the spaces and foreign investment in the city. This 
inhabiting of the space amounts to a form of participant observation modified for the 
specific context of the city. One of the difficulties of conducting qualitative research in 
the city is the inability to adequately conduct participant observation – the logistics of 
following groups as they go about their daily routines in cities becomes quite difficult if 
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not impossible. Roger Sanjek (2000) argues for new ways of thinking about qualitative 
fieldwork in urban areas that do not focus solely on semi-structured interviews. By 
using examples from research in New York neighbourhoods, he shows how participant 
observation is possible in urban environments through such loitering methods (283). By 
inhabiting two case study shopping centres – BBI and SCC – and a residential 
neighbourhood around one of the mosques involved in this study (Alipašino Polje near 
the King Fahd mosque), I was able to better understand processes taking place on site. 
The field interviews from Sarajevo citizens address how Sarajevans understand their 
city and new processes taking place in urban spaces, and thus it helps answer the sub-
questions concerning how the citizens of the city are reacting to new construction 
projects and investment from Muslim-majority countries. In addition to these field 
interviews, I also kept a research notebook in which I remarked on my observations in 
the city and my experiences in the spaces in question.  
 In order to help eliminate interviewer effects and to triangulate some of my 
findings, I researched online forums – some specifically targeting architecture 
(http://www.skyscrapercity.com) and some connected to news media in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – where citizens of the city discussed various urban interventions 
(http://www.klix.ba and http://www.forum.avaz.ba, for example). In the past 20 years, 
internet use has spread world wide, and with that spread has come new and innovative 
was of gathering qualitative data online. Virtual qualitative data collection has become 
much more widespread in the past decades (Winders, 2016: 334-336). Although 
access to the internet is unevenly distributed across different countries and urban and 
rural areas, the ‘increasing centrality of new media [internet forums, social media, 
etc.]… has changed the ways that human geographers think about qualitative research’ 
(Ibid., 335).I have analysed many of the comments listed on these forums, especially in 
response to the case studies I have selected. Using internet data – or new media – 
allows researchers to incorporate the changing reality of social environments (including 
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virtual spaces) into their project designs, as ‘the virtual and material realm complement, 
rather than supplement, each other in practice and, thus, should do so in our research’ 
(345). Internet data collection, however, does have its challenges, as these media 
allow for the construction of plural identities (Taylor, 2012: 5), especially given the 
anonymous nature of many internet forums and comment threads. According to Taylor 
(2012), ‘The phenomenon of plurality and anonymity lead us directly into questions 
about verifiability and reliability’ (9). Using internet data to complement other qualitative 
research methods thus necessitates some careful considerations. For this research, 
which looks at public forums and comments sections, the most important consideration 
is whether it is possible to determine if participants are ‘trolling’, or trying to incite 
reactions by making radical or offensive comments. This can be done by carefully 
examining the context of comments in the discussions taking place (and the reactions 
of other participants). Other considerations include those of access. In Sarajevo, only a 
certain population of people in the city would comment on such forums; the 
demographics are quite limited to younger people with internet access and (in the case 
of the architecture forum) interested in urban development and architecture. However, I 
believe that in addition to the survey data and field interviews that I collected, this 
analysis adds to a solid corpus of data regarding the responses of Sarajevo’s citizens 
to new urban interventions in the city.  
 To round out the methods described above, I also conducted extensive media 
analysis regarding not only the case studies in question but also urban development 
and foreign influence in the country. This media analysis triangulates all of the original 
data collection and places it within the greater context of Sarajevo’s media treatment of 
political and current events. It is important to note that politicians or close associates of 
politicians own various media sources in the city, so often their treatment of urban 
development issues reflects the greater political and cultural context of the city. Media 
analysis combined with interviews with urban professionals and those involved in the 
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development of the city have targeted the sub-questions regarding the political 
agendas and struggles being played out in Sarajevo’s built environment. Many of the 
responses to the survey also support these findings; however, as they are anonymous 
opinions of the people, their usage will be reserved to discussions concerning 
hegemonic discourses in the city.  
 All of these methods combined contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
processes taking place in Sarajevo, especially with respect to urban development, 
foreign investment, political struggles in the built environment, and the reaction of 
everyday citizens to such processes. Qualitative methods including semi-structured 
interviews, survey data, field interviews, and analysis of internet and press sources are 
the most appropriate means of answering the research questions stated above, as they 
allow for nuanced interpretations and understandings of phenomena in the social and 
urban world. While more positivistic studies might focus on replicable findings and 
quantitative data, this project is more concerned with an interpretive understanding of 
the urban development of Sarajevo and the global flows of capital that are driving new 
architectural and real estate investments.  
 
3.5 Research Design 
3.5.1 Stakeholder Interviews 
 To address the research questions above, I conducted 42 semi-structured 
interviews with various different respondents in Sarajevo who fell into an ordered 
typology: 1. Financiers/Project Stakeholders, 2. Urban Professionals/Architects, 3. 
Institutional Representatives (EU, OSCE, IZ), 4. Journalists, 5. Activists/NGO Sector, 
and 6. Real Estate Agents. A detailed list of interviewees can be found in Annex A, and 
a list of interview themes can be found in Annex B. I selected these interviewees based 
on their connection to my case studies or their involvement in the urban development of 
the city. I wanted to see how accurate media attitudes to the projects proved to be and 
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how the stakeholders themselves processed citizens’ reactions to projects. This 
selection of respondents reflected my desire to obtain a broad range of views on the 
issues and to seek perspectives from those who might not be directly involved in the 
projects, but who might be able to shed new light on the processes from a different 
angle. It proved also to be a reflection of my interests in the political motivations behind 
the projects and how such political interests were being played out in the urban 
environment. For example, I spoke to the terrorism expert at the State Investigation and 
Protection Agency (SIPA) and a representative of the OSCE’s press and public 
information unit. While these individuals do not seem directly connected to the case 
studies I have chosen, their views of the processes taking place in the city added 
richness and depth to the investigation.  
 Of the respondents directly involved with the case studies, I interviewed the 
directors of BBI Centar and Sarajevo City Center, the CEO of MDC (the company 
responsible for overseeing the construction of the Sarajevo City Center), the director of 
Poljine Hills and the cultural attaché to the Saudi embassy responsible for running the 
King Fahd cultural complex. Unfortunately, despite repeated efforts to contact Buroj 
Ozone, I was unable to schedule an interview with anyone from the company. A 
colleague of mine working on a similar project in Sarajevo was also denied access to 
Buroj Ozone’s direction after repeated requests for interview.  
 Each interview with project stakeholders and people involved in the urban 
development of the city differed in its exact content and structure; these were tailor-
made to the individuals being interviewed and the information sought from each 
interviewee. My questions for the respondents focused on the politics of urbanism and 
investment in the city, obstacles that different projects encountered, the reaction of the 
citizens, how the interviewees assessed the media representation of the project and 
changing demographics of the city. For example, when interviewing Enes Kazazić the 
director of SEIC (South European Investment Company), I asked, ‘What can you tell 
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me about FDI trends? Is there increasing interest in Bosnia as a site for investment 
from GCC countries? Why, if so?’; ‘What are the main obstacles investors face in BiH?’ 
and ‘Has there been any backlash from BiH citizens regarding investment from GCC 
countries? How has it manifested if so?’ I tried in all cases to keep the questions open-
ended to give respondents the room to elaborate, but I also tried to form my questions 
in such a way as to spur further discussion that might go beyond the reach of the 
question itself. Semi-structured interviews allow for this flexibility, and using this 
method I was able to carefully delve into the phenomena with my interviewees, 
allowing them to provide as much information as they felt comfortable.  
 Such questioning gave me the ability to address the research questions in a 
broad manner, opening up the space for multiple and interlocking factors shaping the 
development of the city. Especially since, at times, I was targeting sensitive information 
about the politics behind investments and the processes through which investors 
received permission for construction, this loose questioning method was invaluable for 
wiggling into the more hidden details of the projects and the involvement of different 
actors. In most cases I endeavoured to establish a trusting rapport with my interviewee 
in order to create an open atmosphere for dialogue. This would have been more 
difficult had my question schedule been rigidly fixed. However, this also depended on 
the language in which I was conducting the interview.  
 When conducting interviews in English, my question design was more open, 
allowing for this flexibility and adaptation based on the interviewee’s responses. For 
example, while interviewing Edin Safo, the CEO of MDC, my questions loosely touched 
on the themes that interested me about the project, but they allowed for Mr. Safo to 
expand or elaborate on the various processes. I asked him questions such as, ‘could 
you please tell me about the privatization process?’ and ‘what kind of obstacles did you 
face before construction began?’ Although I was interested in the media backlash 
against the project, he discussed these issues in relation to the obstacles that were 
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faced before construction began. This also gave me the freedom to ask more pointed 
questions about media treatment of the project when he brought up the issues 
surrounding media and especially Arab investment in Sarajevo. While doing this type of 
interview in English, my strategy tended towards posing as few questions as possible 
and letting the interviewees speak about the project. Although some guidance was 
necessary to keep the conversation on track, I found that often people explain more if 
they are given the freedom to openly discuss their work without strict question 
schedules.  
 This strategy worked for interviews conducted in English, but my method 
necessarily changed slightly when I needed to conduct an interview in Bosnian. My 
language skills in the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language are sufficient for conducting 
interviews, but I am not yet fluent enough to maintain the type of spontaneity that I do 
in English language interviews. Therefore, when preparing for an interview in the local 
language, I tended to stick to a stricter question schedule that I would in English. As it 
is clear that I am not a native speaker of the language, my respondents often spoke 
more slowly and answered questions more directly than they would have done had the 
interview been more open-ended. This was true of my interview with Fatima Šišić at the 
Centre for Islamic Architecture, which is a part of the Islamic Community (IZ). I 
designed more pointed questions about the IZ’s vakuf and how imams are chosen for 
the mosques run by the IZ, and the interview followed a much stricter format than many 
of my interviews in English.  
 This difference in design between interviews conducted in English and those 
conducted in the local language worked relatively well in most instances. However, I 
was confronted with an interview that I thought I would conduct in English but that in 
the end I needed to undertake in Bosnian. Unfortunately, I was unprepared for an 
interview in the local language, and I was unable to obtain the kind of information that I 
normally would have been able to gain using my more open, English language method. 
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This error on my part taught me to always confirm which language I would be able to 
use for the interviews ahead of schedule and not to assume one way or the other.  
 
3.5.2 Survey 
 In order to explore the factors that are shaping the urban redevelopment of 
Sarajevo, I needed to develop a way to gauge how the citizens of the city responded to 
urban changes and processes. I did this in two ways – with an online survey on the 
internet platform SurveyMonkey and with on-site field interviews (discussed further 
below). Creating a survey for people in the city to fill out seemed like the best way to 
address how the citizens were responding to changes, as it gave people in the city a 
comfortable and easy way to express their opinions about urban development in a 
totally anonymous format. I had hoped that this would be a way to reach a large 
number of Sarajevan citizens from many different demographic backgrounds, and the 
questions (which can be found in Annex C) sought out the opinions of these citizens 
regarding urban development and foreign investment in architecture and real estate. I 
designed my survey to reflect all of my case studies – commercial, sacred and 
residential, and I asked questions regarding culture, politics and urbanism in general. 
 While designing the online survey, I was very aware of the fact that I needed to 
stay away from leading questions while also making the questionnaire easy to 
complete and as short as possible. I discussed this issue with other researchers and 
colleagues while I was designing the questions – first in English, then translated into 
Bosnian with the help of three Bosnian friends. I tried wherever possible to format 
questions in either vertical or horizontal closed answers, often using a Likert scale. For 
example, I asked, ‘on a scale from one to ten, do you believe urban development in 
Sarajevo (new architectural investments, urbanization, and reconstruction) since 1995 
has been successful?’ In addition to these closed questions and Likert scales, I added 
optional comment boxes after each question in the event that respondents would want 
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to qualify their answers or comment on why they chose the responses they chose. I 
decided to add these comment boxes from the advice of one of my friends who found 
the questionnaire too closed and short without them. I have noticed that many of the 
respondents did indeed use these comment boxes to give additional information about 
their views of urban development in the city, and these responses are invaluable 
information to the study, especially for answering the research question related to the 
reaction of Sarajevo’s citizens to new investments in the built environment. They add a 
great amount of detail for explaining the overarching discourses surrounding these 
investments.  
  In order to reach as many different voices in the city as possible, I posted the 
link to my survey on internet forums: the architectural forum SkyscraperCity and also 
on Facebook. Additionally, friends of mine shared the link with their networks and took 
paper copies to different cultural institutions in the city to find the voices of older 
citizens. The survey reached a number of students in the architectural faculty and other 
people interested in architecture and urbanism. However, there was a sampling 
problem regarding demographics of the respondents. While those who responded were 
likely those interested in the issue, other voices, especially from older generations were 
left out. To counter this sampling problem, I conducted 40 field interviews (to be 
discussed below) and tried to target as large a range of people in terms of 
demographics as possible. 
 In my survey, I received 154 online responses from Sarajevans aged 18 to 59. I 
was able to supplement that with 13 paper surveys (ages 16 to 43), making a total of 
167 responses. One of my worries about the online survey was that it would not reflect 
the true demographics of the city, and that I would not adequately represent the voices 
of older generations, specifically. Bryman (2008) has also discussed the problem of 
sampling in online surveys, stating ‘internet users are a biased sample of the 
population in that they tend to be better educated, wealthier, younger… although, as 
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internet access diffuses more and more, it is possible that some of these biases will 
become less prominent or even disappear’ (647). In fact, a majority of respondents 
from the online survey (67 responses) came from the 25-29 age group, while there 
were only 24 responses from people aged 40 to 59 and no respondents older than 60. 
 The online survey also had a sampling problem in terms of gender. Of the 167 
respondents, a very large majority (102) were women. There were only 64 male 
respondents and one who chose not to declare either gender. This sampling error may 
be explained due to my own distribution of the survey. I asked female friends and 
colleagues to distribute the survey or share the link, and it is possible that those female 
friends and colleagues had mostly women in their networks.  
 It was important to find voices from all ethno-religious communities in the city, 
and one of the first questions on the survey asks for ethno-religious affiliation. Because 
this information is often considered sensitive, respondents had the option of leaving the 
question blank. It is estimated that the city of Sarajevo is about 80% Muslim or 
Bošnjak, and I tried to match this percentage in my sample. Of the online surveys, 73 
respondents gave an answer for their ethno-religious or national belonging, while 94 
abstained. That over half of the survey respondents decided not to answer the question 
is quite telling in terms of how citizens – at least those who are internet savvy and 
interested in urban development – view national belonging in the city. The majority of 
respondents who did list an ethnic affiliation – 34 people – identified as ‘BiH’ or 
Bosanac, the overarching Bosnian identity that does not stress ethno-religious or 
national belonging but rather includes all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After 
that, 23 respondents answered Bošnjak or Muslim, two identified as Serb (one 
Bosanac of Serbian cultural heritage), and four stated Croat. Additionally there was one 
‘human being’, one ‘Yugoslav’ (Jugosloven), two ‘other’, one ‘multiculturalist’ 
(Multikulturalan), one ‘countryman’ (Zemaljac), one ‘nonexistent’ (Nepostojeći), one 
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‘mixed’, one ‘European’ (Evropljanin), and one ‘Bosanski Huran-Mohawk’. Clearly the 
anonymity of the online survey allowed for some improvisation. 
 Despite the sampling problem with the online survey in terms of age and 
gender, these responses are still valuable for answering the research question aimed 
at assessing the citizens’ responses to new urban processes in the city. Respondents 
were able to comment on the questions, allowing them to express their views of the 
processes taking place in Sarajevo, which gave me broader data to analyse. 
Demographically, there is representation from the three ethno-religious groups, which 
is important for gauging the opinions of the population as a whole.  
 
3.5.3 Field Interviews 
 I chose to conduct on-site, anonymous field interviews for two main reasons. As 
described earlier, the field interviews gave me a way to ‘inhabit’ public and quasi-public 
spaces, and in addition to the survey, the field interviews proved to be a second way 
for me to measure and gauge the reaction of Sarajevans to the processes taking place 
in the built environment. I designed the field interviews according to a strict question 
schedule (see Annex D for a complete list) that followed from some of the questions on 
the survey seeking out the responses of the citizens to urban developments, especially 
in terms of the case studies. My question schedule necessarily had to be shorter than 
the survey as people who are passing through public and quasi-public spaces will 
generally only have enough patience for a five-minute interview. Thus the field 
interview questions had more relevance to the actual setting – the space or building in 
question – and to some more general themes, including opinions about new 
investments, political motivations behind them, shopping centres and mosques in the 
city. I tried to keep these questions as open-ended as possible to let respondents 
answer how they wished. All of these interviews were conducted in the local language, 
and I had a research assistant to aid me with the recruitment of interviewees and small 
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translations and interpretations. These questions included, ‘what do you think about the 
ban on alcohol, pork and gambling in shopping centres such as BBI, SCC and Bosmal 
in Sarajevo?’ and ‘what kind of buildings or spaces does the city of Sarajevo need?’ 
 In total, I conducted 40 field interviews with the citizens of Sarajevo: 10 in both 
the BBI Centar and the Sarajevo City Center and 20 in the residential neighbourhood of 
Alipašino Polje. To counter the sampling problems that I faced with the survey, I 
targeted respondents who hailed from older generations, and I tried to maintain a more 
equal gender balance. Respondents ranged from 76 years old to 19 years old. The 
largest demographic for the field interviews was the 30-39 years old (14 respondents). I 
believe that I was able to balance the demographic sampling problem that I faced with 
the online survey, adding five respondents aged 65-76. Additionally I tried to mirror 
ethno-religious demographics with the field interviews, and while respondents were not 
obliged to answer regarding their ethnic belonging, 33 interviewees did respond and 
only four abstained. Three other respondents were clearly Muslim, as they were 
women wearing the hijab and one woman wearing a full-face veil, the niqab. Seven 
respondents identified as ‘BiH’ or Bosanac, 19 stated they were Bošnjak/Muslim, two 
identified as Croat and there was on Serb. The general avoidance of stating one’s 
ethnicity in census terms (Bošnjak, Croat, Serb) seems to speak to the fatigue in the 
general population regarding nationalism and national belonging in the country. The 
Roma and Jewish communities are missing from this study or were among the 
respondents who chose not to state their ethnic belonging. The field interviews also 
allowed me to target people who are not involved in the architectural community in the 
city, as I am aware that many of my survey respondents hailed from the architecture 
faculties at the universities in Sarajevo.  
 For each field interview, I recorded the interviewees responses – there were a 
number of people who refused to be recorded and thus did not complete the interviews. 
These field interviews were conducted in the local language with the help of a local 
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student who acted as my transcriber and research assistant. Unfortunately, while my 
Bosnian is sufficient enough to conduct more structured interviews, I needed help 
negotiating participation with the citizens on-site – especially the fact that the interviews 
were anonymous. I could not adequately explain why I wanted their opinion specifically 
on the subject of foreign investment. I believe the fact that I am foreign also contributed 
to my difficulty in approaching and conducting the field interviews on my own behalf. Of 
course, having a research assistant can skew results, as the relationship between the 
interviewer and interviewee changes slightly. I do not believe, however, that having a 
research assistant negatively affected my results substantially but rather facilitated the 
collection of data and its analysis.  
  
3.5.4 Observation 
 For all qualitative studies, researcher observation of the site and the participants 
yields imperative additional data. In this study, I conducted two types of observation: 
general observation of the city of Sarajevo and its spaces and more pointed 
observation of case study spaces during field interviews. These observations I noted in 
a research journal for later analysis. It is important when conducting qualitative 
research focusing on the interpretations and understandings of phenomena to be able 
to analyse and reflect upon the processes taking place as they are observed. I noted 
my observations throughout my fieldwork in Sarajevo in order to come to a more 
complete picture of the processes taking place on the local level, how the city was 
adapting to global flows, and how citizens reacted to urban change. Keeping a journal 
allowed me to fill in the blanks, so to speak, with respect to the phenomena I was 
studying.  
 For example, discussions with friends and colleagues in the city opened my 
eyes to how people in the city regarded the neighbourhood of Ilidža on the western 
edge of the city. Some had mentioned that this was the ‘little-Istanbul’ or ‘little-Arabia’ of 
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Sarajevo, remarking that many of the new Arab and Turkish residents of the city 
resided and occupied the area. Because I had noted this comment, I was able to visit 
Ilidža keeping such characterizations of the neighbourhood in mind. This led to photo 
documentation of the many businesses catering to Arab-speaking clients and how that 
was shaping the neighbourhood. These observations also helped me to formulate 
questions for the real estate agents that I visited in Ilidža who target Arab buyers of 
property.  
 Although pure observation of the research area cannot be used alone to 
determine which factors are shaping the architectural redevelopment of post-conflict 
Sarajevo, it is necessary for going beyond interview and media data. A researcher’s 
eye will pick up on interesting occurrences on-site, and these must be documented and 
analysed like all data to adequately answer the research questions and arrive at 
sophisticated conclusions about the phenomena at hand. In terms of supporting 
interviews and surveys, observations is one way to ensure a well-rounded view of the 
topic of study.  
 
3.5.5 Media and Internet Forum Analysis 
 One of the most fruitful avenues for understanding the processes of urban 
redevelopment in Sarajevo is reading the local press and online media, taking into 
account the role of the media in daily life and the slant of different media outlets, 
especially in terms of political influence. With this in mind I cast a broad net in order to 
target different reports and news sources, both print media and strictly online portals. 
To add to the reactions of the citizens of the city, I studied comments left on online 
forums (http://www.skyscrapercity.com, http://www.klix.ba, http://www.forum.avaz.ba, 
for example) to see how the people were talking about these issues amongst 
themselves and on an anonymous platform for commentary.  
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 In order to find media reports related to these structures, it was necessary to 
find an archive of BiH newspapers. Luckily, MediaCentar Sarajevo has developed an 
online archive of media and historical sources that can be accessed through personal 
subscriptions (http://www.idoconline.info). I used this online archive to collect media 
reports about the case studies for this project, urban development in general in 
Sarajevo and anything related to the presence of Arabs in the city. I paid attention to 
each different newspaper and media sources in terms of their political independence or 
political associations, as this helped focus my research around how political struggles 
were being played out in the built environment. It is important to keep in mind that 
politicians or those close to politicians often own media sources in BiH, so the stories 
they cover and how different events are treated are not always neutral. For example, 
there are clear media campaigns against different investments in the city, and 
newspapers and media outlets that support certain politicians lead these campaigns 
(for more about this, see the chapter on commercial investments in Sarajevo). I also 
looked at online news portals such as http://www.klix.ba and Al Jazeera Balkans for 
media stories relating to urban development in the city. These stories help to 
triangulate the data that I obtained in my interviews, field interviews and in the online 
survey.  
 Finally, to gain yet one more source of data for the responses of the citizens of 
Sarajevo to the changing built environment, I analysed comments on different internet 
forums, including http://www.skyscrapercity.com, http://www.klix.ba and others. 
Although this type of research can be problematic, as respondents are generally 
anonymous and hail from certain demographic groups (often young men), in this 
instance internet forum analysis serves to triangulate the responses of the citizens I 
collected through other methods. Many times people will self-censor during face-to-face 
interviews, but they will be more candid on internet forums. Although there are people 
who try to incite strong reactions by ‘trolling’ – which, as described above, consists of 
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saying radical or offensive things in order to receive emotional responses – I tried to 
limit including such comments by paying attention to the context of the conversations. 
Internet forum comments can be analysed using discourse analysis to show the 
discourses present in the city regarding new investments in the urban environment and 
financing originating in the greater Muslim world.  
 
3.6 Data Processing and Analysis 
 After a year’s worth of fieldwork, I was left with hundreds of pages of research 
notes, transcriptions, articles and surveys to analyse and code. Although this was by 
no means an easy task, I set about data processing and analysis in as organized a 
fashion as possible. First, after a thorough read-though of my materials, I came up with 
a table of codes and themes (see Annex E) that would allow me to classify and 
catalogue my data according to different problems and phenomena found in the field 
and in the literature. After creating this table of codes and themes, I was able to then 
go back though my data and catalogue my findings in an efficient and coordinated 
manner, including separating my materials into different folders and binders based on 
the relationship the literature or data had to the case studies and discourses existing in 
city. I also found colour-coordinating my list of codes and themes to be a good way for 
me personally to make sense of the coding. Using discourse analysis for geography, I 
analysed my findings to understand how Sarajevans are interpreting the processes 
taking place in the urban landscape and the important implications this can have for the 
construction of identity and social lives of the city dwellers.  
 
3.6.1 Discourse Analysis 
 Discourse analysis arose in the twentieth century as an approach for 
understanding social processes, and this ‘discursive turn’, which accords an active role 
for language in constructing social lives, has become pervasive in the social sciences 
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and humanities, including in geography (Dittmer, 2010: 274). However, discourse 
analysis has developed into a broad field of study that has grown numerous offshoots 
following different scholars and their preferred methods of interpretation and analysis. 
The term ‘discourse’ itself is ‘a notorious term within human geography and other social 
sciences because of the messy multiplicity of meaning associated with it’ (Ibid., 275). 
Likewise, the term ‘discourse analysis’ itself has become vastly diverse in nature, 
incorporating not just one approach but rather multiple avenues for exploring the social 
world within numerous different fields. According to Jørgensen and Phillips (2011), 
‘there is no clear consensus as to what discourses are or how to analyse them’ (2), but 
all discourse analysis approaches do share a similar foundation based on social 
constructionism; this is the understanding that language is not a neutral reflection of the 
social world but rather an active agent in producing it (Ibid.). Thus the social world and 
the way we talk are co-constitutive.  
 In order to analyse my fieldwork and media data, I have employed a 
Foucauldian understanding of discourse analysis for geographical research. Much has 
been written about Foucault and Geography. For example, Loretta Lees (2004), 
describes two strands of discourse analysis for geographical research, the second of 
which follows Foucault. She explains that, in this second strand, ‘discourse is part of a 
process through which things and identities get constructed. In Foucauldian terms, 
discourses are not simply reflections or (mis)representations of “reality”; rather they 
create their own “regimes of truth” – the acceptable formulation of problems and 
solutions to those problems,’ (102-103). This second strand is different from the first 
strand, which: 
  descends from the long Marxist tradition of political economy and  
  ideology critique. Here discourse analysis is a tool for uncovering certain 
  hegemonic ways of thinking and talking about how things should be 
  done that serve certain vested interests… In this context, discourse is 
  almost synonymous with ideology itself in so far as it functions to  
  conceal the power of vested interests and to induce the consent of the 
  dominated to their own domination (102). 
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While Lees highlights only these two approaches to discourse analysis, there are many 
other ways of carrying out discourse analysis, including, for example, methods such as 
critical discourse analysis, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theory and 
discursive psychology (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2011: 2). These other approaches, 
especially those that rely upon a version of structural Marxism, take a normative 
position on power relations in society (Ibid., 3). While a Foucauldian approach does not 
necessarily oppose such a view, the way in which I apply a Foucauldian analysis to my 
fieldwork data does not take an overtly normative stance on the power relations in 
society 
 However, according to Stuart Elden and Jeremy W. Crampton (2007), 
‘Foucault’s position in relation to geography remains unclear.’ (13). Foucault’s vast 
corpus of work can be applied to geographical studies in many ways, depending on the 
work in question and the analysis to be undertaken. For example, scholars such as 
Felix Driver (1985) have used Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (2012) to analyse 
institutions of power and their relationship to spatial production and surveillance. More 
generally, Foucauldian discourse analysis relies upon the notion that ‘discourse 
simultaneously produces and reproduces knowledge and power (power/knowledge) 
through what it is possible to think/be/do’ (Waitt, 2016: 288), and by applying discourse 
analysis, researchers can reveal social realities. Gordon Wait (2016) argues that, 
‘given Foucault’s interest in the role of knowledge production in making and remaking 
the co-constitutive relationships between people and place, his conception of discourse 
is inherently geographical’ (289). Thus such an approach allows for the possibility of 
exploring why these ‘regimes of truth’ have become dominant (or not), especially in 
terms of spatial production. How populations discuss spatial developments necessarily 
relates to the production of space and the production of knowledge/power. This critical 
exploration of discourses allows researchers to uncover processes of power/knowledge 
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production and how these processes might mobilise the reinforcement of societal 
norms or the creation of social change (Ibid.).  
 With this general notion of how a Foucauldian analysis can contribute to 
geographical research, I will use Foucault’s interview ‘Space, Knowledge, and Power’ 
(1984) as a springboard for analysing my fieldwork data instead of doing a close 
reading of one of his works and its relationship to geography (like Driver, 1985). 
‘Space, Knowledge, and Power’ remains one of the only primary sources from Foucault 
in which he explicitly discusses conceptions of space and the built environment. 
Foucault (1984) says: 
  I think it is somewhat arbitrary to try to dissociate the effective practice of 
  freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial 
  distributions in which they find themselves. If they are separated, they 
  become impossible to understand. Each can only be understood through 
  the other…Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is 
  fundamental in any exercise of power…So it [architecture] is not only 
  considered as an element in space, but is especially thought of as a 
  plunge into a field of social relations in which it brings about some 
  specific effects (246-253). 
 
From this discussion, the relationship between the social world and spatial production 
becomes clearer: space, the social world and, by extension, language use are all co-
constitutive. From this understanding, I have sought to pull out the overarching 
discourses surrounding my case studies to analyse the ‘regimes of truth’ that are 
imbedded in them. These discourses unearth processes of power/knowledge relating 
to the spatial development of the city, including notions such as cultural colonisation, 
exclusion and the power of wealthy investors to change the landscape of the city. I 
have also looked at how these discourses are contributing to novel ideas surrounding 
identity and belonging. By using this Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis, I 
have analysed the way in which individuals use language in order to create meaning, 
often by focusing on omissions or by reading between the lines. Focusing on the ‘co-
constitutive relationships between people and place’, I was better able to obtain an 
understanding of how new urban investments are shaping the city of Sarajevo and how 
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the population of the city is reacting to such processes. Importantly, by employing 
discourse analysis to my data, I was able to critically explore particular ‘truths’ about 
the processes occurring in the city and come to an understanding of the social realities 
of Sarajevo.  
 
3.6.2 Data Processing  
 For interviews with project stakeholders and other urban professionals engaged 
in the development of the city of Sarajevo, I analysed my interview notes and 
transcriptions searching for the themes and codes and codes mentioned above. Often, 
the themes proved to be embedded in the language used by the interviewee but were 
not directly spoken. Analysis of these notes and transcriptions required me to read 
between the lines, so to speak, to understand the interplay of various discourses 
related to urban development in Sarajevo. I then tried to triangulate this data with 
media reports or online information regarding the projects in question. Some of the 
main themes that I pulled out from these interviews were: biases towards Arab 
investment and perceptions of corruption. For example, one architect that I interviewed 
described Arab investments as ‘C-class’ investments, far behind investments from 
Western Europe. Many of my interviewees discussed rumours of corruption related to 
the case studies in the thesis.   
 I evaluated the field interview data in much the same way – reviewing the 
transcriptions and pulling out major themes and discourses. These interviews focused 
on the citizens’ responses to new urban interventions in the city and new financing for 
architectural developments, so it was necessary to triangulate this data with analysis of 
internet forums and other media describing these process in order to understand the 
discourses in the city. I pulled out comments that blatantly discussed themes or alluded 
to them in the language. Some of these themes included: biases against Arabs 
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(‘Arabophobia’), ‘our’ Islam v. ‘their’ Islam, Yugoslav ideals of tolerance and 
‘Islamisation’ of the city.  
 The online survey was supported on the http://www.surveymonkey.com 
website, which also includes data analysis features. These data analysis features 
include graphs and statistics relating to the questions, and a collation of the comments 
left in the optional comment boxes. The platform gives researchers an easy way to 
collect and analyse their data, and the online analysis allows for a clean and efficient 
way of consolidating the data obtained from the survey. Again, as this data targeted the 
research questions pertaining to the reaction of Sarajevans to the changing built 
environment, and SurveyMonkey helped to gather the data in a neat and tidy format, 
ensuring clean analysis. When triangulated with media and internet forum analysis, it 
shows the overarching discourses relating to new investments in the city. Much of this 
analysis centred on the optional comment fields that respondents were allowed to use, 
as they proved to be the most interesting aspect of the survey. Themes for coding 
through the survey data were similar to those from the field interviews, but because the 
demographics proved to be a bit different due to my sampling problem, I found the data 
from the survey was often more reflective of an educated and elite socio-economic 
segment of the population. Some of the codes and themes I found in this data included: 
fear of radicalism, Yugoslav ideals of tolerance and corruption.  
 In addition to coding interview transcriptions and the survey data, I also had to 
reread my research journal and code and theme my own findings from my 
observations. For example, I had heard unofficially in the city that the employees in the 
Sarajevo City Center talked about how many of their customers were Arab and how 
many Arab families spent their time on holiday in Bosnia and Herzegovina shopping. 
None of my field interviews with SCC employees supported this directly, and I did not 
want to ask leading questions about it, but I did find evidence of these perceptions in 
internet form comments. I found these observations quite striking, and in my own 
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observation of the Sarajevo City Center and the BBI Centar I noticed for myself the 
prevalence of Arab families walking about. That they might frequent spaces in which 
they felt comfortable (as many GCC countries have a strong shopping culture where 
families spend their free time in shopping centres) should come as no surprise, and it 
adds to the richness of the study to include information on Arab tourists and their 
occupation and usage of the case studies.  
 To analyse the data from media sources, I sorted articles into groups relating to 
the case studies or to urbanization in Sarajevo. I also kept and classified articles that 
dealt with issues of radicalism in Islam or Arab investment/tourism generally. It was 
important for me to remain aware of the source of these articles, as news outlets in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina often have ties to political parties or politicians directly. This is 
true of the Dnevni Avaz, for example, which is the news source connected to BiH 
politician Fahrudin Radončić. I analysed them with respect to their coverage of the 
issues and buildings in question as much as gleaning information from the reports. 
Many articles written about Arab movements and investment in Sarajevo have 
contributed to discourses of ‘Arab hysteria’ or ‘Arabophobia’ in the country, and this 
was just one of the major discourses I looked for an analysed while reviewing my press 
sources.  
 This type of analysis also helped when using internet forum comments as a 
data source. Often I found these comments connected to media stories (the comments 
section on http://www.klix.ba, for example, allows readers of news articles to comment 
on the stories), and so I sorted them depending on those case studies or themes. Much 
of the commentary could be coded with respect to Bosnian attitudes towards Arabs, 
‘our’ Islam v. ‘their’ Islam, rumours surrounding certain politicians and gossip about 
corruption/political ties in investment.  
 
3.7 Context, Reflexivity and Ethical Considerations 
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3.7.1 Context and Reflexivity 
 The research setting of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina affects data 
collection, as there are context-specific obstacles that make qualitative methods in the 
country – and especially in Sarajevo – more difficult than in other settings. To begin 
with, it is often quite difficult to request and receive an interview simply by emailing a 
potential interviewee. More often than not, if you are even able to find the contact’s 
email, he or she will not respond to your enquiry for an interview. Getting the email 
itself may also prove difficult. Many times, people from Bosnia and Herzegovina prefer 
to call one another instead of communicating by email. This poses the problem that it 
requires Bosnian language skills developed enough to be able to communicate 
effectively by telephone. Even though my own language skills are sufficient enough for 
this task, Bosnians often schedule their days at the last minute, and so I received 
responses such as, ‘call me tomorrow and we’ll arrange something,’ or ‘let me get back 
to you tomorrow to see if I have time’. This type of response can be quite frustrating 
when trying to arrange a time to chat. Additionally, one potential interviewee simply 
stopped responding to me while others never managed to find the time to speak. Many 
of these problems boil down to differences in culture between the locals and 
researchers. As an American, I am relatively forthright and persistent, which can be 
seen as a bit forceful in BiH.  
 A greater problem than simply the means of communication and scheduling is 
that in BiH, and especially in Sarajevo, accessing people in the first place can be quite 
difficult and frustrating. While it is not the case for all interviewees, more often than not, 
access requires contacts and sometimes contacts of contacts. I realised early on in my 
fieldwork that access in Sarajevo was a potential problem for me, and I continually cast 
my net as wide as possible to find people who knew stake holders and other individuals 
engaged in the development of the city. I count myself lucky to have had a pre-
established network of friends and colleagues in Sarajevo before I began my fieldwork; 
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I spent three summers in Sarajevo before research began in order to take Bosnian 
language classes, conduct research for my Masters dissertation and carry out an 
internship. This network assisted me myriad times over the course of the year, and it 
became clear that it was truly an invaluable asset when conducting on-site research in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In most cases when trying to gain access to an individual, I 
pointedly asked friends, colleagues and other professional contacts whether they had 
the contact information to specific people and whether they would be willing to 
introduce me virtually or otherwise. In some instances, I had to go through two or three 
channels to arrive at a contact I was seeking, and for one important contact, I only 
gained access days before leaving the country. Being recommended to a potential 
interviewee in the city opens doors that are otherwise very difficult to unlock, and while 
this may be true in other research settings as well, it seems to be the unwritten rule in 
Sarajevo.  
 Apart from accessing various actors and stakeholders, Sarajevo as a setting is 
difficult for qualitative research because of its status as a post-conflict and post-
socialist city, which suffers from many of the ills of post-socialist and post-conflict 
environments, including corruption and distrust. Suspicion became a major factor for 
me when working amongst the Bosnians living in Sarajevo, and it weighed heavily 
upon me as a researcher. I had often encountered problems of suspicion in Sarajevo 
before commencing my fieldwork; I cannot count the number of times someone in 
Sarajevo jokingly (or not so jokingly) accused me of being a spy, for example. 
However, it was only once I started doing interviews with members of the academic 
and intellectual architectural and urban planning community in Sarajevo that I 
confronted this suspicion in a more head-on fashion. In fact, one contact of mine 
explained to me that: 
  It would be also fantastic to try to bring your UCL people and resources 
  here as it would be interesting to discuss with them about collaborations 
  on different formats. Bosnians are lately very suspicious and demanding 
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  as there was a lot of foreign researchers and architects around and not 
  much was left to/for Sarajevo. I think you can surely contribute! [sic] 
 
This suspicion of foreigners – and of foreign researchers – is pervasive in the city. 
Another contact of mine spoke somewhat derisively of one of my colleagues hailing 
from Western Europe, especially in that he was ‘another foreign researcher’. It is 
understandable how the intellectual and academic communities in Sarajevo may feel 
threatened by foreign researchers coming to study not only their city but also their 
society. Added to that is the fact that foreign researchers are winning grants and 
studentships to research themes that Bosnians feel very strongly about or would like to 
study themselves, given the means. They feel – according to chats I have had with 
Bosnian friends and colleagues – that Bosnians are left to the side and isolated when it 
comes to opportunities to work abroad or contribute to more international programs 
regarding research and professional development. To counter this, I did try to offer 
what I could to my contacts in terms of access to literature. I also discussed co-
authoring papers or presenting at conferences, but these plans never came to fruition. 
This suspicion of foreigners seems deeply ingrained in BiH society, possibly originating 
in the failures and missteps of the international community during the conflict and after. 
In fact, the 'Monument to the international community, from the grateful citizens of 
Sarajevo’ which is a statue of a tin of beef, representing those given to the starving 
citizens during the siege, cements in the built environment the attitude of the citizens to 
the international community (see Sheftel, 2012 for an analysis of Bosnians’ dark 
humour, especially directed at the failures of the international community). Conducting 
qualitative research in Sarajevo as an American PhD student thus requires not only a 
very thick skin, but also the ability to empathise with the frustrations of the local 
community. Unfortunately, I only came to this understanding toward the end of my 
research, and I feel that some of my relationships with various contacts suffered for my 
previous ignorance.  
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 In terms of distrust, people are also reluctant to speak frankly about political 
motivations behind investments or political forces at play behind different processes in 
the city. I had a number of interesting interactions with Bosnians as I was conducting 
my field interviews and inhabiting public and quasi-public spaces. It is important to note 
that my interviewees were all made aware that their answers were anonymous, but that 
I needed to record them for data collection purposes (my research assistant discussed 
this with them in the local language). One woman working in a shopping centre in 
Sarajevo asked to see my list of questions before agreeing to the interview. When she 
read the questions, she became visibly agitated, and stated (in very clear English, 
although we had been speaking in Bosnian) that she refused to answer any of the 
questions or take part in the interview. She then proceeded to follow us out of her shop, 
and she watched us walk away in a clear act of intimidation. Her reaction was 
alarmingly aggressive, and clearly she felt threatened by my presence as a foreigner 
asking questions related to Islam and investment in Sarajevo. Unfortunately we never 
asked her to clarify her reaction, and we felt too intimidated to approach her again. 
Other people also refused to be recorded or participate in the field interviews, and in 
many instances it seemed as if they were protecting themselves from an unknown 
danger. As a post-socialist and post-conflict city dealing with ingrained corruption, it is 
possible that feelings of distrust toward the politicians and elites flows over into other 
areas of life, causing fear amongst the people. While this is an understandable reaction 
by the citizens, it makes conducting qualitative research in the city that much more 
difficult, especially for foreigners.  
 As an American researcher in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to keep 
my positionality in mind. My cultural background, values and biases inevitably influence 
the outcome of my results, especially considering the vast difference between US and 
BiH worldviews. I am aware that my background may lead to judgements and 
interpretations – especially of Islam – that may have a cultural skew. By reflexively 
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considering this potential problem, I hope I have been able to avoid such inherent 
biases as much as possible. I also realise that my cultural background and position of 
privilege in terms of my nationality, age and education level may have influenced the 
responses that I received from interview participants. These power relations probably 
played a part in how willing respondents were to give me information. Marsha Henry, 
Paul Higate and Gurchathen Sanghera (2009) suggest that the researcher and the 
power relations between researcher and researchee ‘may be read in multiple and 
paradoxical ways’ (477), making for complex and challenging research. Being aware of 
the power relationships taking place during the fieldwork is the first step to dealing with 
any negative consequences arising from them.  
 Within the environment of pervasive distrust in Sarajevo, I found it necessary at 
times to downplay my exact interests in order to reduce suspicion. I believe levels of 
suspicion might have been augmented as I study Muslim buildings and financing from 
Muslim-majority countries in the city – a touchy subject in today’s globalised and 
securitised world. When conducting interviews, I tried to limit the details of my research 
and explain that I am focusing on urban processes and urbanisation in Sarajevo. I also 
tried to downplay the focus on Islam and specifically Arab financing while I was 
conducting my fieldwork, but this sometimes came through despite my efforts. The 
woman who refused to speak to us in one of the shopping centres became agitated 
after my research assistant mentioned ‘Arab investment’ instead of the more neutral 
‘foreign investment’, which I believe led her to aggressively decline the interview.  
 On a more personal note, while conducting my fieldwork in Sarajevo, I came to 
know a number of Arabs living in the city, specifically from Syria and Libya. Having 
Arab friends living in Bosnia and being able to ask them questions about how welcome 
they feel in the country definitely gave me a broader understanding of the processes at 
work. I also think these friendships opened my mind and changed my perceptions of 
not only Arabs and the Arab world, but also of Islam in general. I believe my research 
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benefitted substantially from these relationships, giving me a different perspective and 
allowing me to see multiple viewpoints of transnational flows of people, capital and 
goods.  
   
3.7.2 Ethical Considerations 
 In order to conduct this study, I needed to apply to the UCL ethics committee to 
obtain permission to interview human subjects. I received this permission from the 
ethics committee for my application 3853/002 in February of 2014. Part of the 
application for to the ethics committee included consent and information forms for the 
interviewees who would be taking part in the study (see Annex F). This study was 
deemed to be of minimal risk to participants, even in a post-conflict context, and the 
probability of harm to participants would not be greater than that usually encountered in 
daily life.  
 Although I designed permission forms for interviews and information leaflets to 
explain my study, I found that in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian context, these formal 
measures were not only extraneous, but also caused respondents to feel more 
uncomfortable about the interview than they would otherwise. Therefore, I chose to 
impart the information about the study in person and obtain permission for the interview 
verbally or by email. For my interviews with people engaged in the development of the 
urban environment in the city, this type of permission and the information about my 
project was given before the interview commenced through email or over the 
telephone. I also made it clear in the interview itself that respondents did not have to 
answer any of my questions. Some, in fact, chose to answer certain questions only off 
the record. I have honoured their wish. I have also agreed to share what I have written 
about certain respondents before this thesis is officially handed in or published.  
 When conducting the field interviews, gaining consent and discussing the 
project became slightly more difficult. As I mentioned above, I hired a local research 
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assistant to help me approach and vet different respondents as we ‘inhabited’ the 
public and quasi-public spaces around Sarajevo. I realized early on that I could not 
adequately explain the project and describe why I was interested in exactly their 
opinions alone in the local language. Having my research assistant with me to carry out 
these interviews allowed me to not only explain the project and my interests 
adequately, but also to gain proper permission from the respondents and explain their 
rights, including their right not to take part or respond. More than one person refused to 
take part, and often we gave respondents the question schedule ahead of the interview 
so that they could see what kind of information we sought. Using paper permission 
sheets would not have been adequate in this situation, as it would have taken too much 
time (people already seemed pressed for a five-minute interview), and it also would 
have conflicted with the anonymity of the study.  
 After gaining the consent of interviewees, I asked each urban development 
respondent whether I could record the interview. Most agreed to this measure, but 
some asked not to be recorded – especially those who also asked that some 
information remain off the record. Again, I honoured their wishes. When an interviewee 
asked not to be recorded, I took elaborate notes to make up for the lack of 
transcription. For the field interviews, we also made it clear that we wished to record 
respondents for data processing purposes. We again assured anonymity, but despite 
these assurances, some respondents refused to take part after they learned that we 
wished to record the interview.  
 Conducting research with live participants always carries the risk of 
unintentional harm to the research subjects, which could manifest in multiple different 
ways. Although I did not always use printed consent forms as I found that format 
interfered with data collection in the context of BiH society, I did always make sure to 
receive informed consent from all of the participants involved, and I have protected 
confidentiality by maintaining anonymity when necessary. By default, participants in the 
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field interviews and survey data are anonymous, but for interviews with stakeholders 
and urban professionals, I have used pseudonyms unless they specifically ask to be 
named or unless participants are public figures such as CEOs. In a post-conflict 
environment and when dealing with ideas of identity formation and reconciliation, it is 
possible to cause harm by bringing up past traumas. I have tried to avoid this by 
creating questions that do not hint at past traumas. Additionally, while interviewing 
stakeholders on the various projects, I sought out and received some sensitive and/or 
private information that the respondent did not necessarily wish to reveal. Anything 
they have asked to keep off the record will remain off the record. I made it clear to the 
individuals involved that they are not required to answer my questions and that it is 
their right as an interviewee to stop the interview at any time.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 With 42 semi-structured interviews, 167 survey responses, 40 field interviews, 
and an extensive research journal, I have collected a substantial corpus of data for my 
study of the ongoing processes in Sarajevo’s built environment. These methods 
combined with media and internet forum analysis best respond to the research 
questions, as they allow for a deeper understanding of not only the transnational flows 
of capital and people into Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also of the responses of 
everyday citizens of the city. Because this is a qualitative study, I have analysed this 
data using discourse analysis to highlight the discourses surrounding such investment 
and the influence of elite political agendas that have the power to impact the 
development of the urban environment. Although some sampling problems arose with 
respect to the survey data, when triangulated with media and forum research, these 
responses still contribute to the overall findings of the study. In all, this data shows a 
clear picture of the processes taking place and how foreign investment in architecture 
and real estate affects the development of post-socialist and post-conflict cities.
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4. Sarajevo’s Identity Crisis: the City’s Multi-ethnic History, the Islamic Shift and 
Post-War Urban Processes 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Between long established urban identities and new trends in urban 
development, cities struggle between various representations of the urban environment 
and the implications that these representations have for local and international 
populations. In Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, multiple contested representations 
of the city have evolved since the founding of the city by the Ottoman Empire in the 
fifteenth century. Today, in the aftermath of war, Sarajevo’s particular urban identity is 
anything but fixed, and both domestic and foreign actors play a crucial role in forging 
and moulding an emerging reality of the post-conflict city. In fact, as Husukić and 
Zejnilović (2017) state, Sarajevo’s identity is in crisis. New urban interventions from the 
greater Muslim world are shaping the urban environment and clashing with previous 
representations of the city and projects to bring BiH toward the European Union 
(sometimes referred to as ‘Europeanisation’ (Troncota, 2015)). Despite the idyllic 
historical image of Sarajevo as ‘multicultural’ (Greble, 2011: 2), which in this sense 
means sheltering relatively large populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s four 
traditional ethno-religious communities (Catholic Croats, Muslim Bošnjaks, Orthodox 
Serbs and Sephardic Jews) and providing urban spaces and places of worship for 
these groups, Sarajevo’s urban space has been undergoing an overall ethnic 
homogenisation since the war in the 1990s.  
 This ethnic homogenisation has come about both demographically and 
structurally. Not only has the Muslim population itself become a significant majority in 
the city, but also many urban spaces have become Muslim, either by becoming sacred 
spaces of worship for Sarajevo’s Islamic communities or by restricting usage of the 
space through shari’ah law. All of these processes organise solidarities for Muslim 
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groups in the city, even those that are not strictly Bosnian Muslim, as the idea of the 
umma can then be employed (Kusno, 2012: 213 and Simone, 2012: 206, see literature 
review for more on Islam and nationalism in the built environment). Added to this trend 
is the fact that common cultural heritage sites – buildings and monuments that 
represent all ethno-religious communities – are being neglected. Although it would be 
an exaggeration to claim that all new constructions in the city have either overt or 
subtle ties to Islam, a large percentage of the new urban interventions are indeed 
influenced by Islam. This means that while Sarajevans might still believe in the multi-
ethnic identity of the city that was forged over centuries of coexistence and tolerance, 
Sarajevo’s spaces are gradually becoming more Muslim in nature.  
 Yet to describe this trend as Islamisation becomes problematic. The term 
Islamisation has taken on a vast number of connotations in the past decades. It implies 
a process of conversion to Islam and Islamism, or political Islam, including proselytism 
and a move to establish Islamic order and jurisprudence (Mandaville, 2007: 20 and 
Bayat, 2013: 4). In popular culture, however, especially in Europe and North America, 
references to Islamisation and Islamism tend to portray radical Islam, ‘intolerance, 
misogyny and authoritarianism’ (Bayat, 2013:4), and the agenda of terrorists to create 
an Islamic world order. The process in Sarajevo does not necessarily reflect the 
society’s conversion to Islam – most of the citizens are already Muslim – and radical 
Muslims and terrorists are certainly not driving these changes. Thus the term 
Islamisation carries with it a certain amount of anxiety coupled with suggestions of 
conversion, which leave it wanting in conceptual value. Similarly, Muslimisation bears 
popular understandings associated with fear and the threat of radical Islam. In order to 
describe a process that includes a move toward Bosnian Muslim ethnic 
homogenisation (in terms of census demographics) and an increase in Muslim spaces 
in Sarajevo, including spaces that are not strictly sacred but which follow shari’ah rules, 
I will employ the phrase ‘Islamic shift’.  
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 More than any other city in the Balkan region, Sarajevo has historically 
maintained a very special, ‘multicultural’, or more precisely multi-ethnic, identity. In fact, 
it has often been described as a meeting point of East and West, or a ‘European 
Jerusalem’ (Makas, 2012). Yet, the post-war city is physically morphing, caused in part 
by the Dayton Accords and its provisions for separate spaces and by the privatisation 
process after socialism, which allowed a minority elite to claim majority shares in state 
corporations. To understand how post-war Sarajevo has changed, especially in terms 
of city spaces and demographics, an analysis of the city, its history, its culture and its 
identity as an urban space is necessary. In this chapter, I will outline Sarajevo’s urban 
history from its foundation until the 1990s, investigate popular and contested 
representations of the city’s identity and discuss urbanism and changes in the urban 
environment since the war. The Islamic shift taking place in Sarajevo, brought about in 
part by worlding practices, such as investments from GCC countries, and post-conflict 
urban processes, sets the stage for emergent cultural forms to grow and take root. 
These transformations have far-reaching implications for post-conflict Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and for the city undergoing an identity crisis.  
 
4.2 Sarajevo’s Urban History 
 The Ottomans founded the city of Sarajevo in the middle of the fifteenth century 
as an ‘expression of Ottoman Islamic civilisation’ (Donia, 2006: 8). The Ottoman millet 
system, which organised the distinct religious communities in the Empire, allowed 
different confessional groups to maintain their own legal systems and imbued them 
with certain powers. Religious leaders in these communities controlled members of 
their congregations and acted on their behalf in dealings with other authorities (Abu 
Jaber, 1967: 212). The millet system not only organised religious communities 
together, but it also formed the basis for urban development in Sarajevo. Each 
confessional community in the city lived in its own mahala – or neighbourhood – and 
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these mahalas encircled the central business district or Čaršija (Karahasan, 1993: 8). 
The Čaršija became one of the only spaces in the city in which members of different 
faiths mixed and carried out daily business. Communities erected their own places of 
worship within the mahalas, lending a multi-confessional character to the city, which 
has remained to this day. Christian groups – both Catholic and Orthodox – existed on 
the territory of today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina before the Ottomans arrival, and a 
wave of Sephardic Jews entered Sarajevo in the sixteenth century after their expulsion 
from Spain, increasing the multi-ethnic nature of the city and its religious buildings. 
However, because a hierarchy existed within the Ottoman Empire and Muslims held a 
privileged position, the religious edifices of non-Muslims could not exceed the height of 
the tallest mosque, which made early churches and synagogues quite small in 
comparison (Donia, 2006: 16). This fundamental feature of the city has been carried on 
through the centuries.  
 Although the multi-ethnic nature of the city refers to the four main ethno-
religious groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, other occupying forces and historical 
epochs also left their mark on the city. After a short-lived movement by the People’s 
Government following Ottoman rule, in 1878, Austro-Hungarian troops occupied Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, officially beginning a new phase of urban development in Sarajevo 
and in other cities. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Vienna-based order 
implemented an entirely new city plan for Sarajevo based on models of urban design in 
Western Europe, which created the blend of East and West for which Sarajevo is 
known. The Habsburgs focused a great deal of attention on urban development, 
especially in Sarajevo, which they wanted to shape into ‘an example of Habsburg 
administrative success’ (Ibid., 60). The Austro-Hungarian administration in Sarajevo, 
led by Benjamin Kállay von Nagy-Kálló, attempted to foster a multi-confessional 
Bosnian nationalism that they called bošnjaštvo in reaction to rising nationalist 
sentiment in the Serb and Croat communities (Ibid., 63). This new tactic created by the 
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administration contributed to planning that situated Christian religious buildings in the 
centre of the city outside of their prior mahalas, ostensibly creating a more egalitarian 
urban environment. Donia explains that: 
Kállay oversaw a rearrangement of central urban space. Under his 
direction the major religious, cultural and educational institutions of each 
religious community were clustered around a downtown square, and 
these small neighborhoods were placed in close proximity to one 
another. He therefore continued the policy, implicit in the building of the 
new Serbian Orthodox church…of divesting Muslims of their monopoly 
on monumental structures in the city centre (Ibid.) 
 
The Austro-Hungarian administration similarly built a number of major buildings for 
official use, including the Sarajevo city hall, also known as the Vijećnica, which they 
built in a pseudo-Moorish or neo-Oriental style featuring decorative motifs recalling 
Islamic architecture. Other buildings of note include the Regional Government or 
Presidency Building, styled with a neo-Renaissance façade, and the post office 
building. During this epoch, Sarajevo became what Felix Driver and David Gilbert 
(1999) refer to as an imperial city. It was based on the Viennese national model and 
became a project to highlight empire’s power through the built form. The new plan was 
based on Western European urban models, and the Sarajevan urban environment took 
on the ‘spirit of competition’ between imperial cities of this time (Ibid., 9). There is also 
the notion that, in this master plan, the Austro-Hungarian administration wished to bring 
Sarajevo back to Europe, so to speak, by Europeanising the city’s spaces and 
buildings.  
After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the descent into war 
that followed, urban development in Sarajevo came to much of a standstill until after 
the Second World War and the implementation of the socialist state. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina became part of the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia following the First World 
War, but unlike the massive urban plan that accompanied the regime change with the 
Habsburgs, Sarajevo saw very little urban development and only a few new buildings 
were constructed under the administration of the Kingdom (Ibid., 130). Because of 
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preference for Serb, Croat and Slovene cities – namely Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana 
– little attention was paid to more marginal areas of the new state, including Sarajevo. 
This time also saw increased economic stagnation, which led to the decrease in 
development and urbanisation. Of the few structures erected during this time, the most 
notable is the neoclassical Jewish synagogue in the middle of the old city. Until its 
construction, Jewish places of worship only existed outside of the centre (Ibid., 164). 
No other buildings significantly contributed to the city’s skyline or its identity as a multi-
ethnic urban centre under the rule of the Kingdom.  
 
Figure 2: Sarajevo 1929, courtesy of www.discusmedia.com, The 1900 Map Collection. 
 
 Unlike other socialist countries after the Second World War, Socialist 
Yugoslavia broke with the tradition of Socialist Realism early on, especially with respect 
to urban developments (Ibelings, 2010: 14). Instead of the neoclassical path favoured 
by early post-war Stalinist urbanism, Yugoslav buildings followed a more modernist 
design. Buildings made of steel and glass, such as the UNITIC towers and the 
parliament building, began to emerge from the skyline, adding to the already diverse 
character of the urban environment. The urban centre itself shifted during the post-war 
years, moving westward into the Marijin Dvor quarter of the city and further. In fact, by 
the 1960s, Marijin Dvor was considered to be part of the centre of Sarajevo, whereas it 
had been mostly residential before the Second World War (Karahasan, 1993: 21; 
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compare Figures 2 and 3). This growth westward also included numerous concrete 
residential complexes, which are typically socialist in character, in neighbourhoods 
such as Grbavica and Dobrinja. This architecture reflects a pan-Yugoslav identity, 
which was fostered after the Second World War and which increases the diversity of 
styles in Sarajevo’s built environment.  
 The Bosnian War of the 1990s and the Siege of Sarajevo, especially, changed 
the face of the city forever. Not only were major landmarks and historic buildings 
destroyed in the shelling of the city, but also reconstruction has altered the fundamental 
nature of the urban centre (Ibelings, 2010: 20). According to Hans Ibelings, ‘Post-war 
reconstruction has not meant reconstructing the country’s pre-war appearance’ (Ibid.), 
instead urban centres, including Sarajevo, are undergoing transformations, which are 
consequences of the privatisation process in the country and post-socialist 
transformation in general. While such changes have occurred in most post-socialist 
countries following pushes towards privatisation, the situation in BiH is somewhat 
special given its post-conflict nature. In fact, new constructions in Sarajevo’s built 
environment are overwriting the city on a fundamental level, and an Islamic shift of the 
city space is taking place in terms of new structures as well as in terms of 
demographics, both of which serve to create Sarajevo’s identity as a plural or multi-
ethnic city.  
 
4.3 Sarajevo’s Identity 
 Cities as spaces where humans live and circulate maintain specific identities 
and characteristics. Spatial identity not only involves the identities of the people that 
live and work within the urban areas – their cultures and ideals – but it is also based on 
the built environment and its influence in creating a climate for various visions and 
values. Structures and buildings give urban space a concrete foundation on which to 
build an identity, often influencing collective memories based on places of worship and 
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historical assets. That individual cities project specific identities should come as no 
surprise; many major cities throughout the world profit from these imaginaries. For 
example, Paris, ‘the city of light’, draws millions of tourists per year to experience its 
cafes and art nouveau architecture, while New York, ‘the city that never sleeps’, offers 
a 24-hour expanse of bars and restaurants, neon lights and trendy neighbourhoods. In 
a similar fashion, Sarajevo has been known for centuries by its particular idyllic multi-
ethnic urban identity (Greble, 2011: 2), which continues to represent the city and also 
influences tourism. However, this identity is in crisis; it is being torn between the city’s 
Islamic shift and notions of ‘Europeanisation’, making new interventions in the urban 
landscape particularly salient to the construction Sarajevan identity. 
 From the sixteenth century onward, Sarajevo became known as a ‘European 
Jerusalem’ (Makas, 2012), presented as embodying an innate multi-ethnic character of 
Muslim, Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and Jewish influences. Although the term 
‘European Jerusalem’ allegedly originally referred to Sarajevo’s role as a safe haven 
and new homeland for Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain (Ibid.), in later years it took 
on the significance of the multi-ethnic city. Only in Jerusalem and Sarajevo, it is 
claimed, can places of worship from the West’s four main religions be found within 100 
metres of one another. Although other cities with this particularity do exist (Ibid.), 
Sarajevo’s built environment is indeed rare in its religious and cultural plurality. Many 
authors and public figures cite the city’s multi-ethnic nature as its most remarkable 
identifier, the basis of its local and international image, and they believe that Sarajevo’s 
plurality continues to exist, despite the events of the twentieth century (Karahasan, 
1993; Jestrović, 2013; Lagunina, 2012; and Markowitz, 2010). 
 The multi-ethnic image of Sarajevo originates from two sources: the city’s built 
environment and its demographics (Makas, 2012), but both of these are in flux. 
Sarajevo has always had a Muslim majority. However before the war in the 1990s, the 
ratios between the main ethno-religious groups in the city were slightly more balanced. 
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In the early twentieth century, for example, 38% of the population was Muslim, 27% 
was Catholic Croat and 24% was Serb Orthodox with 11% identifying as other (Ibid.). 
Just before the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia, the citizens identifying as Muslim in 
the city accounted for 49.2% of the population. The Serb Orthodox population at this 
time numbered 29.8%, while Catholic Croats had 6.6% and people identifying as 
Yugoslav or ‘other’ brought up the remaining 14.3% (Markowitz, 2007: 55). The post-
war census numbers are staggeringly different. Now the Muslim majority makes up 
roughly 80% of the city’s population, dwarfing the numbers of Catholic Croats, Serb 
Orthodox and others (Makas, 2012; and Markowitz, 2007: 55. See also the 2013 
census statistics on population demographics, Popis, 2013). Because of this ethnic 
homogenisation of the city in terms of strict census demographics, the city’s identity as 
multi-ethnic – and a home for the four ethno-religious communities in BiH – is in 
danger. In fact, some have claimed that the multi-ethnic nature of Sarajevo is dead 
(Markowitz, 2010: 13 and Troncota, 2015: 132). However, the persistent vision of the 
city as a multi-ethnic space continues despite this demographic shift.  
 In terms of the built environment, the identity of Sarajevo as a multi-ethnic city is 
additionally threatened. As with demographics, Muslim religious structures in Sarajevo 
have always outnumbered the places of worship for the Christian and Jewish 
populations (See Figures 3 and 4 below). In the 1990s before the war, there were 
dozens of mosques in the city, but there were only about ten churches and synagogues 
(Makas, 2012). Since the war and with transnational capital from Muslim countries and 
diaspora populations around the world, the number of mosques in Sarajevo has 
skyrocketed (Makas, 2012; and Markowitz, 2010: 46). Many of these buildings do not 
adhere to the traditional architecture for mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following 
instead modern designs from places as distant as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Kuwait. 
The number of churches in Sarajevo has remained relatively the same since the war 
(Ibid.), although a couple of new churches have been built in the western quarters of 
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the city, including the Church of St.Ignatius in the Grbavica area of the city, which was 
finished in 2014. Thus, if Sarajevo’s multi-ethnic identity is based on demographics and 
the built environment, yet both of these are Muslim dominated, then the continued use 
of multi-ethnic imaginaries to describe and represent the city must be beneficial to 
specific actors. 
 
Figure 3: Sarajevo 1997, mosques and Muslim places of worship as circles, Christian and Jewish places of worship as 




Figure 4: Sarajevo 2017, mosques and Muslim places of worship as circlesi, secular buildings under shari’ah law or 
unfinished Muslim buildings as triangles, Christian and Jewish places of worship as squares (map taken from Perry-
Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas, Austin, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia.html, data taken 
from openstreetmap.org, 20171). 
  
 Despite the reality of the city’s Islamic shift, Sarajevo’s image as a multi-ethnic 
city exists in the present. ‘Multicultural Sarajevo’ is continually constructed and 
represented for various audiences, and this discourse serves specific actors in the city 
for touristic and political purposes. According to Makas, ‘Urban identities are similarly 
shaped by specific actors, who selectively remember and strategically forget, and who 
consciously seek to create an image that serves political or other motives in the 
present. In the case of cities often that motive is attracting tourists, and it is even 
described as city-branding in much of the literature’ (Makas, 2012). Sarajevo has been 
branded a ‘multicultural’, multi-ethnic city, drawing from its real history as a city that has 
housed people from various different ethno-religious groups. Its built environment still 
reflects that history, despite the city’s turn towards an Islamic shift demographically and 
																																																													1	The	locations	of	new	buildings	in	Sarajevo	were	taken	from	http://www.openstreetmaps.org,	which	shows	the	contemporary	city,	including	places	of	worship	and	new	shopping	centres.	This	data	was	overlayed	onto	the	map	taken	from	Perry-Castañeda	Library	Map	Collection,	University	of	Texas,	Austin,	http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia.html	
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architecturally, and this multi-ethnic nature is highlighted for tourist purposes (Ibid.). A 
somewhat recent example that shows exactly how the city has been branded is the 
website for the commemoration of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand – 
Sarajevo Srce Europe (Sarajevo Heart of Europe), which can be found at 
http://www.sarajevosrceeurope.org. The very first line of the website reads, ‘Sarajevo, 
deemed as “the Jerusalem of Europe”, holds a special place in European history’ 
(http://www.sarajevosrceeurope.org). The website clearly banks on the image of 
Sarajevo’s multiconfessional past. Similarly, Emily Makas has shown that the Tourist 
Association, guidebooks, and various museums in Sarajevo reflect and promote the 
historical multi-ethnic fabric of the city (Makas, 2012). Makas claims that: 
  Stressing Sarajevo’s history of coexistence and the heightened claims 
  for a multicultural image in the past twenty years can be understood in 
  large part as a reaction to wartime and postwar threats to that identity 
  posed by Serb, Croat and Muslim nationalists. The image of Sarajevo, 
  the capital of Bosnia, as a multicultural city of centuries of peaceful 
  coexistence is at once a statement of fact about the city’s history as well 
  as an understanding of the city constructed in the present (Ibid.).  
 
Despite post-war Islamic shift, Sarajevo is actively being constructed in the present as 
a plural and multi-ethnic city. This image is important for many actors in the city – both 
international and local – and it continues to play a role in how local inhabitants view 
and experience their city.  
 In addition to ‘multiculturalism’ or its multi-ethnic nature, Sarajevo has also been 
known as a ‘meeting point’ of eastern and western cultures. Sarajevo, according to this 
image, is the bridge from the West (understood as Europe) to the East (ostensibly 
Asia), making it an exotic locale, especially for tourists from Europe and North America. 
Makas states that, ‘despite its recent domination of the discourse, multiculturalism is 
not the only image of Sarajevo that has existed historically or that exists today. 
Seeming almost as a contradiction, Sarajevo has also been envisioned as an oriental, 
exotic, Islamic city’ (Ibid.). This second representation of the city stands slightly in 
contrast with the ‘multicultural’ representation, seeing Sarajevo as the beginning of the 
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Islamic world (or, perhaps, the end of the Christian world), highlighting Islam as a key 
factor in the city’s identity.  
 However, while the city’s eastern influences are certainly a focus in this 
representation of the city, especially for tourist purposes, there is some overlap 
between the two main visions of Sarajevo. The city brands itself as a meeting point, not 
just an Islamic city, as Makas would suggest. In fact, the Sarajevo Meeting of Cultures 
project (http://www.smoc.ba) has recently added a pavement instalment at the 
entrance to Baščaršija, the historic Ottoman old town. This instalment exists of tiles in 
the shape of a compass pointing to the East and the West. On each side of the 
compass the words ‘Sarajevo Meeting of Cultures’ are written for pedestrians passing 
(Figure 5). Additionally, there is an informative sign nearby that gives information about 
the Sarajevo Meeting of Cultures project. The idea of the city as a bridge has, thus, 
literally been inscribed into the urban environment of Sarajevo. While this bridging of 
cultures and ethnic mixing are continuously used in discourses about Sarajevo, 
nowhere is there a representation of the city as purely Muslim.   
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 Adding another layer to the complex matrix of Sarajevan identity, some scholars 
have argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina has been in a process of ‘Europeanisation’ 
since the nineteenth century, which coincides with notions of cosmopolitanism 
attributed to the city. According to Maria Todorova (2009): 
There is a widespread notion that the Balkans began losing their identity 
once they began to Europeanize. That this phrasing implies their 
difference from Europe obvious. Far more interesting is the fact that the 
process of ‘Europeanization,’ ‘Westernization’ or ‘modernization’ of the 
Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries included the spread of 
rationalism and secularization, the intensification commercial activities 
and industrialization, the formation of a bourgeoisie and other new social 
groups in the economic and social sphere, and above all, the triumph of 
the bureaucratic nation-state. From this point of view the Balkans were 
becoming European by shedding the last residue of an imperial legacy, 
widely considered an anomaly at the time, and by assuming and 
emulating the homogeneous European nation-state as the normative 
form of social organization. It may well be what we are witnessing today, 
wrongly attributed to some Balkan essence, is the ultimate 
Europeanization of the Balkans. If the Balkans are, as I think they are, 
tantamount to their Ottoman legacy, this is an advanced stage of the 
end of the Balkans (13). 
 
Beginning with the Austro-Hungarian occupation, Sarajevan identity took on an aspect 
of ‘Europeanisation’. According to Emily Greble (2011) ‘with the importation of 
Viennese arts, architecture, and ideology, many of Sarajevo’s elite began to think of 
their city as a special cosmopolitan enclave.’ (6) Since this time, Sarajevo’s identity has 
held a tension between the bridging of East and West discussed above and 
‘Europeanisation’. Since the conflict in the 1990s, this trend has been maintained, 
especially as Bosnia and Herzegovina is taking part in the Stabilisation and Association 
Process necessary for admittance into the European Union. Europe, then, is somewhat 
of an end goal for Sarajevo, as the country moves closer to attaining EU status.  
Sarajevo’s various representations stand in contrast to the real processes that 
the city has been undergoing since the war in the 1990s. The city’s image as a multi-
ethnic city and as a meeting point between the West and the East pervades the 
discourses about the city, despite demographic trends in the census toward ethnic 
homogenisation and an increase in architecture with Islamic influences. In such a 
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setting, any urban interventions that add to a loss of ethnic plurality in the city will have 
to endure a backlash against the ‘multicultural’ imaginary, which underscores 
multiplicity. Constructed in the present, but based on its historical roots, Sarajevo is 
represented both locally and internationally as the Jerusalem of Europe, an image that 
is constantly employed by residents, tourist agencies, the international community and 
government actors alike. Yet many of these same local and international actors have 
created policies including the Dayton Accords and privatisation measures that have 
contributed to the overwriting of Sarajevo’s plurality in real terms, even in the face of 
the continued employment of these urban representations.  
 
4.4 Urbanism and the Urban Environment 
4.4.1 City During War and Urban Destruction 
 The urban environment plays a leading role in Sarajevo’s Islamic shift, yet, 
perhaps ironically, these processes could not have been possible without the massive 
destruction of the city during the Siege of Sarajevo by Serb forces trying to cleanse the 
city of Muslims. The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived in Sarajevo in 1992 when 
Bosnian Serb forces surrounded the city, besieging it and closing it off from external 
access. The attack on the city and its people began in April of that year and lasted 
1,425 days, finally ending on 29 February 1996 after the signing of the Dayton Accords 
on 14 December 1995. Not only did tens of thousands of people – military as well as 
civilians – lose their lives in Sarajevo during the siege, but the urban environment also 
suffered mass destruction and the loss of irreplaceable, historic buildings. Sacred and 
secular structures in the city from all ethnic groups became the objects of targeted 
destruction, which left the city scarred and devastated for years after the cessation of 
conflict. In fact, to this day bullet holes and craters from mortar shells on buildings, 
streets and pedestrian areas still testify to the brutal attack on the city and its 
architecture during the siege.  
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 The Bosnian Serb forces surrounding the city destroyed a vast number of 
residential, cultural and commercial buildings in Sarajevo, but the targeted destruction 
of cultural and religious edifices in the city became a prominent feature of the siege. 
This seemingly intentional elimination of both sacred and secular cultural structures led 
scholars to label the devastation during the Bosnian War and during the Siege of 
Sarajevo, specifically, as ‘urbicide’ (Boyer, 2012: 329 and Herscher, 2008: 40). 
According to Martin Coward (2008), ‘the term “urbicide” became popular during the 
1992-95 Bosnian war as a way of referring to widespread and deliberate destruction of 
the urban environment. Coined by writers on urban development in America, urbicide 
captures the sense that the widespread and deliberate destruction of buildings is a 
distinct form of violence’. However, even though Serb forces were perpetrating the 
crimes against the city, no ethno-religious group’s structures were safe from their 
mortar shells and bullets. In fact, the central Serbian Orthodox cathedral and other 
Orthodox religious buildings sustained damage during the siege (Donia, 2009: 314), 
making the destruction often seem random rather than targeted. Despite this, cultural 
institutions with no ethno-religious affiliation suffered more than any other type of 
structure, and one of the most important cultural institutions in Sarajevo – the Austro-
Hungarian city hall or Vijećnica, which housed the National Library – burned to the 
ground along with most of its contents during the night of the 25 and 26 August 1992. 
The bombing of the Vijećnica resulted in the loss of invaluable and irreplaceable books, 
collections and archives, adding to the devastating loss of the historic building itself. 
Librarians, fire fighters and everyday citizens worked throughout the night to save what 
they could from the burning building, but Serb forces ensured its complete annihilation 
(Riedlmayer, 1995). Other common cultural institutions that the Serbs targeted and 
destroyed included the Olympic Museum (held in a historic Austro-Hungarian villa) and 
the Oriental Institute, which housed Ottoman-era manuscripts and artefacts testifying to 
the cultural achievements of all the ethno-religious groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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(Donia, 2009: 314). Almost all sacred buildings – mosques, churches and synagogues 
alike – bore some destruction during the siege.  
 However, cultural institutions and buildings were not the only structures targeted 
during the siege. Government buildings also incurred great damage, and chief among 
these was the modern glass and steel parliament building in the Marijin Dvor section of 
the city, which was built in 1982 and then shelled and burned in 1992. The UNIS 
towers – major commercial structures in the city also located in Marijin Dvor – had 
similar fates and were completely shelled and burned during the siege. Civil structures 
such as hospitals and the post office also became the objects of attacks. The main 
hospital in the city, Koševo Hospital, went without electricity and critical supplies 
throughout much of the war, and Dragan Kalinić, the minister of health of the Republika 
Srpska, suggested that the hospital be attacked and destroyed to deprive the enemy of 
medical assistance (Ibid., 315). In an attempt to halt the independent flow of news from 
outside Sarajevo, Serb forces attacked press institutions. They shelled the offices of 
the newspaper Oslobodjenje and hit the television and radio outlets, although theses 
were able to withstand the multiple attacks and continued to function throughout the 
siege (Ibid.). Almost all the buildings in the city experiences some damage, evidence of 
which remains today throughout Sarajevo in the form of unrepaired bullet holes and 
mortar craters.  
 Not only was the urban environment devastated during the siege, but daily life 
in the city also became arduous and difficult to endure. The besieging Serb forces 
strangled the flow of necessary goods and utilities into the city. Electricity, gas, water, 
food, public transportation and medical supplies all became targets, and the city went 
mostly without these goods and services throughout the siege. The scarcity of such 
necessities led people to risk their lives just to find bread and water, lining up for such 
goods at public markets and making themselves vulnerable to sniper attacks and 
shellings. In fact, Serb forces more than once attacked public places where citizens 
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were queuing for food and water, killing and injuring many innocent civilians. To add 
insult to injury, they then also attacked ambulances and rescue services attempting to 
help the wounded after such attacks (Ibid., 316). Simply crossing the city to find the 
staples for survival put one’s life at risk, yet such outings were necessary for basic 
survival.  
 The people of Sarajevo, however, did not simply give up throughout the siege, 
although some international journalists painted such a picture of Sarajevans at the time 
(Jestrović, 2013: 120). A sense of solidarity amongst the citizens of the besieged city 
grew throughout the war, and a vibrant cultural life actually existed despite the 
harrowing daily struggle for survival, reminding residents of life before the war (Maček, 
2000: 60). According to Silvija Jestrović (2013), ‘During the war, 3102 artistic and 
cultural events took place or on average 2.5 events per day!’ (121) Sarajevans 
themselves organised most of these events and cultural activities, although some 
foreigners – notably Susan Sontag – also arranged cultural events in the city during the 
siege. Additionally, a very dark aspect to the traditional Bosnian humour was born 
during the war, and people joked and laughed throughout the siege. This contradiction 
of the image of the people of the city as passive suffering victims attests not only to the 
strength of character of the average citizen, but also to their ability to comment and 
critique the situation, all while maintaining the typical, self-deprecating Sarajevan 
humour (Maček, 2000: 60-61). 
 The Siege of Sarajevo destroyed some 60% of the city’s buildings (Bollens, 
2007: 242) and damaged most of the historic, culturally significant structures in the city. 
In addition, important buildings used for government, press and commercial purposes 
also suffered at the hands of the besieging forces. Because of the widespread 
destruction in the city, reconstruction has proven to be a monumental task that has 
been greatly impaired by a lack of funding in general. Of the funding that has been 
given to reconstruction in Sarajevo, much has come from varied international sources, 
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including the European Union, diaspora communities and countries from the greater 
Muslim world. 
 
4.4.2 Post-war Sarajevo: Bounding, Separating and Homogenising 
The post-war urban environment in Sarajevo has been transformed greatly 
since the end of the Siege of Sarajevo. Although many post-socialist cities in Europe 
experienced massive changes to the urban landscape after the fall of the socialist 
systems (to be discussed more below), Sarajevo has dealt with both a post-socialist 
transition and a transition from a zone of conflict, giving way to extensive shifts in the 
composition of the built environment. This change in composition – both 
demographically as well as architecturally – has been a consequence of the Dayton 
Peace Accords. Dayton signalled the end of violent conflict in late 1995, but as a 
whole, the accords have created an incredibly complex governmental structure that, for 
Sarajevo, inhibits urban planning and growth. Because of Dayton’s creation of 
ethnically homogenous entities – the Federation of Muslims and Croats and the 
Republika Srpska (RS) – fundamental changes to the populations resulting from this 
organisation have led to developments in the urban environment. For Sarajevo this has 
been one of the main causes of the city’s Islamic shift.  
 The dual-entity system established with the Dayton Accords creates bounded, 
ethnically homogeneous areas within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Figure 6). 
The Federation of Muslims and Croats, or simply the Federation, encompasses cities 
such as Mostar and Tuzla, while the Republika Srpska holds Banja Luka and Trebinje. 
Sarajevo’s status within the system of entities in BiH proves to be somewhat special. 
The majority of the urban land of the city exists within the Federation, but the Inter-
Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) cuts through the urban area of the city outside the main 
city centre. This part of the Republika Srpska, called Istočno Sarajevo or East 
Sarajevo, is at once part of the city and a different area altogether. Importantly, the 
	 117	
IEBL signals the transition from one ethnically homogeneous area to another inside the 
urban sphere of Sarajevo. Yet, while this boundary exists, Sarajevo is not a divided city 
along the lines of Jerusalem, Nicosia or even Mostar (Bollens, 2007: 243). The majority 
of the city is Muslim, including most of the commercial areas and the old town. The RS 
only exists in the outer suburbs of the city.  
 
Figure 6: East Sarajevo (Istočno Sarajevo) in relation to the centre of the city (left centre of map), map from the Touristic 
Organisation of East Sarajevo, http://www.turizam-isa.ba/sr/smjestaj.html. 
 
 A large Serb population weathered the siege alongside Muslims and Croats in 
solidarity with the city’s population (Ibid.). However, the multi-ethnic city that had 
existed before the war ‘died at the peace-making table’ (Bollens, 2008: 1272), and 
most of the city’s Serbs departed into the RS soon after the signing of Dayton. Bollens 
explains that, ‘Dayton’s ethnic circumscription of space after the war catalysed a mass 
exodus in early 1996 of some 62,000 Sarajevo Serbs from inside what would be the 
Dayton borders of Sarajevo city and its suburbs and created the more mono-ethnic city 
of today (Ibid.). The international community and local politicians discussed a plan to 
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reincorporate Sarajevo’s Serb population back into the centre of the city, but this would 
also mean their incorporation into the Muslim-Croat Federation. Bollens posits that had 
a ‘spatially expansive zone that spanned entity boundaries’ (Ibid.) been created for 
Sarajevo specifically, more of the Serb population would have stayed in the city, giving 
it a more diverse demographic. 
 Along with Serbs leaving the Federation for the RS, Muslims caught within the 
boundaries of the Republika Srpska after the signing of Dayton also fled en masse to 
Muslim dominated parts of the Federation, especially Sarajevo. These immigrants to 
the city took up shelter in abandoned houses, and increased the percentage of Muslim 
residents in relation to other ethno-religious groups. Efforts to help displaced people 
return to their pre-war homes within the city mostly failed due to fears of inter-group 
tensions and conflict (Bollens, 2007: 244). The failure of return programs for displaced 
people means that many people originally from Sarajevo continue to live in other areas 
of Bosnia or abroad, including in Croatia and Serbia, and that the current population of 
the city comprises a mostly mono-ethnic number of Muslims originating from various 
parts of BiH.  
    
4.4.3 Post-war Sarajevan Urbanism: Reconstruction, Planning, Privatisation 
 Ethnic homogenisation of the city has been one side of the changing urban 
landscape in Sarajevo; the built environment has also undergone a substantial change 
in appearance due to post-war reconstruction, planning and post-socialist privatisation. 
As a post-conflict society, reconstruction is a necessary process, but Bosnia and 
Herzegovina also transitioned from a socialist economy. Post-socialist societies in 
Central and Eastern Europe all witnessed similar processes in the urban environment, 
especially in terms of the nationalizing of spaces and the development of privately 
owned commerce. In many cases, politicians pushed forward changes in the built 
environment – such as the renaming of roads and the instalment of new monuments – 
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that eliminated reminders of the socialist rule and emphasised the pre-socialist nation 
(Diener and Hagen, 2013). A ‘flash malling of post-socialist Central Europe’ also 
occurred, and privatisation led to a massive increase in the number of shopping 
centres and retail establishments in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Garb and Dybicz, 2006: 232). Foreign direct investment has been a major source of 
this ‘retail revolution’, transforming these societies into competitive markets. Similar 
processes have been at work in Sarajevo as well, but the post-conflict reconstruction 
has compounded the extent to which the urban environment is changing. Since the 
war, the number of mosques and other Muslim religious structures constructed within 
the city limits has grown greatly, altering the multi-ethnic nature of the city’s urban 
fabric (Makas, 2012; and Markowitz, 2010: 46). Additionally, secular constructions such 
as shopping malls and hotels have increasingly been built using shari’ah compliant 
financing from Muslim countries, which stipulates that after the construction of the 
building, activities on the site must conform to certain rules. These rules indicate that 
there should be no eating of pork, no gambling and no selling or consuming of alcohol 
on the premises of a structure built with Islamic financing (Karim, 2010: 109-110). The 
city was in dire need of new investment in order to continue its economic and 
architectural reconstruction, and new interventions bring vital capital into the city. 
However, they also add to the mono-ethnic character of the urban environment, and 
there is some suggestion, as I will discuss below, that corruption in privatisation 
practices favoured investments with Islamic financing. In addition to an overall 
nationalizing of spaces akin to processes in other post-socialist cities, speculation in 
Sarajevo hints at the idea that corruption in planning, reconstruction and privatisation 
have all contributed to the Islamic shift of Sarajevo’s city space.  
 In terms of general urban trends, despite the massive destruction that Sarajevo 
suffered during the siege, the old city structure of mahalas surrounding the old town 
centre is still visible. These neighbourhoods continue to exist, although they have 
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begun to change in accordance with the evolving urban landscape of the city. Old 
Town does not often receive new, modern constructions, but it is the location for 
reconstructions of historic buildings such as the Austro-Hungarian Town Hall or 
Vijećnica, whose reconstruction finished in 2014. This makes logistical sense, as more 
useable plots of land exist outside of historic city centre. The main commercial centre 
has now shifted to the Marijin Dvor quarter of the city extending westward towards 
Ilidža. Most of the newer constructions in the city are built between Marijin Dvor and 
Ilidža, including new shopping centres, all of which are examples of post-war FDI in 
Sarajevo: the Saudi- and UAE-funded BBI Centre, the Saudi-funded Sarajevo City 
Centre (both of which will be used as case studies later in this thesis), and the mostly 
American-funded Alta Shopping Centre.  
 As with other post-socialist cities, Sarajevo has transformed its socialist legacy 
in the urban environment. Many post-socialist cities tried to either bury or minimize the 
socialist past in the urban environment by renaming streets and removing monuments. 
In Hungary statues from that era were even uprooted from their original locations and 
grouped together in a communist-themed statue mortuary outside of Budapest called 
Memento Park. However, BiH’s relationship with its socialist past is somewhat more 
complicated than other countries from the region. Many people believe life was better 
under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and this shows in the built 
environment as well. In Sarajevo, the main street leading from Old Town to Marijin Dvor 
is still called Tito’s Street (Titova Ulica), and the eternal flame commemorating the 
partisans who died in the Second World War burns to this day. Yet the renaming of 
streets occurred on a large scale after the end of the war. A commission run mostly by 
Bosnian Muslims renamed most of the city streets associated with Serbs or with 
Serbia, and these streets took on names directly associated either with Sarajevo or 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not all of the new names reflected Bosnian Muslims, but 
many did (Robinson et al., 2001: 967). Before the war, most street signs were blue and 
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were written in both the Cyrillic and the Latin scripts. The commission after the war 
removed these street signs and replaced them with green signs solely in the Latin 
script, reflecting the move towards a mono-ethnic city (Maček, 2000: 171).   
 In terms of city planning, gaining permission for a new construction or for a 
reconstruction proves to be a complex, time consuming and frustrating process. Each 
of the municipalities is responsible for building permissions within its boundaries, and 
individuals and companies must apply to the municipality for permission. Gaining 
permission takes at least a year if all the paperwork has been correctly submitted, and 
after initial permission has been granted based on urban requirements and the city 
plan, the second phase, which includes permission for utilities such as water and 
electricity, begins. The municipalities look toward the Canton for the city plan, which 
was originally mapped out in 1986. The Canton also controls the regulatory plans for 
the different quarters of the city, and the municipalities must refer to the Canton and its 
documents when deciding on permission for a structure. However, in my interview with 
a city planning professional in Sarajevo, my contact (to be kept anonymous) stated that 
the Canton’s plans can easily be modified or circumvented depending on the 
construction and who is asking for permission. Knowing how to play the system and 
having high-level political contacts seems as important for new constructions as having 
sound engineering and architecture. According to Bollens, ‘illegal construction and the 
influence of political connections significantly shape the location and magnitude of 
development’ in Sarajevo (Bollens, 2006: 100). Not only is it an incredibly old system 
that needs to be redesigned, but connections and corruption also play a major role in 
the urban planning of the city.  
 Urban planning is just one side of the developing urban environment in 
Sarajevo. Another factor greatly influencing what new urban interventions are being 
constructed is, of course, the privatisation of the land and properties in and around the 
city. Like all post-socialist countries, privatisation after the collapse of the socialist 
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system became an important factor in political and economic development, but 
because of the particularities of the post-conflict environment in BiH, privatisation in the 
country did not follow the best practices and lessons learned from other countries in the 
region (Martin, 2004: 1118). The international community following USAID’s lead took 
the reins of BiH privatisation, but the process became complex, and they implemented 
a mixture of privatisation methods. The main methods they employed were voucher 
privatisation and tenders of state assets (Ibid.).  
 According to my interview with an investigative journalist in Sarajevo, the 
tendering of state assets has been highly corrupt. Properties have been repeatedly 
sold for a fraction of their value, favouring ‘well-connected insiders of the “right” 
ethnicity’ over all others (Donais, 2002: 3). In Sarajevo, the ‘right ethnicity’ in terms of 
political connections is Bosnian Muslims, extending to all those with ties to Islam. At 
auction, bidders can bring down the price of a property using loopholes in the law. 
Companies and individuals usually pay 10% of the initial price of a property as a 
deposit and a fee of 1% before auction (Federal Agency for Privatisation). Those who 
do not win the bid will receive this money back in full, but the winner must pay the 
deposit and fee. However, the winning individual or company is not legally obliged to 
honour the deal, and except for the deposit and fee, there are no guarantees to back 
these transactions. Additionally, a list of individuals and companies that have not 
honoured their deals does not exist, so anyone privy to this system can back out of 
their commitments time and again. Once the highest bidder has refused to pay for the 
property, there is a second or a third auction, at which the price for the asset will have 
been slashed. It is assumed that, since the first bidder backed out of the deal, the land 
or property is not worth the value of the previous bid. Through this system it is possible 
for one individual or company to pay other individuals or companies slightly more than 
the initial deposit and fee for the auction, benefitting both parties. To illustrate this, an 
example of this corruption would take the following form: Company Z would pay 
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Company X (the first bidder) to bid and back out of the deal. They would pay slightly 
more than the deposit and fee, giving Company X a profit. When the asset goes to 
auction for a second time, Company Z would pay Company Y (the second bidder) 
similarly. At the third auction, once the property is being sold for a fraction of its worth, 
Company Z would finally make its own tender, snapping up important real estate for 
just pennies on the dollar, including the money paid to Company X and Y, according to 
my interview with an investigative journalist working on corruption in Sarajevo. 
 Corruption in privatisation was not limited to the auctioning of assets. The 
voucher system also proved highly problematic and benefited mostly the elite and their 
cronies. Donais (2002) explains that, ‘[there was not] much concern that the voucher 
component of Bosnia’s privatisation programme… would tend to reinforce ethnic 
divisions and provide opportunities for the wealthy, the corrupt and the politically-
connected to consolidate power’ (6). This system gave all citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shares of the state-owned companies and assets during the privatisation 
process in the form of vouchers called certifikati. Individuals could take the vouchers 
and transform them into shares ‘directly or through managed investment funds’ (Ibid., 
8). However, the wealthy and politically-connected quickly learned how to amass these 
shares and gain a majority stake. Because the everyday people at the time did not see 
a direct cash payout from investing in the newly privatised assets, many sold their 
vouchers for a fraction of their actual value (Ibid., 9). Men working for the elite camped 
out at places such as the eternal flame in Sarajevo offering to give cash for vouchers. 
Soon a secondary market was created, which gave rise to the development of a small 
elite holding majority shares – sometimes through dummy corporations – in important 
properties and companies throughout the country (Ibid., 10 and interview with BiH 
journalist working on corruption). This privatisation process has affected the 
development of the urban landscape in Sarajevo in a major way, as a small fraction of 
the population owns the most highly sought-after land and properties in the city.  
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Political agendas have been mixed with economic development and 
reconstruction, and some scattered evidence suggests that certain politicians are 
pushing for a stronger Muslim presence in Sarajevo’s space. For example, in 2003, 
Bosna Bank International (BBI) – an investment bank founded by the Islamic 
Development Bank in Saudi Arabia, the Dubai Islamic Bank, and the Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank (to be discussed further in the following chapters) – bought the main socialist 
department store in the centre of the city for a mere 10 million BAM, or around €5.1 
Million. Considering that the Italian company Benetton had previously bid €38 Million 
for the site, the final selling price of only €5 Million seems somewhat odd. This coupled 
with the fact that a major Bošnjak (Muslim) politician, Bakir Izetbegović, received a 
monthly allowance of 5,000 BAM to ‘oversee’ the construction of the BBI Centre 
(‘Weekly Profiles: Bosnia’s Wealthiest Politicians’, September 10, 2008) points to the 
utilisation of the corrupt privatisation method described above and personal agendas 
mixed into reconstruction.   
 
4.4.4 Post-war Sarajevo: Spaces for All Citizens? 
 There has been an overall Islamic shift in the city spaces in Sarajevo, and 
alongside this process, open public spaces for everyday citizens and common cultural 
heritage have been neglected. Along with the destruction of the war, little by little, 
urbanisation and privatisation in the city has led to diminishing parks and garden 
spaces, public spaces that have been privatised, and common cultural heritage in crisis 
without funding. The three of these combined result in fewer open public spaces that 
have no ethno-national affiliation for the citizens of the city to enjoy, thus reducing the 
multi-ethnic nature of city and the everyday quality of life of its citizens. 
 Common cultural heritage – heritage sites that attest to the common history and 
culture of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that bridge all ethnic groups in the 
country – are currently in crisis, and the main cause of this crisis is the structure of the 
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Dayton Accords. Dayton makes no provision for a state-level ministry of culture, 
leading to confusion regarding the responsibility for these institutions. Because no body 
of government is directly responsible for the funding of common cultural heritage, they 
are left without reliable budgets and must apply for basic operating funds on an annual 
basis. While Dayton does not provide for a state-level ministry of culture, a commission 
responsible for the preservation of national monuments (Annex 8) was developed 
(Musi, 2012: 2), but this still does not solve the problem of funding for common cultural 
heritage. The result of this omission from the Accords is the slow administrative death 
of major cultural institutions. For example, the National Museum was forced to shut its 
doors between 2012 and 2015 because it could not afford to maintain regular working 
hours and pay its bills, and the National and University Library, which was once housed 
in the historic Austro-Hungarian city hall – the Vijećnica – has to fight to provide 
salaries for its staff and to pay its electrical bills in its current location in the old army 
barracks. The reconstruction of the Vijećnica has finished, but the library will only 
partially be housed in its walls and will instead be a home for the city administration 
(Hartmann, 2016).  
 As mentioned above, a number of shopping centres have been built in the city 
since the war, giving the people places to stroll and shop. However, these spaces are 
all heavily controlled and policed by private security firms, making them ‘quasi-public’ 
spaces – or spaces that are legally private but which form part of the public sphere 
(Carmona et al, 2010: 111). When these developments have been built using Islamic 
financing, the activities on the site are controlled. These shopping centres often have 
large squares associated with them; the BBI Centre, for example, sits on a large 
square with cafes and benches. People can sit on these areas, but they are not green 
areas, and activities such as picnicking would be uncomfortable on cement and might 
not be allowed by the security firms. Thus while they are in essence public spaces, 
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shopping malls allow only passing traffic for shopping and the consumption of 
authorised food and beverage in approved cafes.  
 The number of parks has similarly been severely diminished since the war, 
leaving the people few outdoor places to relax on warm summer days. As an 
unfortunate consequence of the large number of human casualties during the war, 
many of the city parks that had existed prior to the conflict were used for cemeteries 
during and after the siege. Thomas Sacher (2012) remarks that, ‘most former parks 
and green spaces have been turned into cemeteries. The largest one, in the Kosevo 
quarter, covers the entire football pitch of one of the former Olympic stadiums’ (1). In 
relation to other European cities, the percentage of parks and natural spaces in the city 
of Sarajevo is quite low and decreasing with urbanisation and post-war development 
(Kunovac et al, 2005). A new Marriott hotel in the Čobanija area of the city, for 
example, will control the small park nearby, diminishing the number of outdoor public 
areas accessible to the general population. With respect to this new hotel, the online 
forum Sarajevo Construction (www.sa-c.net) states that, ‘having in mind that the usage 
of park in the vicinity of the construction site will not be possible for personal security 
reason [sic] the investor has undertaken all necessary measures to protect the green 
areas. In addition, the SEIC and committed to rearrange the park and provide it a new 
content once the construction works are finalized’ (Sarajevo Construction). It seems 
that after construction of the hotel is finished, the park will be re-landscaped for the 
benefit of the hotel and its guests. It is not clear how much access the general 
population will have to the area, but like with the shopping centres, this once public 
area will exist as a legally private part of the public sphere and subject to control and 




 Analyzing the post-conflict urban environment in Sarajevo is necessary for 
understanding the impact of new interventions within this historically multi-ethnic city. 
The history of the city’s growth and its identity shape how residents see their urban 
landscape, especially when, as in Sarajevo, the image of the city is deeply ingrained in 
the urban imaginary. Cities are key sites for change around the world, and in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Sarajevo holds a special place within the country as the largest city 
and as the governmental and administrative capital. It is here, often, that new ideas are 
shaped and formed and where the rest of the country looks for leadership. Yet the 
Islamic shift, with its new urban interventions from GCC countries and post-conflict 
urban processes, is changing the very nature of the city, allowing for emergent cultural 
forms to develop. These forces are shaping the city away from the idealised version of 
Sarajevan identity based on ‘multiculturalism’.   
 Examining the changing urban space of Sarajevo requires a somewhat 
sensitive approach. There is a certain amount of hysteria that surrounds popular 
understandings of Islam, especially in Europe and in North America, and some 
scholars have even discussed the rising tide of radical Islam in the Balkans with as 
much panic (see, for example, Deliso, 2007; Morrison, 2008; and Shay, 2008). That 
transnational processes are bringing more Muslim investments to Sarajevo should not 
necessarily be taken in and of itself as something suspicious or dangerous. In fact, 
Sarajevo needed an injection of foreign direct investment after the war to help rebuild 
its economy and urban spaces. However, a phenomenon is now taking place in the city 
in which Sarajevo’s spaces and demographics are becoming more Muslim in character. 
In order to avoid the negative connotations associated with the word Islamisation, I 
have described this process as an Islamic shift in the city.  
 These processes are contributing to the city’s identity crisis. As the country 
moves towards European Union membership and as the city’s historically accepted 
identity erodes in the face of the Islamic shift, tensions between what is perceived as 
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the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ are growing. This mono-ethnic character of the city is a direct 
result of post-conflict policies, including Dayton’s ethnic partitioning and the 
privatisation process, which has been corrupt and has favoured certain individuals and 
cultures over others. Although the city’s Islamic shift should not be viewed as negative, 
in the context of a historically multi-ethnic city, it does have implications for how the 
city’s residents respond to new urban interventions with funding from the Gulf. In the 
following chapters, I will explore exactly how these new interventions in the urban 
landscape are being debated and discussed and the implications that this has for 




5. Sarajevo’s Commercial Investments: Perceptions of Corruption and Investor 
Urbanism in Post-Conflict and Post-Socialist Urban Development 
 
5.1 Introduction   
 Public space is integral to a city’s identity, and in Sarajevo this includes large-
scale commercial developments that have been built since the Siege of Sarajevo. The 
new commercial investments that arrived in Sarajevo during this time of economic, 
social and political transformation have been paving the way for economic growth in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and laying the foundation for greater flows of people, capital 
and ideas. Sarajevo’s dual transformation – from socialism and from conflict – with its 
breakneck rush to a capitalist market economy in a war-damaged city, creates a unique 
context for studying contemporary transnational investments and the urban 
redevelopment of the city. Constituting part of the public sphere, the origin of capital for 
large commercial developments in Sarajevo and the political struggles surrounding 
these investments have made these buildings contested spaces within the Sarajevan 
urban environment. Although public space is not a simple concept, I will refer to it as a 
‘crossroads, where different paths and trajectories meet, sometimes overlapping and at 
other times colliding; they are the meeting place of politics and culture, social and 
individual territories, and instrumental and expressive concerns’ as defined by Ali 
Madanipour et al (2014: 1). In the case of commercial developments in Sarajevo, these 
public spaces are not ‘true public spaces’ where there is little to no control on the 
activities taking place (Mitchell, 1995). Rather, the case studies in this chapter 
represent quasi-public spaces: legally private areas that form part of the public sphere 
and remain under the control of private interests (Carmona, 2003: 111; Miljački, 2012: 
187; Stanilov, 2007: 276).  
In this chapter, I will examine two new commercial investments in Sarajevo: The 
BBI Centar (BBI) and the Sarajevo City Center (SCC). These investments have many 
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similarities. Both shopping centres were built with funding from Gulf countries – the 
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, specifically – and both occupy city squares in 
the very heart of Sarajevo, giving them a prominence in the urban landscape. Although 
there are other large-scale, noteworthy structures in Sarajevo such as Alta Shopping 
Center and the UNITIC towers, BBI and SCC have been among the most controversial 
urban interventions since the end of the Siege of Sarajevo. Not only has the source of 
their funding been a cause for popular discussion, but also the buildings’ alleged ties to 
certain Bosnian political elite have caused speculation and unease throughout the 
country as a whole. While commercial buildings such as the Alta Center and the 
Bosmal Centar (American and Malaysian investments, respectively) were also fraught 
with complications and controversy, both witnessing considerable financial difficulties 
during construction and operation, neither Alta nor Bosmal faced quite the media and 
popular reaction as BBI and SCC. These centres are globalising, bringing transnational 
and local actors together. BBI and SCC are what Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (2011) 
refer to as ‘worlding practices’ – ‘projects that attempt to establish or break established 
horizons of urban standards in and beyond a particular city’ (4). Through inter-
referencing to projects in the Gulf, these centres are both particular to Sarajevo and 
global, and they attempt to solve the ‘urban problem’ (Ibid.) of post-socialist and post-
conflict reconstruction and development.  
 As contested, quasi-public spaces, BBI and SCC are the subject of public 
debates in Sarajevo, which are being used to position Sarajevan identity along the 
imagined binary of East/West. I argue that Sarajevans view certain issues surrounding 
BBI and SCC as particularly ‘eastern’, especially the issue of corruption. Corruption can 
be defined here as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (Labelle, 2014: 4). 
Corruption is a real phenomenon occurring around the globe that can perpetuate social 
injustices keeping elites in power (ibid.), yet in Sarajevo, it is also mobilised as a 
discourse to separate activities deemed ‘eastern’ in contrast to ostensibly ‘western’ 
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transparency. Corruption has been a real problem in the country since the Siege of 
Sarajevo, and as will be discussed below, most Sarajevans believe government 
officials are corrupt and self-serving. In fact, in 2014, protests against corruption 
erupted across the country and citizens’ plenums were established leading many to 
believe there would be large-scale changes especially in the political elite (see 
Arsenijević, 2014). However, to the disappointment of many Sarajevans, little changed 
in terms of the political establishment as these movements were co-opted and 
silenced.   
 The case studies in the chapter have also been vehicles for discourses about 
corruption in the city. As Sarajevo is undergoing an identity crisis, these public spaces 
become central to this discussion. In order to show this, I will analyse the media 
representation and the public perceptions of these buildings in two parts. First, I will 
examine the allegations and rumours of corruption surrounding BBI and SCC and how 
this focus on corruption is functioning in terms of legitimising or delegitimising political 
power. Second, I will focus on market-driven urbanism in Sarajevo and perceptions that 
investors’ power to shape the city is changing the character of spaces in Sarajevo with 
respect to its historical and idealised identity. Before moving to the analysis of my data, 
however, I will discuss investor urbanism – or market-driven urbanism – as a concept. I 
will then move on to give a more detailed look at the case studies themselves. In 
Sarajevo, as in other societies, imagined social binaries play a crucial role in the 
perception of city life and how the city and its inhabitants fit into the contemporary 
global reality. Analysing how Sarajevans are discussing BBI, SCC and the 
development of their city will allow a richer view of the anxieties and fears of city 
dwellers as the urban environment opens up to transnational flows of capital, people 




5.1.1 Data Collection 
 The debates circulating around BBI and SCC are being played out in the media 
and in the public perceptions of the buildings. In order to demonstrate the effect of 
these discourses upon the positioning of Sarajevan identity, I drew from a large and 
varied selection of data, including: articles from different media outlets in BiH, interview 
data with stakeholders and people working in urban related fields in Sarajevo, field 
interviews (whereby I approached people on the street and in the shopping centres 
themselves to discuss the buildings) and survey data from my online survey about 
urban development in Sarajevo. I have also drawn from comments on an internet forum 
called SkycraperCity.com. This is a new and somewhat unconventional source for 
qualitative data, but I believe that this data supports my own findings and contributes 
viewpoints that interviewees might self-censor. I have tried to provide the context for 
the forum conversations and avoid people who are obviously looking to incite reaction. I 
endeavoured to keep the sources of my data as broad as possible in order to reflect 
the true debates and contestations taking place in Sarajevo regarding BBI and SCC.  
 In the first part where I will discuss allegations and rumours of corruption in the 
city, I will draw upon excerpts and notes from eleven interviews with project 
stakeholders and people working within urban development in Sarajevo. To add to this, 
I will analyse five field interviews from within BBI and SCC and from the Alipašino Polje 
area of the city. After discussing the perceptions of these individuals, I will examine 
media reports of corruption surrounding BBI and SCC, especially from the daily 
newspaper Dnevni Avaz, which according to USAID’s ‘Assessment of the Media Sector 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Brunwasser et al, 2016) is the second most popular news 
portal in BiH and the most read newspaper in Sarajevo, according to my interview with 
a representative of the OSCE’s Press and Public Information Unit.2 I will also analyse 
																																																													2	In	conversation	with	representative	of	OSCE	Press	and	Public	Information	Unit,	11.08.2015.		
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an article from Slobodna Bosna, a weekly political magazine and the 13th most popular 
news portal in BiH, according to USAID (Ibid.). 
For the second part of the chapter, which will examine how Sarajevans are 
reacting to BBI and SCC in terms of their perceptions of market-driven urbanism and 
the power of investors to shape the city, I will draw from a similarly varied collection of 
data. I will use data from eight interviews with project stakeholders and urban 
professionals, and I will draw from my field interviews and survey responses. To add to 
this, I will analyse comments found on the internet forum SkyscraperCity.com. This is 
an architectural forum where people discuss architecture and urban development 
around the world. My data comes from the forum thread about Sarajevo’s development. 
Media reports centered around investor driven urbanism are less abundant than those 
dealing with the rumours of corruption with BBI and SCC. Therefore, I will also draw 
upon one article written in the weekly news magazine Dani, which is a rival to Slobodna 
Bosna, and one of two most important weeklies (according to Tarik Jusić in his analysis 
of media ownership in BiH (2004)). I will also draw from an article from Al Jazeera 
Balkans, a Qatari owned media source and the third most popular news portal in BiH, 
according to USAID (Brunwasser et al, 2016).   
 
5.1.2 Investor Urbanism 
 Market-driven urban planning, or investor urbanism, is a feature that scholars of 
post-socialist cities are examining increasingly in the literature (see, for example, Van 
Assche and Salukvadze, 2013 and Vujošević, Zeković, and Maričić, 2010). According 
to Slavka Zeković, Miodrag Vujošević, and Tamara Maričić (2015), ‘The global 
economic and financial crisis in SEE is deeper than elsewhere, with low development 
status, low economic growth, high unemployment, an informal (“gray”) economy, 
massive informal building, uncertainties related to the impact of the globalisation 
process, an inappropriate institutional framework, poor technical infrastructure, huge 
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public debt, poverty, a prolonged regulatory gap in the economy, investment, urban 
development, and urban land economics,’ (66). With all of these challenges to 
development and the difficulty in bringing in investors as described above, it is not a 
surprise that those willing to invest in Sarajevo’s urban landscape are given some 
leeway regarding how the buildings fit into the urban plan. However, with this ushering 
in of capitalism at a breakneck speed, especially as BiH is undergoing a dual 
transformation, the perception exists that these new investments are dictating the 
development of the city instead of being a part of a more organised plan for the 
development of Sarajevo (as will be shown below in part two of this chapter).  
 Because much of the city was destroyed during the Siege of Sarajevo, investor 
urbanism becomes distinctive as the whole city is in the process of post-conflict 
redevelopment and reconstruction. Investors have more power in Sarajevo than in 
other post-socialist cities to dictate the long-term vision of the city. Clearly investment in 
the urban environment and the construction of shopping centres such as BBI and SCC 
may not be damaging to the city in and of themselves. BiH and Sarajevo need 
investment in order to continue developing. The problems with these investments arise, 
it is suggested, when investors begin to have power over the development of the city at 
the detriment of urban planning professionals and the overall quality of city life in terms 
of the environment and public spaces for the people.  
 One of the main challenges in Sarajevo is that the institutions that oversaw 
urban planning in the socialist era lack the power and ability to perform the work that 
they once carried out, according to my interviewees.3 The city is fighting to cope with 
the change from socialism to post-socialism, but the urban planning offices simply have 
limited resources when it comes to planning and development. A common theme in 
																																																													3	In	conversation	with	an	architect	in	Sarajevo	04.11.2015.	
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interview data is that permissions get pushed through quickly when money is involved,4 
frustrating urban professionals and others trying to maintain a balance in the city. The 
collective thinking of socialist urban planning has given way to ‘strict individuality.’5  
Those with money can circumvent urban laws and regulations simply by 
changing their plans in accordance with a new Law on Spatial Planning that was 
brought into effect in 2005 (‘Zakon o prostornom uređenju’, 2005). This law and its 
articles 46 and 81 give investors the power to change plans that have already been 
given permission without public consent. It simply states that the ‘basic concept’ must 
remain the same,6 (Ibid.). The idea of what the basic concept of the plan is, however, 
can be and is debated.7 Only the agreement of three people is needed to change the 
plans after permission is given: the municipality’s mayor, the city mayor and the head 
of the canton. According to Nasiha Pozder, speaking in Dani, ‘legal constructions, and 
construction in accordance with the plans, also carry their hazards arising from the 
constant change of plans through the corrections that are provided by law, or to be 
applied to the detriment of the space and its users, and according to the wishes of 
investors and local authorities,’8 (quoted in Omeragić and Redžić, 2014).  
5.1.3 Case Studies: BBI and SCC 
The BBI Centar (Figure 7) was the first shopping centre in Sarajevo built with 
funding from the Gulf region. BBI Real Estate – the real estate branch of Bosna Bank 
International (BBI) – was founded with capital from the Islamic Development Bank 
(based in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Dubai Islamic 
4	For	example,	the	mayor	of	Trnovo	signed	an	agreement	for	a	large	tourist	development	Buroj	Ozone	in	a	rushed	fashion	on	15	October	2015,	according	to	a	town	meeting	that	was	held	two	days	later,	which	I	attended.		5	In	conversation	with	Amer	Vuk	Zec,	architect,	12.11.2015.		6	‘U	slučaju	evidentnih	nedostataka,	nedorečenosti	ili	razlika	u	grafičkom	i	tekstualnom	dijelu	plana	može	se	izvršiti	korekcija	provedbenog	plana.	Korekcijom	provedbenog	plana	ne	može	se	mijenjati	osnovni	koncept,’	(Zakon	o	prostornom	uređenju,	2005:	11).	7	In	conversation	with	Nasiha	Pozder,	Faculty	of	Architecture,	University	of	Sarajevo,	05.03.2015.		8	‘pravna	gradnja,	odnosno	gradnja	u	skladu	sa	planovima	također	nosi	svoje	opasnosti	koje	proizlaze	iz	stalnih	promjena	planova	kroz	korekcije	koje	su	zakonom	predviđene,	ali	koje	se	primjenjuju	na	štetu	i	prostora	i	njegovih	korisnika,	a	prema	željama	investitora	ili	lokalnih	vlasti.’	
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Bank, and Bosna Bank International, launching the project in 2006 and opening the 
completed shopping centre in 2009 (http://www.bbicentar.ba/bh/). At 5,500 m2, BBI 
comprises a 479 vehicle capacity car park, 125 retail units with brands such as 
L’Occitane en Provence and Tommy Hilfiger, a food court, a mesjid (prayer room) and 
a tower of office spaces home to Al Jazeera Balkans and Bosna Bank International. 
Although BBI Real Estate originally considered constructing a five-star hotel on the 
premises, this idea was later abandoned in favour of the office tower due to practical 
considerations such as the lack of space that would be needed for a swimming pool 
and a laundry large enough to support such a business.9 Built on the site of the 
socialist-era department store known locally as the Sarajka, BBI sits on one of the 
busiest city squares and has become a meeting point in the city.10 Bosna Bank 
International purchased the war-destroyed Sarajka in 2002 during its privatisation, and 
the company ANS Drive became the contractor for its construction under the 
architectural guidance of Sead Gološ, who also designed the interior. The BBI Centar 
has a modern glass and steel design reminiscent of high-end shopping centres found 
throughout the world from the United States to Saudi Arabia. BBI allows groups and 
individuals the opportunity to apply to organise events on the square surrounding the 
shopping centre, and any activities in the space must be pre-approved. The entire 
investment is valued at 70 million BAM (27.8 million GBP).  
9	In	conversation	with	Sead	Živalj,	general	manager	of	BBI	Real	Estate	05.01.2016.	10	In	conversation	with	Sead	Živalj	and	anonymous	architects	in	Sarajevo	04.11.2015.		
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Figure 7: the BBI Centar, courtesy of author 
The Sarajevo City Center (Figure 8) sits in the city quarter known as Marijin 
Dvor, only a ten-minute walk from BBI. Its investor, Al Shiddi Group, is an investment 
and development company based in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and founded by 
Sulaiman Al Shiddi. After acquiring the premises from the privatisation of the Yugoslav 
company Magros (a consortium of Magros Export-Import and Magros Veletrgovina), Al 
Shiddi Group began construction of SCC in 2008 and opened the shopping centre in 
2014. The entire project is comprised of four parts: the 49,000 m2 shopping area, which 
houses 80 retail units including Zara; a full car park with over 1000 parking spaces; a 
6,000 m2 office tower; and a 13,900 m2 five-star hotel tower (soon to be a Weston 
hotel11) with over 220 guest rooms, including presidential suites (scc.ba). Additionally 
SCC has entertainment facilities such as a bowling alley, an arcade, and a spa. Inside 
the shopping centre there is a mesjid with male and female ablution areas. Like the BBI 
11	In	conversation	with	Tarik	Bilalbegović,	Ascendant	Project	Finance	22.09.2015.		
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Centar, ANS Drive became the primary contractor for the construction of the complex, 
and architect Sead Gološ designed the building and the interior. SCC is also a modern 
glass and steel design, and it is adorned on the exterior with a very large plasma LED 
screen for advertisements and announcements, reminiscent of those found in Times 
Square or Piccadilly Circus. Although SCC does not have a square like BBI for 
organising events and small retail enterprises, it still controls the activities on its 
premises, and individuals wishing to conduct any activities other than shopping at SCC 
must apply first for permission. The entire investment is estimated at over 160 million 
BAM (63.3 million GBP). 
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Figure 8: photo of SCC with large plasma screen, courtesy of author 
As these investments originated in Muslim-majority countries, both BBI and 
SCC were built using Islamic financing, which has mandated certain rules regarding the 
use of the space. Because of this, it is impossible for profit to be made on items that 
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are considered haram – or forbidden – in Islam, including pork and alcohol. 
Accordingly, both of the large Konzum supermarkets in BBI and SCC refrain from 
selling such products. There is also no gambling permitted on the premises. Islamic 
financing dictates that there must be an area for people to pray on the premises, thus 
both of the shopping centres have mesjids complete with male and female ablution 
areas.12  
 
5.2 Corruption in the Building Process: Rumours and Legitimacy 
 In Sarajevo, my data (including interviews, field interviews, survey data and 
media analysis) suggests that perceptions of corruption on the part of the political elite 
are linked to new buildings with funding from GCC countries, especially BBI and SCC. 
There have been many rumours and allegations of corruption connected to these 
shopping centres, and this discourse serves two functions. First the allegations of 
corruption surrounding BBI and SCC position Sarajevan identity between the imaginary 
binary of East and West, especially as the funding source of these buildings stems 
from what Sarajevans see as the ‘East’. Second, such narratives serve to legitimise or 
delegitimise those who have the power to control the development of the urban 
environment and their networks. In this section, I will first set out how corruption is 
perceived as one of the major issues in BiH and in Sarajevo, generally and then within 
the building process, examining how Sarajevans and internationals working in Sarajevo 
discuss this issue. I will then analyse media reports about BBI and SCC that 
contributed to what has been called a media campaign against these buildings in my 
interviews with project stakeholders such as Samid Sinanović of Shad Invest and Sead 
Živalj the general manager of BBI Real Estate. Because much of what was said to me 
																																																													12	Shopping	centres	with	Muslim	facilities	exist	around	the	world,	including	both	Westfield	shopping	centres	in	London.	Airports	often	have	non-denominational	prayer	rooms	as	well,	although	they	may	or	may	not	have	full	ablution	facilities.	
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in my interviews is sensitive in terms of rumours and allegations of corruption, I have 
chosen to keep many of my informants anonymous.  
 
5.2.1 Perceptions of Corruption  
 Perceptions of corruption and the causes of corruption highlighted in the 
UNODC BiH Business Corruption Report (2013) show that large percentages of 
business owners and representatives see corruption as a problem when conducting 
business, especially when dealing with officials and politicians. The report states: 
  When asked whether certain issues represent an obstacle to doing 
  business in their country, business owners and representatives in 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina rank corruption as the sixth most important 
  issue. In fact, corruption is considered a major obstacle by more than a 
  third (36.5 per cent) of business representatives, after high taxes (64.3 
  per cent), complicated tax laws (50.1 per cent), political instability (42.5 
  per cent), labour regulations (40 per cent) and limited access to  
  financing (37.2 per cent). However, an additional 37.2 per cent of  
  respondents consider corruption a moderate obstacle to doing business, 
  while 26.3 per cent consider it no obstacle…The data show that almost 
  half (47.8 per cent) of business representatives consider lack of  
  transparency a common cause of corruption. In addition, between 40 
  and 45 per cent of business representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  consider great powers of public officials, absence of evaluation  
  mechanisms, lack of integrity of officials, lack of integrity within  
  businesses, inappropriate influence of politicians and influence of 
  powerful individuals to be a common cause of corruption (41-44). 
 
Very generally, this quote demonstrates the prevailing view amongst people in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina – local business owners and internationals alike – that corruption is 
deeply entrenched in politics as well as in the economy. Suggestions of corruption 
surround most political and economic issues, including the redevelopment of the city of 
Sarajevo. While the UNODC report focuses extensively on bribery among petty officials 
as the most obvious form of corruption, the perceptions of the causes of corruption by 
business owners also point at larger forces taking place in the country and are quite 
telling. It refers to the ‘great powers of public officials’ and the ‘inappropriate influence 
of politicians and influence of powerful individuals’ as common causes of corruption, as 
observed by 40-45 per cent of business representatives. That is a staggering statistic 
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that points at an understanding by BiH individuals that those in the country who have 
wealth and power are complicit in corruption.  
 Sentiments about the general level of corruption in the country were reflected in 
an interview I conducted with a female student at the architecture faculty. While 
discussing urban development in Sarajevo, she said: 
So I guess that this is something like the entrance to Europe. You know, 
it’s always been like that. We’re the crossroad of everything! You know, 
people come from the East and the West and they meet here, the drug 
trafficking meets here as well and prostitution rings I guess. It’s just I 
think… there’s a diagram I found online a while back which basically 
said that all the paths crossed in Bosnia. It’s actually worrying because 
you don’t get in touch with that because you can’t really tell, but when 
you think about the crime rate, it actually makes perfect sense, and also 
by the way… we also have the biggest corruption level in entire Europe, 
the fact that our borders are not guarded by anything literally, err, also 
you can get a Bosnia passport like that [sound of fingers snapping]. 
 
While she focuses on symptoms of corruption, such as drug trafficking and prostitution, 
she also alludes to an interesting dynamic involving influences originating in the ‘East’. 
She states that BiH is ‘something like the entrance to Europe’ and that people come 
from both ‘East’ and ‘West’ at this ‘crossroads’. However, as BiH is part of Europe, the 
underlying suggestion is that the influences from the ‘East’ cause the high levels of 
corruption. By explaining that, ‘when you think about the crime rate, it actually makes 
perfect sense’ she is alluding to the fact that BiH has Eastern influences, which cause it 
to ‘have the biggest corruption level in entire Europe’. The borders are not guarded, 
allowing for all manner of elements from the ‘East’ into this ‘Entrance to Europe’.  
 While the quote above shows general attitudes about corruption in BiH, the 
issue of corruption surrounds foreign investment more specifically as well. When 
discussing foreign investments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one male interview 
respondent working for an international organisation (to be kept anonymous) explained: 
They [Arab investors] have a lot of money, you know… So in Bosnia, 
lots of money during the war was came and gone [sic], and we never 
saw it. We don’t have solid proof, but lots of these foreign investments, 
it’s money that is being laundered. Like you find some Arab, you pay 
him a salary, and he’ll act as investor. 
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This quote constructs corruption, such as money laundering, as something that is 
connected to foreign investments, specifically in this case Arab investments. He depicts 
the process of laundering money as incredibly easy; it only takes finding ‘some Arab’ 
and paying him a salary in order to cover money laundering. Of course he does not 
explain the logical details of how this might work, but the suggestion is that Arabs can 
be easily bribed or used in corrupt schemes, and that they are, perhaps, more corrupt 
than other investors in BiH. There is a hidden suspicion of investments originating in 
the Arab world, especially with those who have ‘a lot of money’. 
In my interviews with people working in the architectural and urban 
development sectors and with people working with government institutions, a recurring 
theme of corruption in investment and as an obstacle to investment arose. In fact, for 
large projects, more than one interviewee stated that it is necessary to have strong 
political connections to build, and that without some political protection, large-scale 
commercial investments are extremely difficult if not impossible. For example, one 
female respondent working for a governmental institution stressed that it is nearly 
impossible to build without good connections and that there are no public consultations 
in urban development, ‘everything is 100% top-down – no public consultation.’ She also 
explained that of today’s tycoons in BiH, ‘maybe 70% are war profiteers’. She does not 
state who these ‘tycoons’ are. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a small country 
and there are few rich and powerful people. Another woman I interviewed, who works 
in investment in Sarajevo, stated that, ‘big projects require shelter from one of the three 
main political parties. Everything can be done with the right connections.’ In other 
words, who you know is more important than how much you own.  
Many of my interviewees explained that it is the corruption already existing in 
BiH that hinders investments from areas of the world that are not considered part of the 
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‘East’. One interviewee, a man working in urban development, described the situation 
in the following way: 
The biggest impediment to investment in Bosnia is corruption. Most 
western investors avoid Sarajevo for this reason. It creates confusion, 
no clarity. The math cannot be applied. It creates unease, and a huge 
return on investment is needed. Nobody comes here; those that do take 
a big risk.  
 
Thus, because there is so much corruption in Sarajevo, investors from the ‘West’ 
believe the risks are too large. That investors from Arab countries would not be 
deterred by the levels of corruption in investment assumes that for these investors, 
such a thing is normal or expected. However, another interview respondent who works 
at the architecture faculty described it in the following way, ‘the eastern world is more 
tolerant of the administration and bureaucracy in the Bosnian investment process. 
Americans, for example, would not tolerate it.’ This account is more diplomatic, and 
does not paint investors from GCC countries as necessarily corrupt or accepting of 
corruption.  
The discourse that foreign investment from GCC countries is tied to corruption 
also points to who exactly is believed to be the perpetrator of this corruption. It is 
assumed in Sarajevo that the political elite are deeply involved in economic issues for 
their own personal advancement, and many people in the city (as will be examined 
below) implicate the SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije or Party of Democratic Action, 
a main Bošnjak political party in BiH) and the personage of Bakir Izetbegović, the 
Bošnjak member of the tripartite presidency who happens to be the son of Alija 
Izetbegović (the famous war-time politician). Bakir Izetbegović is a member of the SDA, 
and on his website, he claims he was the ‘coordinator of the building of BBI Centar in 
Sarajevo’ and that he ‘organised or significantly helped build mosques in Sarajevo’, 
including many foreign funded mosques (‘Biografija’, 
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http://bakirizetbegovic.ba/stranica/biografija).13 For coordinating the building of BBI, 
Izetbegović received 2,500 BAM (993 GBP) monthly between 2005 and 2006 (Imovina 
Političara, http://imovinapoliticara.cin.ba/). Although he clearly has had a hand in 
bringing investment from the Middle East, many – including press sources, as will be 
discussed below – have speculated on his own personal gain from these investments.  
To demonstrate the perception of Bakir Izetbegović in Sarajevo, one man 
working for a governmental organisation in the city explained Izetbegović’s influence in 
the following way: 
You talk about Bakir Izetbegović, and he’s got a fortune around him. The 
other one is Radončić, the head of the political party SPB. They’re 
punching each other all the time, mentally, through newspapers through 
press releases... Every opportunity they get. You hear stories that there 
are people who have information that will put them both away for a long 
time. But those people, through fear or because they’ve been paid off, 
won’t come forward. You have to think that only twenty years ago these 
characters were the political mouthpieces of murder gangs. The 
henchmen of those gangs are still alive. Some of them are in prison, 
some have been killed by other gang members, but the majority are still 
alive. Would you go up against somebody like that if you had to live 
here? 
 
I will discuss the rivalry between Izetbegović and Radončić further on in this chapter. 
This quote clearly describes the aura of fear and intimidation that surrounds people of 
great wealth and power in Sarajevo, specifically Bakir Izetbegović. He indicates that 
Izetbegović is involved in corrupt activities and that ‘there are people who have 
information that will put them both away for a long time’. However, by using the words 
‘murder gangs’ and ‘henchmen’ and by explaining how some of the ‘gang members’ 
have killed other members, he underscores the prevailing discourse around this 
personage: Izetbegović is dangerous and would not be afraid of killing those who 
speak out against him.  
Bakir Izetbegović had a stake in the construction of both BBI and SCC, and 
there have been many rumours and accusations of corruption levied at him for both 																																																													13	‘Bio	je	koordinator	izgradnje	BBI	centra	u	Sarajevu…Gospodin	Izetbegović	je	organizovao	ili	značajno	pomogao	izgradnju	džamija	u	Sarajevu	(Istiklal,	Kralj	Fahd,	Koševo,	Jordanska	džamija,	Malezijska	džamija,	Sokolje)’	
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investments. One of my interviewees, a man working for an international organisation, 
explained that: 
There are rumours that Bakir Izetbegović is behind it [SCC], that he 
might have a stake in the ownership somehow… We have done a check 
into Al Shiddi, it is not as dodgy as in the Dnevni Avaz [more on this will 
be discussed below]. It’s not as shady as it appears. The arrangements 
– the permits and permission and privatisation – was all completely non-
transparent. Izetbegović was definitely involved in this. There is 
something dodgy there. Many things are done under the table, no 
transparency. 
 
Izetbegović and his business practices are associated with ideas such as ‘non-
transparent’, ‘shady’ and ‘dodgy’, and while the construction of SCC is ‘not as dodgy as 
in the Dnevni Avaz’, Bakir Izetbegović is still characterised as somewhat crooked and 
unscrupulous.  
 Many of my field interviews also pointed to Bakir Izetbegović and the SDA as 
hidden political forces behind foreign investments such as SCC and BBI. For example 
one man, a waiter working in the Alipašino Polje area of the city stated, ‘there are 
hidden political motivations, big political motivations.’14 When I asked him who he 
thought might have hidden political motivations behind the investments, he replied, 
‘SDA, the thieving party [lopovska stranka]’. In another of my field interviews, a female 
shopkeeper in BBI stated: 
Yes, yes. There are hidden political motivations, here everything is 
politically bound, and I think that everything is in the interest… and these 
large centres, I think everything is beautiful and well-visited, for us it is 
lovely for the people to use something so beautiful, but behind 
everything stands politics and the biggest profit goes in the pockets of 
the politicians.15  
 
When I pressed her to state which politicians or political parties had hidden 
motivations, she answered without any hesitation, ‘Bakir Izetbegović, SDA, we all know 
																																																													14	‘Krije,	krije…	i	to	veliki	politički	motiv’	15	‘Da,	da.	Krije	se	politički	motiv,	ovdje	je	sve	politički	uvezano	i	mislim	da	je	sve	u	interesu…	I	ovi	neki	veliki	centri,	mislim	sve	je	to	lijepo	i	posjećano,	nama	je	to	divno,	za	narod	da	koristi	tako	nešto	lijepo,	ali	iza	svega	togo	stoji	politika	i	najveća	dobit	ide	u	džepove	političara.’		
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that, but not everyone will say it.’16 There is a great deal of fear connected with 
corruption in Sarajevo and with personages such as Bakir Izetbegović, as this field 
interview respondent suggests. People are reluctant to talk about who or which forces 
might be behind foreign investment in Sarajevo. One woman even refused to continue 
further with our interview after being asked about political connections. Indeed, many 
seem to fear some sort of retribution from political leader, even when speaking 
anonymously with me.  
Many of my field interviews reflect this fear. One male, Muslim shopkeeper 
explained: 
There are [hidden political motivations]. That means, to you it is a public 
secret. Everybody alive knows about it being so, but nobody says so 
because people are afraid of something, I don’t know what.17  
 
Another woman, a young economist, couched her answer in such a way as to not 
outwardly name any parties specifically. She said: 
Of course, of course, everything is political… well, I think it is those who 
are in power. I would have a lot to say, believe me, but… well, I think 
about those who are ruling now, about the presidents let’s say, about 
one head president who has taken the wheel of this state, unfortunately, 
after his father [Alija Izetbegović] he continued and so on. I hope not 
much longer [that he will be in power].18 
 
She does not explicitly state that she thinks Bakir Izetbegović is behind foreign 
investments in the country, but she greatly alludes to it by mentioning ‘those who are 
ruling now… one head president who has taken the wheel of this state...after his 
father’. However, she is reluctant to say any more, explaining that ‘I would have a lot to 
say, believe me’, but she does not, presumably out of fear. Likewise, another female 
shopkeeper responded that: 
																																																													16	‘Bakir	Izetbegović,	SDA,	svi	to	znamo,	a	neće	svako	da	kaže.’		17	‘To	se	krije...znači,	to	vam	je	javna	tajna.	Svako	živ	zna	o	tome	da	je	to	tako,	ali	niko	ne	govori	zato	što	se	ljudi	boje	nečega,	ne	znam	čega.’	18	‘Naravno,	naravno,	sve	je	politički…	Pa	mislim	o	ovim	što	su	na	vlasti.	Imala	bih	ja	puno	toga	da	kažem,	vjerujte	mi,	ali	ovaj...pa	mislim	o	ovim	što	vladaju	sada,	predsjednicima	recimo,	jednom	glavnom	predsjednika	koji	vodi	kolo	u	ovoj	državi,	nažalost,	poslije	svog	oca	on	je	nastavio	i	tako	dalje.	Nadam	se	da	neće	još	dugo.’	
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Political motivations are hidden in everything here. I think that there 
doesn’t exist anything that doesn’t hide [them]. That is a rarity really… 
who do I think [is behind the investments]? Uh, I don’t want to respond. 
I’m sorry, I don’t want to. I think that maybe that is clear to everyone who 
it is.19  
 
The perception in the city that certain politicians are behind the investments and that 
they are potentially dangerous, even to non-elites, is quite pervasive.  
 On the other hand, however, two of my interviewees described this perception 
as part of the problem when courting investment into Bosnia and Herzegovina. In my 
interview with Enes Kazazić, the director of South European Investment Company 
(SEIC), he explained that: 
The major problem is our mentality. Here in Bosnia... when we speak 
about GCC, among Bošnjiaks… that always there might be some bad 
scenario. Who’s coming? Is it some politically motivated something? 
You know, I think this terrorism word is always a kind of umbrella. Who 
is checking whom, you know? 
 
Interestingly, as someone engaged in courting investment from GCC countries, he 
downplayed any and all talk about politics and corruption. His response indicates that 
the mentality of the people connects investment from the Gulf region with terrorism, 
and this is the real reason that people are afraid. Samid Sinanović, the director of Shad 
Invest, a member of the Al Shiddi group, had a similar response. He said: 
Bosnia has always been part of the East and West. They all want to be 
part of the EU. They would like investors from the West – from 
Germany. In their minds, if they are not from the West it is degrading 
them as part of the West, part of the EU. There are mainly eastern 
investors. We cannot afford to tell them no. 
 
According to Sinanović, it is the people’s prejudices that are a major obstacle. They 
want to be seen as a part of the West, which is why the discourses surrounding BBI 
and SCC have been constructed in such a way as to position Sarajevan identity along 
the East/West binary.  
																																																													19	‘U	svemu	se	kod	nas	krije	politički	motiv.	Ja	mislim	da	ne	postoji	ništa	što	se	ne	krije.	To	je	rijetkost,	stvarno...Ko	mislim?	E,	to	neću	da	odgovorim.	Izvini,	to	neću.	Mislim	da	je	to	možda	svima	i	jasno	čiji	je.’	
	 149	
 As many of the quotes above indicate, the perception exists in Sarajevo that 
corruption has been tied to movements of people, capital and ideas from the ‘East’ or 
from Islamic countries. People in the city see Bakir Izetbegović as someone who is 
perhaps outside the law and also the individual who is instrumental in courting 
investments from GCC countries and elsewhere in the Muslim world. Thus the two 
things have become entwined in the popular construction of this narrative: corruption 
and investment from the Arab world. People in the city use the connection to corruption 
to position Sarajevan identity towards the ‘West’ and towards Europe and the EU. Little 
discussion of corruption from countries such as the United States of America or 
Germany is mentioned, although this undoubtedly exists. By focusing on corruption 
with respect to BBI and SCC and Bakir Izetbegović, the spaces become contested, 
especially in terms of the city’s identity.  
 
5.2.2 Press Campaigns Against BBI and SCC 
 According to my interviews with Samid Sinanović, the director of Shad Invest, 
part of the Al Shiddi group, and Sead Živalj, the director of BBI, (and hinted at by other 
interviewees off the record), there were media campaigns launched in certain BiH 
media outlets against the building of both BBI and SCC. The negative media coverage 
of these two buildings and their connection to, especially, Bakir Izetbegović, contributed 
in no small way to the prevailing discourses surrounding the investments, especially in 
terms of corruption. These discourses that circulated in the press served to, in many 
cases, delegitimise the power networks that brought the investments into the city. In 
this section, I will explore media’s portrayal SCC (and to a lesser extent, BBI), notably 
by the BiH media outlet Dnevni Avaz. While also contributing to the discourse of 
corruption discussed in the section above, this media coverage also discredited Bakir 
Izetbegović, the SDA and their Arab business partners. These discourses, in addition 
to serving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the power networks, also serve to again 
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position Sarajevan identity between the imagined binaries of East/West in terms of 
corruption as discussed in the section above.  
 Media outlets in Bosnia and Herzegovina are strongly connected to political 
interests. In fact, according to Davor Marko (2011), ‘In the analysis of the media 
landscape and media reporting on political candidates in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
during the 2010 general election campaign, it was noticed that major media were 
affiliated to various political groups and openly advocated for or riled against voter 
choices,’ (167). One of the most widely read newspapers in Sarajevo is the Dnevni 
Avaz, according to a representative of the OSCE’s Press and Public Information Unit. 
Fahrudin Radončić, a Bošnjak politician who currently heads the political party Savez 
za bolju budućnost BiH (Union for a Better Future of BiH), owned the Dnevni Avaz after 
the war (Kurspahić, 2003: 156). However, the newspaper has now been handed over 
to his ex-wife Azra Radončić,20 ostensibly to curb criticisms of conflict of interest. The 
Dnevni Avaz has been instrumental in the above-mentioned media campaigns against 
SCC that delegitimise Bakir Izetbegović and his business partners.  
 Fahrudin Radončić and Bakir Izetbegović have been known political 
adversaries. Michael Pugh (2016) has even commented somewhat indirectly on the 
media campaigns against Izetbegović, explaining: 
  This did not deter a subsequent campaign in the daily newspaper 
  Dnevni Avaz (e.g. 4 June 2012), owned by Radončić. It denounced 
  Selimović [another BiH politician] as personifying privatization trickery 
  (also alluding to the construction activities of Bakir Izetbegović, son of 
  Alija, also on the Dani list)…Radončić certainly had business interests, 
  and two prestige skyscrapers in Sarajevo, that could benefit from  
  political engagement. Splitting from the Izetbegović-dominated SDA he 
  created the Union for a Better Future for Bosnia (SBB), which divided 
  the Bosniak vote in the 2010 and 2014 general elections (180).  
 
Of the media that has been the most negative against the shopping centres, Dnevni 
Avaz has been by far the most active in campaigning against the alleged political 
connections, corruption and financial crime connected with the buildings. Behind these 																																																													20	In	conversation	with	representative	of	OSCE’s	Press	and	Public	Information	Unit,	11.08.2015.		
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campaigns lies a struggle for prime real estate in the city of Sarajevo and control of the 
urban environment. Radončić is not only a media mogul and politician, but he also 
owns at least two major buildings in Sarajevo: the Avaz Twist Tower and the Radon 
Plaza Hotel. What makes these media campaigns telling is that Radončić also bid on 
Magros as it was being privatised and lost out to Al-Shiddi, and thus SCC.21 
Izetbegović has many friends in the Muslim world and is very close to people such as 
Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. His business partners hail from Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and other Muslim-majority countries. Radončić, on the 
other hand, has, ‘cultivated international opinion as a pro-European and anti-corruption 
crusader,’ (Pugh, 2016: 180). SCC and BBI (and by contrast the Avaz Twist Tower, 
especially) thus become embodiments of greater international political encounters, the 
East and the West.   
 Looking first at articles that were published in the Dnevni Avaz, the wording of 
many of the stories and headlines point to such a campaign against Bakir Izetbegović 
and his business partners as mentioned by my interviewees. For example, Bakir 
Izetbegović is portrayed as a scrupulously unethical man of connections, a corrupt war 
profiteer in the pockets of Islamists. Fahir Karalić (2013a) wrote an article for the 
Dnevni Avaz titled ‘“Ševe” oversees all Bakir’s buildings’. Ševe was a secret police 
organisation that was formed during the war and that allegedly received training from 
Iran (Pugliese, 2015). Karalić describes Ševe as a ‘terrorist unit’22, and he states that 
Sead Gološ, the architect of both BBI and SCC was a member of this terrorist unit and: 
one of the key links connecting the circle with Bakir Izetbegović at the 
centre, which, with the construction of several buildings and the 
acquisition of valuable real estate in the capital, judging by everything, 
laundered several hundred million marks, as shown by the research of 
"Dnevni Avaz"!’23 (Karalić, 2013a).  																																																													21	In	conversation	with	anonymous	businessman	and	Samid	Sinanović	19.10.2015.	22		‘teroristička	jedinica’	23	‘jedna	je	od	ključnih	karika	koje	povezuju	halku	s	Bakirom	Izetbegovićem	u	centru,	a	koja	je	izgradnjom	nekoliko	objekata	i	otimanjem	vrijednih	nekretnina	u	glavnom	gradu,	sudeći	po	svemu,	oprala	nekoliko	stotina	miliona	maraka,	pokazalo	je	istraživanje	"Dnevnog	avaza"!’	
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Karalić thus connects the architect of BBI and SCC with very serious allegations of 
corruption against Bakir Izetbegović, while also implicating all involved in a ‘terrorist’ 
organisation that received training from Iran. Corruption, then, is again tied to Islamic 
countries and their influences in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author continues by 
saying, ‘In fact, all of the one million suspicious and often illegal building jobs in 
Sarajevo, which were tied to Izetbegović's pro-Iranian circle, are not built without 
Gološ’s architectural studio.’24 Employing words such as suspicious and illegal in 
reference to Izetbegović and his business activities delegitimises these investments 
and brands them as criminal businesses, and by including Iran (pro-Iranian circle), the 
author links Izetbegović and his business activities directly to the greater Muslim world. 
Karalić furthers this by incriminating specific individuals affiliated with BBI and SCC. He 
states: 
And the research shows that it is precisely ‘Group Arh’ [Gološ’s 
architectural studio] that is the proof of this unbreakable connection 
between Izetbegovic and his ‘operatives’ Amer Bukvic, the director of 
‘Bosnia Bank International’, Sulaiman Al-Shiddi, the phantom Saudi 
investor, tycoon Hilme and Muje Selimović, who with the help of the 
SDA invested in more than 120 state-owned companies, and Sefkija 
Okeric, also a tycoon close to the SDA and the builder of Bosmal ... 
Gološ also oversees the construction of the Al-Shiddi business center in 
Marindvor in downtown Sarajevo, and was also authorized to supervise 
the construction of the Gazi Husrev-bey Library and Hotel Europe. Bakir 
Izetbegović, the Bošnjiak member of the Presidency of BiH, appeared in 
almost all projects, in one way or another, whether he was a consultant 
in the construction (as is the case with the BBI Centar), a supervisory 
authority or coordinator. Also, insiders say that the contractors on some 
of these construction projects, when the investor did not pay them on 




The author thus suggests that both BBI and SCC were involved in corruption in one 
way or another through Bakir Izetbegović and Sead Gološ’s architectural studio. It 
furthers the construction of the narrative that both shopping centres were built using 
corrupt practices, but it also ties BBI and SCC to the ‘pro-Iranian’ ‘terrorist 
organisation’, which delegitimises the power networks involved in the building of the 
centres. The members of Izetbegović’s circle are characterised as ‘phantom Saudi 
investor’ and ‘tycoon’, which paint them as shady individuals, possibly involved in 
criminal activity (as such words suggest).  
 Later in 2013, Karalić (2013b) wrote another article in the Dnevni Avaz titled, 
‘The prosecutor's office has extensive documentation of the crimes of Bakir's 
partners’26 accompanying a photo of Bakir Izetbegović and Sulaiman Al-Shiddi. He 
suggests that the Cantonal Prosecutor's Office has found that actions are being taken 
to conceal the real origin of money for investment into SCC, using an offshore company 
based in the Cayman Islands called Istethmary Sarajevo City Center-II Ltd. (and 
apparently a sister company called Istethmary Sarajevo City Center-I Ltd.). He states, 
‘namely, "Istethmary Sarajevo City Center-II Ltd." is the owner of 28.31% of "Magros 
Veletrgovina". At the same time, the owner of this Cayman company is "Istethmary 
Sarajevo City Center-I Ltd.", which is also registered on these exotic islands, and it was 
founded by "International Investment Bank" from Bahrain.’ (Karalić, 2013b). This article 
alleges that Izetbegović and his partners are committing criminal acts in the 
privatisation of Magros for SCC by using an offshore company to buy the property. 
Interestingly, Karalić mentions that Istethmary Sarajevo City Center-I Ltd. was founded 
by the IIB in Bahrain, making its connection to the ‘East’ more explicit.  
In a commentary published in June of 2014, Karalić (2014a) claims, ‘Bakir 
behind the back: Lenient punishment for Al-Shiddi is a clear sign that he has powerful 
																																																													26	‘Tužilaštvo	ima	obimnu	dokumentaciju	o	kriminalu	Bakirovih	partnera’	
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aides and political patrons like Bakir Izetbegovic,’27 (3). He also claims Izetbegović 
helped with the privatisation of Magros before the construction of SCC (Ibid.). Using 
phrasing such as ‘lenient punishment’ suggests that those close to Izetbegović are 
somehow above the law, making their dealings murky in nature and delegitimising the 
business connections. Later that year, the same author wrote another article titled, 
‘Bakir got SCC and “Bristol” for three million KM, damaged the state for hundreds of 
millions!’28 (2014b). In this article, Karalić reported money laundering of donor funds 
between Izetbegović, Bukvić (of BBI) and Al-Shiddi (Ibid.). The construction of this 
discourse of corruption blends all of these business links together, painting a simple 
picture of Izetbegović’s power circle and swiftly defaming the people involved and their 
buildings and businesses. The report also states, ‘otherwise the financial support for 
the suspicious activities of Al-Shiddi and Bakir Izetbegovic has been provided by BBI, 
which is headed by one of their close associates, Amer Bukvić.’29 (Ibid.). That their 
dealings have ‘damaged the state’ and are ‘suspicious’ portrays the building SCC as 
very much illegal and delegitimises the political and business networks involved.  
 Another headline from the Dnevni Avaz research team in 2014 questions, ‘Who 
are the members of Bakir’s secret circles? A group of unscrupulous Mladi Muslimani 
[The Young Muslims, a defunct pan-Islamist group] descendents who want to rule with 
the state,’30 (Research Team [Istraživački tim], 2014). Again, words such as 
unscrupulous serve to discredit Izetbegović’s business networks and links them to pan-
Islamism. They go on to claim to know the ‘relations to Bakir’s groups and the Muslim 
Brotherhood,’31 (Ibid.). By associating Izetbegović and his business partners involved 
with SCC and BBI with the Muslim Brotherhood, the authors of the article link the 																																																													27	‘Bakir	iza	leđa:	Blaga	kazna	ze	El-Šidija	jasan	je	znak	da	iza	sebe	ima	moćne	saradnike	i	političke	pokrovitelje	poput	Bakira	Izetbegovića.’	28	‘Bakir	dobio	SCC	i	“Bristol”	za	tri	miliona	KM,	oštetio	državu	za	stotine	miliona!’	29	‘Inače	finansijsku	podršku	za	sumnijeve	poslove	El-Šidija	i	Bakira	Izetbegovića	godinama	pruža	“Bosnia	[sic]	Bank	International”	(BBI)	na	čijem	je	čelu	bliski	im	saradnik	Amer	Bukvić.’	30	‘Ko	su	članovi	Bakirove	halke?	Državom	želi	vladati	grupa	beskrupuloznih	mladomuslimanskih	potomaka.’	31	‘Veze	Bakirove	grupe	i	Muslimanskog	bratstva.’	
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shopping centres to the Middle East where the Muslim Brotherhood is most active. 
There is even a photo in this article of Bakir Izetbegović with ‘the delegation of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’32. These allegations of corruption and of links to Islamist groups 
contribute to the media campaigns that delegitimise the power networks surrounding 
Bakir Izetbegović, and by proxy the shopping centres themselves as public spaces in 
the city.  
Dnevni Avaz, however, was not the only media outlet to report on corruption 
linked to SCC and Bakir Izetbegović. In a Slobodna Bosna report titled ‘Halal 
investments: thank God’33 that questions the transparency of the financing of SCC 
(specifically Al-Shiddi’s Cayman Island-registered subsidiary Istethmary Sarajevo City 
Center-II LTD that helped finance its construction (Fazlić, 2014)), there is also a 
suggestion of financial interest on the part of Izetbegović. The report states: 
And if it is already known that the above-mentioned bank [International 
Investment Bank from Bahrain] concluded an agreement on participation 
in the construction of the Sarajevo City Center with Al-Shiddi in 2009, 
the question is why was this work done through an offshore company 
registered in the Cayman Islands? The answer to this, and other issues 
related to the (il)legality of the building and implementation of the 
Sarajevo City Center certainly could be provided by Sulaiman Al-Shiddi, 
and perhaps the Bošnjak member of the Presidency Bakir Izetbegović34 
(23). 
 
This report continues the narrative of corruption surrounding Izetbegović and the 
building of SCC. The wording (il)legality suggests a high level of corruption on the part 
of Izetbegović, making the entire enterprise suspicious – an invalid addition to 
Sarajevo’s urban fabric. 
 Although BBI and businessmen associated with BBI are often implicated with 
SCC in these articles, the shopping centre itself did not witness the same level of 																																																													32		‘Bakir	Izetbegović	s	delegacijom	Muslimanskog	bratstva’	33	‘Halal	investicije:	šućur	Allah’	34	‘A	ako	se	već	zna	da	je	spomenuta	banka	sa	al-shiddijem	još	2009.	godine	zaključila	sporazum	o	učešću	u	izgradnji	“Sarajevo	City	Centra”,	postavlja	se	pitanje	zašto	se	taj	posao	realizuje	preko	offshore	kompanija	registrovanih	na	Kajmanskim	otocima?	Odgovor	na	ovo,	ali	i	druga	pitanja	koja	se	tiču	(i)legalnosti	prilikom	izgradnje	i	realizacije	projekta	“Sarajevo	City	Centar”	sigurno	bi	nam	mogao	dati	sulejman	al-shiddi,	a	možda	i	bošnjački	član	Predsjedništva	Bakir	Izetbegović’	
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scrutiny during its building as the SCC campaigns in terms of actively serving to 
discredit the power networks. However, there was a petition to stop construction of BBI 
in favour of a public square (see, for example, Filipović, 2006). This was a more overt 
challenge to the control of the public space, which in the end failed. However, the 
media campaign to collect signatures for the public square did become a major 
obstacle to BBI’s construction, according to my interview with Sead Živalj.35 Both BBI 
and SCC are thus contested spaces in the city, whose legitimacy depends upon the 
legality of their privatisation and development.  
 In opposition to this, BBI and SCC project stakeholders have discussed the 
media reports against the buildings. They stressed in interviews with me that the media 
campaigns proved to be some of the major obstacles that they encountered.36 When 
interviewing the director of SCC, Goran Kahvedžić, and Edin Sefo, the CEO of 
Management Development Consulting (MDC) who oversaw the construction of SCC, 
both underscored their commitment to transparency and their willingness to discuss the 
buildings with both researchers and the media. Samid Sinanović, the general director of 
Shad Invest, and Sead Živalj, the director of BBI, also echoed these sentiments.  
I have argued that corruption is an issue constructed as particularly ‘eastern’ in 
the Sarajevo imaginary, in contrast to ostensibly ‘western’ transparency, and that 
Sarajevo is undergoing an identity crisis, part of which pulls Sarajevan identity between 
the two imaginary poles of ‘East’ and ‘West’. BBI and SCC with funding from GCC 
countries are contested spaces in the public sphere, and they have been closely linked 
to corruption. The sustained media campaign in Dnevni Avaz served to question the 
legitimacy of these buildings, their funding and their place within the city spaces of 
Sarajevo. This helps to position Sarajevan identity along this imaginary binary away 
from the corrupt ‘East’ and towards an assumed transparent and democratic ‘West’. In 																																																													35	In	conversation	with	Sead	Živalj	05.01.2016.	36	In	conversation	with	Sead	Živalj	of	BBI,	Samid	Sinanović	of	Shad	Invest,	and	Edin	Safo	of	MDC.	
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the next section, I will discuss investor urbanism and the power of money to determine 
urban practices in the city, which will investigate ideas of control over public spaces 
such as BBI and SCC and what that means for the identity of the city.  
 
5.3 ‘Money is the Only Standard’: Investor Urbanism in Sarajevo  
 Market-driven urban planning, or investor urbanism, as discussed above is a 
feature of post-socialist cities, in which elites give investors leeway in the urban 
environment – even outside the bounds of urban planning offices – to create the 
spaces in the city that they would like with little to no public consultation. In Sarajevo, 
public debates about how the capital itself has functioned to dictate the growth of the 
city focuses on whether development should be decided by elites or whether the public 
should also have a say. By questioning the role of the urban planning office (or its lack 
of control in dictating the development of the city, especially in terms of what 
Sarajevans believe the city needs), and by examining the feeling of exclusion of 
Sarajevans from public spaces such as BBI and SCC, narratives are constructed that 
position Sarajevan identity along the East/West binary. In this section I will first analyse 
interview, survey and media data about investor urbanism in Sarajevo with respect to 
how building projects such as SCC and BBI circumvent urban planning officials. In the 
second part of this section, I will examine Sarajevan perceptions of investor urbanism 
and how it is changing the nature of the city.  
 
5.3.1 ‘Those Who Have Money Build’ – Global Forces in Control of Urban Development 
 When it comes to post-socialist and post-conflict urban development in 
Sarajevo, people believe that money is the driving force behind all building projects. 
Although money dictates much of urban planning in other cities in the world as well, in 
Sarajevo with its socialist legacy, people see money sweeping aside their concerns for 
the environment and the general quality of life in the city. While the primacy of money 
	158
for urban development is almost a given in today’s world, in Sarajevo, it is the source of 
that capital that stands behind the unease of the people, especially when these 
investors – often foreigners – and their capital and political connections determine the 
development of Sarajevans’ city. The perceived problems with these investments arise 
when investors begin to have power over the development of the city at the apparent 
detriment of urban planning professionals and the vision Sarajevans have for the 
overall quality of city life. 
Investor urbanism comes in stark contrast to Sarajevo’s socialist history of 
urban planning, and this becomes part of the discourse surrounding BBI and SCC as 
commercial buildings. In my interview with Sarajevan architect Amir Zec, he echoed 
such ideas, saying, ‘before people thought collectively – now there is strict and rigid 
individuality. We are losing public space and relation to others’37 Public space has thus 
become a battleground between the collective, the pre-siege socialist way of life and 
the individual, post-siege capitalist order. Underlying this statement are the assumed 
ideals of collectivity and community in socialist public space versus the cold 
individualism and impersonal nature of capitalist cities. It belies the belief in a dying 
urban planning profession at the hands of capitalism, where social constructions that 
were common before the breakup of Yugoslavia are disappearing and foreign investors 
are given free rein to build commercial buildings outside ordinary rules and regulations.  
Adding to the perception of a dying socialist urban planning profession is the 
fact that urban planning offices are struggling to adapt to contemporary realities of a 
globalising city. Institutions that oversaw urban planning in the socialist era lack the 
power and ability to perform the work that they once carried out, which blends into 




  There have been many changes in the last twenty years, and one of the 
  major shifts is from this large socialist planning to a total free market 
  driven government…the institutions are the same, nothing has  
  changed…I think that urban planning and spatial planning is one of the 
  most complex things that one can imagine…All cities are struggling, all 
  societies are struggling to keep a good balance, and we can see here 
  that institutions are not best equipped to cope with the process…but 
  even… if they develop regulation plans with good intentions…they’re not 
  very appropriate any more, they’re very old style. In addition, you have 
  the investors with a lot of powers who overrun them, who upscale them, 
  making it impossible.38 
 
Investors are pitted against the urban planners, and it is the capital in the end that 
edges out more socialist-minded ideas of how the city should develop. He portrays a 
quasi battle between the investors and urban planning offices, but it is the investors 
‘with a lot of powers who overrun them, who upscale them’. Because these investors 
are mostly foreign, and because they hail from the Arab world, an underlying message 
is that ‘eastern’ forces are controlling the city with their money, while European 
Sarajevans fight to demand more social spaces and parks. A common theme in 
interview data is that permissions get pushed through quickly when money is 
involved,39 frustrating urban professionals and others trying to maintain a balance in the 
city. One architect in the city, who I will keep anonymous, stated that, ‘Investors push 
through permissions for big projects. There is little to no resistance from authorities or 
from the people.’ Another architect working in Sarajevo, who I will also keep 
anonymous, explained that, ‘Things get pushed through very quickly when money is 
involved.’ Capitalism, and foreign, Arab capital specifically, is perceived as dominating 
the fight to control space in the city.  
 To intensify this, investors can go around urban laws and regulations simply by 
changing their plans in accordance with a new Law on Spatial Planning (‘Zakon o 
prostornom uređenju’, 2005), which I have discussed above. Investors, then, legally 
have great power when it comes to the development of the city. These changes often 																																																													38	In	conversation	with	anonymous	architects	04.11.2015.	39	For	example,	the	mayor	of	Trnovo	signed	an	agreement	for	a	large	tourist	development	Buroj	Ozone	in	a	rushed	fashion	on	15	October	2015,	according	to	a	town	meeting	that	was	held	two	days	later,	which	I	attended.		
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take place against the wishes of the citizens, again cementing the view in the 
Sarajevan consciousness that foreign capital is controlling their city at the detriment of 
their quality of life. The Sarajevo City Center and BBI Centar are themselves both 
products of investor-urbanism, contributing to the changing of the city spaces with little 
oversight. Strictly in terms of planning provisions and the regulations of the city, both 
SCC and BBI changed their plans after the construction permits had already been 
granted, according to the Law on Spatial Planning from 2005. Both of the shopping 
centres added floors to their designs after permissions had already been given.40 
Although these changes are legal, they point to the fact that the investors skirt around 
gaining permission on the actual desired height of the building in the beginning stages 
of the construction project in order to go back and have such additions permitted by 
politicians. 
 More than just circumventing urban professionals, BBI and SCC as vehicles for 
investor-urbanism have actively gone against the wishes of the people for their city. 
With BBI this is clear, as there was a petition against the construction of the building 
brought by Sarajevo architect Aida Daidžić. The petition collected around 3,500 
signatures and called for the square to be used for the common good (Filipović, 2006). 
According to Daidžić, quoted in the Dnevni Avaz, ‘Instead of building a large business 
centre, we propose creating a town square,’41 (N.P., 2006). Daidžić designed an entire 
counter-concept for the square, complete with ice skating rink for the winter and green 
spaces in the summer. She even suggested that the citizens of the city buy the state-
owned department store that became BBI’s before construction commenced (‘Bila sam 
depresivna’, 2006). Some Sarajevans thus actively fought to gain control of the city 
square over the foreign investors, making a distinct partition between capitalist spaces 
in the interest of foreign businessmen and socialist spaces for the local population.  																																																													40	In	conversation	with	Nasiha	Pozder,	05.03.2015.	and	in	conversation	with	Edin	Safo,	CEO	of	MDC,	05.10.2015.		41	‘Umjesto	izgradnje	velikog	poslovnog	centra,	predlažemo	da	se	napravi	gradski	trg.’	
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 With SCC, a concert hall had been planned for the square of the former Magros 
company that Al-Shiddi eventually bought, as revealed in my interview with Nasiha 
Pozder at the architecture faculty in Sarajevo. According to my notes, she explained 
that before the privatisation of Magros, they were going to have a concert hall on the 
SCC location. The famous Iraqi-British architect Zaha Hadid was running the 
competition with her London office, and they were going to build a huge park with a 
cultural centre and a concert hall. Then the plans began to shrink, and they wanted to 
put a skyscraper on the location without public knowledge. The concert hall plans 
continually decreased in size – smaller and smaller. Then Al Shiddi began to take up 
more and more of that space.42 There is currently an online petition open to support a 
campaign to build this concert hall, albeit on a space near to SCC (Concert Hall 
Sarajevo Campaign, 2018). The petition states: 
  Invitation to sign petition for Sarajevo Concert Hall 
We invite professionals, all citizens and friends of Sarajevo and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to support campaign to build the Concert Hall Sarajevo 
in Marindvor, according to the anticipated regulatory plan and programs 
of development of Sarajevo and the Sarajevo Canton. This is an unduly 
neglected project that, by international agreement, through the world 
competition, was prepared in 1998 by Sarajevo Canton and the City of 
Rome. The project was chosen by a jury headed by the world-famous 
architect Zaha Hadid, with the participation of Bosnian architects 
Nedzad Kurt and Saida Jamaković and representatives of international 
associations of architects. The project was presented at numerous 
international architecture trade fairs (Venice, etc.) and published in 
professional journals and books. It is considered one of the best projects 
of the new generation. 
Sarajevo Philharmonic Orchestra held on 9 February 2017 concert in 
honor of Zaha Hadid and supported the construction of Concert Hall 
Sarajevo as a natural seat for Philharmonic orchestra and the seat of 
musical life in Southeast Europe. 
Department of Urban Planning, Faculty of Architecture in Sarajevo, 
submitted to the competent institutions petition opposing the changes to 
the regulation plan Marindvor where was planned construction of 
Concert Hall.   
Regulatory Plan Center Marindvor approved the construction of a 
Concert Hall Sarajevo, which will be located on the current parking lot, 
next to the Bridge of Suada Dilberović. At Contest for Concert Hall 
design participated architects from 43 countries. (Ibid.).  
 																																																													42	In	conversation	with	Nasiha	Pozder	05.03.2015	
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Although there is now a petition supported by the architectural faculty, it does not state 
how such a project would be funded.  
The perceived problems of investor urbanism were even laid out in an article in 
the weekly magazine Dani titled ‘He who has money builds’43 by Darko Omeragić and 
Edin Redžić (2014). They explained that, ‘Sarajevo has unfortunately become an urban 
jungle, a township where only those who have money build, in violation of all possible 
rules of construction, and often laws. The only criterion is – money.’44 The article 
interviews many urban professionals in Sarajevo. The authors argue that money rules 
when it comes to building in Sarajevo, and on the title page of the article they state, 
‘The only measure of construction in Sarajevo has become – money, and all plans are 
adjusted to the wishes of the investors.’45 They contend that investor urbanism is a 
‘violation of all possible rules of construction, and often laws’ and that the ‘wishes of 
investors’ trump the needs of the city in terms of space.  
An article on Al Jazeera Balkans similarly deals with market-driven urbanism. 
Titled ‘Investors, politics and new constructions are turning Sarajevo into a ruin’46 
(Avdukić, 2016), it states that ‘There are practically no public competitions for 
conceptual urban and architectural solutions in the capital of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina...Under the influence of investors, it would very easily be possible for the 
traditional image of Sarajevo to be lost, and for the city to be turned into a urban ruin, 
experts warn.’47 The author is careful to express multiple viewpoints, especially about 
what is considered the ‘traditional image of Sarajevo’. She quotes Sarajevan architect 
Dušan Jovanović, who explains that, ‘the stories that new investors threaten the 
authentic appearance of Sarajevo are put by people who have no idea about 																																																													43	‘Gradi	ko	ima	novca’	44	‘Sarajevo,	nažalost,	postaje	urbana	džungla,	kasaba	u	kojoj	gradi	onaj	ko	ima	novca,	kršeći	sva	moguća	pravila	gradnje,	a	nerijetko	i	zakone.	Jedino	mjerilo	je	–	novac.’	45	‘Jedino	mjerilo	gradnje	u	Sarajevu	postao	je	-	novac,	a	svi	planovi	se	prilagođavaju	željama	investitora.’	46	‘Investitori,	politika	i	novogradnja	pretvaraju	Sarajevo	u	ruglo’	47	‘Javni	konkursi	za	idejna	urbanističko-arhitektonska	rješenja	u	glavnom	gradu	Bosne	i	Hercegovine	praktično	ne	postoje...Pod	utjecajem	investitora,	vrlo	lako	bi	se	moglo	desiti	da	se	tradicionalna	slika	Sarajeva	izgubi,	a	grad	pretvori	u	urbanističko	ruglo,	upozoravaju	stručnjaci.’	
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architecture, or they are people who are in connection with architecture, but have never 
drawn anything in their life.’48 Although the author makes sure to include this message 
supporting new investments, the overall theme of the article, as expressed by its title, 
follows the prevailing narrative that investor urbanism is ‘turning Sarajevo into a ruin’.  
These views have also been reflected in my survey data. One survey 
respondent, a female economist, explained, for example, ‘Investments are ok, but the 
problem is that no urban standard exists. Money is the only standard’49 and a male 
chauffeur stated, ‘those who have money and power – make what they want, where 
they want!’50. These perceptions clearly imply that Sarajevans believe they have lost 
control of their own urban environment and that whoever has money can do with it as 
they please, even in the face of destroying the historical urban identity. For many, as I 
will show below, this is also a threat to the identity of Sarajevo as a European city.  
 
5.3.2 The ‘Orientalising’ Effect of Foreign Capital  
 The fact that BBI and SCC are investments from the Arab world has a distinct 
effect on the Sarajevan imaginary, and when connected to investor urbanism and the 
tension between the past socialist traditions and the new market economy, some 
Sarajevans believe they are changing the nature of the city in terms of its ‘eastern’ 
character. The power of investors and the commodification and commercialisation of 
city squares is not a new phenomenon, and most would point to Times Square in New 
York or Piccadilly Circus in London as obvious examples of this. BBI and SCC, in their 
sleek steel designs and luxurious furnishings, resemble shopping centres that can be 
seen around the world – from the United States to London to Riyadh to Dubai and on to 
Tokyo. However, because of the source of their capital, they have begun to stand for 
																																																													48	‘Priče	da	novi	investitori	ugrožavaju	autentični	izgled	Sarajeva	plasiraju	ljudi	koji	nemaju	pojma	o	arhitekturi,	ili	oni	koji	su	u	vezi	s	arhitekturom	ali	nikada	u	životu	ništa	nisu	nacrtali.’	49	‘Ulaganja	su	OK,	ali	problem	je	sto	ne	postoji	urbanistički	standard.	Novac	je	jedini	standard’	50	‘Onaj	ko	ima	pare	i	vlast	–	pravi	šta	hoće	i	gdje	hoće!’	
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the Muslim world in BiH. They are reminiscent of oil wealth of the Gulf and the 
extravagance that is often shown in news portals and on social media. Many of the 
shops within these buildings are quite expensive; for example, products from 
L’Occitane en Provence (inside BBI) are relatively expensive even for someone with an 
average salary in London. Products can easily cost around 15-20 GBP (37-50BAM) for 
one item. When the average monthly salary in Sarajevo is around 875 BAM (‘Cost of 
Living in Sarajevo’, 2018) and an average rent is between 300 and 500 BAM, 50 BAM 
becomes a very large amount of money for something as insignificant as a bottle of 
body lotion, for example. As will be shown below, perceptions of exclusion from these 
spaces exist, especially in terms of purchasing power, creating tension between the 
local population and visiting shoppers from the Middle East.  
 The discourses that have been constructed around BBI and SCC quite often 
focus on its eastern-ness or Middle Eastern or Islamic character. One student at the 
architecture faculty that I interviewed explained:  
  We are not in the Middle East. I know that these are the rules in the 
  Middle East, but this is not us…we’re at a crossroads, we have both 
  influences from the East and West, and I kind of think that the West has 
  already…they already gave up and they just let us be literally trampled 
  by these investors that are completely ruining the city.51 
 
Her wording that the investors from the Middle East are trampling Sarajevo is quite 
telling; it implies that they have taken control and can do what they like, regardless of 
the effect on the citizens or the development of the city. The notion that the West has 
abandoned Sarajevo further shows how these constructions are forcing a renegotiation 
of identity between East and West.  
 In another interview I conducted with a Sarajevan architect, who I will keep 
anonymous, similar concerns about the changing urban spaces due to investor 
urbanism were expressed: 
																																																													51	Interview	with	student	at	faculty	of	architecture	at	the	University	of	Sarajevo,	to	be	kept	anonymous.		
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We are aware that something is going on – buildings showing off and a 
lot of investors are coming and changing our landscapes… We are very 
aware that something is going on, but we don’t want to think of it.  
 
This quote implies that investments from the Middle East (‘buildings showing off’ 
suggests the new, luxury constructions built with GCC financing) are changing the city 
spaces, the ‘landscapes’. This individual also creates a divide between the investors, 
who are coming and changing the city, potentially with an agenda (‘something is going 
on’), and Sarajevans. They are changing ‘our landscapes’ and ‘we are very aware that 
something is going on’. This constructs the investors as an ‘other’ in the city, something 
foreign that has come in and dictated the course of urban development without the 
agreement of the local people. Similarly, another very prominent architect in Sarajevo, 
who I will also keep anonymous, told me that he saw these investments as ‘c-class’ 
investments, where investments from Europe and North American presumably took the 
‘a-class’ position. This echoes the idea that the ‘West’ has abandoned Sarajevo, 
leaving it to be ‘trampled’ upon by investors from the Middle East (to quote the student 
mentioned above).  
 Not only do some of my interviewees and survey respondents see investors 
from GCC countries as active agents in the redevelopment of the city without the 
agreement of the local people, but some have also expressed the concern that this is 
changing the identity of the city itself at the exclusion of the local population. For 
example, one survey respondent, a female economist, stated, ‘Sarajevo is losing its old 
identity, [it’s] getting some twists, directed by money. Yes, it is orientalising.’52 This 
quote demonstrates the perception that foreign capital coming from Muslim-majority 
countries, especially Arab countries, is shifting Sarajevo in terms of its identity, 
‘orientalising’ the city and pulling it away from its multicultural, cosmopolitan and 
European image.  
																																																													52	‘Sarajevo	gubi	svoj	stari	identitet,	dobiva	neki	nakaradni,	diktiran	novcem.	Da,	orijentalizira	se.’	
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As the city is changing, the local population is finding itself at odds with the new 
developments, which seem to not only ‘orientalise’ the city, but also to exclude the local 
population. One female field interview respondent in BBI, an employee in one of the 
shops, observed: 
  Well, to put it this way, the customers here, well ... Since we are a 
  country ... to say a poor country, I think in most cases, 70% of the 
  population here barely live, our customers [those from Bosnia] are not 
  very good consumers when it comes to all these centres. You can count 
  maybe 30% of people who might have money to spend. But foreign 
  customers… Arabs and others, they are great customers and spend a 
  lot of money.53 
 
As mentioned above, the prices in many of the brand-name shops in BBI and SCC are 
simply out of the budget for many residents of Sarajevo. These shopping centres are 
often referred to as spaces for foreign spenders, especially those from Arab countries 
and Turkey. In my survey responses, a female professor wrote that in SCC, ‘every third 
person is Bosnian [Bosanac], the rest are Arabs.’54 Such ideas were discussed in 
online forums as well. In the forum SkyscraperCity.com (an urban development forum) 
amongst a discussion about future plans for a hotel in the building and other 
commenters’ first impressions, one commenter with the username BosniaHerzegovina 
described his first visit to SCC on 2 June 2015 saying, ‘I finally was in SCC the day 
before yesterday and yesterday. The centre is ok, nothing special. There weren’t many 
customers, mostly Turks and Arabs’55 (http://www.skyscrapercity.com). Another 
commenter with the username Tango Zulu stated on 24 August 2015: 
  This is almost the first time I saw it live [SCC]. I cannot believe it. As if 
  I've come to another country. Phenomenal! A lot of Arabs. They spend 
  like crazy. I've seen girls who drink coffee and sit next to about 20 bags 
  of goods that they purchased. That for each shirt, you can imagine how 
  much they spend. I was there for half an hour, not planning on buying 
  anything, but I emptied my pockets. I witnessed an Arab in L'Occitane 																																																													53	‘Pa,	da	kažem	ovako,	kupci	ovdje,	pa…	Obzirom	da	smo	mi	zemlja…	da	kažem	siromašna	jedna	zemlja,	mislim	da	u	većini	slučajeva,	70%	stanovnika	ovdje	jedva	živi,	naši	kupci	nisu	baš	dobri	potrošači	što	se	tiče	svih	ovih	centara.	U	tih	ćemo	ubrojati	30%	ljudi	koji	možda	imaju	novaca	da	troše.	A	o	stranim	kucima…	Arapi	i	ostali,	oni	su	super	kupci	i	troše	dosta	novca.’	54	‘U	njemu	je	svaki	treći	čovjek	Bosanac,	a	sve	ostalo	Arapi.’	55	‘Bio	sam	prekjučer	i	jučer	konačno	u	SCC.	Centar	je	ok,	ništa	posebno.	Slabo	je	kupaca	bilo,	najviše	je	Turaka	i	Arapa.’	
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  buy 500 KM of some cream. I’m a man whose basic hygiene is compiled 
  from soaps, shampoos and deodorants, I did not stop being amazed. 
  The staff working there is so pleasant, smart, thoughtful, competent.56 
  (Ibid.).  
 
In both of these comments, there is an underlying suggestion that Bosnians cannot 
afford any of the goods in the shops and that the entire centre is oriented to visiting 
Arabs and Turks, and thus fundamentally excludes non-elite Bosnians in certain ways. 
Despite the fact that Bosnians visit these centres, mostly for social visits and to drink 
coffee in the cafes, the implication exists that they are not the main focus for the 
investment. They are almost foreign in their own city, as if they have ‘come to another 
country’.  
 In Sarajevo market-driven urbanism from GCC countries has created the 
perception that the city is being changed and developed according to the will of foreign 
investors for the benefit of foreigners in the city. Some see this as having an 
‘orientalising’ effect on the city, making it fundamentally more ‘eastern’ in nature. As 
Sarajevans are grappling with their identity in a globalising world, they are constructing 
these discourses that articulate along the East/West binary in order to position their 
own identity, which is itself in flux and which has always bridged the so-called ‘East’ 
and ‘West’.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have explored how Sarajevans are reacting to new commercial 
developments in Sarajevo with funding from GCC countries, specifically the shopping 
centres BBI and SCC. I have examined their reactions focusing on perceptions of 
corruption and investor urbanism, and I have analysed discourses that understand 
corruption as particularly ‘eastern’ and that see investor urbanism as changing the 																																																													56	‘Ovo	sam	skoro	prvi	put	vidio	uživo.	Nemogu	vjerovat.	Kao	da	sam	došo	u	drugu	državu.	Fenomenalno!	Puno	je	arapa.	Oni	troše	kao	ludi.	Vidio	sam	djevojke	koje	piju	kafu	i	suede	[sic]	pored	20ak	kesa	robe	koje	su	kupili.	Da	je	u	svakoj	majice,	možete	zamislit	koliko	troše.	Ja	sam	bio	pola	sata	neplanirajući	kupit	ništa,	ali	sam	izpraznio	džepove.	Svjedočio	sam	kako	arapkinja	u	l’occitane,	kupuje	500	KM	nekih	krema.	Ja	kao	muško	čija	osnovna	higijena	se	sastavlja	od	sapuna,	šampona	i	dezodoransa,	nisam	se	prestao	čudit.	Osoblje	koje	radi	tamo	je	toliko	ugodno,	pametno,	obzirno,	sposobno.’	
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character of the city toward the ‘East’. Sarajevo is being worlded through investments 
such as BBI and SCC, meaning such investments are ‘globalising’ the city. The case 
studies are elite-approved worlding practices that inter-reference the luxury of similar 
buildings in Gulf cities such as Dubai. These interventions form part of the public 
sphere in Sarajevo, underlining their importance for the city. As public space is a 
meeting place and a crossroads it becomes an arena for multiplicity and hybridity to 
develop, as transnationalism encourages the development of emergent cultural forms 
(Mandaville, 2003; Ong, 1999 and 2011; Tsing, 2005). In Sarajevo, this means that BBI 
and SCC are pushing new understandings of the city and its identity, which go beyond 
simple binaries such as ‘East’ and ‘West’.  
 As I have shown above, many people in Sarajevo perceive the development of 
BBI and SCC as corrupt and linked to the personal and private interests of elite 
politicians and foreign investors. They also view market-driven urbanism as 
contributing to the ‘ruin’ of Sarajevo and its historical identity, especially as foreign 
private interests control these quasi-public spaces and the activities that take place on 
them. As Sarajevo’s historical identity has firmly entrenched the notions of 
‘multiculturalism’, cosmopolitanism, tolerance and ‘European-ness’, the current 
processes that are developing the city are challenging these notions and how 
Sarajevans view themselves in the globalising world. These processes are compelling 
Sarajevans to position their identity along the imaginary East/West binary away from 
what is understood as ‘East’, especially the conceptual ‘eastern-ness’ connected to 
SCC, BBI and their rumours and allegations of corruption, despite the fact that the case 
studies actually contribute to the development of multiplicity in Sarajevo. By doing so, 
Sarajevans are asserting their ‘western-ness’, their European-ness and their closeness 
to the ostensibly transparent and cosmopolitan values associated with Europe.  
 Worlding practices in Sarajevo are attempts to solve the ‘urban problems’ (Ong, 
2011: 4) of post-conflict and post-socialist reconstruction and development. As 
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described above, ‘worlding practices’ push the boundaries of urbanism beyond the city 
itself, ‘being at once heterogeneously particular and yet irreducibly global’ (9). The case 
studies in this section are ‘expressions and agents of global urban imaginaries’ (Baker 
and Ruming, 2014: 63). Such expressions and agents, both human and material, are 
actively creating emergent cultural forms outside of binaries such as East/West, but 
they are also elite-approved and beyond the control and consent of the city’s residents. 
Although they are sites of developing multiplicity, Sarajevans have reacted to the case 
studies by distancing themselves from the elements of these projects that they view as 
‘eastern’, as they endeavour to solidify an understanding of their identity and the 
identity of the city that they see as being ‘ruined’ by the elite and by foreign investors. 
The post-conflict and post-socialist urban landscape of Sarajevo is a prime location for 
development solutions that hail from all areas of the globe, potentially inter-referencing 
cities such as Dubai. Yet, the reactions of the Sarajevans to these projects speak to an 
underlying fear of novel cultural forms and new urban identities outside the pre-war 
‘multicultural’ idyll. This fear, a reaction to corruption and investor urbanism, also 
extends more explicitly to Islam in the built environment and the perceived threat of 
‘Islamisation’ of the city and extremism, as I will discuss in the next chapter on sacred 
spaces.  
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 Sacred spaces have traditionally been understood as overt manifestations of 
religiosity in the built environment and as places imbued with feelings of awe and 
wonder, according to scholars such as Veronica della Dora (2011: 167). In Sarajevo, 
traditional sacred spaces such as churches and mosques are representations of the 
ethno-religious communities, their histories and their conflicts. Yet the line between the 
sacred and the secular is proving ever more difficult to define and describe. What 
makes a purely ‘sacred’ space and what makes a ‘secular’ space in a city where 
religious ties and ethno-religious nationalism exist along with the recent memory of 
secular socialism? Feelings of wonder and awe that can define these spaces may also 
develop in nominally secular spaces, and traditional sacred spaces may also exist 
without these feelings of wonder when they take on secular functions (such as cultural 
centres). The terms ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ remain contested, and academics such as 
Justin Beaumont and Christopher Baker (2011), Banu Gökarıksel (2009 and 2012) and 
Lily Kong (2001) contend that the ‘sacred’ and the ‘secular’ transcend binary 
understandings, allowing for the simultaneous production of different realities. 
Sarajevo’s history is inseparable from the religious and political movements that have 
shaped its architecture and identity. From its founding, religion carved out mahalas for 
the different denominations in the city, and the presence of the sacred in the built 
environment continues to permeate Sarajevan urban spaces even outside of mosques, 
churches and synagogues.  
In this chapter I will examine new spaces in Sarajevo imbued with elements of 
the sacred that have been built since the end of the conflict in 1995 with funding from 
the greater Muslim world, focusing on examples of the most contested spaces: the 
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shopping centres BBI and SCC and the Saudi King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre. 
After much consideration, I have decided to use BBI and SCC as case studies for both 
chapters on commercial spaces as well as sacred spaces. While this may be unusual, I 
believe this is exactly what is necessary for the contemporary reality of Sarajevo. SCC 
and BBI are privately owned, quasi-public spaces (legally private buildings that form 
part of the public sphere and which are controlled by private interests), and because 
they were both built using Islamic financing from GCC countries, there is a blending of 
the sacred and the secular. Both shopping centres host mesjids (prayer rooms), 
complete with ablution areas, and as stated in the previous chapter on commercial 
buildings, both are shari’ah compliant, meaning the activities on the premises are 
restricted (no gambling, eating pork, selling or drinking alcohol). One colleague of mine 
has insisted to me in private conversations that BBI and SCC are in fact wholly sacred 
spaces due to their religious undertones. I disagree. I believe that, similar to Gökarıksel 
(2009 and 2012) and Kong (2001), the production of space transcends binary divisions, 
allowing for different realities to exist simultaneously ‘through the specific set of political 
and social relations, ideologies and practices in particular sites’ (Gökarıksel, 2012: 5). 
These buildings are at once sacred and secular. BBI and SCC are symbolically imbued 
with Islamic sacred elements (such as their prayer rooms and shari’ah restrictions), 
they are sites of ritual prayer in their mesjids, and they are shopping centres hosting 
different multinational retail stores. In a similar fashion, the King Fahd Mosque and 
Cultural Centre – a site of ritual prayer – also contains a cultural and sporting complex 
outside the scope of the religious leaders and open to all people in Sarajevo.  
These contested spaces have been the subject of public debates that reinforce 
the imagined binaries of Sacred/Secular and East/West in order to position Sarajevan 
identity. Urban interventions such as the King Fahd Mosque, BBI and SCC are 
‘worlding practices’ as described earlier in this thesis – ‘projects that attempt to 
establish or break established horizons of urban standards in and beyond a particular 
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city’ (Ong, 2011: 4). As such, they defy traditional binary thinking: ‘this notion of the 
production of emergent spaces from the flows of ideas, actions and objects is a radical 
departure from a conventional view of the world as stabilized into binary orders’ (Ibid., 
12). They create a contradiction; new urban interventions demand an understanding 
outside of binaries while the public debate surrounding them articulates around 
imagined binaries, demanding conceptual stasis of what the city is and what the city 
should be.  
 Analysing how Sarajevans are discussing new urban interventions imbued with 
sacred elements, I will examine the case studies in two parts: first I will explore the 
public debates around the shopping centers SCC and BBI in terms of their links to 
Islam and the sacred elements imbued in the spaces. I will look at the shopping centres 
by concentrating on two themes: narratives around conspiracies to ‘Islamise’ the city 
with such investments and fears of expanding shari’ah compliant spaces. I use the 
term ‘Islamise’ in this section to refer to the perception by Sarajevans of increasing 
encroachment of Islam into the public sphere (‘the sphere of private people coming 
together as a public’ (Habermas, 1989: 27)). In the second part of the chapter, I will 
focus on the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre. In this section, I will evaluate the 
public debate, especially focusing on the themes of radicalism and security risks and 
the perception that the mosque and cultural centre preys upon the poor and vulnerable. 
Before analysing my data, however, it will be important to discuss the recent history of 
Islam in BiH from the end of the Second World War. This history is important for 
understanding the global flows of ideas and people into the country and how the 
Sarajevan population has understood the sacred versus the secular and Islam as 
practiced in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will discuss global movements within Islam, 
how they pertain to Sarajevo, and how the socialist history of secularism affects such 
ideas. I will then give a brief overview of the case studies. In all, I will demonstrate how 
Sarajevans attempt to position their identity, especially around the imagined binaries of 
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Sacred/Secular and East/West. The movement of people and ideas through BiH and 
Sarajevo is informing new conceptions of the sacred, Islamic belonging and Sarajevo’s 
placement in the globalising world, and because of this, Sarajevans are scrambling to 
make sense of a rapidly changing city and its identity. 
 
6.1.1 Data Collection 
 In order to come to an understanding about the debates taking place in 
Sarajevo regarding the case studies, I have drawn on a very broad selection of data, 
which includes media articles, interview transcripts from my fieldwork, field interview 
conversations (in which I stopped Sarajevan residents on the street and in shopping 
centers to discuss current trends such as the transnational flows of capital and people 
from GCC countries) and data from my internet survey about urban development in 
Sarajevo. I have also drawn from some unconventional sources, such as a blog written 
by a Bosnian journalist (Latal, 2009) and the Klix.ba forum (Klix.ba being the top news 
portal in BiH, according to USAID in its report titled, ‘Assessment of the Media Sector in 
BiH’ (Brunwasser et al, 2016)). I have used these internet sources as a means to 
support my data, as the responses from interviewees are often not as candid as many 
online comments. The risk of using these sources is that some commenters online are 
‘trolls’, ie, they say the most radical opinions with the aim of inciting arguments 
between people. I have done my best to recognise and avoid such commentary and 
analyse the comments in the context of the conversation taking place in the forum 
thread. To understand the attitudes of the people of Sarajevo regarding these buildings, 
I sought data from many of the most popular and highly read sources in BiH and in the 
Balkans as a whole, as I will show below. My interviews were with people engaged 
professionally in the development of the city or with the projects themselves, and my 
field interviews included people using, working in or living around the case studies.  
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 In the first part of this chapter that focuses on the shopping centres BBI and 
SCC, I will draw upon three interviews with urban professionals and stakeholders in 
Sarajevo. This will include the general director of Shad Invest, Samid Sinanović, a 
student at the architecture faculty and an urban professional who I will keep 
anonymous but who is active in architectural and urban planning circles in the city. In 
addition to these interviews, I will use the data from two field interviews (in which I 
approached people on the streets and in the shopping centres of Sarajevo) and four of 
my survey respondents. To triangulate this data and to expand on the debates in the 
city, I will also analyse three media articles originating from some of the most popular 
news sources in BiH. The first quotes a BiH politician in the Nezavisne Novine, which is 
a Banja Luka (Republika Srpska) based news source. Its name means the 
‘Independent Newspaper’, and it has one of the largest readerships in BiH (Jusić, 
2004). Second, I will look at a Balkan Insight article, which is a publication of the 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), and which is considered one of the 
remaining true investigative reporting service in Sarajevo, according to a representative 
of the OSCE’s Press and Public Information Unit.57 The Balkan Insight website states 
that it, ‘has built a reputation as the most comprehensive, professional and 
independent source of news in English in the Balkan region, which provides the public 
with relevant and insightful reporting on key regional issues’ 
(http://www.balkaninsight.com). Third, I will examine an article from the Dnevni Avaz, 
which is the highest read newspaper in Sarajevo and probably in BiH, according to the 
OSCE’s press representative and Jusić (2004). USAID (Brunwasser et al, 2016) lists 
the both Dnevni Avaz and Nezavise Novine in the top three of the top 15 news portals 
in BiH (the first being Klix.ba, as mentioned previously). Finally, although considered 
slightly unorthodox, I will analyse a blog post written by a Sarajevan journalist and 
political analyst. In his post, he discusses the then newly opened BBI and the 																																																													57	In	conversation	with	representative	of	the	OSCE’s	Press	and	Public	Information	Unit	11.08.15.	
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sentiments in the city about the building at that time. I believe it is a valuable source 
that shows how residents reacted to the building of BBI.  
 In the second part of this chapter, I will focus on the King Fahd Mosque and 
Cultural Centre, and my analysis will draw upon a similarly varied list of sources. I will 
analyse one interview with the director of the King Fahd Cultural Centre and three field 
interviews that were taken in the area of the city where the mosque is located. For 
media analysis, I will examine excerpts and headlines from Balkan Insight and 
Nezavisne Novine, which were described above. However, I will also draw upon an 
article from Dani, a weekly news magazine from Sarajevo with an estimated readership 
of 100,000 people, according to its marketing team 
(https://www.bhdani.ba/portal/marketing) and an article that appeared in the Serbian 
newspaper, Politika, which is daily paper published in Belgrade. It is, according to its 
website, the ‘oldest and most read daily newspaper in this part of Europe’ (‘O Nama’, 
http://www.politika.rs/scc/stranica/4/O-nama),58 and is read in BiH as well as in Serbia. 
In addition to these media sources, I will analyse comments left on the Klix.ba forum 
about the King Fahd mosque. As noted above, Klix.ba is the number one accessed 
webportal in BiH, and its forums are also popular with the public. Considering such 
comments as part of my data is unconventional (as with blog posts), however it does 
allow for viewpoints that interviewees might self-censor during a face-to-face 
interaction.  
 
6.1.2 Islam in Sarajevo: From Secularism to Salafism 
 I argue that it is not possible to separate the religious and secular in Sarajevo 
and that defining the sacred in terms of awe and wonder falls short of the contemporary 
reality of the city. In contrast to the city’s secular, Yugoslav identity, there is a current 
‘Islamic shift’ in the city, meaning its spaces and demographics are becoming more 																																																													58‘najstariji	i	najuticajniji	dnevni	list	u	ovom	delu	Evrope.’	
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Muslim in nature (see chapter four on Sarajevo’s Islamic shift). Instead of there being a 
strict delineation between the two, the sacred and the secular are merging, blending 
into one another and being produced simultaneously in the same spaces. Religion, 
which existed only behind closed doors throughout much of the twentieth century, has 
emerged with the spread of global religious ideas and movements, the influence of 
religion in the national politics and the influx of people from Muslim-majority countries 
into BiH. All this has allowed for religion, and Islam particularly in the case of Sarajevo, 
to become part of the public sphere.  
 The current dynamics of media and popular discourses surrounding the case 
studies can only be conceived of in light of the city’s history with religion and 
secularism. Sarajevo has a long religious history, and BiH society only shifted towards 
secularism after the Second World War with the rise of the socialist Yugoslav state 
(Merdjanova, 2013 and Karčić, 2010a). Sarajevo was founded as an Ottoman city, one 
in which Islam has played a decisive role in the production and arrangement of urban 
space. Islam was a dominant force in the urban environment until the occupation of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878, and it was only after this time that the large 
cathedrals – both Catholic and Orthodox – were built in the centre of the city (Donia, 
2006). This dominance of Islam in the urban environment is a historical reality, and 
although other religious communities have always existed in Sarajevo, Islam’s 
presence has overshadowed other religions until the Habsburg occupation (Ibid., 60). 
This Ottoman aspect of Sarajevo’s identity still influences the identity of the city as a 
whole. 
 Religiosity in what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to influence both 
public and private spheres until 1945 when the political establishment changed 
dramatically, altering the place of religion in society and the future development of the 
city (Merdjanova, 2013: 31). With the new socialist government, religion was relegated 
entirely to the private sphere, and religious leaders were persecuted under the new 
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regime. They abolished the shari’ah courts, closed the madrassas, nationalized the 
religious endowments, and banned the full-face veil (Merdjanova, 2013: 31 and Karčić, 
2010b). This hostile environment for religious worship led to the decline in religiosity in 
the public sphere until the later part of the twentieth century when the visibility of 
religion re-emerged.  
 With the establishment of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, the socialist 
government began to liberalise its attitudes toward religion, causing a revival of 
religiosity in the public sphere generally. In the 1970s, the Faculty of Islamic Studies at 
the University of Sarajevo was reopened, and the madrassas followed suit. This was 
especially apparent in the Islamic community, as it corresponded with a global Islamic 
revival and the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The NAM facilitated the communication of 
ideas and people from Yugoslavia to the Middle East, North Africa and Muslim-majority 
countries in Southeast Asia, allowing for a strengthening of religious adherence from 
Yugoslav citizens who studied and worked in these countries (Karčić, 2010b).  
 In addition to these influences, Islam returned to the political front as well within 
the Yugoslav state with the rise of Alija Izetbegović (father of Bakir, the current Bošnjak 
president) and other Muslim intellectuals and pan-Islamic activists. Although 
Izetbegović’s ‘Islamic Declaration’ dreamed of an Islamic state that progressed along 
with modern technology, he claimed this was a utopia. According to John V. A. Fine 
(2002), ‘It was not his goal, and though Izetbegović may well have liked the idea of 
such a state, it was anathema to his SDA associates, who, as ethnic and not religious 
Muslims, were secular Europeans who did not think that religion had a place in 
governing a modern state,’ (15). So while nationalist political currents in the Serb and 
Croat ethno-religious communities twisted the ‘Declaration’ to stir up fear of a push 
towards an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reality was that there was very 
little chance of such a thing ever occurring (Ibid.). Although the reality did not match the 
discourses, this seed of fear of an Islamised BiH has propelled Islamophobia in the 
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country, not only influencing the massacres of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and 
other localities during the conflict in the 1990s, but also continuing to this day and 
perpetuating fears of Islamism in politics and in city spaces.  
 Parallel to the rising tide of Islamophobia was an actual emergence of Islam on 
the political scene, but only as late as 1993, according to Fine (16). He explains that, 
‘the anti-Islamic propaganda became a self-fulfilling prophecy,’ (Ibid.). Once ethnic 
partition by the international community became a reality, and ‘owing to the exodus of 
Christians from the area under the control of the Muslim-led government, religious 
Muslims found themselves able to enter the sphere of Bosnian politics. As a result, if 
one was a religious Muslim, new opportunities arose; but if one was a secular Muslim, 
or a non-Muslim, new dangers emerged.’ (Ibid.). In my research, I also encountered 
these attitudes from Sarajevans. They described how people during this time feigned 
religiosity in order to gain influence and power. For secular Muslims, these tendencies 
entered into the discourses around Islam in Sarajevo and the fears that have been 
linked to the rise of Islamic religiosity in BiH beginning in the last decade of the 
twentieth century. Islamophobia from secular Muslims and non-Muslims then mixed 
with the sentiment that religiosity was a necessity for political and social assent, 
allowing for growing resentment towards Islam in BiH.  
 During the war, movements of people and ideas from the greater Muslim world 
accelerated, as both foreign Islamic fighters and Islamic charities rushed to the support 
of Bosnian Muslims. Much has been written about these influences, including the fact 
that some charities offered money to Bosnian Muslim families in ‘exchange’ for women 
wearing the veil. Other charities were later unmasked as fronts for terrorist operations 
(see, for example, Kohlmann, 2006). The foreign Islamic fighters, or mujahideen, hailed 
from regions in the world such as Saudi Arabia, and they brought with them more 
conservative understandings of the practice of Islam that had been developing in the 
greater Muslim world in the twentieth century. These ideas were at odds with the 
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lifestyles many of the men in the Bosnian army, their so-called co-religionists. For the 
Bosnian Muslims on the front lines – men who had grown up in a secular society where 
the state actively discouraged religious practice, men who often drank alcohol, had 
premarital sexual relationships and rarely if ever went to mosque – obvious conflicts of 
ideology began to develop (Tziampiris, 2009).    
 While Bosnians who worked and lived abroad under programmes promoted by 
the NAM were exposed to global practices of Islam (and brought them back home) and 
while those in rural areas tended to be more religious than city dwellers, those who 
stayed in urban areas of Yugoslavia remained exposed to the secular ideal promoted 
by the state. The foreign influences during the war from the mujahideen and Islamic 
charities did have an effect on religious practices in BiH, but this effect has been mostly 
exaggerated in the media and literature (Ibid.). There surely were Salafist trends 
coming into the country – i.e., the move to emulate the religious practices of the 
companions of the Prophet Mohammed. Unfortunately, there is much confusion 
surrounding the idea of Salafism and Wahhabism, the Saudi brand of Salafism. In order 
to truly understand the current dynamics of Islam in BiH and the discourses 
surrounding Islam in Sarajevo, it is necessary to first discuss the concept of ‘Bosnian 
Islam’ or ‘naš Islam’ (our Islam), after which global movements of Islamic thought can 
be discussed in relation to this understanding.  
In the year 2006, the IZ (Islamska Zajednica, or the regulatory body for Islam in 
ex-Yugoslav countries) published its constitution, which spells out some aspects of the 
concept of ‘Bosnian Islam’, although they are very careful to never use this 
terminology, preferring instead the ‘Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks’. This coincided with a 
rise in Islamic investment in real estate, the building of mosques with foreign funding, 
the visible arrival of Arabs and Turks in the country for tourism and education, and the 
rise in global terror networks. Importantly, Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, according 
to the IZ, is to follow the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence (madhab). Article 8 of 
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the constitution states, ‘The Islamic community preserves the credibility of Islamic 
norms and ensures their interpretation and application. The Hanafi madhab shall be 
applied in interpretation and practice of the Islamic worship (ibadat) duties in the IZ.’59 
(Neimarlija, 2006). Additionally, the constitution mentions in Article 2 that, ‘the 
autonomy of the IZ in BiH is based on religious and legal institutions of Bosnian 
Muslims from the time of Ottoman administration.’60 (Ibid.). Such a constitution, while 
again not specifically talking about ‘Bosnian Islam’, does set religious Islamic practice 
in BiH apart from Islamic practice in other areas of the Muslim world, especially Saudi 
Arabia. In fact, according to scholars such as Xavier Bougarel (2007) and Elissa Helms 
(2008), Bosnian Muslims have emphasised that their tradition of Islam is ‘European’, 
perceiving the ‘Muslim “east”’ (Helms, 2008: 105) as less tolerant.   
 Two years after the publication of the constitution, the IZ founded the Institute 
for the Islamic Tradition of Bošnjaks (Institut za Islamsku Tradiciju Bošnjaka, or IITB). 
The creation and founding of the IITB is another move to solidify the concept of Islam in 
Bosnia and to set it apart from other currents in the Islamic world. According to the IZ, 
the IITB’s mission is as follows: 
  Institute of Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks is a scientific research institution 
  of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The scientific 
  fields in which the Institute strives to achieve scientific research and 
  academic excellence are:  
  1. The concept of the Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks 
  2. The contribution of Bošnjaks to the Islamic sciences 
  3. Religious practice of Bošnjaks 
  4. Migration and demographic processes of Bošnjaks 
  5. Genocide against Bošnjaks 
  6. Bošnjak surroundings [and encounter with the ‘other’] 
  The focus of the Institute is the Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks through 
  theoretical and empirical research.61 (‘O Institutu’, http://iitb.ba/o- 
  institutu/).  																																																													59	‘Islamska	zajednica	čuva	vjerodostojnost	islamskih	nor-mi	i	osigurava	njihovo	tumačenje	i	primjenu.	U	tumačenju	i	izvršavanju	ibadetskih	islamskih	dužnosti	u	Islamskoj	zajednici	primjenjuje	se	hanefijski	mezheb.’	60	‘Autonomija	Islamske	zajednice	u	Bosni	i	Hercegovini	utemeljena	je	na	vjerskopravnim	institucijama	bosanskih	muslimana	iz	vremena	osmanske	uprave	u	Bosni.’	61	‘Institut	za	islamsku	tradiciju	Bošnjaka	je	naučnoistraživačka	ustanova	Islamske	zajednice	u	Bosni	i	Hercegovini.	Naučne	oblasti	u	kojima	Institut	nastoji	postići	naučnoistraživačku	i	akademsku	izvrsnost	jesu:	1.	Koncept	islamske	tradicija	Bošnjaka	2.	Doprinos	Bošnjaka	islamskim	naukama	
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While the institute is a research centre, its focus is on codifying the Islam practiced in 
Bosnia against other currents of Islam, especially basing this concept on the traditions 
of Bosnian Muslims. There is quite a lot of emphasis placed on the Islamic and cultural 
traditions of the Bošnjaks as elements that differentiate the Bosnian Islamic tradition 
from Islam practiced in other parts of the world. Fikret Karčić, working with the IITB, 
specifies that the ‘Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks’ consists of: 
  1. Ahl al-sunnah branch of Islam [Sunni], including application of  
  Maturidi thought in aqaid [Islamic creed] and Hanafi madhab in fiqh 
  [Islamic jurisprudence], with respective Sufi orders (tariqats)… 
  2. Belonging to Ottoman-Islamic cultural zone… 
  3. Existence of elements of ‘Islamized’ practice of inhabitants of pre-
  Ottoman Bosnia… 
  4. Tradition of Islamic reformism (islah) in interpretation of Islam… 
  5. Institutionalization of Islam in the form of the Islamic Community… 
  6. Practice of expression of Islam in a secular state…(Karčić, 2006). 
 
Again, while the expression ‘Bosnian Islam’ is avoided, the implication of this detailed 
description of the ‘Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks’ is that the Islam practiced in BiH is to 
be distinguished from other ‘Islams’, especially those ‘less tolerant’ versions from the 
‘East’ (Bougarel, 2007 and Helms, 2008). These concepts form part and parcel of the 
discourse of ‘Bosnian Islam’ or ‘naš Islam’ to which Sarajevans often refer, setting 
themselves apart from other Muslims – especially Muslims from GCC countries.  
 The public discourse surrounding Islam particularly aims to separate ‘naš Islam’ 
from what is commonly called Wahhabism. However, there is much confusion about 
what is actually meant by this term, and there are other global movements in Islam that 
become entangled within such categorisations. Wahhabism is the particularly Saudi 
brand of Salafism, a conservative current of Islam that aims to follow the exact 
practices of the, ‘pious forefathers (al-salaf al-salih), the first three generations of 
Muslims who had first-hand experience of the rise of Islam and are regarded as 																																																													3.	Religijska	praksa	Bošnjaka	4.	Migracijski	i	demografski	procesi	Bošnjaka	5.	Genocid	nad	Bošnjacima	6.	Bošnjačko	okruženje	Fokus	rada	Instituta	je	na	islamskoj	tradiciji	Bošnjaka	i	to	kroz	teorijska	i	empirijska	istraživanja.’	
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exemplary for the correct way to live for future Muslims.’ (Meijer, 2014: 4). Salafism, 
including Wahhabism, emphasises the idea of tawhid or the complete oneness of God 
in all daily affairs as the basis for Islamic creed. Importantly tawhid does away with any 
innovations that might be seen as intermediaries between God and the believer, 
including veneration of tombs and saints, astrology or idolatry of any kind. Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhab, the father of Wahhabism, insisted on a very fundamentalist interpretation of 
tawhid, and, ‘he was willing to call all those who did not adhere to the doctrine of tawhid 
unbelievers (kafir/kuffar) or apostates (murtaddun), who can be excommunicated 
(takfir), which was a precondition for waging jihad against them’ (5). This is the crux of 
the matter, especially in Bosnia, when considering Salafism and Wahhabism: although 
many strands of Salafism shun violence, like the so-called quietist Salafists (Shepard, 
2013: 173-175), others do not. In addition to this, followers of Salafism are often 
(though not always) more visible, as they adhere to traditional dress codes in which 
women veil their faces and men grow long beards. Some brands of Salafism reject 
adherence to the schools of Islamic jurisprudence, but the Saudi Wahhabis follow the 
Hanbali madhab.  
 Salafism, however, is not the only global force within Islam. Raymond William 
Baker (2015) argues that a global Islamic midstream, the ‘Wassatteyya’, is the basis for 
Islam’s continuing strength and endurance (3-4). This current – what Tariq Ramadan 
calls ‘Universal Islam’ (Ramadan, 2003) – stresses the guiding force of the midstream 
of Islamic thought and a connection with the global umma for Islamic renewal. Baker 
asserts that: 
  In the view of its adherents, the Wassatteyya functions as a vital yet 
  flexible midstream, a centrist river out of Islam. Today, the Wassatteyya 
  has made itself a presence everywhere Muslims are found. It connects, 
  but does not unify, all parts of the Islamic world or ummah. It plays an 
  important role even in those parts of the globe where Muslims are a 
  minority. The midstream defines Islam for the vast majority of Muslims, 
  even as it acts as a wellspring for all manner of tributaries that allow 
  Islam to renew itself in the most diverse ways (3).  
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While Salafism is a growing trend that excludes all but those purporting to follow the 
pious forefathers, midstream Islam – the Wassatteyya – is more tolerant and stresses 
the universalist and peaceful aspects of the religion. These ideas, too, have found their 
way to Sarajevo and are influencing how Bosnian Muslims understand their faith and 
the faith of Muslims around the world. Of lesser note, trends such as Quranism, which 
rejects the Hadith as religious authority, have also found a foothold in Sarajevo.  
 
6.1.3 Case Studies BBI, SCC, King Fahd  
In the first part of this chapter’s empirical analysis, I will focus on the shopping 
centres BBI and SCC, which were built with Islamic financing from the Gulf region. As 
discussed in the previous chapter on commercial investments, Islamic financing 
mandates certain rules for spaces built using this type of funding, and it is forbidden for 
the restaurants, cafes and supermarkets within the buildings to profit from the sale of 
pork and alcohol. Strictly no gambling is permitted on the premises, so betting agencies 
– or kladionice – are not allowed to buy space within the shopping centres. In addition 
to these rules, the buildings must also provide a clean area for people to pray. Both BBI 
and SCC have Islamic prayer rooms (mesjids) on the premises, complete with male 
and female ablution areas, and are specifically designed for Muslim prayer. The 
mesjids are beautiful spaces that use light to create a feeling of awe (Figure 9 and 
Figure 10). Although these are Muslim prayer rooms, worshipers of other faiths would 
be welcome to use such spaces if they wished.  
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Figure 9: the mesjid in BBI, photo by author.  
 
Sead Živalj, the general manager of BBI Real Estate, explained that if the Christian 
community asked for a prayer space, he would be happily oblige. The difference in 
frequency and format of formal prayer between Islam and Christianity makes this 
unlikely,62 as Christians generally do not need access to prayer areas during daily 
working hours. Because Muslims are required to pray five times daily, and because 
their prayers involve prostration to the floor, they need access to clean prayer spaces 







Figure 10: SCC mesjid, partition looking toward men’s area. Photo by author.  
 
In addition to the BBI and SCC as case studies of spaces that blend the sacred 
and the secular, I am also including the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre 
(Džamija i Kulturni Centar Kralj Fahd), which is the Saudi-funded mosque and cultural 
centre in Sarajevo (Figure 11). Built in 2000, the King Fahd mosque is an investment 
from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which ‘tends toward’ the Hanbali school of Islamic 
jurisprudence63. It is the largest mosque in the Balkans, with a 1,500 person capacity. 
Adjacent to the mosque, and forming part of the Saudi complex on the site, is an 
education centre and sports terrain. Any person living in Sarajevo or the surrounding 
area can sign up to take entirely free classes in multiple subjects, including English, 
Arabic, calligraphy, and IT skills. Residents can also sign up to use the sports terrain 
free of cost, although this part of the complex is separated by sex. The entire project is 
																																																													63	In	conversation	with	Dr	Khalid	AdDamigh,	the	Cultural	Attache	and	head	of	the	Saudi	Cultural	Centre	
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estimated at around EUR 20 million (‘Alipašino B faza’, 2013). The King Fahd mosque 
has been the most controversial mosque built in Sarajevo, as residents have seen it as 
a home for Salafis, and often there is an aura of fear surrounding the building, as will 
be demonstrated in the discussion below. However, like with BBI and SCC, the King 
Fahd mosque is not a purely sacred space, as its cultural centre and sporting terrain 
blend the sacred and secular aspects of the site.  
 
Figure 11: the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre, photo by author.  
 
6.2 Islam in the Public Sphere: ‘Islamisation’ and the Perception of Increasing Shari’ah 
Compliant Spaces 
Urban interventions in Sarajevo including mosques such as the King Fahd 
Mosque and shopping centres such as BBI and SCC have propelled public debates in 
the city around the ‘Islamic shift’ that I discussed earlier in this dissertation, meaning 
the increasing Muslim nature of the city spaces and its demographics. While I have 
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shown that there is a real movement towards an expansion of Muslim spaces in the city 
over Orthodox Christian, Catholic and Jewish spaces, this has as much to do with 
demographics and the ethnic partitioning that has occurred since the signing of the 
Dayton Accords. However, the narrative constructions in the city surrounding new 
urban investments prey on fears of an agenda towards ‘Islamisation’ of the city driven 
by certain political elite. And while there is a de facto phenomenon taking place in the 
city whereby the sacred – linked to Islam – is blending into the secular, this complex 
reality is being used to play upon the fears of the population that the secular, multi-
ethnic nature of the city is under attack by Islamists and Islamic financing for projects. 
As a continuation of this fear, media articles, interview and survey data suggest the 
perception exists in the city of an agenda to not only ‘Islamise’ the city spaces, but also 
to impose stricter Islamic regulations upon the people. These regulations, according to 
such perceptions, could involve limiting the availability of alcohol and pork or instituting 
dress codes in public places. In this section, I will analyse the discourses surrounding 
BBI and SCC and how Sarajevans attempt to position their identity along the 
Sacred/Secular binary. I will focus on the theme of ‘Islamisation’ of the city – the city 
spaces and regulations. By ‘Islamisation’ in this case I mean an active agenda to 
incorporate Islam into the city spaces and impose Islamic regulations upon the people. 
Those constructing the discourse describe political agendas on the part of BiH 
politicians to ‘Islamise’ the city and the expansion of shari’ah compliant spaces such as 
BBI and SCC.  
 
6.2.1 Asserting a Political Agenda to ‘Islamise’ Sarajevo 
 With its recent secular history and multiethnic imaginary, urban investments in 
Sarajevo such as BBI and SCC are becoming the focus of many media reports and 
discussions. As related to the last chapter on commercial buildings in Sarajevo, my 
data suggests that the perception exists that there is a political agenda related to the 
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Islamic shift in the city. This is often linked to the SDA and Bakir Izetbegović, who has 
been instrumental in courting Arab investment in BiH. There are many examples of 
these narratives operating in the city, reacting to the new buildings, their funding and 
assumed agendas on the political elite, all which attempt to position Sarajevan identity 
accordingly on the Sacred/Secular binary. I will begin generally with examples hinting 
at an agenda to ‘Islamise’ the city and move to cases specifically centered around BBI 
and SCC and their political connections.  
Religion came to the fore directly before the conflict in the 90s and after. 
However, in Sarajevo, as ethnic cleansing created a mostly Muslim populace, the 
public debates invariably target Islam and the fear of imposed Islamic regulations, 
asserting that there is a conspiracy to ‘Islamise’ the city. For example, in 2010, 
Nezavisne Novine – one of BiH’s most highly read daily newspapers – quoted Nikola 
Špirić (a Bosnian Serb politician, who at the time was the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina) stating that for Serbs and Croats, ‘if they want to 
survive in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be best for them to convert to Islam.’ 
(Arslanagić, 2010). The usage of the phrase ‘to survive’ brings about feelings of life or 
death. In a country that witnessed mass murder due to ethno-religious affiliation, it 
suggests a vengeful turn of events where Serbs and Croats might find themselves the 
victims. The legacy of the Muslim massacres in places such as Srebrenica, something 
many qualify as a genocide, lives on in the collective memory of Bosnian Muslims. 
Muslims were persecuted and executed en masse, and using terminology such as ‘if 
they want to survive’ conveys an urgent, life-threatening situation for non-Muslims in 
BiH, yet it spins it to switch the victim and perpetrator roles. The article states, ‘Špirić 
was referring to the ideas promoted by the multi-ethnic Social Democratic Party, SDP, 
which emerged as the strongest political force in Bosnia’s Croat-Bosniak part and at 
the level of the state’ (Ibid). Absent in form from Špirić’s declaration, but present in 
meaning is the idea that in order to advance politically, one must have ties to the 
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Bošnjak political elite (here the SDP, which is ‘multi-ethnic’ but mostly Bošnjak, but also 
the SDA, which regained power from the SDP in 2014). This alludes back to the 
change from a secular elite to a religious elite mentioned earlier and how at one time it 
was advantageous to attend mosque (or church) in order to progress in one’s career. 
Survival in BiH, then, is depended on not only faith, but adhering to the ‘right’ faith, and 
those outside these areas of belonging are not only excluded, but somehow at risk. 
Balkan Insight, a publication of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network 
(BIRN), published a report from 2014 by Elvira Jukić that states further: 
Hoping to re-win the Bosniak seat on the tripartite Presidency, Bakir 
Izetbegovic has promised to create 100,000 new jobs – but he is often 
criticized for his close ties to Turkey and for radicalizing the SDA... With 
the 58-year-old Izetbegovic leaning more towards Muslim and Turkish 
options, Tihic [a former political rival in the SDA] stood for a more 
centrist ideology... Contrary to Tihic’s policy of directing the SDA 
towards the pursuit of democratic values, Izetbegovic’s sharper rhetoric 
has tended to undermine reconciliation. While Tihić tried to distance 
religion from politics, Izetbegović did the opposite, preferring to position 
Bosniaks as a Muslim community rather than a group of citizens with an 
ethnic affiliation (Jukić, 2014).  
 
This article not only implies an active agenda on the part of Bakir Izetbegović towards 
Islamism, but it does so by juxtaposing Izetbegović’s links to Turkey and the Middle 
East – his moves towards ‘radicalising the SDA’ – with ‘centrist’ policies and the 
‘pursuit of democratic values’. Thus, the implication is that the agenda towards 
Islamism in ranks of the Bošnjak political elite linked to the Middle East and GCC 
countries are contrary to the Western ideas of secularism, ‘undermin[ing] reconciliation’ 
as a whole in BiH. Linking with Middle Eastern allies on the part of Izetbegović is a 
tactical move that positions Bosnian Muslims toward religion instead of simply 
belonging to an ethnic group. The language of the article implies a clear preference for 
secularism, but it also has Islamophobic undertones. Jukić warns of ‘radicalism’ in the 
SDA, while such words would never be used to describe the religious influence of 
practicing Croats or Serbs.  
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In terms of investment from Muslim-majority countries, narratives in Sarajevo 
are constructed to continue the fear of an active agenda on behalf of the Bošnjak 
political elite to ‘Islamise’ the city and the country by courting funding and influence 
from the Middle East. In a short piece in the Dnevni Avaz, one of the most highly read 
daily newspapers in Sarajevo, Omer Čevra (2015) warns, ‘Dangerous attempts to sell 
BiH sovereignty: What is behind Izetbegović’s fear of creating a rule of law.’64 The 
article then continues with: 
Who was in power in 1992? Who brought the mujahideen into BiH and 
later gave them BiH citizenship? Who during the war stole and used 
billions of marks that came to help defend the country? Who and why 
[sic] prevented the RBH Army from freeing Mostar and thus 
surrendering Herzegovina’s leadership to the so-called Herceg-Bosna? 
Who recognised and legalised the Republika Srpska? Who ordered 
numerous political assassinations? Who built megalomaniac shopping 
malls and ‘Beverly Hills’ on Sarajevo’s hills and with whose money?65 
 
The answer to these questions the article indicates is, ‘the Bošnjak political 
establishment with Bakir Izetbegović at the head’66 who is selling BiH ‘sovereignty’ to 
Turkey and the Middle East, which is, ‘a serious indication that Izetbegovic and SDA 
are trying to forcibly change the ethnic structure in BiH. In a multinational country it is 
clear that such a model unnatural Islamisation and Afro-Asian-isation can only produce 
inter-Bosniak conflict and a variety of radicalisms.’67 The article constructs influences 
from the Middle East as ‘unnatural’ to BiH, including their variants of Islam, and the 
author suggests that these influences are an attempt to change the ethnic structure not 
only towards a greater Muslim majority, but also towards a larger Salafi (and possibly 
																																																													64	‘Opasni	pokušaji	prodaje	bh.	suvereniteta:	Šta	se	krije	iza	Izetbegovićevog	straha	od	stvaranja	pravne	države.’	65	‘Ko	je	bio	na	vlasti	1992.	godine?	Ko	je	doveo	mudžahedine	u	BiH	pa	im	kasnije	dao	bh.	državljanstvo?	Ko	je	za	vrijeme	rata	pokrao	i	upravljao	milijardama	maraka	koje	su	dolazile	kao	pomoć	za	odbranu	države?	Ko	je	i	zašto	spriječio	Armiju	RBiH	da	oslobodi	Mostar	te	time	predao	Hercegovinu	rukovodstvu	tzv.	Herceg-Bosne?	Ko	je	priznao	i	legalizirao	Republiku	Srpsku?	Ko	je	naručio	mnogobrojna	politička	ubistva?	Ko	to	gradi	megalomanske	tržne	centre	i	“Beverly	Hills”	na	sarajevskim	brdima	i	čijim	parama?’	66	‘bošnjački	politički	establišment	s	Bakirom	Izetbegovićem	na	čelu’	67	‘predstavlja	ozbiljan	indikator	da	Izetbegović	i	SDA	pokušavaju	nasilno	promijeniti	etničku	strukturu	u	BiH.	U	multinacionalnoj	zemlji	jasno	je	da	takav	model	neprirodne	islamizacije	i	afroazijacije	može	samo	proizvesti	međubošnjački	sukob	i	razne	radikalizme.’	
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African or Asian) population. This is stressed as a threat to the ‘multinational country’, 
something that will ultimately produce radicalism.  
 The idea in Sarajevo that there is an active agenda to ‘Islamise’ the city and the 
population and that part of this agenda involves actively attracting Islamic investment 
from the Middle East clearly resonates here. BBI and SCC – the ‘megalomaniac 
shopping malls’ (Ibid.) are key aspects of this agenda, according to Čevra; they are just 
the latest manifestation of the process that began with bringing in the mujahideen 
during the conflict in the 1990s. The wording of the article necessarily creates fear and 
apprehension. The title leads with ‘Dangerous attempts to sell BiH sovereignty’; it is a 
warning to the readership that something sinister is happening, and this something has 
everything to do with the coming wave of Islamic investment. The focus is ‘Afro-Asian-
isation’ and ‘Islamisation’ and the threats these pose to the ‘sovereignty’ and multi-
national character of BiH. Thus, there is an implicit understanding that to remain free of 
this encroaching threat of Islam in the public sphere, secular financing (ostensibly from 
Europe and North America) would not only be preferable, but would save the country 
from radicalism.  
 Yet it goes further; by suggesting that BiH’s sovereignty is a risk through these 
investments and ties to the Middle East, the article suggests that these businessmen 
and politicians linked to the Bošnjak political establishment and Bakir Izetbegović 
somehow have power to rule over the people in the city, if illegitimately or from behind 
closed doors. Thus the hidden conspiracy of the SDA and Izetbegović risks creating 
Islamism: a city ruled by shari’ah law. There is an implicit fear that this loss of 
sovereignty will eventually lead to forced dress codes and dietary restrictions à la Saudi 
Arabia, following upon the restrictions already present in BBI and SCC and other 
Islamically financed businesses in Sarajevo. In fact, the public debates surrounding the 
case studies hinge very much on this fear of tighter Islamic regulations in the public 
sphere, especially with respect to dress codes, as I will discuss further below.  
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 Čevra suggests that there is an active and planned, long-term agenda dating 
back to 1992 at work in the country. He indicates a step-by-step process that has led 
up to the selling of Sarajevo’s public spaces to Islamic investors. This agenda began 
with the SDA and Izetbegović actively ‘bringing’ the mujahideen into BiH, as if for some 
larger plan. It indicates that the mujahideen, far from being individually inspired 
freedom fighters, were actually a mercenary force able to be contracted into fighting. 
There is the underlying idea in this article that the long-term plan of the SDA and 
Izetbegović was to import stricter Islamic observance into the country by inviting 
people, ideas and capital from Muslim-majority countries, and this is what is behind 
Izetbegović’s ‘fear of creating a rule of law’, as such moves have gone outside legal 
boundaries. The ever increasing Islamic nature of Sarajevo and the Muslim-majority 
areas of BiH thus has little to do with ethnic cleansing during the conflict, the siege of 
Sarajevo and failed refugee return schemes, but rather it is the ‘unnatural Islamisation’ 
brought into the country by the Bošnjak political elite.  
 In my field interview data, in which I spoke to people while within the spaces of 
BBI and SCC, some responses also indicated this discourse of ‘unnatural Islamisation’ 
or the conspiracy to ‘Islamise’ the city. When asked whether he thought there was a 
political motive behind large investments, one respondent that I spoke to in BBI, a 
young, male student who identified as ‘Bošnjak’ responded, ‘Political motive? Well, I 
think 50/50 yes, and maybe a religious motive’.68 As I have stated before, many of my 
field interview respondents seemed somewhat uneasy when responding to questions 
concerning political motivations for investments. However, although this answer is quite 
short, it shows that people in the city view BBI and SCC as having a sacred or religious 
function and that they suggest an active and planned agenda of ‘Islamisation’ in the city 
and in the Muslim-majority areas of the country generally.  
																																																													68	‘Politički	motiv?	Pa	50-50%	mislim	da,	a	možda	i	vjerski	motiv.’	
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 Similarly, survey responses tended towards the same discourse of planned 
‘Islamisation’ in the city on the part of the political elite through Islamic investments in 
the built environment. When asked his opinion on whether investments such as BBI 
and SCC had an effect on the culture of Sarajevo, one male project manager for an 
international organisation replied that it was, ‘Islamisation in the Arabian peninsula style 
(as opposed to secular, Yugoslav variants)’.69 Although the response is somewhat 
unclear with respect to ‘secular, Yugoslav variants’ (he possibly meant it as a 
comparison to the former secularisation of the city spaces, although this is 
speculation), the respondent clearly expresses the idea of an Islamisation occurring in 
the city driven by GCC funding and transnational Islam. He juxtaposes ‘Islamisation in 
the Arabian peninsula style’ to secularism as an ideal, constructing the financial and 
ideological influences from the Middle East as foreign to the city. The usage of the term 
‘Islamisation’ carries very negative connotations in this quote when set side by side 
with the idea of Yugoslav secularism, as nostalgia for the Yugoslav era in Bosnia often 
revolves around ideas of pan-Yugo brotherhood and multi-ethnic harmony and peace. 
The reverse, then, the creation of Islamically regulated spaces in the city as an active 
agenda of the Bošnjak political elite, threatens the notion of multiculturalism and the 
ideals of the secular, multi-ethnic past.  
 Of course, there are two sides of the debate. One urban professional I 
interviewed in Sarajevo shot down this idea, saying ‘he [Bakir Izetbegović] is not so 
clever to have an agenda. The networks just came. It snowballed. In the beginning he 
didn’t have an agenda; he inherited connections’.70 While this urban professional 
downplayed the idea of an overarching agenda, the fact that it was mentioned at all 
shows how pervasive this discourse in the city is. In the context of our conversation, 
this comment came as if it was anticipated. I had the feeling that she was not only used 																																																													69	‘Islamizacija	u	stilu	Arabiskog	polustrva	(za	razliku	od	sekularne,	YU	varijante)’	70	In	conversation	with	anonymous	urban	professional	in	Sarajevo.		
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to hearing this idea, but that she needed to strongly counter it to set the record straight. 
At the same time, she minimises the idea of an agenda by completely discrediting the 
ability of Izetbegović to conceive of and execute such a plan. Despite voices like hers 
to the contrary, the idea that Sarajevo is being ‘Islamised’ through investments is a real 
and active discourse surrounding the new urban interventions with Islamic financing 
from the Middle East, and these voices attempt to position Sarajevan identity on the 
Sacred/Secular binary, often by implying that there is a greater threat at play. This 
threat is that if this agenda continues, stricter Islamic regulations will be enforced on 
the general public.  
 
6.2.2 Fear of Shari’ah Regulations on the Public 
Building upon the perception that there is an active and planned agenda on the 
part of the Bošnjak political elite to ‘Islamise’ the city of Sarajevo by courting capital, 
ideas and people from the Middle East and GCC countries, people in Sarajevo speak 
of the fear of expanding shari’ah compliant spaces and increasing Islamic regulations 
imposed upon the public. This narrative warns of a real and imminent threat to secular 
public spaces due to the slow encroachment of these investments taking over the 
formerly-secular public spaces of the city. Seeing the movement as a challenge to ‘naš 
Islam’ which exists with a secular state, the construction of this discourse serves to 
position Sarajevan identity away from the Islam of the Middle East and GCC countries 
and Islamism in general. In this section I will analyse the public debate surrounding the 
case studies BBI and SCC in terms of fears of increasing shari’ah compliant spaces 
and public regulations. 
The prohibitions on alcohol, pork and gambling in the new shopping centres 
caused reverberations throughout the city. As mentioned above, I have decided to use 
some internet sources in order to obtain a more complete view of the debate in the city, 
and this includes a blog by a Sarajevan journalist Srećko Latal, who is now a political 
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analyst for the UNDP in BiH (http://www.ba.undp.org/). In his post about the building’s 
opening, Latal (2009) researched whether public displays of affection were on the 
banned list, stating, ‘Later I came back to the BBI with my wife for a final test, to 
investigate reports that the security guards were preventing couples from hugging and 
kissing on the premises. We kissed and hugged repeatedly in front of a guard but he 
paid no attention whatsoever and eventually left.’ This account shows that Islamic 
restrictions on the spaces caused concern regarding the loss of freedoms in previously 
secular spaces, and some people in the city tried to test how far these restrictions 
went. Rumours that the imposition of very strict Islamically-inspired rules of conduct 
circulated throughout the city. In this example, Latal tested whether public displays of 
affection would be permitted. It is known in Sarajevo that in countries such as Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE such displays are not tolerated in public. That he is even testing 
this shows apprehension that the public sphere in Sarajevo might be moving in the 
direction of such tight Islamic regulations on behaviour and conduct. His investigation 
of these boundaries inside BBI attest to the prevailing attitude in the city: the fear of 
Islamism becoming the predominant ideology and a loss of the secular to ‘Islamisation’. 
Within this, there is the fear of losing the multi-ethnic character of the city’s spaces (tied 
to the secular, Yugoslav ethic), sustaining the deep suspicions and misgivings about 
Islamic financing and the movement of capital, people and ideas from the Middle East 
and GCC countries.  
According to Latal, a rumour even circulated through the city that 15 people had 
been arrested after entering BBI when guards realized they had not made wudu – the 
Muslim ritual ablution – before entering (Latal, 2009). Although exaggerated in its 
attempt to demonstrate the threat of encroaching religious regulations in the public 
sphere, this rumour speaks to concern present in the city that the secular public sphere 
is at risk. Although it has now been years since BBI and SCC opened, rumours still 
circulate about buildings with Islamic financing from GCC countries. In fact, in my 
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interview with a Samid Sinanović, the general director of Shad Invest (also part of the 
Al Shiddi Group), he stated that when Hotel Bristol reopened in 2011, people thought it 
would be necessary for women to cover their hair in order to come to the café for a 
coffee.71 The headscarf has always been a contested symbol, and in Sarajevo, the 
topic of Islamic dress is as charged as it is in other areas of Europe (Mesarič, 2013). 
That the public debate around these investments is constructing an atmosphere of fear 
and suspicion around Islamic financing speaks to the power of the secular Yugoslav 
ideology and its link to the idea of a multi-ethnic city, which is being overtaken by the 
‘Islamic shift’. This may also be influenced by wider fears of Islam worldwide that have 
grown since the beginning of the century.  
With respect to this fear of restrictions on the dress of women – either explicitly 
imposed or imposed through changing social norms – one survey respondent, a female 
architect, explained: 
With the arrival of foreign investors who allegedly leave money in BiH, 
there is an increase in and entrance of their population that brings its 
own cultural habits and imposes them on the existing environment. 
Unfortunately, this is about a population that is not ready to adapt to the 
surroundings in which they come, so they impose their own, appearing 
in loud, large groups in public. For example, as a female and free 
European woman [evropljanka] in her own city, I am no longer able to 
move freely because I am attacked by the looks and commentary of 
members of certain groups that are moving through the community like a 
flock of sheep. As a free European woman, I'm no longer able to walk 
the streets normally without judgment and prejudice wearing what I want 
and buying products that I want – because I'm surrounded by the people 
described above and I fear for my own safety! In my own city I longer 
feel comfortable because of their impact on the community, 
surroundings and the environment in which we live.72 
 
According to this respondent, the investments from the Middle East, and specifically 
GCC countries, are influencing the social norms in the city’s public spaces in such a 																																																													71	In	conversation	with	Samid	Sinanović,	general	director	of	Shad	Invest	19.10.2015.		72	‘Dolaskom	stranih	investitora	koji	navodno	ostavljaju	novac	u	BiH	povećava	se	i	uđo	njhovog	[sic]	stanovništva	koji	sa	sobom	dovodi	svoje	kulturolosške	[sic]	navike	i	nameće	ih	postojećoj	sredini.	Nažalost,	riječ	je	o	populaciji	koja	nije	spremna	da	se	prilagodi	okruženju	u	koje	dolazi	već	nameće	svoje,	samom	pojavom	u	velikim	grupama	i	glasnim	pristustvom	u	javnosti.	Primjer,	kao	zensko	i	slobodna	evropljanka	u	svom	gradu	više	nisam	u	stanju	da	se	krećem	slobodno	jer	me	pogledima	i	komenarima	[sic]	napadaju	pripadnici	određenih	skupina	koji	se	kreću	kroz	zajednicu	poput	stada	ovaca.	Kao	slobodna	evropljanka	nisam	više	u	stanju	da	normalno,	bes	[sic]	osuđivanja	i	predrasuda	hodam	ulicama,	odjevam	se	kako	želim	i	kupujem	proizvode	koje	želim	-	jer	sam	okružena	navedenim	uzorcima	i	strahujem	za	svoju	sigurnost!	U	svom	na	svom	se	više	ne	osjećam	ugodno	zbog	njihovog	utjecaja	na	zajednicu,	sredinu	i	okruženje	u	kojem	živimo.’	
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way that she no longer feels free to dress in an implied western style – ie, not adhering 
to Islamic dress and probably exposing her arms and legs. While she is not discussing 
explicitly imposed Islamic restrictions, such as the ban on pork and alcohol, she 
suggests that the investments, their Islamic restrictions and the increase in people 
coming to Sarajevo from the Middle East and GCC countries (and Bosnian Salafis) are 
all changing the norms for behaviour and dress in public spaces. Here, it is a chain 
reaction – starting with capital for investment – and ending with feelings of fear and 
discomfort from being judged by those adhering to stricter Islamic rules, which 
influences social norms and imposes de facto rules for behaviour on the public. This, it 
is implied, goes against Europe, as she is a European woman, an ‘evropljanka’, who no 
longer feels at home in this European city due to investment from Muslim-majority 
countries and the influence it is having on people and their behaviour. She constructs 
her identity as a Sarajevan and a European, which she characterises as diametrically 
opposed to those in GCC countries and Salafis generally, marginalising their perceived 
influence in BiH and casting them as foreign and threatening (she fears for her own 
safety). She fears a loss of freedom with the loss of secularism in the public spaces 
and the inability to do as she pleases without judgment. Positioning Sarajevan identity 
along the Sacred/Secular binary (and the East/West binary) towards the Secular pole, 
she separates herself from transnational Islamic influences from the Middle East by 
stressing that such regulations should not be imposed on European or on European 
public spaces.  
The fear of greater Islamic regulations in public spaces is a common and 
recurring theme in interview and survey data. It is often juxtaposed to the ideal of a 
multi-ethnic, secular city. For example, when asked about the ban on alcohol and pork 
in BBI and SCC, one of my field interview respondents from the Alipašino Polje area of 
the city, a pensioner replied, ‘I think it's nonsense. Let me tell you, we are a 
multinational, multicultural state, always have been. Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
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always been Europe.’73 These restrictions are constructed as going against the secular, 
Yugoslav ethic and the ideal of a western, secular state. Not only do such investments 
counter the idea of secularism, the imposition of Islamic regulations on public spaces 
erodes away at the multi-ethnic, ‘multi-cultural’, plural fabric that has been the identity 
of Sarajevo. BBI and SCC and other investments with Islamic financing in the city then 
become threats to this imagery. They take Sarajevo away from ‘Europe’ and towards 
the Islamism of Saudi Arabia and the lack of freedom that that implies, especially for 
women.  
According to my data, BBI and SCC are perceived as some of the earliest 
manifestations of an Islamised future. One of my interview respondents, a student at 
the architecture faculty in Sarajevo, discussed this issue. She said: 
If you have new generations, and they grow up in this new, modified city 
that we never had, but they grow up in a city where it’s forbidden to drink 
alcohol in certain places – and it’s going to be forbidden in many more to 
come with the way that this development is going – then it is going to 
influence a whole new generation of people and they are going to think 
differently. Definitely! All these things influence people, they are 
completely connected – the politics, the socio-economic thing, the socio-
economic status of the country, the people, everything. Everything is 
completely connected. So yeah, I guess the new generations are going 
to be influenced by this, especially if they don’t have anyone to explain 
why this is happening, if they just accept it as something that is 
completely normal – because the majority of the population does that. 
People don’t really think, it’s like ‘oh cool, we have a really cool mall in 
the middle of the city, we don’t have to walk that much, we have a lot of 
parking space.’ And you have everything you need there. 
 
She believes younger generations might suffer for some perceived ignorance of 
contemporary society. There is a sense of regret imbedded in this statement – that she 
believes the people of the city will regret their complacency in the future, after all is said 
and done and Sarajevo is no longer secular. She is frustrated that the population is 
allowing this shift away from secularism towards Islamic regulation in the public sphere 
																																																													73	‘Mislim	da	su	to	gluposti.	Da	Vam	kažem,	mi		smo	jedna	multinacionalna,	multikulturalna	država	uvijek	bili.	Bosna	i	Hercegovina	je	uvijek	bila	Evropa.’	
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and that they are content to have new developments without thinking about the social 
consequences.  
 One survey respondent, a 27 year-old female student, described new 
developments in the city as ‘the suppression and gradual destruction of the cultural 
scene, but also the promotion of a non-secular lifestyle that does not progress but 
regress.’74 Words such as ‘suppression’, ‘destruction’ and ‘regress’ to characterise the 
phenomenon are telling. This quote shows that a turn towards the sacred – including 
the Islamic regulations on the spaces – is seen as backwards and against the secular 
progress of western, European society, especially, perhaps, by educated young people 
such as this student. BBI and SCC are not additions to the architectural wealth of the 
city, but rather they are manifestations of its destruction. Again, danger is implied in the 
loss of the secular in the public sphere, and along with this danger there is an implied 
feeling of regret at having lost something valuable. Another respondent, a male 
economist, stated: 
The more land and property BiH continues to sell to Arabs, the more 
often it will happen that our shopping centers do not sell alcohol and 
pork, and at the same time have mesjids or that they build mosques in 
the area … it is not a problem to bring in foreign investors, the problem 
is when foreign investor dictate ALL the rules and impose their culture, 
which is 180 degrees different than ours.75 
 
Again, this quote implies the move away from secularism is a ‘problem’, and that the 
foreign Islamic financing is dictating ‘ALL’ the ‘rules’ in the city. This ‘imposition’ of 
culture and Islamic regulation in the discourse is diametrically opposed to Sarajevan 
ideals of secularism and multiculturalism, ‘180’ degrees different.  
 However, not all Sarajevans see the restrictions in BBI and SCC as a threat. In 
my field interviews, when asked about the ban on alcohol and pork in SCC and BBI, 
																																																													74	‘Na	suzbijanje	i	postupno	uništavanje	kulturne	scene,	ali	i	promovisanje	nesekularnog	načina	života	koji	nikako	nije	napredak,	već	nazadak.’	75	‘Što	više	zemlje	i	nekretnina	BiH	nastavi	prodavat	Aarapima,	to	će	nam	se	češće	dešavat	da	u	shopping	centri	ne	prodaju	alkohol	i	svinjetinu,	ted	a	se	u	istim	nalaze	mesdžidi	ili	da	se	prave	džamije	u	blizini…nije	problem	dovest	stranog	investitora,	problem	je	kada	strain	investitor	diktira	SVA	pravila	i	namece	svoju	kulturu	koja	je	za	180	drugačija	od	naše.’	
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one respondent, a female sales assistant, said: ‘I support it [the ban]. Totally.’76 
Another respondent, a shopkeeper, explained: ‘for me, that's OK [the ban]. I mean, 
there's somewhere to go to drink, that ... Well, yeah, you have bars, and in the bars 
there is drink. That's my opinion.’77 The public debate is not one-sided, and although 
many in the city oppose such regulations, others are indifferent or even supportive of 
such measures.  
 
6.3 Radicalism: the East/West Binary 
 In this section, I will focus on the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Center as a 
case study. The King Fahd Mosque is one of the most contested spaces in the city, 
and the controversy surrounding it falls into the themes of security risks, victimisation of 
the poor and uneducated and a rejection of Islamic tradition outside of the codified 
version of Islam practiced in Bosnia outlined above. In the following analysis, I will draw 
upon media reports, interview transcriptions and survey responses, focusing on how 
Sarajevans attempt to position their identity along the imagined East/West binary. 
Threatened by the ‘Islamic shift’ in the city, this construction of Sarajevan identity aligns 
with western secularism and the idea of a multiethnic city and state. It is important to 
note that the data does not always explicitly refer to the East vs. the West. However, 
there is an implicit reference to this imagined binary though the stress placed on the 
othering of GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and the attempt to distance 
Bosnia’s Islamic practices and political relationship to Islam from those of the Persian 
Gulf.  
 
6.3.1 Perceived Security Risks and Threats to ‘Naš Islam’ 
																																																													76	‘Pa,	podržavam.	Potpuno.’	77	‘Za	mene	je	to	OK.	Mislim,	ima	gdje	treba	da	se	ide	da	se	pije,	da	to...Pa,	ja,	imaš	kafanu	i	u	kafani	i	pij.	To	je	moje	neko	mišljenje.’		
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 In much of the press and internet data about currents of Islam and capital 
arriving into Sarajevo, BiH and, on a larger scale, the Balkans, such movements are 
discussed with problematically vague and confused terminology, especially when 
referring to ideas such as extremism, radicalism, fundamentalism, terrorism, Islamism 
and schools of thought within Islam such as Salafism, Wahhabism and Takfirism. In 
many cases, Wahhabism – a current of Salafism as discussed above – is paired 
together with radicalism and/or extremism without much thought. While a follower of 
Wahhabism might be a radical or an extremist or both, that individual might also be 
neither, just as followers of any ideology could become radicals or extremists (or not). 
Because the press and commentators often use this problematic language, the 
discourses surrounding sacred spaces – especially the Saudi King Fahd mosque – 
have been constructed around threats and fear. Threats to the security of the city and 
the state from Saudi- or GCC-inspired Islam allow Sarajevans to position their identity 
toward the opposite end of this spectrum, identifying ‘naš Islam’ with peace and 
freedom instead of terrorism and oppression. Media and interview data describe an 
imminent and alarming security risk circulating around the case studies in terms of their 
role in proliferating ‘extremism’ or ‘radicalism’ in the form of Salafism or Wahhabism. In 
this section, I will examine the themes of national security and attempts to convert 
people through access to education and financial assistance for faith centred around 
the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre. Throughout this section, I will demonstrate 
how narratives are created around Wahhabism or Salafism as a direct threat to ‘naš 
Islam’, and how the tradition of the Bošnjaks is maintained as the ideal form of Islam in 
a secular state. 
 Generally, there is an idea in Sarajevo that anything coming from Saudi Arabia, 
especially, but also from other GCC countries, Iran and South Asia, is a potential risk to 
security and to the idea of ‘naš Islam’. For example, one Balkan Insight article from 
2007 is titled ‘Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia: Saudi-based 
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Wahhabi Fundamentalists Infiltrate Complacent Religious Structures’. In this short title, 
Islam from Saudi Arabia becomes ‘militant’ and ‘Wahhabi fundamentalists’ are 
‘infiltrating’ the Islamic Community (IZ) in BiH. The underlying threat of Islam from other 
parts of the world, but especially Saudi Arabia, is clearly outlined for the reader. The IZ 
is complacent, and these ‘militant’ forces are marching into the country to conquer with 
no one to fight for ‘naš Islam’. Another Balkan Insight title cautions, “Bosnia’s Wartime 
Legacy Fuels Radical Islam’ (Džidić, 2015), and the body of the article states, ‘Saudis 
wanted to spread Wahhabism and that is why they funded the Mujahideen and that 
continued after the war. You could see all of a sudden, mosques were being built which 
were huge and they had no relation in size and style to the ones you normally see in 
Bosnia; this is all intentional and deliberate’. This article describes a ‘deliberate’ plan on 
the part of the Saudis beginning with the mujahideen to ‘spread Wahhabism’, which is, 
according to the title, ‘radical’. Part of this plan to spread Wahhabism also includes the 
building of mosques, such as the King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo.  
Although anything relating to Saudi Arabia in the media is often portrayed as a 
security risk and a threat to ‘naš Islam’ in Sarajevo, this is especially true for the King 
Fahd Mosque. In an article from Balkan Insight, ‘Emissaries of Militant Islam Make 
Headway in Bosnia: Saudi-based Wahhabi Fundamentalists Infiltrate Complacent 
Religious Structures’ (Ahmetašević, 2007), the author explains: 
SFOR arrested four of the Saudi staff and shut down the organisation 
[The High Saudi Committee]. The most visible physical legacy of Saudi 
Arabian influence is the King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo, built after the 
war. For years, it was not run by staff responsible to Bosnia’s Islamic 
Community. Although the latter has since posted its own man to head 
the mosque, it remains a popular gathering place for local Wahhabi 
faithful (21). 
 
According to this statement, the mosque is a ‘gathering place for local Wahhabi faithful’ 
– which is implied as ‘militant’ from the headline. There is a suggestion that although 
there is now someone from the IZ at the head of the mosque, it is still somehow outside 
of control as the title states that the Wahhabis have ‘infiltrated the complacent religious 
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structures’ ie the Islamic Community. Underlying all this is the threat and danger of 
Saudi-style Islam in Sarajevo and for the people of BiH. Not only is it against the 
principles of ‘naš Islam’, it is a force that is seeking to corrupt the practices of BiH’s 
Muslims and turn them into radicals.  
 The danger associated with the King Fahd mosque puts the mosque and the 
cultural centre in an untouchable realm, outside the reach of the law. Because the 
complex officially sits on diplomatic land, there has been speculation that it is beyond 
the authority of the state. The Nezavisne Novine in 2008 (Čubro, 2008) ran an article 
with the headline, ‘The police cannot enter the King Fahd mosque’78 followed by 
statements that qualify the grounds as a ‘place for the gathering of radical Islamists.’79 
The article also explains that, ‘Federal police are checking several people who gather 
in the center and who are known for extremist views.’80 The discourse constructed 
around King Fahd paints the Saudi complex as a place where dangerous people meet 
to discuss dangerous ideas. They are ‘extremists’ and ‘radical Islamists’ who have 
found a safe haven in King Fahd away from the inspections of the police. In response 
to this particular article, the King Fahd Mosque had a letter published in Nezavisne 
Novine titled, ‘Reaction: The Police Can Enter’81 (Imamović, 2008). However, while the 
original article used large fonts and photos to grab the reader’s attention, the reaction 
from King Fahd is tiny in comparison and does not even mention King Fahd in the title. 
Their letter states: 
We believe that the activities mentioned are very humane and do not 
constitute an 'extreme action'. The media, but also your newspaper in 
recent years, wants to present the mosque as a ‘gathering place for 
radical Islamists' ... We expect that you will, in the future, be objective in 
writing articles that concern the King Fahd mosque.82  																																																													78	‘Policija	ne	može	da	uđe	u	džamije	Kralj	Fahd’	79	‘mjesto	okupljanja	radikalnih	islamista’	80	‘Federalna	policija	provjerava	nekoliko	osoba	koje	se	okupljaju	u	ovom	centru,	a	poznate	su	po	ekstremističkim	stavovima.’	81	‘Reagovanje:	Policija	može	da	uđe’	82	‘Smatramo	da	su	pomenute	aktivnosti	veoma	humane	i	da	ne	predstavljaju	nikakvo	‘ekstremno	djelovanje’.	Džamiju	kroz	medije,	pa	i	kroz	vas	list	u	posljednjih	nekoliko	godina,	žele	predstaviti	kao	‘mjesto	okupljanja	radikalnih	islamista’...Očekujemo	da	ćete	ubuduće	biti	objektivni	u	pisanju	tekstova	koji	tretiraju	džamiju	Kralja	Fahd.’	
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It is telling that the mosque had to defend itself against reports that it is place where 
extremists gather outside the rule of law of BiH; the media has presented the complex 
as a dangerous place that breeds terrorism and Islamic ideals that counter the tradition 
of Muslims in the country represented by ‘naš Islam’.  
 A similar article was published in Politika, a Serbian news portal, about the King 
Fahd Mosque under the title, ‘King Fahd Mosque Gathers Radical Islamists’83 (Sarajljić, 
2008). Although Politika is a Serbian paper, people in Sarajevo access and read such 
articles online. The article claims that, ‘there are speculations that this place has an 
extraterritorial status and that it is under the rule of the Saudi Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, and also that national intelligence and security services keep it under constant 
surveillance’84 The article continues by stating that, ‘According to some media in BiH, 
"at the Cultural Center, owned by the Saudi Ministry of Higher Education, Wahhabis run 
ideological sermons and political speeches,” and among them there are individuals 
who could, allegedly, “be linked to certain illegal activities”.’ The article mixes illegality, 
danger and the ideology of Wahhabism, constructing the King Fahd Mosque as not 
only dangerous in terms of sheltering would-be terrorists but also for its programmes to 
convert Bosnian Muslims to Wahhabism. These are activities and modes of thinking 
coming from the Middle East and especially Saudi Arabia: the East versus BiH’s 
westernised Islam.  
 In my field interviews, I encountered similar views regarding the mosque and 
cultural centre as well. When asked about King Fahd, one respondent, a female 
pensioner, simply said, ‘King Fahd? Potential danger.’85 Many people in the city see 
King Fahd as a threat – to their way of life if not to their physical lives. There is both an 
ideological fear represented by the gathering of ‘radical Islamists’ and their missionary 																																																													83	‘Džamija	Kralj	Fahd	okuplja	radikalne	islamiste’	84	‘Spekuliše	se	da	ovo	mesto	ima	eksteritorijalni	staus	id	a	je	pod	upravom	saudijskog	ministarstva	za	verska	pitanja,	kao	id	a	ga	domaće	obaveštajne	i	bezbednosne	službe	drže	pod	stalnim	nadzorom.’	85	Kralj	Fahd?	Potencijalna	opasnost.	
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activities, as well as the fear of terrorist activities that such gathering might generate. In 
one field interview with a housekeeper, this fear again became the focus of the 
discussion. Here my interview questions are marked with (K) and the interviewee’s 
answers are marked with (I): 
  (K) What do you think about this mosque, King Fahd? 
  (I) It scares me a little. I’m afraid of this mosque. 
  (K) Why? 
(I) Well, there are, terrorists and there… Everything comes to mind. It 
really angers me when I pass by, and, well, I’m a Muslim too, Bošnjaka, 
but anyway, I fear it in my bones [fear flows in my bones].86 
 
 The King Fahd Mosque has thus become associated with terrorism and extremism to 
the extent that passersby fear it. Although it is known to the security services that no 
real threat comes from King Fahd – in my interview with a representative at the State 
Investigation and Protection Agency,87 my interviewee explained that those who might 
be an actual threat to security would not go to the King Fahd Mosque, but rather would 
organise their own religious services. Yet the King Fahd Mosque continues to be one of 
the most contested buildings in the city, one marked by the perception of an 
encroaching Islamic ideology that is opposite ‘naš Islam’ and promotes radicalism, 
extremism and terrorism. It does not stop there, however, as the media, interview, 
survey and internet data also implies that these ‘radical Islamists’ are courting favour 
with the public through programmes that take advantage of Sarajevo’s poor. 
 
6.3.2 Rumours of Agendas to Target the Poor 
 The King Fahd Mosque and other charitable organisations from GCC countries 
have been the subjects of debates that present the goodwill on the part of financiers 
from these countries as hidden plans to convert the gullible, impoverished masses to 
Salafism. These discourses see benevolent activities as a front for more sinister 																																																													86	(K)	Šta	mislite	o	ovoj	džamiji,	Kralj	Fahd?	(I)	Malo	me	strah.	Strah	me	te	džamije.	(K)	Zašto?	(I)	Pa,	ovo	sad,	teroristi	i	ovo…Svašta	pada	na	pamet.	Baš	me	ono	jeza	kad	prođem,	a,	eto,	muslimanka	sam	i	ja,	Bosanka,	ali	džaba,	strah	u	kosti	ulijeva.		87	In	conversation	with	SIPA	representative	22	July	2015.	
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ambitions and an obvious and imminent threat to ‘naš Islam’. The Saudis do have a 
political agenda in BiH that may or may not include missionary work. In my interview 
with Prof. Dr. Khalid AdDamigh, the Cultural Attaché and head of the Saudi Cultural 
Centre (part of the King Fahd Mosque complex), he described this as ‘soft power’.88 
However, it should not be forgotten that the United States, the EU and many Western 
European countries also have active diplomatic missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and the US embassy in Sarajevo is actually the largest US embassy in Europe.89 The 
Saudi cultural centre and mosque do play a role in Saudi Arabia’s mission for ‘soft 
power’ in the country, but little attention is paid to other national agendas in BiH, such 
as the American agenda. As I will show below, media, internet and interview data 
suggest that Salafism or Wahhabism would not have a foothold in Sarajevo were it not 
for the ‘gullible, ignorant poor’ being preyed upon by the rich Arabs to proliferate stricter 
versions of Islam and to ‘Islamise’ the city. Going further than this, however, by painting 
followers in this light and by challenging the proliferation of Salafism, Sarajevans act to 
position Sarajevan identity towards the West on the East/West binary, rejecting the 
flows of ideas and people from GCC countries in favour of western secularism and 
pluralism.  
 There have been many media reports that place Saudi charitable activities – 
such as the free English, Arabic and computer classes at the King Fahd cultural centre 
– as weapons in the Saudi arsenal against BiH Islam. Often this is linked to terrorism, 
as shown in the above section on security risks. For example, in the article entitle 
‘Wahhabis are divided into two currents’90 from Dani, a popular BiH weekly magazine, 
(Bećirbašić 2010), the author states: 
Financial sponsorship of mosques and economic aid by Saudi Arabia 
aimed to cement the Saudi global leadership (vs. Iran) in order bring 
Bosnian Muslims closer to the beliefs and practices acceptable in 																																																													88	In	conversation	with	Prof.	Dr.	Khalid	AdDamigh,	General	Director	of	the	King	Fahd	Cultural	Centre,	15	February	2015.	89	I	was	told	this	while	I	was	an	intern	at	the	US	embassy	in	Sarajevo	in	the	summer	of	2012.	90	‘Vehabije	su	podijeljenena	dvije	struje’	
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Wahhabism ... The King Fahd Cultural Center in Sarajevo ... [is an 
example] of this process ... Its results are changing the traditional Hanafi 
viewpoint with Wahhabism, the radical and intolerant Saudi version of 
Islam, which in some cases, causes and makes possible terrorist 
activity91 (32). 
 
In the same article, the subheading ‘Jihadi Wahhabism’92 is juxtaposed with a photo of 
the Saudi mosque. Here outwardly benevolent activities, such as ‘financial sponsorship 
of mosques and economic aid’, on the part of the Saudis actually hide the sinister 
agenda of converting Bosnian Muslims to Wahhabism, making terrorist activity possible 
and threatening the existence of traditional BiH Islam. Saudi ‘soft power’ according to 
this media report is an attempt to cement Saudi leadership amongst Muslims.  
 Yet this idea goes somewhat deeper in the Bosnian psyche, and those who 
have converted to Salafism or who are sympathetic to the Saudis in one way or another 
are very often portrayed as ‘ignorant’, ‘poor’ or ‘uneducated’. Thus, those who are 
duped by the obvious power grabs and coercion through charity reflect the less 
intelligent sections of society. In the article ‘Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway 
in Bosnia: Saudi-based Wahhabi fundamentalists infiltrate complacent religious 
structures’ from Balkan Insight, Nidžara Ahmetašević (2007) furthers this idea, stating: 
A public opinion poll conducted by Prism Research, a private agency, 
shows that 69 per cent of Bosnia’s Muslims oppose Wahhabists and 
their interpretation and practice of Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while 
12.9 per cent support them one way or another. The poll also shows the 
Wahhabi are predominantly supported by the poorly educated section of 
the population. ‘Many of their supporters come from rural areas and the 
bottom of the social ladder. These people are desperate.’ (5). 
 
This quote not only serves to position BiH Islam and identity away from that practiced 
in Saudi Arabia, articulating on the East/West binary, but it also aims to convince the 
population that only the peasants from ‘rural areas’ who are at the ‘bottom of the social 
ladder’ – the ‘poorly educated section of the population’ – could possibly find any value 																																																													91	‘Finansijsko	sponzoriranje	džamija	i	ekonomska	pomoć	od	strane	Saudijske	Arabije	imala	je	za	cilj	da	zabetonira	saudijsko	globalno	vodstvo	(vs.	Iran)	kako	bi	bosanske	muslimane	približila	vjerovanjima	i	praksi	prihvatljivoj	za	vehabizam...Kulturni	centar	Kralja	fahda	u	Sarajevu…[je	primjer]	ovog	procesa...Njegovi	rezultati	su	upravo	mijenjanje	tradicionalnog	hanefijskog	gledista	s	vehabizmom,	radikalnom	i	netolerantnom	saudijskom	verzijom	islama,	koja	u	nekim	slucajevima	prouzrokuje	i	moguće	terorističke	aktivnosti.’	92	‘Dzihadski	vehabizam’		
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in the ideas of the Wahhabis. The article cleverly persuades the population against this 
form of Islam by describing their supporters in this way.  
 This discourse appears repeatedly throughout the media. Such a portrayal 
delegitimises the charitable activities of the Saudis – directly related to the King Fahd 
mosque or not. There are more general assertions about Saudi charities, such as the 
article ‘Bosnian Muslims: Threat or Opportunity’ from Balkan Insight (Nikšić, 2009) in 
which the author states: 
Saudi Arabia funded a number of charities that tried to convince the 
traditionally more moderate Bosnian Muslims to abandon their version of 
the faith. In a country ruined by war and with unemployment between 80 
and 90 per cent, the economic incentives these charities were offering 
tempted many people to adopt the Saudis’ ‘true’ variety of 
Islam...Wahhabi activists preached to all those who felt neglected by 
society – the young, the uneducated, the poor and the 
confused…’Bosnian Muslims were greatly offended,’ recalls Ziga. ‘They 
were unwilling to accept these trouble-makers who believed they spoke 
for God and turned women into walking tents.’ 
 
Again, this article suggests that the charity from Saudi Arabia is laced with bad 
intentions: to impose Wahhabism on ‘all those who felt neglected by society – the 
young, the uneducated, the poor and the confused’ and to turn ‘women into walking 
tents’. By default, anyone adopting such practices, according to this viewpoint, must be 
‘uneducated’ or ‘poor’; they must be victims the Saudi propaganda machine. While the 
above quote did not mention any of the case studies specifically, the King Fahd 
mosque has been at the centre of such discussions, as it is the Saudi epicentre in 
Sarajevo.  
 Other media sources implicate King Fahd more directly in this plot to deceive 
and conquer the country’s poor, destitute and uneducated. For example, Nezavisne 
Novine on 26 October 2010 had a headline, ‘Poor Targeted by Radical Islam’93 which is 
accompanied by a photo of the King Fahd mosque. The articles states that: 
From Bosnia to Kosovo huge amounts of money flow into this region, 
mainly from countries like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, but also 																																																													93	‘Siromašni	na	meti	radikalnog	islama.’	
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from missionaries of Wahhabism, targeting mainly the young and the 
poor, who live in a country dominated by unemployment and corruption. 
In Sarajevo, the BiH capital, the huge King Fahd mosque is one 
example of this.94 
 
Again, Wahhabism is ‘radical’ and it is coming from the East, targeting Bosnia’s poor. 
The victims are made to be helpless in a ‘country dominated by unemployment and 
corruption,’ which makes them easier prey for such dangerous movements, according 
to the tone of the article. That there is a photo of King Fahd in the middle of the article 
shows that this space – along with its cultural centre – is highly contested in the city 
and seen as the epicentre for Wahhabism.  
 These concepts in the media are echoed in the speech of the people of 
Sarajevo in comments left on internet forums and in field interview data. Although 
unconventional as a data source, forum comments allow for data collection of 
viewpoints that might not be expressed in face-to-face interviews or that interviewees 
might self-censor. On the internet forum Klix.ba, in the thread titled ‘About the Mosque 
and Cultural Centre King Fahd,’95 people in the city discuss the rumour in Sarajevo that 
Saudis give families financial compensation for overt displays of faith such as wearing 
the headscarf or growing a beard. One commentator with the username kokuz_sa 
swears that: 
I have a neighbour who lives a couple doors down from me and who has 
a covered wife (one [wife] left him because she did not want to cover) 
and he grows his beard and he personally told me that he receives 
compensation for covering his wife and for growing his beard… only he 
did not tell me how much and from whom96 (Forum Klix.ba, 2010). 
 
Although this user cannot say for sure who exactly is funding such activities, that it was 
written in the thread on King Fahd implies that the commenters believe the Saudis are 
																																																													94	‘Od	Bosne	do	Kosova	ogromne	kolićine	novca	se	slijevaju	u	ovaj	region	i	to	uglavnom	iz	zemalja	poput	Saudijske	Arabije	i	zalivskih	država,	ali	i	od	misionara	vehabizma,	čija	su	meta	uglavnom	mladi	i	siromašni,	koji	žive	u	zemlji	gdje	prevladavaju	nezaposlenost	i	korupcija.	U	Sarajevu,	bh.	prijestonici,	ogromna	džamija	kralja	fahda	je	jedan	od	primjera	ovoga.’	95	‘o	džamiji	i	KC	Kralj	Fahd’	96	‘evo	imam	ja	komsiju	do	mene	tj	vrata	do	mojih	zivi	i	on	ima	pokrivenu	zenu(jedna	ga	je	napustila	nije	htjela	da	se	pokrije)	i	pusta	bradu	i	on	mi	je	licno	kazao	da	prima	naknadu	za	pokrivanje	zene	i	za	pustanje	brade..samo	nije	htjeo	da	kaze	koliko	i	od	koga..’	
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the funders for such measures of faith. Another commenter with the username statix 
discusses compensation from the Saudis in this thread and states: 
My three high-school friends found refuge in the Wahhabis. 
Interestingly, all three were catastrophic students with problem 
behaviour. :D After finishing high school they spent two to three years 
sneaking and tramping around, so that in the end their question of 
existence was solved exactly in said mosque [King Fahd] and with the 
Wahhabis. Immediately they got married and now have two or three 
children, and for each receive financial compensation like women do to 
cover. A couple of times I met them and they started to tell me stories 
about Islam and Muhammad, and how I need to come by so they can 
educate me97 (Ibid.). 
 
Although some Muslim women in Sarajevo see the headscarf as a goal or ideal, the 
issue is just as contested as it is in Western Europe, and many see Islamic dress as 
foreign and against Bošnjak tradition (Mesarič, 2013). The author of this quote paints 
the ‘three high-school friends’ as uneducated or stupid, ‘catastrophic students with 
problem behaviour.’ It again follows the perspective that the Wahhabis at King Fahd 
and the Saudis generally prey upon the weakest in society to convert them to their 
creed. The sarcastic tone reveals the author’s incredulity that these uneducated 
‘catastrophic students’ might then try to educate him. The three school friends 
described in such a manner continues the discourse that only the poor and uneducated 
fall victim to the Saudi missionary work, those who don’t have the sense to know that 
such ways are foreign to BiH and against ‘naš Islam’. 
 In field interview data as well this idea of compensation for faith is expressed. 
When discussing the King Fahd Mosque with an older resident of the area (a 76 year-
old pensioner), he spoke tentatively about the programmes offered at the cultural 
centre and its implications: 
I mean this mosque is more than a mosque. You know, there are… it 
gathers… I live here so I’ve followed them and I know. I’m from Old 
Town, but I moved here. They created this centre here for the youth, for 																																																													97	‘Moja	tri	srednjoskolska	druga	su	nasla	utociste	u	vehabijama.	Interesantno,	ali	sva	tri	su	bili	katastrofalni	ucenici	i	problematicnog	ponasanja.	:D	Nakon	zavrsene	srednje	dvije-tri	godine	su	se	smucali	i	klosarili,	da	bi	na	kraju	svoje	pitanja	egzistencije	rjesili	bas	u	navedenoj	dzamiji	i	vehabijama.	Odmah	su	se	ozenili	i	sad	imaju	po	dvoje-troje	djece,	i	za	svako	primaju	novcanu	naknadu	kao	i	zena	za	pokrivanje.	Par	puta	sam	ih	sreo	i	poceli	su	mi	sa	pricom	o	Islamu	i	Muhamedu,	i	kako	trebam	doci	da	me	edukuju,’	
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young people. When Bosnia had no money, they were the first to make 
centres with electronics, with computers, with… of course they had 
money and then they purchased and bought [electronics and 
computers]. And our youth, our young are eager for knowledge and 
learning. You know… and it attracted them, because all young people… 
look I have a few years on me, 76, and I like to sit at a computer, I like 
Facebook, I like, I like everything, but you young people especially do. It 
is thus totally understandable that they find ways to attract them. And 
how… now how much can they influence them, how much further will 
they affect them? That I really don’t know, but I think that it’s, uh, one 
mistake of our government. If you are allowed to make a mosque, then 
the mosque serves as a place of worship. Is that right? But there’s some 
... some other education. You know what that means? That they do not 
educate people in a different direction, but rather they educate them to 
be believers. But the latter may be left to other institutions.98 
 
While this respondent does not perpetuate the discourse that only the uneducated fall 
victim to the ‘plot’ of the Saudis to convert them, he does suggest that there is a plan in 
place to entice the youth with courses, electronics and computers. He also discusses 
these activities very carefully and with an underlying concern that they are threatening 
to the youth of the city. The words he uses ‘attract’ and ‘influence’ show an active 
agenda from the Saudis to use the King Fahd Cultural Centre to bring in easily 
influenced young people and to ‘educate’ [odgajati] them, to raise them and bring them 
up. It is implied that this ‘education’ or rearing involves conversion to Wahhabism, as 
he states that they are ‘educated’ or reared to be believers. And while the youth in this 
case do not receive direct financial compensation, they are given access to things they 
desire: computers, electronics and knowledge.  
 Thus, the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre is perceived as having an 
agenda to convert the young and the gullible, impoverished masses to Salafism 
through aid and access to resources. These are not the practices of a perceived 
sophisticated, Bosnian Islam in line with the ‘West’ and a secular state as envisaged in 																																																													98	‘Ali,	mislim,	ta	džamija	je	sve	viće	nego	džamija.	Znate,	ona	ima…	ona	okuplja…	Ja	tu	stanujem,	pa	sam	malo	pratila	i	znam.	Ja	sam	iz	starog	grada	ovdje	doselila.	Oni	su	tu	stvorili	centar	za	omladinu,	za	mlade	ljude.	Oni	su	prvi	kad	u	Bosni	nije	bilo	para	da	se	naprave	centri	sa	elekronikom,	sa	kompjuterima,	sa…	oni	su,	naravno,	imali	pare	i	onda	su	to	nabavili	i	pokupovali.	A	omladina	naša,	naša	mladost	je	željna	znanja	i	učenja.	Znate…I	to	je	njih	privuklo,	jer	svi	mladi…	evo	ja	imam	toliko	godina,	76,	pa	volim	sjest	za	kompjuter,	volim	Facebooku,	volim,	sve	volim,	a	pogotovo	vi	mladi.	To	je	tako	razumljivo	da	su	našli	načina	kako	će	ih	privući.	I	kako…	E,	sad,	koliko	mogu	uticati	na	njih,	koliko	dalje	utiču	na	njih,	to	stvarno	ne	znam	ali	mislim	da	je	to,	ovaj,	jedna	greška	naše	vlasti.	Ako	su	dozvolili	da	se	napravi	džamija,	onda	ta	džamija	neko	služi	samo	kao	bogomolja.	Je	li	tako?	Da	nema	tu	nekih…	nekih	drugih	odgoja.	Znate	šta	to	znači?	Da	ne	odgajaju	ljude	u	drugom	smjeru,	nego	da	ga	odgaja	da	bude	vjernik.	Ali	ovo	drugo	neka	prepusti	nekim	drugim	ustanovama.’	
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the IZ’s constitution. These activities and ideas are dangerous and threatening to the 
traditions of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, as a consequence, to the multi-
ethnic nature of the city of Sarajevo. By portraying those who take on Salafi ideas as 
the ‘uneducated poor’ and ‘unemployed youth’ such ideas dissuade Bosnians from 
following Salafism. It is a means to position Sarajevan identity towards the West on the 
imagined binary, advocating, instead, western secularism combined with ‘naš Islam’ – 
an idea created in direct opposition to the Salafi ‘other’ that proliferated during the war 
and directly after.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have explored the discourses around sacred spaces in 
Sarajevo, understanding that with the ‘Islamic shift’ in the city, public spaces such as 
the shopping centres BBI and SCC have become imbued with the sacred. The line 
between the sacred and the secular in Sarajevo has been blurred, and the case studies 
– the King Fahd Mosque, BBI and SCC – represent this mixing of the sacred and the 
secular where the simultaneous production of both exist on one site. Public debates in 
Sarajevo are challenging the Islamic shift, and they are attempting to reclaim some 
version of a simplified secular public sphere, asserting the ideals of Yugoslav 
secularism. Sarajevans also defend the idea of ‘naš Islam’ against new currents of 
Islam, but especially against Salafism. They perceive their tradition of Islam as 
‘European’ and ‘tolerant’ as opposed to ‘eastern’ varients that are less tolerant 
(Bougarel, 2007 and Helms, 2008). As a direct reaction to these new urban 
investments in Sarajevo, Sarajevans are positioning their identity around the imagined 
binaries of Sacred/Secular and East/West.  
 All three of the case studies have been implicated in what has been termed the 
‘Islamisation’ of the city: the perception that there is an active agenda on the part of the 
Bošnjak elite to bring Islam into the public sphere through Islamic financing of public 
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spaces and the expansion of mosque building in the city. For BBI and SCC, Sarajevans 
are defining their identity in terms of the Sacred/Secular binary, asserting the Yugoslav 
ideal of secularism and the preservation of the multi-ethnic city against Islamic 
homogenisation of the city spaces. Fear of the imposition of Islam on Sarajevo extends 
further into the regulations of these spaces. As ‘naš Islam’ is defined in relation to a 
secular state, including a secular public sphere, the threat of Islamic regulations upon 
the people from new urban interventions has inspired discourses that challenge any 
such regulations as against ‘our traditions and our Islam’. This positions Sarajevan 
identity – that of the city and the population – towards the secular, despite the fact that 
the true nature of these spaces and the city generally is more multiplex and defies 
binary definition.  
 Constructed along the East/West binary, the discourses surrounding the King 
Fahd mosque portray Islamic currents from Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Arab 
world as a threat to the security of the country as well as a threat to the Islamic tradition 
of Bošnjaks. Seen as a foreign import from the ‘East’, Sarajevan identity is positioned 
in direct relation to the ‘other’ that is ‘eastern’ Salafism, where ‘naš Islam’ is aligned 
with western secular ideals and a secular state. The Islam practiced at the King Fahd 
Mosque and its followers are perceived as potential threats to the security and stability 
of the country and of western liberal democracy. The perception exists that this ‘radical’ 
and ‘extreme’ form of Islam is not native to BiH, and must therefore be treated with 
caution. To challenge the threat of Salafism from King Fahd, narratives in the city 
underscore the idea that there is a Saudi/Wahhabi plot to convert vulnerable people in 
the country to Salafism through access to free educational services at the King Fahd 
Cultural Centre and through financial assistance in exchange for certain faith practices. 
By representing converts to Salafism in Sarajevo in such a way, adherence to anything 
but traditional, Hanafi Islam practiced in BiH is actively discouraged, which aligns 
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Sarajevan identity with the ‘West’ in terms of ideals, its cohabitation with a secular state 
and its rejection of terrorism.  
 BBI, SCC and the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre are worlding 
practices, which are attempting to solve the ‘urban problem’ (Ong, 2011: 4) of post-
socialist and post-conflict redevelopment. They are bringing new conceptions of Islam 
and of sacred space into Sarajevo from different corners of the earth, and as agents of 
multiplicity and hybridity where simultaneous realities may exist at once, new cultural 
forms are emerging through these worlding practices. These projects act as 
‘expressions and agents of global urban imaginaries’ (Baker and Ruming, 2014: 63), 
but they are elite-approved and mostly outside the control of the population of the city. 
To challenge the perceived elite-approved rise of Islam in the public sphere that is 
linked to the new investments, there is a move to flatten the phenomena and create an 
easily digestible and defendable version of Sarajevan identity based on the historical 
‘multicultural’ idyll, which aligns with the ostensibly transparent and safe ‘secular’ 
‘West’. By positioning their identity along the imagined binaries of East/West and 
Sacred/Secular, Sarajevans are attempting to interpret the new currents and 
information flowing through the city and the city’s link with both Europe and the Middle 
East; they are attempting to solidify an understanding of their identity and of the identity 
of the city in the twenty-first century. This positioning of Sarajevan identity along the 
two binaries speaks to a fundamental fear of the unknown emerging cultural forms 
developing in the city. Such fears also extend to the movement of people into Sarajevo 
from different parts of the Muslim world, as I will discuss in the following chapter on 
residential spaces in the city.  
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7. Understanding Arabophobia: Residential Projects as Catalysts for New 
Constructions of the ‘Other’ in Sarajevo  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 In Sarajevo, a noticeable number of foreigners in the past decade has arrived 
on the bustling cobbled streets of the old town, where, especially on warm summer 
nights, groups of tourists and new residents stroll along the passageways, smoke 
nargila (shisha or flavoured tobacco in water pipes) under awnings and drink coffee in 
the many cafes. These new arrivals are distinguishable from the Sarajevan population 
mainly by their dress, which is often characterised as being regional variants of Islamic 
attire, especially (but not exclusively) for the women. Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
become attractive to tourists and visitors from the Middle East, and according to my 
interview data with people working in the tourism and real estate sectors in Sarajevo,99 
growing numbers of people from these regions are not only visiting but also buying 
property in and around Sarajevo. This growing trend has been explored by both local 
and international news sources as well, including The Economist in their article 
‘Ottoman Comfort: Bosnia’s New visitors’ (2016). To cater to this new demand for 
property and accommodation, both Arab and Bosnian companies have proposed new 
developments targeting tourists and buyers from GCC countries. In Sarajevo, real 
estate agencies run by business owners from the Middle East focus exclusively on the 
Arab property market in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Likewise, Arabic speakers around 
the capital are profiting from the tourist boom to BiH by providing Arabic-language 
services to these tourists (Arabic-language tours, for example, have become a 
common offering to the new visitors), according to my interview data with real estate 
agents and tour operators in Sarajevo.  
																																																													99Aida	Musagić,	Helvetas	tourism	expert;	Tarik	Bilalbegović,	Ascendant	Finance;	Samid	Sinanović,	General	Director	of	Shad	Invest;	Enes	Kazazić,	Director	of	SEIC	
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 Amongst these new residential and tourist developments are Poljine Hills 
residential complex and Buroj Ozone tourist village (see Figure 12 below). Poljine Hills 
is a gated community of private villas northwest of Sarajevo’s city centre. It offers a 
number of residential options for upper middle class Bosnians and foreigners wishing 
to buy property in BiH. Owned by Shad Invest, which is part of the Saudi Al Shiddi 
Group, Poljine Hills’ business model consists of the management of all properties, 
which allows for upkeep when foreign buyers are away from their homes. Buroj Ozone 
is a proposed tourist village in the Sarajevan municipality of Trnovo from the Dubai-
based Buroj Property Development, which will specifically target Arab tourists and cater 
to their needs. At an estimated cost of 2.3 billion Euros, this investment will be the 
largest in South East Europe.  
 
Figure 12: map of Sarajevo with Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone highlighted, courtesy of Google Earth 
 
 As with the case studies in the previous chapters, both of these projects are 
‘worlding practices’ (Ong, 2011), or projects pushing urbanism beyond the city and 
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driving new flows of people and ideas into Sarajevo. Such flows, however, are not a 
new phenomenon. Cities such as London and New York have been experiencing this 
type of urban change for centuries as waves of immigrants and visitors have arrived 
from various areas of the world. Sarajevo itself has also witnessed this type of 
migration when it welcomed Sephardic Jews in the sixteenth century after their 
expulsion from Spain (Donia, 2006: 16). In the contemporary Sarajevan context, such 
flows differ from cities like New York and London in a number of ways. For one, 
Sarajevo is a Muslim-majority city, and these networks of people and ideas also belong 
to the Muslim world. New flows of people from Muslim-majority countries to cities in 
North America and Western Europe are met with some more fundamental religious 
differences, (see for example Kassam, 2016). However, there are ideological 
differences between newcomers in Sarajevo and the local population, as will be 
discussed below. Secondly, the people coming to Sarajevo from the Middle East and 
North Africa are often more materially wealthy than the average person in Sarajevo, 
whose typical monthly salary is around 875 BAM or about 395 GBP (‘Cost of Living in 
Sarajevo’, 2018). These people are not usually economic migrants. Spatial inequalities 
that exist in cities like London, in which economic migrants find themselves in 
unattractive, low-income neighbourhoods (Keith, 2005: 13 and Sassen, 2005: 39), are 
not the same in Sarajevo, where property buyers from the Muslim world seek out gated 
communities, villas and tourist resorts. Wealthy buyers from oil-rich countries do also 
purchase exclusive properties in London, New York, Paris, etc. (‘UAE, Saudi buyers 
target London’s elite homes’, 2010), but there are not as many of these buyers relative 
to the rest of the New York or London population, and it is mainly the middle class that 
find themselves in Bosnia instead of the super wealthy (‘Ottoman Comfort’, 2016). 
Finally, these new flows of people consist mostly of visitors who do not seek long-term 
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residence and only stay for a short time in the country each year,100 as opposed to 
economic migrants in London, New York or Paris who would reside there continuously.   
As the case studies in this chapter are a new phenomenon in Sarajevo, Poljine 
Hills and Buroj Ozone have generated public debates around the themes of exclusion, 
safety, cultural colonisation and the new ‘other’. The controversy around these projects 
– and, especially, the discussions around Arab tourists and residents that the projects 
have mobilised – has proved to be intense and divided. In this chapter, I will examine 
the way in which Sarajevans are constructing the Arab ‘other’ as a reaction to new 
residential complexes such as Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone and how this construction 
helps position Sarajevan identity. While gathering media, interview, survey and internet 
data, the theme of the Arab ‘other’ expanded beyond focused discussions about the 
case studies themselves. These investments prompted and catalysed conversations 
about Arab residents and tourists on a larger scale, which recurred repeatedly during 
my data collection. Because residential developments such as Poljine Hills and Buroj 
Ozone are by definition private or exclusive to paying visitors, the debate then focuses 
on who can and should inhabit such places, how these residents compare to the rest of 
the population and what attributes they contribute to the larger community. By allowing 
the data to expand away from a strict focus on Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone, but while 
keeping within the framework of residential spaces and the idea of what constitutes a 
‘good’ neighbour, I was able to analyse better how new residential spaces are 
marshaling the positioning of Sarajevan identity, especially along the binaries of 
East/West and Global/Local. Although the issue of race has not been explored much in 
the literature on the ex-Yugoslav space, Catherine Baker’s work Race and the 
Yugoslav Region (2018) shows that attitudes in BiH contribute to global formations of 
race. This chapter explores how some of these discourses are mobilised for identity 
formation in Sarajevo.  																																																													100	In	conversation	with	real	estate	agents	focusing	on	the	Arab	market	in	Sarajevo,	02.11.15.	
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 I will examine how Sarajevans are discussing residential spaces and the 
accompanying phenomenon of the Arab neighbour and ‘other’ by drawing on five types 
of data: first, I will look at media articles and editorials; second, I will examine the data 
from my interviews with Sarajevans working in urban development or studying urban 
development; after that I will analyse responses from my field interviews with people on 
the streets of Sarajevo and in shopping centres; I will then add survey data; and finally, 
I will explore internet data taken from the comments sections of articles and from 
internet forums. Throughout all of these sources of data, certain themes recur, 
including: exclusion, cultural colonization, security and safety, and clashes of 
behaviours and values or ‘Arabophobia’. I will highlight these themes as they arise, and 
analyse the construction of the Arab ‘other’ in relation to the themes.  
 
7.1.1 Data Collection 
For the media data, I will explore a cross section of media available to the 
Sarajevan audience. Although I cannot discuss all articles and publications that have 
been written about new residential spaces in Sarajevo and the accompanying 
phenomena of Arab residents and tourists, I have attempted to select articles from a 
wide range of sources, which demonstrate the breadth of the debate. It is not simply a 
subject for one or two specific news portals, but rather, many news portals in BiH, even 
those writing in English, contribute to the public debate surrounding residential spaces 
in Sarajevo. I will analyse articles and editorials from sources such as Radio Slobodna 
Evropa, the US government’s Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty local language news 
source for the Western Balkans, which is widely read by the Sarajevan population. 
Radio Slobodna Evropa markets itself as anti-nationalist and pro-democracy, making it 
attractive to urban and university educated audiences. An interview I will examine 
comes from the Blic online portal, a Serbian news portal that is popular in BiH. The 
interview from the Blic article I have chosen was shared or reported by at least ten 
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different online news portals in BiH, including Slobodna Bosna, BNTV, and others, thus 
reaching a very large audience simply by its spread. Another article that adds to the 
debate about Arab residents comes from Dani, a weekly news magazine from 
Sarajevo, described earlier in the chapter on sacred spaces. Slobodna Bosna also 
provides data for this analysis. It is a weekly political magazine in Sarajevo that has 
now become a digital publication and is a very well known publication in BiH and a rival 
of Dani. According to Marko (2011), Slobodna Bosna offers a strong critical stance of 
authorities in the country and maintains a secular point of view (7). Additionally, I will 
examine an article that appeared in both Balkan Insight and Justice Report, in English 
and in Bosnian. A BIRN journalist wrote this particular article. As described in the 
previous chapter, BIRN stands for the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, and it is 
one of the last investigative news sources in BiH.101 Finally, I have chosen to analyse 
an editorial that appeared on the DEPO news portal. DEPO boasts over 300,000 
unique viewers daily and describes itself as ‘one of the leading online news sources in 
BiH’102 (‘O Nama’, http://depo.ba/stranica/o-nama-depo). DEPO is linked to its partner 
BL!N, which has exactly the same format and content as DEPO, and the editorial I will 
be analysing was shared on at least three different online forums in BiH, including Klix 
forum, Skyscraper City forum and Bosanski forum.  
 While media articles and editorials are crucial for understanding the debate 
about residential spaces and the rise of Arab residents and tourists, I will also draw 
upon my interview, field interview and survey data, as these offer insights into the 
phenomenon. However, it is important to note that due to the nature of interviews, 
interviewees are aware that their responses might be analysed, leading to somewhat 
less candid responses. This can be especially true when dealing with a controversial 
topic. I will analyse interview segments I had with a student of architecture at the 																																																													101	In	conversation	with	representative	of	the	OSCE’s	Press	and	Public	Information	Unit	11.08.15.	102	‘DEPO	Portal	je	jedan	od	vodećih	online	medija	u	BiH.’	
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University of Sarajevo and a local architect working in Sarajevo. I did not set out to 
discuss their views on the new coming residents, but the subject was raised during the 
interview, as it is linked to urban investments with links to GCC countries. In addition to 
these in-depth interviews, my field interviews (in which I stopped Sarajevan residents 
on the street and in shopping centers to discuss current trends such as the 
transnational flows of capital and people from GCC countries) also provide invaluable 
data on this public debate, and I will be analysing six field interview segments from 
women and men that I approached in different areas of the city. Finally, my survey data 
supplies an added source of data for this discussion, and I will draw upon a few 
responses to my survey that I thought added interesting insights to the discussion.  
 As this is a public debate, I did not limit myself to traditional sources of data 
(media, interview and survey), but I allowed myself to use public internet comments on 
news portals and on internet forums as data as well. Using such data is not a familiar 
technique within the social sciences, but it is gaining in repudiability and popularity. It is 
advantageous for this study because it allows me to gather viewpoints that traditional 
interviewees might self-censor. However, due to the anonymous nature of internet 
forums and comments sections and the propensity for commenters to ‘troll’ (to incite 
strong reactions from others by expressing sometime outlandish and radical 
viewpoints), this method does have its drawbacks for social research. I have tried to 
exclude viewpoints that seem to be ‘trolling’ by understanding the context of the 
comments and the responses they received, while also focusing on how these 
comments construct the ‘other’ with respect to Arab residents and tourists. I analysed 
comments that were left in the comments sections of online articles, especially those 
linked to the case studies. These comments are on the Radio Slobodna Evropa 
website and the Klix.ba website, which is the most visited news portal in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, according to USAID (Brunwasser et al, 2016). In addition to the 
comments on articles themselves, I also drew from the internet forums 
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SkyscraperCity.com and Klix.ba’s forum. SkyscraperCity.com is an architectural and 
urban environment forum that operates worldwide. I chose to use it as a source of data 
because the people who comment on it are interested in developments in the urban 
environment and often work in or study fields relating to urban development. Thus, 
comments on this forum will look at the trend of Arab residents and tourists through the 
lens of urban development. Klix.ba’s forum section is very popular and highly visited by 
the population of BiH, which allows for the data obtained from this forum to encapsulate 
a larger sample of viewpoints (not just from those people working in urban 
development). These non-traditional sources of data support and reaffirm the media, 
interview and survey data, and are valuable for analysing how Sarajevans are 
constructing the ‘other’ in environments where they can offer anonymous opinions.  
 
7.1.2 Case Studies: Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone 
 In this chapter, I will be using the residential complexes of Poljine Hills and 
Buroj Ozone as case studies. There are, in fact, many different residential 
developments in Sarajevo that have funding from GCC countries, and there are real 
estate agencies specifically focusing on the Arab market in Sarajevo. According to my 
interview data with such estate agencies, people from Arab countries and especially 
the GCC are seeking out residential properties in BiH for a number of reasons. Among 
these are the lush green nature found in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its location in 
Europe, which some buyers use as a hub for travelling around the rest of Europe. A 
strong selling point for this market is the climate and greenery combined with the fact 
that Sarajevo and other parts of BiH are Muslim-majority areas. Many buyers visit 
during the month of Ramadan, as it is much cooler and greener in BiH than it would be 
in Kuwait or the UAE, for example, making the month of fasting more pleasant while 
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also allowing for night prayers at the local mosque.103 Arabic-speaking visitors and 
residents have become so prevalent in Sarajevo that the municipality of Ilidža has 
become something of a ‘little Arabia’, where shop signs in Arabic and Turkish seem to 
equal or outnumber those in Bosnian (Figure 13 and Figure 14). 
 





Figure 14: Street in Ilidža, photo courtesy of author.  
 
Supporting this trend is the fact that there are now direct flights to and from Dubai and 
Istanbul from the Sarajevo airport (but there is no direct flight to London or Paris).  
The residential complexes Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone are amongst the most 
well known and contested of these developments appearing in and around Sarajevo. 
Although they differ from each other in their aims and targets, both case studies 
provide residential and living spaces for people from Arabic-speaking countries wishing 
to visit BiH or reside on a longer-term basis in the region. Both Poljine Hills and Buroj 
Ozone are at the time of writing this chapter unfinished; Poljine Hills still has not built all 
of its villas, and Buroj Ozone is still only in the initial phases of its development.  
 Poljine Hills is a Shad Invest project, which is part of the Saudi Al-Shiddi Group 
(along with Sarajevo City Center). A luxury, gated community, Poljine Hills comprises, 
‘211 urban villas, spread over 180,000 m2, giving you the opportunity to choose your 
dream home from five different available villa types’ (http://www.poljinehills.com). In 
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addition to the private villas, buyers may also purchase one of some 260 flats 
contained within ten different buildings. Amongst the flats are rooftop, two-storey 
penthouse units. According to the website, ‘The penthouses are sized from 195 to 280 
squared meters [sic], and feature three bedrooms, a pool, and a terrace with a view of 
the whole development as well as the city’ (Ibid.). The Poljine Hills website describes 
all of the amenities that will be available to buyers within the community in the English 
language. At the time of writing this chapter in July 2017, the website includes buttons 
to change the language to either Bosnian or Arabic. However, even after choosing 
Bosnian, the majority of the text remains in English. Interestingly, when Arabic is 
chosen, selected areas of text are fully translated into Arabic, and these areas include 
the description of the villas available (Figure 15).  
Figure 15: Image from Poljine Hills website with Arabic translations, http://www.poljinehills.com/ 
 
This section is not translated into Bosnian for the Bosnian language version of the 
website, showing a clear targeting of buyers from Arabic speaking countries or non-
native Bosnian speakers (perhaps Bosnians from the diaspora). In my interview with 
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Samid Sinanović, the director of Shad Invest, he explained that, while many Bosnians 
think the properties are exclusive and only for Arab buyers, the homes at Poljine Hills 
are not as far out of reach for regular Bosnians as most think. According to Sinanović, 
the villas and flats available at Poljine Hills could be bought by middle class Bosnians 
and members of the diaspora, and that they market to these groups of buyers as well 
as to foreigners from all over the world.104 However, this was countered by my 
empirical data discussed below, which suggests that middle class Bosnians are not 
targeted by the marketing for Poljine Hills and that they feel excluded from such 
developments. As visible in the image above from Poljine Hills, the architectural style of 
the villas resembles a transnational, modern style that could be found anywhere in the 
world. They are quite different from Sarajevan houses that often are built with red tile 
roofs in a more traditional Balkan style.  
 Much larger in scope than Poljine Hills, Buroj Ozone is a luxury tourist resort 
targeting Arab tourists that has been planned for construction in the Sarajevan 
municipality of Trnovo. It is an investment of Buroj Property Development based in 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates and will consist of: over 1,000 luxury villas, luxury hotel 
flats, a shopping centre called the Zayed Mall (which will house 800 brand name 
stores), a sports complex and various activities such as a zipline and kids’ park and ski 
area (Figure 16).   
																																																													104	In	conversation	with	Samid	Sinanović,	19	October	2015.	
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Figure 16: Site plan of Buroj Ozone, courtesy of http://www.burojo3.ba/. 
 
Buroj Ozone has been hailed the largest investment in South East Europe at 2.3 billion 
Euros (http://www.burojo3.ba), and international news organisations such as the BBC 
and the Economist have written about the project and its implications for BiH and the 
Balkans (Brunwasser, 2016 and ‘Ottoman Comfort’, 2016). According to the company’s 
website, Buroj Ozone will be, ‘The largest tourist city in South Eastern Europe...built in 
the metropolis of Trnovo’ (http://www.burojo3.ba). Having laid its cornerstone in 
September 2016, Buroj Ozone promises the creation of thousands of jobs for 
Bosnians. Like the website of Poljine Hills, Buroj Ozone’s website can be read in 
English, Arabic and Bosnian. However, unlike Poljine Hills, the website has been 
completely translated into these three languages. During my field research, I tried 
multiple times to speak with someone from Buroj Property Development, even calling 
the UAE multiple times. However, I was never granted an interview with anyone from 
the company. 
 
7.2 ‘This Picture Is Not Idyllic’: Constructions of the Arab ‘Other’ in BiH Media 
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 Articles and editorials in BiH media are an important source of data for 
analysing how people in Sarajevo are constructing the ‘other’ when referring to 
residential spaces such as Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone. In an article from Radio 
Slobodna Evropa (the Western Balkan branch of the US funded Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty as described above that has a pro-democracy, anti-nationalist 
stance) on the 5 October 2015 titled ‘United Bosnian Emirates’105, author Dženana 
Halimović (2015) discussed Buroj Ozone and the exchange of people, capital and 
ideas from GCC countries. The article was written ten days before the final contract 
signing between the mayor of the municipality of Trnovo, Ibro Berilo, and Buroj 
Property Development. The online version of the article begins with a large photo of 
ostensibly Arab women walking with their children in Sarajevo’s old town wearing 
niqabs and abayas (Figure 17).  
Figure 17: Photo showing women in abayas and niqabs from Halimović, Dženana. ‘Ujedinjeni bosanski emirati’. Radio 
Slobodna Evropa, 05.10.2015. http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ujedinjeni-bosanski-emirati/27288811.html 
 
The title ‘United Bosnian Emirates’ suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina – the state 
created from the dissolution of Yugoslavia – has ceased to exist, and that in its place, 
only an extension of the United Arab Emirates has been left. The photo caption reads: 																																																													105	‘Ujedinjeni	bosanski	emirati’	
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‘foreign citizens in Sarajevo, August 2015’106, placing emphasis on the othering of 
these women (they are ‘foreign citizens’) through their dress alone. The caption of the 
photo eliminates the possibility that these women could be Bosnian, even though their 
faces are covered; they could realistically have any nationality, including Bosnian.  
 The article begins by describing an idyllic scene: men, women and children 
‘apparently of Arab origin’107 picnic by the source of the river Bosna (Vrelo Bosne), 
sharing photos and comments about this ‘pearl’108 of Bosnia and Herzegovina on their 
social networks. The article then changes its tone, becoming suddenly ominous: 
No matter how it sounds, this picture is not idyllic. It is far from that in 
which rich Arab tourists see Bosnia and Herzegovina as an attractive 
destination in which they come to leave [ostave] money and to enjoy the 
natural beauty. In recent years, these tourists have found a way to 
permanently reside in Bosnia and Herzegovina, buying vast areas of the 
country, but also houses around Ilidža, but also many other parts of 
BiH.109 (Ibid.). 
   
The article underlines that Arabs buying property and permanently residing in BiH is 
‘not idyllic’. Instead of just coming for a short while to ‘leave’ their money in the 
economy, which the author implies would be acceptable, Arabs are deciding to stay 
and buy up property, something that is unwelcome. Halimović constructs the Arab 
‘other’ who overstays his or her welcome in BiH (a welcome based on leaving as much 
money as possible in as short a timeframe as possible) as objectionable to not only 
Sarajevans around Ilidža but also to ‘vast areas of the country’ and ‘many other parts of 
BiH’.  
Moving from this introduction of the phenomenon, the article expounds upon the 
feelings of exclusion surfacing in the debates about the case studies and about Arab 
residents in particular. Halimović states:  
																																																													106	‘Strani	državljani	u	Sarajevu,	august	2015’	(Halimović,	2015).	107	‘očito	arapskog	porijekla’	108	‘jedan	od	bisera	BiH’	109	‘Ma	kako	zvučalo,	slika	i	nije	idilična.	Daleko	je	od	one	da	bogati	arapski	turisti	Bosnu	i	Hercegovinu	vide	kao	privlačnu	destinaciju	u	koju	dolaze	da	ostave	novac	i	uživaju	u	prirodnim	ljepotama.U	posljednjih	nekoliko	godina,	ti	turisti	su	pronašli	način	da	se	trajno	nastane	u	BiH	kupivši	tako	ogromne	površine	zemlje,	ali	i	kuće	oko	Ilidže,	ali	i	brojnih	drugih	dijelova	BiH.’	
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Citizens in places where neighbours in the Arab world are building their 
closed oases are not overly enthusiastic...in the places that are most 
attractive for purchase, Arabic has became the second language. 
From the notification of the sale of apartments to the prices of kebabs – 
everything is in Arabic, and everything is dependent on investors. And 
they invest only in their own comfort.’110(Ibid.).  
 
At the heart of these sentiments is a perceived power imbalance between the rich 
Arabs and the poor Bosnians, who are losing their country to the encroachment of all 
things Arab and Arabic, including whole neighbourhoods turning into ‘Little Arabias’ 
where Bosnian is pushed aside for the convenience of Arab investors. These ‘closed 
oases’ are not open to BiH citizens, thus excluding them from their own territory. That 
the Arabs ‘invest only in their own comfort’ indicates that the author has constructed 
the Arab ‘other’ as a demanding presence in the city that refuses to conform to BiH 
standards, including maintaining Bosnian as the dominant language of the city. This 
suggests that there is a fear being circulated through these discourses that indicators 
of ‘Bosnian-ness’ in Sarajevo such as language will be lost with the increasing numbers 
of Arab residents and tourists.  
Articles in the media such as ‘United Bosnian Emirates’ underline this sense of 
fear and exclusion associated with new flows of capital and people. Mirna Buljugić, the 
director of The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, BIRN, wrote an article 
published in both Bosnian and English on the websites of Balkan Insight and Justice 
Report titled ‘Wealthy Arabs Buy Slice of “Heaven” in Bosnia’ (Buljugić, 2016). These 
portals are popular news sources amongst the international community (many working 
for foreign embassies and international organisations in BiH) and the bilingual Bosnian 
community in Sarajevo, who also often work in such organisations. Yet this article, too, 
constructs an Arab ‘other’ with an undertone of fear. Buljugić’s article begins by 
describing the situation, ‘Bosnia is becoming an attractive destination for Arab and Gulf 
																																																													110	‘Građani	u	mjestima	na	kojima	komšije	iz	arapskog	svijeta	grade	svoje	zatvorene	oaze	nisu	pretjerano	oduševljeni...na	mjestima	koja	su	najatraktivnija	za	kupovinu,	arapski	je	postao	drugi	jezik.	Od	obavještenja	o	prodaji	stanova	do	cijene	kebaba	-	sve	je	na	arapskom,	te	sve	podređeno	investitorima.	A	oni	ulažu	samo	u	vlastiti	komfor’	(Ibid.).	
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state visitors, many of whom are buying real estate – but while some welcome the 
influx, not everyone is delighted.’ (Ibid). Words used such as ‘influx’ hint that the author 
sees the movement in terms of large numbers of people, even though later in the article 
the author states, ‘Data from the Bosnian state agency for foreign investments show 
that, despite talk of big investments, Gulf state countries are not important investors in 
Bosnia.’ (Ibid.). The construction of an ‘influx’ or wave of Arab people into the country 
adds to the othering and creates a sense of fear in terms of being outnumbered. 
Buljugić also sets Arabs apart from Bosnians in two additional ways: through their 
physical difference and their assumed wealth. In the introduction of the article, she 
describes a scene in Sarajevo, ‘In one of the most popular hotels in the Ilidža district of 
Sarajevo, the Hotel Hollywood, a dark-skinned middle-aged man sits in the lobby 
beside a sign of the AlAyyad Company.’ (Ibid.). Arabs become othered by their skin 
tone, marked as different from apparently light-skinned Bosnians. She continues later 
in the article that, ‘Aside from its natural charms, Bosnia is a cheap destination for 
wealthy Arabs’ (Ibid.). There is an assumption that all the visitors and residents from 
GCC countries and the Middle East are rich, creating a divide between the Bosnian 
population (who has suffered economically since the conflict in the 1990s) and the 
newcomers who are buying property in the country.  
As a piece of investigative journalism, the article interviews ‘ordinary people’ in 
Sarajevo about their views of the phenomenon. They state: 
‘East investment is good, but we need to check the source of funding… 
we do not know the source of this money from Arab countries and that 
worries me,’ one Sarajevo citizen told BIRN...Some Bosnians, especially 
Serbs and Croats – who are not Muslim – worry about the growing 
influence of Muslim Arab culture. ‘These Arabs came and they have 
their own rules,’ one bystander said. ‘I know a woman who had a 
problem with an Arab and people came from their embassy… If this 
continues, we will not be able to tell them anything,’ he said. ‘It hurts that 
they want to have such influence on our territory. I want to know who is 
selling this country to them.’ (Ibid.).  
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These interviewees in the article each construct the Arab ‘other’ as something to be 
feared and as something that is becoming a dominant influence in the country. The first 
interviewee suggests that the source of the money could be illicit and that is a cause for 
worry. He or she implies that there is corruption amongst the new Arab population. 
These respondents fear the ‘growing influence of Muslim Arab culture’, in other words, 
Salafism, and that the Arabs ‘have their own rules’ and do not abide by assumed 
Bosnian standards of conduct. The third interviewee constructs the Arab ‘other’ as 
someone beyond the law, and that representatives from embassies will intervene in 
problematic cases, leaving Bosnians with no recourse for justice. And finally, the last 
interviewee overtly positions Arabs versus Bosnians by stating, ‘that they want to have 
such influence on our territory. I want to know who is selling this country to them 
[emphasis added].’ Again, the Arab ‘other’ is constructed in contrast to Bosnians. They 
are depicted as having influence on Bosnian territory, producing a dynamic in which 
‘we’, the Bosnians, are losing ‘our territory’ and that someone is ‘selling this country’ to 
‘them’. It is an unnatural and illegitimate process in this construction, a theft of the 
natural right to the land by the Bosnians themselves.  
 Although not stated outright in the beginning of the article, the discussion of 
Arab visitors and residents hinges upon the case studies Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone. 
Towards the end of the piece, Buljugić states, ‘in the past few months construction has 
begun on three large-scale real-estate projects. These are the Sarajevo Resort in 
Hadžići, the Poljine Hills above Sarajevo and the luxury tourist Buroj Ozone in Trnovo.’ 
(Ibid.). She then interviews a worker on one of the projects, an academic and local 
residents living around Poljine Hills for their input on these projects specifically. 
Recounting the interview with the worker, she states: 
A handyman, putting in the air conditioning and curtains in a finished 
villa, says the arrival of the Arabs is good for Bosnia’s economy. He 
revealed that the villas are being constructed so that the lower section 
houses the maids and the upper section is for the families. This is 
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because many wealthy Arab clients are expected to travel to Bosnia with 
their servants. (Ibid.). 
 
This interview shows a generally positive attitude toward the case studies in terms of 
helping Bosnia’s economy, but the quote continues to construct the Arab ‘other’ as 
extremely wealthy in contrast to the relatively poor Bosnians. Having maids and 
constructing a house that has areas specifically for the maids is far beyond the means 
of the majority of BiH citizens. Buljugić continues 
However, academic Esad Duraković said he feared that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is selling its resources off cheap. ‘I can guarantee we will 
have problems, if not now, then in ten to 15 years,’ Duraković opined. 
Significantly, he declined to speak more plainly, claiming that after 
previous statements in which he criticized Arab investments, he had 
received threats.’ (Ibid.).  
 
This undermines the previous positive statement, and suggests a level of corruption 
with Arab investments that could potentially cause harm to anyone who speaks out 
against them. It places Arab residents and visitors – and by association the Bosnian 
politicians ushering in these projects – within a category of the corrupt and violent. It 
also reiterates a notion mentioned previously in the article, that ‘someone’ is selling off 
‘their territory’ to the Arab ‘other’ for cheap. Further on in the section speaking 
specifically about the case studies, Buljugić explains that for Buroj Ozone, ‘The 
apartments were supposed to be offered first to Bosnian citizens, and then to buyers 
from Arab countries under different prices. However, Buroj has since changed this 
plan.’ (Ibid.). Again, there is a direct contrast in the article between ‘Bosnian citizens’ 
and ‘buyers from Arab countries’, and she highlights that Bosnians are now being 
excluded from the market in favour of Arab buyers, who are ‘wealthy’ and can afford 
the higher prices.  
Hinted at in the BIRN article is the fear of security risks associated with new 
Arab residents and tourists (‘he declined to speak more plainly, claiming that after 
previous statements in which he criticized Arab investments, he had received threats.’). 
Throughout the media, BiH politicians have further propagated this discourse that 
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Arabs coming to BiH to buy property have become a security risk. In November 2013, 
Milorad Dodik, the president of the Serbian entity in BiH, the Republika Srpska, gave 
an interview to Blic online magazine, a Serbian news portal mention above (the 
contents of which was shared and discussed on many news portals in BiH, as I will 
show), in which he said that: 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Islamisation of society is happening. 
There are serious projects to settle between 300,000 and 500,000 
people from the Islamic world who could change the image of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. There is a precise plan, and the lowest layer of the 
Arab world would come,111 (Kozomora, 2013). 
  
These ‘serious projects’ refer to projects such as Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone, and 
with 300,000 to 500,000 people (the population or more of Sarajevo itself) coming from 
the ‘Islamic world’ the image of BiH could become entirely, or almost entirely, Muslim. 
Not only will BiH become ‘Islamicised’, but also it will be the ‘lowest layer’ of the Arab 
world that will come. It is not clear what this ‘lowest layer’ refers to, but judging from the 
hysteria in the media and popular discourse around Salafis, one could conclude that 
according to Dodik this would be comprised of violent religious fundamentalists. This 
comment was picked up by other local newspapers and news portals, including Dani, a 
popular, weekly news magazine in BiH. In their article titled ‘What do Arabs want in 
BiH?’112 from the 6 December 2013 issue (Redžić, 2013), author Edin Redžić 
discusses the new investments coming into BiH and Sarajevo, including residential 
investments such as Poljine Hills. He references the statement made by Dodik, saying: 
Stories of expatriate nationals from Arab countries in BiH have 
experienced their peak now with the famous statement from Milorad 
Dodik on the arrival 500,000 Arabs in BiH. Minister of Security Fahrudin 
Radončić has also somewhat actualised things, as he said that his 
ministry will pay particular attention to Arabs. Furthermore, Radončić 
announced that the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
should adopt a law with which the settlement of Arab citizens in Bosnia 
																																																													111	‘U	Bosni	i	Hercegovini	se	radi	na	islamizaciji	društva.	Postoje	ozbiljni	projekti	da	se	iz	islamskog	sveta	u	BiH	naseli	između	300.000	i	500.000	ljudi	koji	bi	mogli	da	promene	sliku	BiH.	Postoji	tačan	plan	i	tu	bi	dolazio	najniži	sloj	iz	arapskog	svet.’	112	‘Šta	hoće	Arapi	u	BiH’	
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and Herzegovina would be sanctioned, as well as their practice of 
buying real estate.’113 (Ibid.). 
  
Building upon the statement from Dodik, the author combines the Minister of Security’s 
announcement that his ministry will ‘pay particular attention to Arabs’, as if there is 
something inherently risky about Arab people, and that their ability to reside and buy 
property in the country should be ‘sanctioned’. However, the author of the article 
balanced this view from the politicians, adding: 
However, data from the Ministry of Security not only says differently, but 
even the opposite. From a total of close to 10,000 foreign nationals 
currently residing in BiH, most were citizens from the area of 
neighbouring Western Balkan countries, Russia, China, Turkey, etc., 
while those of Arab origin are at the very bottom of the list,114 (Ibid.).  
  
Thus while politicians attempt to create an atmosphere of Arabophobia through their 
statements that are picked up in the media, the facts of the debate do also come into 
play. Redžić adjusts the tone of the article by adding actual figures that contradict the 
fearmongering of the politicians.  
 Slobodna Bosna, another popular news portal in Sarajevo, ran a similar story at 
approximately the same time (26 November 2013). Titled ‘Radončić: law to sanction 
Arabs massively buying real estate’ the article quotes Fahrudin Radončić as he 
discusses the Ministry of Security’s plans to sanction Arabs from buying real estate. It 
says:   
Minister of Security Fahrudin Radončić announced today that in due 
course in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly a law may be adopted that 
would sanction citizens of Arab countries en masse coming to BiH, 
buying property and settling down. ‘In the foreseeable future concrete 
sanctions can be expected for such persons if the Parliamentary 
Assembly adopts a law. I do not expect that it will be a problem that 
such a law is adopted, and then it is for the Prosecution to do its job, 
meaning justice,’ said Radončić. He stressed to BH Radio One that this 
is a problem that the Ministry of Security of BiH is seriously working on. 																																																													113	‘Priče	o	emigraciji	državljana	iz	arapskih	zemlja	u	BiH	doživjele	su	svoj	vrhunac	sada	već	famoznom	izjavom	Milorada	Dodika	o	dolasku	500.000	Arapa	u	BiH.	Stvari	je	unekoliko	aktuelizirao	i	ministar	sigurnosti	BiH	Fahrudin	Radončić,	koji	je	izjavio	da	će	njegovo	ministarstvo	na	Arape	obratiti	posebnu	pažnju.	Radončić	je,	štaviše,	najavio	da	bi	u	Parlamentarnoj	skupštini	BiH	mogao	biti	usvojen	zakon	kojim	bi	naseljavanje	arapskih	državljana	u	BiH	bila	sankcionisano,	kao	i	njihova	praksa	kupovine	nekretnina.’	114	‘No,	podaci	Ministarstva	sigurnosti	BiH	ne	govore	samo	drugačije,	nego	čak	i	suprotno.	Od	ukupno	blizu	10.000	stranih	državljana	koji	trenutno	borave	u	BiH,	najviše	je	riječ	o	državljanima	sa	područja	sudsjednih	zemalja	Zapadnog	Balkana,	Rusije,	Kine,	Turske	itd,	dok	su	oni	arapskog	porijekla	na	samom	začelju	te	liste.’	
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"We are talking with foreign partners, we are educating local political 
partners, and we will act as in the case of the expulsion of Iranian 
diplomats who were abusing the service, when I introduced restrictive 
measures for Iran. We will look for legal solutions for the country to be 
defended from these types of viruses," said Radončić...In his opinion, 
BiH pays the price of levity for when the mujahideen were brought in the 
war. ‘After that we got the Wahhabis, now we have the departure of 
young people to Syria and the intimation and political patronage brought 
by so-called Kuwaitis in BiH and their settlement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina," said Radončić.115 
  
Radončić constructs people coming from the Middle East as ‘viruses’ who are taking 
advantage of BiH and creating security risks through violent religious fundamentalism. 
The suggestion that Arabs buying real estate could be linked to ‘radical extremism’ is 
made more blatant in this article, as Radončić is quoted connecting the mujahideen, 
Wahhabis, radicalised youth leaving to fight for Daesh in Syria and new residents from 
GCC countries (specifically Kuwait). He also suggests that such Arab residents might 
have political control through their ‘patronage’, making the threat that much more 
severe.  
 Radio Slobodna Evropa’s article ‘United Bosnian Emirates’ analysed above also 
associates new Arab residents and visitors to security risks. The author Dženana 
Halimović (2015) quotes mayor of Kiseljak, Mladen Mišurić Ramljak, who said, ‘Always 
chose your neighbour, because it is not all the same who will be your neighbor. Do you 
know what is happening in the last few years when it comes to the world, terrorism or 
fear of people – that fear is justified,’116 (Ibid.). Further on in the article, Halimović 
references the quotes by both Dodik and Radončić, and quotes Radončić again saying: 
																																																													115	‘Ministar	bezbjednosti	BiH	Fahrudin	Radončić	najavio	je	danas	da	bi	u	dogledno	vrijeme	u	Parlamentarnoj	skupštini	BiH	mogao	da	bude	usvojen	zakon	kojim	bi	bilo	sankcionisano	da	državljani	arapskih	zemalja	masovno	dolaze	u	BiH,	kupuju	nekretnine	i	naseljavaju	se.	"U	dogledno	vrijeme	mogu	se	očekivati	konkretne	sankcije	za	takva	lica	ukoliko	u	Parlamentarnoj	skupštini	bude	usvojen	zakon.	Ne	očekujem	da	će	biti	problem	da	takav	zakon	bude	usvojen,	a	onda	je	na	redu	Tužilaštvo	BiH	da	radi	svoj	posao,	odnosno	pravosuđe",	rekao	je	Radončić.	On	je	za	BH	Radio	jedan	istakao	da	je	to	problem	na	kojem	Ministarstvo	bezbjednosti	BiH	ozbiljno	radi.	"Razgovaramo	sa	stranim	partnerima,	edukujemo	domaće	političke	partnere	i	djelovaćemo	kao	u	slučaju	protjerivanja	iranskih	diplomata	koji	su	zloupotrebljavali	službu,	kada	sam	uveo	restriktivne	mjere	za	Iran.	Tražićemo	zakonska	rješenja	da	zemlja	bude	odbranjena	od	te	vrste	virusa",	naglasio	je	Radončić...Prema	njegovom	mišljenju,	BiH	plaća	cijenu	lakoumnosti	kada	su	u	ratu	dovedeni	mudžahedini.	"Nakon	toga	smo	dobili	vehabije,	sada	imamo	odlazak	mladih	ljudi	u	Siriju	i	nagovještaj	i	političko	pokroviteljstvo	dovođenja	takozvanih	Kuvajćana	u	BiH	i	njihovo	naseljavanje	u	BiH",	istakao	je	Radončić.’	116	‘Uvijek	se	birao	susjed,	jer	vam	nije	bilo	svejedno	ko	će	vam	biti	susjed.	Znate	li	šta	se	dešava	u	posljednjih	nekoliko	godina	kada	je	u	pitanju	svijet,	terorizam	ili	bojazan	ljudi	-	taj	strah	je	opravdan.’	
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‘There is some truth in the fact that someone wants to bring in foreign 
residents to Islamise Bosnia and Herzegovina, although not in such 
numbers, nor will anyone permit it. In the vicinity of Sarajevo the 
construction of settlements is being prepared for about 20,000 people 
who are originally from Kuwait and those countries, and it is much less 
than the figure mentioned by Mr. Dodik. We should be an open country, 
but also need to implement the laws,’ said Radoncic117, (Ibid.). 
  
These public figures are opening declaring that the public should be afraid of the influx 
of Arab residents into BiH, and that this fear is ‘justified’. They are coming to ‘Islamise’ 
the country, and they need to be sanctioned by law to protect the vulnerable citizens of 
the country from ‘terrorism’. While the ideal of being an open country is noted, (‘We 
should be an open country’), Arabophobia is subsequently justified by the need for rule 
of law.  
 Such commentary by political leaders about the incoming Arab residents 
perpetuates and incites Arabophobia in the general population. The discourse presents 
Arabs as a threat to security and should be sanctioned from buying property. With this 
focus on Arabs, it is implied that foreigners from ‘western’ countries in North America 
and Europe would not be a threat to security and would not need to be sanctioned by 
law from buying property in BiH. Dodik, Radončić and other politicians effectively place 
Arab residents in opposition to Bosnians and position Sarajevan identity away from the 
Middle East and GCC countries. Thus exclusive settlements like Poljine Hills and Buroj 
Ozone, which cater to the Arab market, become havens for fundamentalism and 
extremism, something that the Ministry of Security needs to seriously address.  
Unlike the focus on security shown in the previous articles, the Arab ‘other’ is 
also constructed in terms of cultural differences that do not conform to Bosnian 
standards of behaviour. On the internet news portal DEPO.ba, one ‘anonymous 
frustrated Sarajevan’118 wrote an editorial that was published on the 17 August 2015 																																																													117	‘Ima	istine	u	tome	da	neko	želi	da	dovođenjem	stranog	stanovništva	islamizira	BiH,	mada	ne	u	tolikom	broju,	niti	će	to	iko	dozvoliti.	U	okolini	Sarajeva	se	priprema	gradnja	naselja	za	oko	20,000	ljudi	koji	su	porijeklom	iz	Kuvajta	ili	tih	zemalja,	i	to	je	mnogo	manje	od	cifre	koju	je	spomenuo	gospodin	Dodik.	Mi	treba	da	budemo	otvorena	zemlja,	ali	također	treba	da	provodimo	zakone",	ističe	Radončić.’					118	‘Anonimni	isfrustrirani	Sarajlija’	
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(again, in the middle of negotiations between the municipality of Trnovo and Buroj 
Property Development) which was titled, ‘Letter of an anonymous frustrated Sarajevan: 
carpet spread out in the middle [of everything], lunch cooking, and when in the 
toilets…’119 (‘Pismo anonimnog isfrustriranog Sarajlije’, 2015). The title itself hints at the 
perceived ill-mannered nature of the new tourists; they take more than their share of 
space, impose the smell of their lunch on the public, and apparently have poor 
manners in the toilet. The editorial is accompanied by photos of women in niqabs and 
their families having picnics in grassy areas (Figure 18).  
Figure 18: Photo of family having picnic from DEPO.ba. ‘Pismo anonimnog isfrustriranog Sarajlije: Prostrla ćilim nasred, 
kuha ručak, a kod WC-a….’, 18.08.2015. http://tip.ba/2015/08/18/kako-gradani-dozivljavaju-novopridosle-turiste-
prostrla-cilim-nasred-kuha-rucak-a-kod-wc-a/ 
 
The article begins by explaining the recent high numbers of Arab tourists in Sarajevo 
and that Sarajevans are trying to be ‘tolerant and good hosts’120 and trying to 
understand the sometimes ‘abnormal behaviour of their guests’. Already, the 
relationship between Sarajevans and Arabs is being constructed; Bosnians are the 
‘tolerant and good hosts’ and Arabs are the ill-mannered ‘guests’. While the editorial is 
																																																													119	‘Pismo	anonimnog	isfrustriranog	Sarajlije:Prostrla	ćilim	nasred,	kuha	ručak,	a	kod	WC-a…’	120	‘tolerantni	i	dobri	domaćini’	
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too long to copy here in its entirety, it characterising Arab tourists and visitors as 
something entirely other and ill-mannered. The letter begins by saying: 
In recent days, I could not help but notice just how many foreign citizens 
there are in our country. Nothing bad, right? However, citizens of Middle 
Eastern and North African countries occupied my attention, mainly those 
who respect the so-called shari’ah law and the like. They have became 
of interest to all citizens but mostly in a not so pleasant way.121 
  
The letter constructs the difference between the Arab ‘other’ and Bosnians by 
contrasting ‘just how many foreign citizens there are in our country’ [emphasis added]. 
Not only is there a direct distinction between ‘us’ versus the Arab ‘other’, but also the 
author of the editorial indicates that there is a very large number of these people, 
hinting at an ‘influx’, as some have stated. This difference is also highlighted by ‘those 
who respect the so-called shari’ah law and the like.’ All practicing Muslims follow 
shari’ah law; it is simply Muslim law and not something as sinister as it has been 
described in the media. However, its usage to denote an oppressive system that spurs 
hatred has been the norm in most countries where Muslims are not in the majority. It is 
used in this context as well to construct difference and fear of the Arab ‘other’. The 
author continues: 
In fact, I was witness to how, in one of the only open shopping 
centres...the same so-called ‘tourists’ (let's call them so, although their 
tendencies in this city and the country seem to be very, very different) 
demolished sanitary facilities, did not respect the basic norms (throwing 
garbage wherever they can), norms of behavior at the table or walking in 
public buildings and areas, order in markets etc. [sic].122 (Ibid.).  
  
The letter goes on with a list of grievances that the author has against the apparent bad 
behaviour of Arab tourists in the Sarajevo. By calling them ‘so-called “tourists”’, she 
questions their motives in the country, implying that they have an agenda to stay on a 
long-term basis, and on top of that, they are upsetting the social norms of Bosnian 																																																													121		‘Posljednjih	dana	nisam	mogao,	a	da	ne	primijetim	koliko	je	samo	stranih	državljana	u	našoj	zemlji.	Ništa	loše,	zar	ne?	Međutim,	moju	pažnju	zaokupili	su	državljani	bliskoistočnih	i	država	sjevera	Afrike,	uglavnom	oni	koji	poštuju	tzv.	šerijatski	zakon	i	sl.	Postali	su	interesantni	svim	građanima	ali	većinom	na	ne	tako	ugodan	način.’	122	‘Naime,	bio	sam	svjedok	kako	u	jednom	tek	otvorenom	tržnom	centru...,	isti	ti	“turisti”	(nazovimo	ih	tako,	mada	su	njihove	tendencije	u	ovom	gradu	i	državi,	čini	se,	mnogo	mnogo	drugačije)	demoliraju	sanitarne	prostorije,	ne	poštuju	osnovne	norme	(bacanje	smeća	gdje	stignu),	norme	ponašanja	za	stolom	ili	hodanja	po	javnim	objektima	i	površinama,	reda	u	marketima	itd.’	
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society by throw rubbish wherever they please and committing other acts against 
Sarajevan values, such as cooking lunch in parks and leaving marks in the grass from 
where they sat on carpets (Ibid.). There is a clear separation between the ‘good hosts’, 
the Sarajevans, who are characterised in opposition to the Arabs as being well-
behaved in public spaces and more orderly, and Arab residents and tourists, who are 
portrayed as chaotic, ill-behaved and plotting to buy property in BiH.  
 The articles examined in this section form a tapestry of the public construction 
of the Arab ‘other’ in Sarajevo. I have tried to draw from a cross section of Bosnian 
media to show how these differences are being created in the public imaginary. The 
narratives follow themes such as exclusion, corruption, security risks and the bad 
behaviour of new coming Arab tourists, all of which add to the public debates 
surrounding new residential projects such as Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone that target 
Arab buyers and tourists. Furthermore, they position Sarajevan identity in opposition to 
these attributes, especially along the imaginary binaries upon which Sarajevans are 
locating their identity.  
 
7.3 ‘I Feel Like An Alien’: Perceptions of Cultural Colonisation in Interview, Field 
Interview and Survey Data 
7.3.1 Interviews 
In addition to the media data that shows the construction of the Arab ‘other’, my 
interview data also contains elements of these narratives. However, as mentioned 
above, self-censorship in interviews is common, especially when discussing 
controversial topics. Despite this, two of my interview subjects both working in the 
urban development sector in the city discussed the incoming flows of Arab and Middle 
Eastern residents. In these interviews, I have analysed the discussion in terms of 
residential spaces and the idea of neighbourly sentiments and ‘multiculturalism’, even 
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though the interviews below strayed from a conversation focused on the case studies. 
One female architecture student at the faculty of architecture explained that: 
You know how we have majorities and minorities in population? I believe 
that the Turkish population in Bosnia and Herzegovina can soon apply 
as a minority here. I think that they’re going to be able to do that 
because there’s a lot of Turkish citizens here, a lot of Turkish students. I 
guess basically a lot of students from the Middle East which is not 
something I mind because it happens everywhere, but I think 
that…Angela Merkel actually said something like this a while back… 
The thing is I think that Germany is one of the biggest melting pots in 
Europe – a lot, a lot of different nationalities live there. And I think that 
she said something along the lines of ‘we don’t actually live together, we 
live next to each other’ – and she was completely right!... I don’t expect 
people to accept my culture, but I think that they are supposed to 
respect it in a way. You know, you should obviously keep yours, I’m not 
asking for anyone to become Bosnian, but you shouldn’t have to change 
mine in order to accommodate yours. You know, these things should co-
exist. Obviously I don’t know how that’s going to work here, but we’ll 
see. Time will tell I guess.123 
  
Although she began by stating that there is a lack of integration of people from the 
Middle East (‘we don’t actually live together, we live next to each other’), she then 
implied that there was an expectation for Bosnians to change their culture with the 
growing flows of people arriving from the Middle East (‘I don’t expect people to accept 
my culture, but I think that they are supposed to respect it in a way. You know, you 
should obviously keep yours, I’m not asking for anyone to become Bosnian, but you 
shouldn’t have to change mine in order to accommodate yours.’). By saying that she 
should not have to change her culture in order to accommodate people from the Middle 
East, there is an implication that the growing flows of people from the Middle East are 
not only excluding local residents from residential complexes, but they are also forcing 
Bosnian citizens to conform to their way of life. She implies that there is a form of 
cultural colonisation occurring, and she is characterising new residents from the Middle 
East as a domineering presence in the city. It can be read as resentment at having to 
change her culture in order to ‘accommodate’ the culture of the new residents in the 
city, implying perhaps a stricter observance of Islamic regulations, including dress.  																																																													123	In	conversation	with	a	mid-20,	female	architecture	student	at	the	Faculty	of	Architecture	in	Sarajevo.	
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 In one of my interviews with local architects, one young, female architect from 
Sarajevo made similar comments. She explained to me: 
When I go to the mountains, for example, during the winter, I see a lot of 
weird people. I don’t know… it’s like… I don’t have anything against their 
nature of dressing, of living, but there are too many of them. It’s like they 
are taking over. A lot of people are. That’s how I feel… I know my 
friends… I’m saying that the mountain was the good example because I 
saw them, and it was very weird. There’s too many of them so suddenly. 
So suddenly... I’m just afraid…I’m just afraid that we’re wondering – or 
not wondering – when is it going to stop? Or is it going to stop? What if 
they buy everything? Ok, then, when they buy everything and they come 
here to live, so it’s becoming a problem. They’re changing the mentality, 
they’re changing the appearance, the environment, and most of… I 
mean, I’m thinking about it, I don't want to live here like that. I don’t 
know, maybe I’m sounding too national, but it’s just somehow I didn’t 
imagine my environment like that. It’s my country, it’s my place of living. 
What happens if they come? They can change. It’s like I’m talking about 
aliens…But I feel like an alien, really, I feel like an alien now.124  
  
She states explicitly that she feels like a takeover is occurring, and that this takeover is 
through a change in mentality, appearance and environment along with Arabs buying 
‘everything’. She feels that Bosnians are losing the actual territory of their country 
through real estate sales and tourist villages, but importantly, there is the perception 
that they are losing their local identity by being absorbed or changed in terms of 
mentality and appearance. It is as if an acceptance of the global flows of capital and 
the people and ideas that they bring is a negation of Bosnian tradition, including naš 
Islam (explained further in the previous chapter). This architect constructs the Arab 
‘other’ as a strange, colonising presence in the city. She uses words such as ‘weird 
people’ to describe them, but she also states that she now feels like an ‘alien’ in her 
own city, further separating Sarajevans from new Arab tourists and residents in the city. 
The following phrase from the interview, specifically, demonstrates how Sarajevans are 
constructing the Arab ‘other’ in terms of neighbourly sentiments, ‘I didn’t imagine my 
environment like that. It’s my country, it’s my place of living. What happens if they 
come? They can change. It’s like I’m talking about aliens…But I feel like an alien, 																																																													124	In	conversation	with	a	young,	female	architect	in	Sarajevo,	identity	kept	anonymous.		
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really, I feel like an alien now [emphasis added].’ She characterises the introduction of 
new Arab residents into Sarajevo’s domestic sphere as a perceived invasion of an alien 
species, something that will take away her values and way of life, her country, her 
place of living. In doing this, she believes she will become an outsider – an alien – in 
Sarajevo. These global flows of people into the residential spaces of Sarajevo can thus 
be seen as threatening to the local population who fears losing local tradition and way 
of life to a transnational force.  
 
7.3.2 Field Interviews and Survey Data 
To supplement my interview data, I performed field interviews in which I 
approached Sarajevans on the street and in shopping centres and discussed urban 
phenomena in the city. These discussions often provided data on the phenomenon of 
Arab residents and tourists in the city. During one of these field interviews, I spoke to a 
young woman working in one of the shops of the BBI shopping centre. Describing her 
feelings regarding new flows of people and capital into the city, she said: 
Sometimes, frankly tell you, when I walk down the street, I feel that I am 
in Dubai. So really ... I have really nothing against anybody, you 
understand, but somehow you no longer have the feeling that you are in 
Sarajevo. Wherever you go, from Ilidža down, it's, I mean, everyone is 
covered, everyone has a beard, everyone is some kind of sheik, I think 
really what ... Yes indeed, there is enough of that... And especially I hear 
that there will be even more of that.125 
  
This interviewee expresses exclusion and cultural colonisation. Here Sarajevo has 
become a little Dubai, and she no longer has ‘the feeling that you are in Sarajevo’, and 
what creates this feeling for her are the visible signs of Islamic dress (‘everyone is 
covered, everyone has a beard’). For this Sarajevan, it is not just the buying of property 
by Arabs, but it is also the changing mentality, where Sarajevans are taking on the 
characteristics of the newcomers, the markers of transnational Islam. In contrast, the 																																																													125	‘Nekad,	iskreno	vam	kažem,	kad	hodam	ulicom,	imam	osjećaj	da	sam	u	Dubaiju.	Znači	stvarno…	Nemam	stvarno	ništa	protiv	nikoga,	razumijete,	ali	nekako	nemaš	više	taj	osjećaj	da	si	ti	u	Sarajevu.	Gdje	god	odeš,	na	Ilidžu	dole,	to	je	znači,	sve	su	pokrivene,	sve	su	brade,	sve	šeikovi	neki,	mislim	stvarno	ono…	Jest	stvarno,	ima	dosta	toga…	A	pogotov	kako	čujem	da	će	još	više	toga.’	
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local identity is perceived to be in crisis and attacked by forces coming specifically from 
GCC countries and other areas of the Middle East. Another female field interview 
respondent working in BBI expressed the same fear of the consequences of this 
cultural exchange on the identity of Bosnians: 
The biggest problem is that foreigners are buying land in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, specifically Arabs, and it is now very trendy to sell land to 
these foreigners, especially Arabs. And now, these same people also 
bring a part of that culture, which is normal for us, [but] totally different 
from our culture, and I hope that it will not have any consequences on 
the life of Bošnjaks and Bosnians in this country.126 
  
According to this interviewee, it is ‘very trendy’ to sell property to Arab buyers. She 
implies that there is a large demand for property, and also possibly that Bosnians can 
sell their land at a higher price due to the real or perceived wealth of the buyers. 
However, she explains that this trend is problematic due to the cultural exchange taking 
place. By stating that she hopes there will not be any consequences on the life of 
Bosnians, the implication is that the local identity and its traditions are being 
threatened.  
 During my field interviews in the Alipašino Polje area of the city, which is near 
Ilidža, the more Arabicised part of the city, my interview respondents shared similar 
sentiments about the new residential complexes. When asked about exclusive 
residential complexes and cultural exchanges in the city, one man working as a waiter 
replied: 
Like Poljine Hills...Here above [pointing to the hills above Sarajevo and 
referring to residential complexes] what the Arabs opened. I do not like it 
at all. Many settled here in Sarajevo. What will be? How will it be? Ask 
God...I have no idea, but I do not like it. That their settlements will be up 
there and that. I say to you again, I'm a Muslim, but what they're making 
up there and what they’re doing, I just heard that a huge settlement of 
theirs will be up there, and I do not like it at all. What will be, how will it 
be, I do not know, to tell you the truth ... I tell you, I work, but for around 
four months I haven’t had my salary...And those that come from there, 
all the Arabs, and all Arabs come here to buy real estate and land that 																																																													126	‘Najveći	problem	je	što	stranci	kupuju	zemljište	u	Bosni	i	Hercegovini,	da	kažem	Arapi	i	što	je	sad	veoma	aktuelno	da	se	prodaje	zemljište	stranim	tim	državljanima,	odnosno	Arapima.	E,	sad,	samim	tim	i	donose	jednim	dijelom	tu	kulturu	koja	je	za	nas	normalno,	skroz	drugačija	od	naše	kulture	i	nadam	se	da	to	neće	imati	nekih	posljedica	na	život	Bošnjaka	i	Bosanaca	i	Hercegovaca	u	ovoj	državi.’	
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they buy in the area, which is cheap for them, and they make their 
settlements. I do not like it at all. What will be, how will it be ... I do not 
know... Here, watch here where I work in the hotel, they bring their 
culture, they do not take our culture at all. They cultivate their own. They 
do not take our culture at all, you understand. I work in the hotel down 
there, and with us these purchases are very much carried out, and they 
come and buy, and everything around up there that they buy, everything 
is around 12 KM for an acre of land. No, I don’t know how it goes, 
square metre, or what do I know? Everything around up there that they 
buy is cheap. And right here, they will move all that is theirs [svoje] here 
that comes from there. They will move their people and they will take 
their culture here. They do not take anything from our culture [naše]. I’ve 
done a lot with them, and they do not respect us [oni nas ne fermaju] 
even one percent.127 
  
The construction of the divide between the Bosnian ‘us’ versus the Arab ‘them’ is quite 
pronounced in this quote. For example, he stresses that he is a Muslim, but ‘what 
they're making up there and what they’re doing, I just heard that a huge settlement of 
theirs will be up there, and I do not like it at all [emphasis added].’ He uses the same 
repetition of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ when he discusses culture, ‘they bring their culture, they 
do not take our culture at all. They cultivate their own. They do not take our culture at 
all… they will move all that is theirs here that comes from there. They will move their 
people and they will take their culture here. They do not take anything from our 
culture...they do not respect us even one percent [emphasis added].’ He perceives a 
deep divide between Bosnian culture (and to Bosnian identity) and that of Arab 
residents, a divide that does not seem to be bridgeable, and he fears the ‘cultivation’ 
[gajiti] of Arab culture in BiH due to this divide and perceived lack of respect on the 
Arab residents’ part. His almost poetic repetition of ‘what will be, how will it be, I do not 
know’ [šta će biti, kako će biti, ne znam] suggests a real fear for the future of his 
understanding of Bosnian culture and lifestyle. There is an ominous undertone to what 																																																													127	‘Kao	Poljine	Hills...Tu	gore	ono	što	Arapi	otvaraju.	Da	mi	se	nimalo	ne	sviđa.	Puno	se	naseljavaju	ovdje	u	Sarajevu.	Šta	će	bit’,	kako	će	bit’,	pitaj	boga...nemam	pojma,	ali	ne	sviđa	mi	se	to.	Da	će	biti	to	gore	njihovo	naselje	i	to.	Ja	vam	opet	kažem,	musliman	sam,	ali	šta	oni	gore	to	prave	i	šte	rade,	samo	sam	čuo	da	je	ogromno	naselje,	to	njihovo	da	će	biti	gore	i	to	mi	se	ne	sviđa	nikako.	Šta	će	biti,	kako	će	biti,	ne	znam,	da	vam	pravo	kažem…Sad	vam	kažem,	radim,	a	po	četiri	mjeseca	namam	platu...A	ovi	što	dolaze	od	tamo,	sve	Arapi	dolaze	i	sve	Arapi	kupuju	ovdje	nekretnine	i	zemlju	što	kupuju	okolo,	što	im	je	jeftino	i	prave	svoja	naselja.	To	mi	se	ne	sviđa	nikako.	Šta	će	biti,	kako	će	biti…	ja	ne	znam….Evo	gledam	ovdje	gdje	ja	radim	u	hotelu,	oni	donose	svoju	kulturu,	oni	našu	kulturu	ne	uzimaju	nikako.	Oni	gaje	svoje	to.	Oni	nikakvu	našu	kulturu	ne	uzimaju	tu,	razumijete.	Ja	radim	u	hotelu	dole	i	kod	nas	se	baš	vrše	ti	kupoprodajni,	i	što	dolaze	i	kupuju,	a	sve	okolo	gore	što	kupuju,	to	sve	po	12	maraka	dulum	zemlje.	Onaj,	ne.	Ne	znam	kako	to	ide,	kvadrat	ili	šta	ja	znam.	Sve	okolo	gore	je	to	jeftino	što	oni	kupuju.	I	prave	tu	i	uselit	će	svoje	tu	što	dolaze	od	tamo.	Uselit		će	svoje	ljude	i	oni	uzimaju	svoju	kulturu	ovdje.	Oni	naše	ništa	ne	uzimaju.	Jas	am	puno	sa	njima	i	oni	nas	ne	fermaju	ni	jedan	posto.’		
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he says, and he compares his own situation, (that he has not even received pay in four 
months), to how cheap and easy it is for new Arab residents to buy land. Thus there is 
an implied exclusion of local residents in terms of culture and access to the property 
market, and he expresses this in terms of ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, completing the othering 
and exclusion between new Arab residents and BiH citizens.  
 Another field interview respondent from the Alipašino Polje area of the city 
expressed related sentiments regarding residential complexes in and around Sarajevo. 
A retired, ethnically Croat, civil engineer, he stated, ‘now this has begun in the 
settlements of Ilidža and Hadžići that they are making buildings for these foreign 
citizens, so that I do not know how it will end. For the multi-ethnic city that it once was, 
it won’t be any more, not in this case, it isn’t even now, but it will be the worst thing [ali 
će biti najgora stvar].’ While he lacks details about the problems that will make this ‘the 
worst thing’, he suggests that it has to do with the fact that the city will no longer be 
‘multi-ethnic’. He, thus, sees what is ‘multiethnic’ as mostly pertaining to religious 
diversity, which was explored previously in the chapter on the ‘Islamic Shift’ in 
Sarajevo. Certainly a more heterogeneous population including Arabs, or ‘foreign 
citizens’ as he says, along with the Bosnian citizens would increase the level of 
multiethnicity, but in Sarajevo, ‘multiculturalism’, ‘multiethnicity’ and pluralism are seen 
in terms of religion. Since the newcomers are religiously Muslim, he hints that the 
‘worst thing’ will be the Islamisation of the city, especially if the population of Salafis 
grows.  
 Sentiments hinting at the Islamisation of the city through the coming populations 
of Arabs buying real estate also arose in my survey data. One respondent, a male 
lawyer, ‘I heard that where Arabs buy property, people look more like they are on their 
way to mosque’, touching on the visual markers that define the Bosnian ‘us’ from the 
Arab ‘them’. However, the undertone is that Islamic dress and visual markers spread to 
the rest of the population when Arabs arrive in the community. Another respondent, a 
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female student, hinted that, ‘with the arrival of new residents in larger groups, new 
standards are also coming (for example Ilidža)’. These ‘new standards’ could 
conceivably be anything, but because she chose to highlight Ilidža as an example, it 
suggests that these new standards relate to Salafism and especially stricter Islamic 
dress codes (niqabs, beards, abayas, etc.). As the previous respondent illustrated, 
people that, ‘look more like they are on their way to mosque.’ Again, this can be read 
as a fear of the changing nature of Bosnian culture and traditions in the face of 
incoming flows of people and ideas from the Middle East, something that many 
Sarajevans see as a threat to their identity and values.  
 This threat to Sarajevan identity and values is often directly paired with 
perceived increases in Islamic dress, as one survey respondent demonstrated. A 
female clerk explained that, ‘Sarajevo is an Olympic, multicultural city, and it should 
remain that way. I don’t want some veiled ninja to condemn me because of the way I 
dress when it’s over 40 degrees in the city where I was born.’ She stresses here the 
international renown of Sarajevo (that it is Olympic) and its ‘multicultural’ identity, 
implying that an increase in the presence of ‘veiled ninjas’, or women wearing niqabs, 
would cause the city’s Olympic and ‘multicultural’ nature to disappear. This places the 
idea of ‘multiculturalism’ itself as the focal point; why would an increase in ethnic 
diversity in Sarajevo cause the city to become less ‘multicultural’? As explained 
previously, Sarajevan ‘multiculturalism’ is based on religious identification, and with the 
influx of people from the Middle East, the proportion of the population identifying as 
Muslim and being visibly Muslim in public increases. More importantly, however, she 
uses ‘multiculturalism’ here as a discursive tool to position Sarajevan identity in 
opposition to Arab tourists and residents, instead of using it conceptually as a notion in 
and of itself.  
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7.4 ‘Tolerating Uncultured Tourists’: Arabophobia and the Arab ‘Other’ in Online 
Commentary 
 
7.4.1 Article Comments 
In order to supplement my media, interview, field interview and survey data, I 
have also analysed online comments that appeared next to articles and on the forums 
Klix.ba and Skyscrapercity.com. These sources offer a response to the possible self-
censorship of interviewees, as the anonymity of online environments allows for 
commenters to be more candid. For the article ‘United Bosnian Emirates’ discussed 
above, one online comment reveals some of the feelings of BiH citizens towards Buroj 
Ozone. On 8 October 2015 the reader with the username ‘sar-bos’ observed that, 
‘some of our citizens are following what the presidents [mayors] of the municipalities 
are doing in Ilidža, Hadžići, or what greater misery still awaits us in Trnovo [where 
Buroj Ozone will be located]. Will our children be a minority here too. [sic] We have to 
have public opinion. Good luck to us all!’128 This commenter describes the development 
of Buroj Ozone as a ‘misery’, something that could potentially lead to Bosnians 
becoming a minority in their country. He attributes the project (and other similar 
projects) to the mayors of the municipalities, suggesting that there is no public 
consensus or agreement to the projects (‘We have to have public opinion’) and that 
these mayors have an agenda that they are fulfilling. 
 While this comment focuses on ideas of exclusion, possible political agendas 
and fears for the future, other comments focus on Arab residents and tourists as 
potential neighbours and additions to Sarajevo’s urban community. In May, 2015 in the 
middle of negotiations between the municipality of Trnovo and Buroj Property 
Development, Klix.ba published an article titled, ‘Everything about Arab tourists in BiH: 
																																																													128	‘Neka	nasi	gradjani	dobro	prate	sta	rade	predsjednici	opstina	Ilidza,Hadzici	ili	jos	nas	ceka	veci	jad	od	Trnova.	Hoce	li	nasa	djeca	i	ovdje	biti	manjina.	Moramo	imati	javno	misljenje.	Sretno	nam	bilo	!’	[sic].	
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why they come, what they visit, how much they spend,’129 (N.N., 2015). The article itself 
is reasonably well balanced and even says in the first paragraph, ‘Those who are 
familiar with the "business with Arabs" say that they are some of the most rewarding 
guests,’130 (Ibid.). However, in the comments section of this article, the greater 
Sarajevo community discusses other views of the phenomenon, and the anonymity of 
the internet allows for the unveiling of deeper, hidden sentiments.  
 To illustrate this, one anonymous male user with the username back2track 
states, ‘does anyone want to mention that an important factor is also sex tourism?’131 
During my fieldwork, I came upon this idea more than once while I was discussing Arab 
investment with people in Sarajevo. Some mentioned that Arab men come to Bosnia to 
search for a wife or to enjoy the local women more generally during their visit. Balkan 
Insight also wrote an article about Arab men marrying Bosnian women titled ‘Arabs 
Marry Bosnian Women to Establish Parallel Families’ (Sorguc, 2016), which explains 
that these Bosnian women are usually second or third wives and that there is: 
a new trend in which Bosnian women, usually with the consent of 
fathers or brothers, marry businessmen from Arab countries who are 
increasingly coming to Bosnia, either for business or for holidays which 
they spend in apartments or houses they rent or buy here… Bosnian 
brides usually remain living in the country and are waiting for their 
husbands to visit them. (Ibid.).  
 
Using the phrase ‘sex tourism’ to describe this phenomenon constructs the Arab ‘other’ 
in a deeply negative way, suggesting a similarity to other ‘sex tourists’ around the world 
who might seek out prostitutes. This commentary flips the morality on its head; instead 
of Arabs influencing stricter observance of Islamic practice in BiH, commenters are 
painting them as immoral, bringing a demand for sex tourism to a poor country where 
over 40% of the young population is officially unemployed.  
																																																													129	‘Sve	o	arapskim	turistima	u	BiH:	Zašto	dolaze,	šta	posjećuju,	koliko	troše’	130	‘oni	koji	su	upućeni	u	"biznis	s	Arapima"	kažu	da	su	to	jedni	od	najzahvalnijih	gostiju.’	131	‘A	hoće	li	neko	spomenuti	da	je	bitan	faktor	i	sex	turizam?’	
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 In response to back2track, another male commenter on this article with the 
username Miralem Šečić similarly uses immorality to characterise Arab tourists. He 
says, ‘Yes, they spend, and also they kill themselves with alcohol like they have a free 
pass [kao s lanca pušteni, literally as if released from chains] and offer girls 50-60 
euros for a blowjob and the like.’132 He constructs the Arab ‘other’ coming to Sarajevo 
as someone being ‘released from chains’ who falls into alcohol consumption and 
solicited sex, both of which are haram or forbidden in Islam. There is a contradiction 
between the various characterizations of Arabs in the data: they are both making 
Sarajevo more Islamic, and they are bearers of immorality and consumers of ‘sex 
tourism’.  
 Apart from direct accusations of sex tourism, the article attracted other 
comments of a more general variety. One female reader with the name ‘evet’ 
commented that, ‘To them 300KM is what 3KM is to us. I don’t like those who are rich 
by accident...Ok, you have money because back home you have oil, but to me, you’re 
still a Gypsy only that you bathe more often.’133 The Bosnian word cigan or Gypsy 
denotes people of Roma origin, and it can be used colloquially to indicate someone 
who is not cultured or educated. The commenter then portrays Arabs as people who 
are uneducated or uncultured and who are ‘rich by accident’, who do not have the skill 
to become rich any other way. It underlines their perceived inferiority in terms of 
education and culture, despite their wealth. 
 These sentiments directed towards Arab residents and tourists appear in other 
comment sections as well. Around the time that the contract was signed between the 
municipality of Trnovo and Buroj Property Development for Buroj Ozone, Klix.ba ran an 
article titled, ‘Tourist town at the foot of Bjelasnica and Treskavica: initial investment of 
one billion euros,’ (Klix.ba, 2015). Comments on this article echo the Arabophobia 																																																													132	‘Da,	troše	a	također	i	ubijaju	se	alkoholom	kao	s	lanca	pušteni	i	nude	curicama	po	50-60	eura	za	pušenje	i	sl.’	133	‘Njima	je	300KM	ko	nama	3KM.	Ne	volim	ove	što	su	igrom	slučaja	bogati...Ok,	imaš	para	jer		u	dvorištu	imaš	nafte,	ali	meni	si	i	dalje	cigan	samo	što	se	češće	kupaš.’	
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described above. The reader ‘Rudar iz oza’, who writes using the Serbian variant of the 
language, stated: 
The building of thousands of housing units, hotels, the largest shopping 
center in BiH, sports and recreational and cultural facilities for the 
world's elite is anticipated. ????.... but who will come here? Who needs 
this? What does the state really get out of this? What do WE get out of 
this frankly except that we will have to look at all these STRANGE 
people as they move on our roads and we must ignore them as if they 
were air because we can’t start anything with them... We are left only to 
wonder how strange and ugly ... am I wrong ... ??? [sic].134 
  
Mixed with disbelief that Buroj Ozone is even real, he uses the incredulous feelings 
towards the project to propel the discussion of Arab visitors, who he describes as 
strange and ugly. He makes the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ very clear by 
capitalising ‘WE’ and the adjective for the Arabs, ‘STRANGE’. Repeating the word 
‘strange’ to qualify Arab visitors can be read as a way for the commentor to set up a 
barrier between the Arabs and ‘us’, othering them and positioning Sarajevan identity 
opposite the ‘strange’ Arabs.  
 
7.4.2 Comments on Internet Forums 
Constructions of the Arab ‘other’ that focus on behaviour and culture are more 
abundant in online forums, including the architectural forum SkyscraperCity.com and 
the Klix.ba forums. These venues allow for in depth discussions of issues, while also 
maintaining relative anonymity of the users. This anonymity can be beneficial for 
uncovering true sentiments, but it can also engender ‘trolling’, or saying radical or 
nonsensical things in order to provoke reactions. As stated above, I have tried to 
eliminate all instances that could be deemed trolling in this data by analysing the 
context of the comments and any reactions to them. While comments on articles have 
less of a conversational tone to them (they sometimes, but not always, respond to each 
																																																													134	‘Predviđena	je	izgradnja	na	hiljade	luksuznih	stambenih	jedinica,	hotela,	najvećeg	trgovačkog	centra	u	BiH,	sportsko-rekreacionih	i	kulturnih	sadržaja	za	svjetsku	elitu.	????....pa	ko	ce	ovde	dolaziti	?	Kome	ovo	treba	?	Sta	drzava	ima	od	ovoga	realno	?	Sta	MI	imamo	od	ovoga	iskreno	osim	da	ce	mo	morati	gledati	sve	ove	CUDNE	ljude	kako	se	krecu	nasim	putevima	a	mi	ih	moramo	ignorirati	kao	da	su	zrak	jer	s	njima	ne	mozemo	nista	zapoceti	...	Ostaje	nam	samo	da	se	cudimo	kako	su	cudni	i	ruzni	...	ili	se	varam	...???’	[sic].	
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other), internet forums do have a conversational quality, so I have tried to explain their 
context. The following excerpts from online forums were all published online in the 
summer of 2015, in the middle of negotiations between the municipality of Trnovo and 
Buroj Property Development, as the entire city was debating the topic of Arab tourists 
at this time and Buroj Ozone. Klix.ba had an entire forum thread titled ‘Arabs in 
Sarajevo’135, which is now locked but which was open for about a year. The forum 
thread began in August, 2015, with questions surrounding the increase in Arabs 
coming to BiH at that time.  
 During a discussion about the possibilities of forbidding Arabs from immigrating 
to BiH, some commenters described those who feared Arab immigration as ‘paranoid’ 
and others responded by saying the former were ‘naive’. As a response, and perhaps 
to justify being ‘paranoid’, on 10 August 2015, the user ‘EmiRem’ expressed strong 
sentiments towards Arabs, stating that: 
I only know that those who have come have no kind of connection with 
us. Primitive, noisy, walking barefoot around hotels, arrogantly behave 
as if they came from the jungle, doing this and we are on all the black 
lists in the world… I’m Bošnjak, but I do not want to be put in any kind of 
context with these uneducated savages and primitives. We are 
Europeans, we look so regardless of our crazy mentality.136 
  
This commenter constructs The Arab ‘other’ as: ‘primitive, noisy, walking barefoot’, 
arrogant, ‘came from the jungle’, ‘uneducated savages and primitives’. It is a caricature 
of the uneducated and uncultured. Significantly, this view of the Arab tourists and 
newcomers shows that the positioning of Sarajevan identity as European is meaningful 
in the eyes of many Sarajevans and that, conversely, the Arabs that they are identifying 




 While the Klix.ba forum does not necessarily concentrate on any one theme, 
Skyscrapercity.com is a forum that is more focused on discussions about the urban 
environment. However, this does not mean that it is free from Arabophobia. In the 
forum thread ‘Other city discussions,’ new Arab investments including Buroj Ozone and 
Poljine Hills have been debated, and this has led to expressions of Arabophobia. After 
the conversation began about Arab behaviour in public and the ‘invasion of the 
Arabs’137, the user ‘atlantis’ on 10 August 2015 replied: ‘This is the fucking dilemma. On 
one side we have the "uncultured" tourists, and on the other the need to profit from 
tourism. The question is can we ourselves at the moment afford to be choosy? There 
must be a compromise between these two fires.’138 He reduces Arabs tourists to their 
perceived wealth, rich foreigners whose bad behaviours and uncultured ways need to 
be ‘tolerated’ in order to profit from them. Further on in the discussion on the 12 August 
2015 ‘dragikom’ responded: 
This is an online forum, which means that each "contribution" is subject 
to dissection. The argument is that we need to endure the rude tourists 
because they leave a lot of money. However, there is no data (and 
statistics are most relevant here) to support the claim that these rude 
tourists leave a lot of money, but the question leads itself the original 
statement that we need to tolerate them.139 
  
Dragikom’s suggestion is that, since he believes there is no statistical evidence that 
Arabs bring in a lot of money, then there is no need to actually ‘tolerate’ them. The 
word ‘tolerate’ itself is full of meaning, implying that they are a nuisance that must be 
endured. The examples of overt racism and Arabophobia on the internet in the form of 





7.5 ‘Cosmopolitan Values’: the Other Side of the Debate 
The public debate, however, does have two sides, and these sides are 
expressed online as well as in my interview and survey data. For example, in response 
to the Arabophobic comments in the SkyscraperCity.com forum thread discussed 
above, on 12 August 2015, the user ‘sarma’ asserted: 
We simply have no tolerance for anyone, but especially for those from 
the East. We overestimate ourselves and underestimate others, a 
typical example of the closed environment without a shred of 
cosmopolitan values. If you're open, you're open to everyone, be it 
Chinese, Arabs, Yankee or black. Nobody's forcing you love them, but 
show them a minimum of respect and provide a service for which they 
will return next year and again leave their money in your country. Of 
course, all the while respecting the laws here. When they do not respect 
the laws, express deportation. So it is not necessary in all of this to lose 
your spine, but we need to adapt a little.140 
  
Although many of the underlying prejudices are still present here (Arabs are good for 
leaving money in the country) and although the commenter still positions Sarajevan 
identity to the ‘West’ in opposition to people from the ‘East’, it is clear that there are 
people in Sarajevo who are opening their minds to ‘cosmopolitan values’, perceived as 
different from Sarajevan ‘multiculturalism’ as it does not focus on religious affiliation but 
rather sees greater diversity (‘Chinese, Arabs, Yankee or black’). Likewise, field 
interview respondents shared feelings that aligned more closely with this open-minded 
approach. One woman, a merchant explained that: 
Bosnia has always been with different cultures, so that we are simply a 
people who accept all. Why not, why not? If one America has hundreds 
of nations, hundreds of different cultures, why shouldn’t we have that? It 
is true that Europe is an old continent and holds it all somehow under 




This interviewee stresses the accepting nature of Sarajevan citizens, stemming from 
the historical identity of the city. She does not see ‘multiculturalism’ as strictly religion 
based, and this allows for a broader acknowledgement of difference in the population. 
Echoing these sentiments, another field interviewee a female entrepreneur stated: 
I think that, in any case, it is not bad [the transfer of culture]. Maybe they 
bring a part of their culture, I think it is not bad, but they still accept ours 
more because they have to. I think it's normal. When we go somewhere 
we have to adjust to those where we go. So I think that they, too, when 
they come here they adapt more to us. And that they have their own 
culture, it is in any case positive. I think, from every culture we can, as a 
nation, draw and learn something positive.142 
  
Not only does she feel that visitors are, in fact, respecting the norms of Sarajevan 
society (in contrast to many comments on internet forums), but also she thinks it might 
be possible for BiH society to take something positive from their culture. This is far from 
the blatantly Arabophobic statements seen in the internet data, showing that the public 
debates surrounding the case studies and the phenomena that they are bringing into 
the city are clearly not one-sided.  
 Additionally, one of my survey respondents, a young male researcher explained 
that, ‘Wherever capital comes from so too does culture. The influence of Turkish and 
Arab culture has significantly increased, but it should not be a problem for an open 
society. Finally, culture is dynamic category, that is subject to a socio-historical 
dynamics.’ As a researcher, this respondent potentially had a better understanding of 
the dynamics of cultural than others, but his comment shows that these ideas are being 
discussed in relation to Arab tourists and residents. Although statements from 
politicians, media reports and internet comments show the fear surrounding Arab 
residents and tourists, this discourse is being actively countered. There are, however, 
fewer examples of this opposing viewpoint in the empirical data.  
																																																													142	‘Mislim	da	to	u	svakom	slučaju	nije	loše.	Možda	oni	donose	dio	kulture,	mislim	da	nije	loše,	ali	ipak	oni	više	prihvataju	našu	jer	moraju.	Mislim,	to	je	tako	normalno.	Kad	mi	negdje	dođemo	moramo	se	prilagoditi	nekome	gdje	odemo.	Tako	mislim	da	i	oni,	isto,	kad	dođu	ovdje	da	se	više	prilagođavaju	nama.	A	to	što	imaju	svoju	kulturu,	to	je	u	svakom	slučaju	pozitivno.	Mislim,	iz	svake	kulture	možemo	mi,	mi	kao	nacija,	nešto	pozitivno	izvući	i	naučiti.’	
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 From the viewpoint of the investors and real estate agents working in Sarajevo, 
they are providing a service that is increasing tourism in the city, and this increase in 
tourism directly benefits the economy. In my interview with Tarik Bilalbegović of 
Ascendant Project Finance, an investment banking firm focused on tourism and real 
estate projects in South East Europe, this increase in tourism was underscored. He 
explained that the real estate sector was bringing in tourism, which was increasing at 3-
4% annually, and that the tourists from Arab countries are coming to enjoy the beauty 
of the natural landscape.143 Similarly, when discussing the real estate sector with estate 
agents focused on the Arab market, they explained that most Arab buyers only stay in 
BiH for one or two weeks per year or up to three months maximum. According to these 
interviewees, only a small percentage stay longer (5-10%), but those who do buy a 
home in BiH often use it as a hub from which they can visit other areas of Europe 
(Switzerland and Austria, for example). Although the estate agents I spoke to were 
Arab themselves, neither stated that they had personally experienced much 
discrimination in Sarajevo, although one mentioned that there might be some jealousy 
from the local population when they see people with resources moving in.144 These 
viewpoints stress the idea that Arab visitors are simply tourists enjoying the green 
mountains and countrysides in BiH, far from cultural colonisers taking over the country.  
  
7.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter has analysed the ways in which new residential projects such as 
the case studies Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone are understood and debated in 
Sarajevo, including how Sarajevans construct the Arab ‘other’ in reference to new Arab 
residents and tourists for these complexes. Drawing upon media analysis, my fieldwork 
data (interviews, field interviews and survey responses) and an examination of online 																																																													143	In	conversation	with	Tarik	Bilalbegović	of	Ascendant	Project	Finance,	22.09.2015.	144	In	conversation	with	Arab	real	estate	agents	02.11.15.	
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comments, I have shown that the public debates are focusing on the themes of 
exclusion, cultural colonization, security and safety, and clashes of behaviours and 
values or ‘Arabophobia’.  
Residential projects in the city are forcing new conceptualisations of Sarajevo’s 
placement in the globalising world. Sarajevo’s identity is in flux, and this dynamism has 
produced a sense of insecurity in the city’s population. With the advent of residential 
projects such as Buroj Ozone and Poljine Hills that actively seek out and attract Arab 
buyers and tourists, Sarajevans have begun positioning their identity in terms of 
East/West and Global/Local as novel new cultural forms emerge. In the discussion 
above, the construction of the Arab ‘other’ in relation to the case studies positions 
Sarajevan identity toward the ‘West’ and toward the ‘Local’. Arab residents and tourists 
are characterised as being uncultured and uneducated in contrast to ‘European’ 
Sarajevans, splitting the ‘East’ and the Arab ‘other’ from the ‘West’ and the European. 
This follows the findings of ethnographic scholarship focusing on the ex-Yugoslav 
region showing how identity has been constructed within the Bosnian Muslim 
community through discourses that emphasize the ‘European’ and ‘tolerant’ nature of 
Bosnia’s Islamic tradition (Bougarel, 2007 and Helms, 2008). However, the flows of 
capital and people from Arab countries are also creating cultural colonisation and 
exclusion in the perceptions of Sarajevans; Arab residents are buying up the land and 
forcing their customs upon the local population. These global forces are in opposition to 
the city’s Bosnian population, who position Sarajevan identity toward the ‘Local’ end of 
the binary. The placement of Sarajevan identity along these binaries entrenches the 
differences between Sarajevans and the new Arab visitors and residents, obscuring the 
hybridity and novelty created by these flows.  
 Despite the fact that the new Arab visitors and residents belong to the majority 
religion in the city, these flows are nonetheless adding to growing diversity in Sarajevo. 
Such new networks of people are contributing to processes of urban change. Although 
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migrant flows that drive urban change in cities such as London, New York and Paris 
often reinforce inequality in the form of spatialised social divisions, in which there is a 
‘ghettoization and marginalization of immigrants’ (Arapoglou, 2012), in Sarajevo this 
dynamic is somewhat reversed. Tourism, in this case, is creating inequality between 
visitors and residents where one part of the city is inhabited by the wealthy and middle 
class and the other by the less fortunate (Spirou, 2011: 196). In this case, the exclusive 
communities Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone contribute to a process in which, ‘long-
established landscapes are gradually transformed by the interplay of global and local 
forces and produce a new set of urban socio-spatial inequalities’ (Arapoglou, 2012: 
232). Sarajevans perceive these networks as excluding the local population from the 
property market and enforcing their customs upon the city. Their reactions to these 
flows can be read as a rejection of what they see as cultural colonisation by Arab 
residents and a loss of civic belonging; they are resisting the new socio-spatial 
inequalities that they perceive are emerging in the city. By positioning their identity 
along the East/West and Global/Local binaries, they are attempting to halt the dynamic 
processes that are currently taking place in the city, which are creating novelty, 
hybridity and the unknown, and which they perceive may also generate 
disadvantageous development of the city for the local population.  
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8. Conclusion: Worlding Projects, Urban Problems and Identity in Crisis 
 
8.1 Interpretations and Arguments  
 The reverberations of conflict can still be felt in the city of Sarajevo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Walking along the city streets, physical manifestations of conflict still scar 
the urban landscape of the city over twenty years after the Siege. Yet the city is also 
transforming; its spaces are developing with transnational flows of capital from around 
the globe. This thesis has examined how such transnational flows of capital for urban 
development in Sarajevo have impacted the post-conflict and post-socialist city 
landscape. I have argued that the case studies analysed in this work are ‘worlding 
projects’, following the conception by Roy and Ong (2011), which are creating hybridity 
and emergent cultural forms. They are projects that are attempting to solve the urban 
‘problems’ of post-conflict and post-socialist redevelopment but that are also part of 
networks that are enacting the city into being (Farias and Bender, 2010). As ‘the urban 
and the global are constitutive of one another’ (Baker and Ruming, 2014: 63), these 
projects are pulling Sarajevo towards the global; they are enabling greater flows of 
people, ideas, cultures and capital between Sarajevo and countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, and they are bringing market capitalism 
to the post-socialist city.  
 The ‘problems’ of post-conflict and post-socialist redevelopment are embedded 
in many different developmental areas. For example, aesthetically, the city still contains 
visible scars from the conflict: bullet holes in the exterior plaster of buildings, marks 
called ‘roses’ where mortar shells hit concrete (which are often filled with red resin for 
remembrance), and abandoned spaces too dangerous to inhabit. Economically, the city 
needs redevelopment to contribute to growth and job creation, especially as 
unemployment among the youth remains a serious issue (Bičo and Bajram, 2013) and 
as the country falls well behind its neighbours (Croatia and Serbia) in terms of official 
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unemployment numbers (officially 25.4% in 2016 – CIA World Factbook, 2017). The 
case studies examined in this thesis can be seen as ‘expressions and agents of global 
urban imaginaries’ (Baker and Ruming, 2015: 63) trying to solve such urban problems. 
The shopping centres BBI and SCC have redeveloped abandoned city squares and 
created jobs for the local population. The King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre offers 
free educational opportunities to Sarajevans, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation, 
including free English and Arab language instruction, computer classes and a sports 
terrain. Finally, the residential projects Buroj Ozone and Poljine Hills encourage tourism 
from middle class and wealthy Arab visitors, who enjoy the greenery of BiH’s 
countryside, injecting the local economy with added monetary streams.  
 Such redevelopment, however, does not come without friction. As increasing 
numbers of visitors and residents from the greater Muslim world take an interest in 
Sarajevo and as greater capital flows from GCC countries come into the country for 
urban projects, the residents of the city react. I have analysed the reactions of 
Sarajevans to these new projects, especially in terms of how they have attempted to 
position their own identity in relation to the new phenomena arriving in their city. In the 
fourth chapter of this thesis titled ‘Sarajevo’s Identity Crisis: the City’s Multi-ethnic 
History, the Islamic shift and Post-War Urban Processes’, I have argued that Sarajevan 
identity is in crisis and that the city is becoming more Muslim in terms of space and 
demographics. Because of this crisis of identity, the case studies in this thesis have 
become sounding boards onto which people in the city project an idealised identity, one 
that references a historical ‘multicultural’ idyll.  
 Using discourse analysis based on what Loretta Lees (2004) describes as the 
second strand of discourse analysis for geographical research, I analysed how 
Sarajevans discuss the case studies and related phenomena around them, such as 
Arab migration and ideas of neighbourliness. In this second strand, Lees states that, 
‘Here discourse is part of a process through which things and identities get 
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constructed. In Foucauldian terms, discourses are not simply reflections or 
(mis)representations of “reality”; rather they create their own “regimes of truth” – the 
acceptable formulation of problems and solutions to those problems,’ (102-103). 
Focusing on how individuals use language in both media reports but also in face-to-
face interviews and survey responses, I pulled out the meanings they created. Using 
discourse analysis gave me a better way to understand how the population of the city is 
responding to new urban investments and what greater meaning this has for Sarajevo 
as a city.  
 In the fifth chapter of this thesis titled, ‘Sarajevo’s Commercial Investments: 
Perceptions of Corruption and Investor Urbanism in Post-Conflict and Post-Socialist 
Urban Development’, I have analysed the discourses surrounding the BBI Centar (BBI) 
and the Sarajevo City Center (SCC), focusing specifically on perceptions of corruption 
and market-driven, or investor, urbanism. These buildings are contested, quasi-public 
spaces, which have been the subject of intense public debates in Sarajevo. I have 
argued in this chapter that Sarajevans view issues of corruption surrounding BBI and 
SCC as particularly ‘eastern’ in character, as opposed to ostensibly ‘western’ 
transparency. The reactions of many the residents of the city to these case studies 
position Sarajevan identity along the imaginary East/West binary away from what is 
perceived as ‘eastern’, especially corruption and the ‘Orientalising’ effect of foreign 
capital flows from GCC countries. The data that I analysed from media reports, 
interviews, field interviews and survey responses separates an idealised ‘western’ and 
European Sarajevan identity, one that upholds transparency and democracy, from the 
corrupt and colonising ‘eastern’ force of GCC capital flows, manifested in the material 
environment with the two shopping centres. BBI and SCC are elite-approved worlding 
projects that inter-reference similar luxury buildings in places like Dubai and Abu Dhabi. 
Forming part of the public sphere, they are important for the identity of the city, but they 
are also spaces that encourage the emergence of multiplicity and hyrbidity.  
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 Following from this chapter on commercial investments, chapter six of this 
thesis titled ‘Redefining Sarajevo’s Relationship to Islam: the Blending of Sacred and 
Secular Spaces’ analyses spaces in Sarajevo that are sacred in nature. I have used 
BBI and SCC as case studies for this chapter as well as the King Fahd Mosque and 
Cultural Centre, arguing that all of these buildings represent a blending of sacred and 
secular space, allowing for different realities to exist simultaneously. Religious ritual 
takes place in all three buildings (the shopping centres have Muslim mesjids for prayer 
and are shari’ah compliant, meaning certain activities such as the sale of alcohol are 
forbidden), but their secular functions also determine their production of space. All 
three are at once both sacred and secular. I analysed the discourses around BBI and 
SCC first, focusing on their link to Islam and the sacred elements in the spaces. Here I 
explored two themes: perceptions of a conspiracy to ‘Islamise’ the city and fears of 
expanding shari’ah compliant spaces. Secondly, I examined the discourses around the 
King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre, focusing on radicalism and the perception that 
the mosque seeks out or preys upon the poor and the vulnerable populations of the 
city. The reactions of Sarajevans to these case studies attempt to position their identity 
along the Sacred/Secular and East/West binaries. In reaction to perceptions of a 
conspiracy to ‘Islamise’ the city and fears of expanding shari’ah compliant spaces, I 
found that Sarajevans positioned themselves toward the secular end of the 
Sacred/Secular binary, asserting a Yugoslav ideal of secularism. Views of radicalism 
connected with the King Fahd Mosque placed an emphasis on the ‘eastern’ nature of 
such ideologies and their attempts to garner converts, consistent with the idea of 
‘eastern’ corruption analysed in the preceding chapter. Thus, Sarajevans positioned 
their identity, especially connected with ‘naš Islam’ toward the ‘western’ side of the 
East/West binary in reaction to such perceptions. With the ‘Islamic shift’, Sarajevo has 
become more Muslim in character, and these worlding projects are contributing to this 
changing nature. However, while the population fears homogeneity in terms of the 
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increasing influence of Islam, the case studies are fields of multiplicity where 
simultaneous realities exist at once.  
 Moving away from a focus on Islam in the built environment, chapter seven of 
this thesis titled ‘Understanding Arabophobia: Residential Projects as Catalysts for New 
Constructions of the “Other” in Sarajevo’ explores new residential and tourist 
complexes in Sarajevo, the construction of the Arab ‘other’ and ideas surrounding 
neighbourliness and flows of people into the city. I examine two case studies: the 
Poljine Hills residential complex and Buroj Ozone tourist village, both of which are still 
under construction. Drawing upon media analysis, my fieldwork data (interviews, field 
interviews and survey responses) and an examination of online comments, I argue that 
the case studies are catalysing discourses around new visitors and residents in 
Sarajevo from Arab countries, such as the UAE and Kuwait, concentrated around 
concepts such as exclusion, cultural colonisation, safety, clashes of behaviour and the 
new ‘other’. Through these discourses, Sarajevans are attempting to position their 
identity along the imaginary binaries of East/West and Global/Local toward the ‘West’ 
and toward the ‘Local’. Arab residents and tourists are portrayed as being uncultured in 
contrast to more cultured, educated and ‘European’ Sarajevans, who make up the local 
population. Additionally, fears are expressed that Sarajevans are being excluded from 
the local property market by Arab buyers and that the Bosnian population will have to 
adapt to the customs of the new residents. Such flows of people and capital can be 
interpreted as contributing to urban change in the sense of spatialised social divisions 
in Sarajevo, following along the lines of the ‘two cities’ conception where one part of the 
city is inhabited by the wealthy and middle class and the other by the less fortunate 
(Spirou, 2011: 196). Sarajevans’ reactions to these flows can be read as a rejection of 
perceived cultural colonisation and exclusion and a resistance to new socio-spatial 
inequalities. The positioning of their identity along the imagined binaries is an attempt 
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to stop the dynamic processes at work in the city and create a static conception of 
Sarajevo and belonging in the city. 
As a whole, the discourses surrounding the case studies in this thesis can be 
read as a means for the local population to assert control over their changing built 
environment and identity. With elite approval, global actors are managing the 
development process, creating a conflict in which the people themselves have little say 
in the redevelopment of their own urban landscape. While this is not an uncommon or 
novel phenomenon, in Sarajevo, this lack of control seems to be catalysing narratives 
that aim to create stasis in the ever-changing and morphing city environment. Global 
flows are enabling the creation of cultural hybridity, but as a reaction, Sarajevans are 
attempting to concretize shifting ideas related to belonging and the city. Tensions 
between the three ethno-religious groups in the city undoubtedly still exist, but these 
historical struggles seem to take a secondary place in contemporary Sarajevo, 
especially with the ‘Islamic shift’ that is making the city more Muslim in character.  
From my analysis above, the stabilised and controlled Sarajevan identity being 
created and formed as a reaction to global flows of capital, people and ideas from GCC 
countries exists at the ends of three imaginary binaries: East/West, Sacred/Secular and 
Global/Local. According to Alev Çinar and Thomas Bender (2007), discourses and 
imaginary binaries (or imaginaries), ‘serve urban dwellers by locating the city and 
themselves in it... the city is located and continually reproduced through such orienting 
acts of imagination, acts grounded in material space and social practice’ (xii). The ways 
in which residents of the city imagine and discuss the urban environment and their 
identity constitutes both social reality and urban space. Aligning itself with vague 
concepts such as democracy, transparency, equality and cosmopolitanism, this 
Sarajevan identity speaks to the historical idyll of ‘multiculturalism’, but it also reaches 
into an idealised future in which Sarajevo forms part of an integrated Europe 
exemplifying these traits.  
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 Such positioning can be interpreted as going beyond identity formation as well. 
In terms of Sarajevo’s urban landscape, the analysis above can also be read as a 
rejection of the city’s spaces’ growing Muslim character, or the ‘Islamic shift’. Although 
the nature of transnational flows of capital and people creates multiplicity and the 
existence of simultaneous realities, the residents of the city are rejecting what they 
perceive as an ‘Islamisation’ of the city spaces, including increasing shari’ah compliant 
spaces. Expanding this beyond a focus on Islam and Islamic values, Sarajevans’ 
responses to the changing urban landscape centered around the case studies in this 
thesis can also be read as a rejection of urban space that is perceived of as exclusive 
to new Arab residents or tourists. This is especially true when the people of the city 
view urban redevelopment as excluding the local population or as creating separate 
urban spheres dividing the local population from newcomers. Finally, the analysis 
shows a lack of tolerance for corruption and corrupt practices that are driving the 
development of the urban landscape. Through the discourses surrounding the case 
studies, they are asserting an ethical vision for Sarajevo’s urban environment, which 
would eliminate the power of foreign capital to dictate redevelopment projects and 
urban goals. While Sarajevans have little control over these processes, through these 
discourses, they are creating a means of contesting new urban redevelopment projects 
that they feel go against idealised Sarajevan values located at the ends of the 
imaginary binaries. Thus their reactions to the case studies serve two functions: identity 
creation and contestation of elite-approved urban redevelopment.  
 Of course, there are multiple sides to the debate, and there are Sarajevans who 
do not view the case studies or related phenomena as problematic. As I have 
discussed in previous chapters, there are voices in the city that see the new 
developments in an entirely positive light, especially in terms of economic growth and 
job creation. Additionally, there have been reactions to ‘Arabophobia’ and the othering 
of newcomers to Sarajevo with calls for tolerance and acceptance. It is my belief, 
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however, that these voices are less pronounced and prominent than those that I have 
highlighted. From the analysis of my data, I contend that the dominant reactions of the 
residents of Sarajevo continue to position Sarajevan identity along the imaginary 
binaries as a reaction to the worlding projects coming into the city.  
 
8.2 Theoretical Contributions  
 The data and interpretations in this thesis have made both empirical and 
theoretical contributions and have cleared the way for future research areas. 
Empirically this research contributes to knowledge on Sarajevo and on post-socialist 
and post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in terms of identity. As identity in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the focus of a considerable corpus of literature (see 
for example Markowitz, 2010; Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobrić, 2001; or Robinson and 
Pobrić, 2006), especially in terms of ideas of ‘reconciliation’ between the three main 
ethno-religious communities, the findings in this thesis reach beyond nationalism and 
religious affiliation towards new ideas of what Sarajevan identity means in the current 
context.  
 The observations and data collected in this thesis provide an avenue for 
exploring Sarajevan identity and belonging in a more complex way. This research does 
not attempt to flatten or reduce identity in Sarajevo to its most basic, ethno-religious 
components; instead, the empirical data shows how new conceptions and 
understandings of belonging can be highlighted in the face of transnational movements 
of people and capital. Although tensions between the three religious communities do 
still exist, a more nuanced understanding of current social dynamics is necessary for 
understanding the reality of the current phenomena. Moving away from a strict focus on 
reconciliation between the three ethno-religious communities also allows for the 
analysis of solidarities between members of different religious groups and how such 
connections might provide fruitful avenues for peace research and policy making. I 
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show that scholarship that focuses on identity in terms of ethno-national belonging in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (for example, Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobrić, 2001 and 
Robinson and Pobrić, 2006) flattens more complex understandings of identity in the 
country, missing the true nature of social relations taking place.  
 This thesis contributes to the anthropological and ethnographic literature on the 
ex-Yugoslav space, which goes against strict ethno-national identity formation in BiH. 
These works demonstrate how identity is formed outside of ethno-religious belonging 
through the construction of different discourses (see, for example, Bougarel, Helms and 
Duijzings, 2008; Helms, 2008; Jansen, 2015; and Jansen, Brković and Čelebičić, 
2017). This research adds to the understanding of identity formation through the 
mobilisation of various imaginaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, showing how such 
processes are much more complex than identitarian politics focused on ethno-
nationalism. However, it pushes this body of research further by looking at how identity 
is being constructed within the Muslim community and in reaction to global flows of 
people and capital. This opens up the literature to global flows outside of a strict focus 
on the peoples of the former Yugoslavia.  
 Theoretically, this research contributes to geographical research on the 
production of space and on transnationality. Firstly, it contributes to new conceptions of 
sacred space. Following along the ideas of Lily Kong (2001) and Banu Gökarıksel 
(2009), this thesis has conceptualised sacred space outside of binary understandings. I 
have shown how the case studies BBI, SCC and the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural 
Centre produce simultaneous realities that are at once both sacred and secular. 
Reaching beyond conceptions of sacred space that focus on feelings of awe and 
wonder (della Dora, 2011) or that view the sacred in opposition to the secular or 
profane (Kedar and Werblowsky, 1998 and Gottschalk, 2013), this research argues for 
more complex understandings of the sacred that can be imbued with the secular in 
various contexts. Because the case studies are all spaces where religious ritual takes 
	268
place and where there are religious regulations on activities on site, they cannot be 
described as fully sacred or secular. As Sarajevo globalises, spatial production 
becomes more complex. It is no longer possible to make clear delineations between 
the sacred and the secular in the case studies examined. This research shows that 
spaces as nominally secular as shopping centres can be both sacred and secular, and 
that nominally sacred spaces such as mosques can also produce both. Importantly, 
this thesis expands the geography literature on sacred space and the simultaneous 
production of the sacred and the secular by showing how such simultaneous realities 
can exist in large public spaces such as shopping centres. It broadens the idea of this 
simultaneous reality outside of spaces for religious practice and personal expressions 
of this reality (such as wearing the hijab explored by Banu Gökarıksel (2009)). Such 
findings could be expanded beyond Sarajevo to other cities in the Muslim world that are 
recipients of transnational capital for urban redevelopment based on Islamic financing 
principles. These findings could also be fruitful avenues for exploring sacred spatial 
production in secular spaces such as airports and shopping centres around the world 
that offer spaces for prayer and reflection.  
 Secondly, the findings in this thesis point to new ideas for conceptualising Islam 
and nationalism in the built environment, especially in the context of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. I have argued that Sarajevo is undergoing an ‘Islamic shift’ in its built 
environment and in its demographics, meaning that the city is becoming more Muslim 
in character. Although Kusno (2012) describes how solidarities can be organised in the 
built environment for larger national communities, such as the umma, I have found that 
this is not always the case in Sarajevo and that the idea of the umma is not as salient 
an identity as others. Simone (2012) defines the umma as, ‘a deep horizontal 
comradeship that crosses the temporary convenience of nations’ (206). In Sarajevo, 
the ‘Islamic shift’ includes processes that can be read as excluding of Bosnian 
Muslims, especially in terms of how they understand ‘naš Islam’. It is reductionary to 
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assume that Sarajevo’s increasing Muslim character is simple enough to organise 
solidarities for the entire umma. In the city’s built environment, global flows of capital 
and people are creating spaces that Sarajevan Muslims find exclusionary and against 
their ideologies, and they are reacting against such spatial production. This research 
underscores the multiplicity of the city and goes beyond simplified notions of belonging, 
such as the umma. The notion of competing Muslim spaces within a Muslim-majority 
city breaks new ground in the literature on Islam in the built environment, expanding 
beyond notions of one homogeneous and coherent Islamic community or the imaginary 
unity of the umma. Outside of Sarajevo, such findings could look at Islam in the built 
environment in cities such as London, where there are multiple Muslim communities 
and differing solidarities amongst such groups.  
 Finally, this thesis adds to the literature on transnationality. Following upon Roy 
and Ong’s (2011) conception of ‘worlding cities’, I have argued that the case studies in 
this thesis are ‘worlding projects’ that are bringing the global to Sarajevo and that this is 
creating novel cultural forms. Adding to Tsing’s (2005) idea of ‘friction’, I have argued 
that such flows are bringing hybridity to Sarajevo – not homogeneity. Outside of a 
‘West-to-rest’ model, the processes analysed in this thesis prove that transnational 
flows exceed the simple economic models of early globalization literature and that their 
effects can be felt in all aspects of life. The literature on transnational flows in Sarajevo 
and in Bosnia and Herzegovina focuses mostly on diaspora relations (see, for example, 
Valenta and Ramet, 2011) and the role of the international community and NGOs 
before and after the war (Petersen, 2012 and Kostić, 2014 for example). This thesis 
adds a much-needed conceptualisation of the contemporary processes taking place in 
the city and in the country as a whole with special attention to the effects on spatial 
properties in the city. Using Sarajevo as a case study adds to the ‘worlding’ literature, 
as Sarajevo has not been studied using this theoretical model. This research shows 
how elite-approved interventions from GCC countries are bringing Sarajevo into the 
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globalising world and into the global market economy. It also adds a much-needed 
analysis of new global flows that are not related to the Bosnian diaspora or NGO and 
international organisations working in the country, 
  
8.3 Critical Reflections 
 This thesis has examined how transnational flows of capital are informing the 
urban redevelopment of Sarajevo. It has done so through the use of qualitative 
research methods and discourse analysis. Throughout my analysis, I have tried to deal 
fairly with the data I have collected, especially the interview and field interview data. At 
times, however, the nature of these results became somewhat sensitive, especially 
when considering Sarajevan attitudes towards new visitors and residents from GCC 
countries. It is not productive to interpret these findings as bigoted, as there are many 
nuanced viewpoints behind them. My analysis may have been too severe when dealing 
with these ideas. This could also be a reflection of the fact that I am not Bosnian and 
lack certain understandings of the subtleties of language and cultural expression. This 
can also be extended further. My positionality as a foreigner directed my research, 
despite my attempts to control for this effect. As mentioned in my methodology chapter, 
this certainly contributed to both the data I received (people surely self-censored and 
edited knowing my position as a foreign researcher) and my analysis of that data. 
While I have tried to be as objective as possible, I am aware that this positionality could 
have led to differences in analysis from that of a native Bosnian researcher.  
 Unlike much of the literature on post-conflict Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
this thesis gives only a very superficial account of the inter-ethnic tensions and 
problems associated with nationalism. Some scholars might argue that this omission is 
problematic for the research as it ignores the main source of conflict that has existed in 
the city for over two decades. While I recognise this concern, I believe that Sarajevo as 
a city is moving beyond these historical conflicts and tensions between the ethno-
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religious communities. I also believe that, with the ‘Islamic shift’, these ideas are not as 
salient to the processes occurring in Sarajevo at the current moment. Following the 
scholarship of Emily Greble (2011), I underscore the power of the civic identity of 
Sarajevo over those of the ethno-religious communities, and I argue that this identity is 
in crisis. Undoubtedly, the tensions between these communities do exist, and in other 
parts of the country, they are still a major consideration in all aspects of life. This would 
be especially true for divided cities like Mostar where the communities are separated 
spatially from one another and where there exists a ‘Muslim’ side of the city and a 
‘Croat’ side of the city (Calame and Charlesworth, 2011). However, Sarajevo has a 
different ethos, which has been grounded in centuries of cohabitation between different 
religious communities and the continuing narrative of ‘multiculturalism’ that keeps that 
idyll alive (Ibid.). The results of my data showed me that the inter-ethnic tensions, while 
certainly not forgotten, are not necessarily as prominent or as mobilising as they 
perhaps once were. For this reason, such forces in the city fell into the background of 
my analysis.  
 In another vein, my focus on investments from GCC countries could be seen as 
somewhat narrow. I have mentioned in passing that there are shopping centres in the 
city that were investments originating in the United States and Croatia, for example. 
There is also a large residential tower that was built using Malaysian funding, and there 
are other infrastructure and architectural projects that have been built and developed 
with Malaysian funds. Added to this, reconstruction of the city has been occurring since 
the end of the siege with the help of the international community, especially the 
European Union, the United States, the World Bank and other countries such as 
Norway (Stroschein, 2014). With so many flows of capital and people (in the form of 
diplomatic and international organisation employees) from the EU, the United States 
and other European countries, why focus on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, etc.? 
Could their role in the redevelopment of the city be so much more substantial? I would 
	272
argue that the flows from GCC countries are not more substantial, per se, but that there 
are more discourses mobilised around these investments. They are more controversial 
and the buildings themselves are more contested than investments and funding from 
the EU, the USA or countries like Norway. For this reason, they are a phenomenon 
unto themselves that deserve focused research.  
 Methodologically, I believe this research could have benefitted from focused 
interviews with members of the Salafi community in Sarajevo and with interviews with 
more Arab residents in the city. Although I did carry out a field interview with a fully 
covered woman, the voices from this community are somewhat absent from my 
analysis. While reaching out to this community would have been very difficult, having 
their viewpoints surely would have added a layer of complexity to this thesis and would 
have enriched this research. Additionally, I did interview two Arab businessmen 
working in real estate and tourism, but having more of their voices would have added 
depth to the analysis, especially in terms of how they feel they have been welcomed in 
Sarajevo or any difficulties that they have found. Fieldwork is a difficult time full of 
uncertainties, and it is only in retrospect sometimes that our omissions come into focus. 
Despite this, I do believe I was able to obtain enough data to understand the processes 
taking place regarding the case studies and the overarching discourses surrounding 
them.  
 With this in mind, this thesis sets the stage for future research. I have argued 
that the case studies are driving the emergence of new cultural forms in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Except for hybridity in spatial production, I have not described what I 
believe these new cultural forms are, as this goes beyond the scope of the thesis. I 
believe research into emerging Islamic practices in Sarajevo could shed some light on 
the effects of these transnational flows. Specifically, it could be fruitful to investigate 
Muslims in Sarajevo who are ‘Quranists’ or Muslims who have taken certain practices 
from Salafi movements while leaving others. Research following the marriages of 
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Bosnians to Arabs might also include how hybridity is developing in Sarajevo, how the 
children of these marriages understand their belonging in the city and how these 
families practice Islam. These flows can also be driving language use and learning. 
Future research could focus on the use of Arabic and Turkish as second languages in 
Sarajevo, especially for business and tourist purposes. In terms of geography, this 
research could be used as a stepping-stone for investigating investments in other cities 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially those cities that do not have a Muslim majority. 
Research into Russia’s investments, for example, might prove quite interesting in a 
comparative analysis. In all, the avenues for future research are wide and potentially 
important not only for South East European studies but for various different fields.  
 As a whole, the findings in this thesis are significant for the people of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, especially the city dwellers in Sarajevo. By exploring the ways in 
which transnational capital flows are mobilising discourses in the city around identity 
and belonging, it points to underlying social power struggles and nascent movements 
that are developing and that will shape the future of the social fabric of the city. 
Uncovering such shifts will allow for a more critical analysis of social relationships and 
the creation of policy or best practices for the continuing redevelopment of the city. 
Additionally, this thesis contributes to understandings of inter-Islamic relationships on a 
global scale and how tensions within the umma might catalyse conflict. These findings 
could help pave the way for greater understanding between Islamic currents in other 
cities worldwide, especially cities with large Muslim populations such as London and 
other Muslim-majority cities. This could be especially relevant for cities where 
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Annex A – Detailed List of Interviewees 
 Name Organisation/Profession Date of 
Interview 
Comments 
1 Anonymous Investigative journalist at 
CIN – Centar za 
istraživačko novinarstvo 
(Centre for investigative 
journalism) 
July 2014 Discussed corruption 
and building projects, 
gas stations 
2 Anonymous Clerk, Stari Grad 
Municipality Department 










Sead Gološ Architect of BBI, SCC, 




investment. Would not 
agree to follow up 
interview 
4 Prof. Dr. 
Khalid 
AdDamigh 
Saudi cultural attaché 25 February 
2015 
Gave tour of entire 
complex, discussed 
mission, challenges 
5 Anonymous Architect 26 February 
2015 
Met in café, discussed 
problems of urbanism. 
In local language 
6 Nasiha 
Pozder 
University of Sarajevo 




Problems of urbanism 
in Sarajevo, political 
issues 
7 Anonymous Cantonal Agency for 10 March Discussed issues of 
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Privatization 2015 privatization and 
received documents 
on privatization. In 
local language 
8 Anonymous Researcher 29 March 
2015 
Discussed King Fahd 
and Salafi movement 
9 Anonymous Member of orthodox 
community 
03 May 2015 Discussed orthodox 




Ne Da(vi)mo Beograd 12 May 2015 Discussed protest 
movements in 
Belgrade v. Sarajevo 
for Urban change 
11 Anonymous Architect 12 May 2015 Discussed investor 
driven urbanism in 
Belgrade and 
Sarajevo. In local 
language.  
12 Anonymous International contractor 
for IOs in Sarajevo 
18 May 2015 Political and 
urbanization 
processes in Sarajevo 


























17 Anonymous OSCE representative 22 June 
2015 
Issues surrounding 
protests and activism 
18  Anonymous Investigative journalist 13 July 2015 Discussed issues of 
corruption, urbanism, 
land and property 
holdings of politicians 
19 Anonymous State Investigation and 
Protection Agency (SIPA) 
22 July 2015 Talked about Islamic 
radicalism in BiH with 
respect to different 
mosques/religious 
spaces 
20 Fatima Šišić Centre for Islamic 
Architecture (Islamska 
Zajednica) 
23 July 2015 Discussed how imams 
are chosen, the case 
study mosques, vakuf 
21 Anonymous Governmental 
organisation  
27 July 2015 Discussed how politics 




22 Anonymous Architect 27 July 2015 Urbanization in 
Mostar, BiH as a 




Director and founder of 
Bosmal Centar 






24 Anonymous Student, University of 












Press freedom, links 
between press and 
politics, problems of 
press in BiH 
26 Anonymous Helvetas, tourism  09 
September 
2015 
Discussed new trends 
in tourism, especially 
tourism from GCC 
countries 
27 Anonymous Architect 21 
September 
2015 
Tried to glean 
information about 
mosque building and 
political connections. 
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Director, SCC 01 October 
2015 
Construction of SCC, 
privatization, obstacles 














32  Anonymous Financial consultant, 






33  Samid 
Sinanović 




Discussed Poljine Hills 





















Real estate trends in 
Sarajevo, marketing 
real estate to Arabs 
37 Anonymous Estate agent, Arab-
focused estate agency 
02 November 
2015 
Discussed trends in 
real estate investment 
in Sarajevo, Arab 
clients buying 
property. In local 
language.  




Buroj Ozone and 
environmental 
problems 
39 Anonymous Architects 04 November 
2015 





40  Anonymous Cantonal Planning Office 05 November 
2015 
Planning and 
permissions at the 
cantonal level. In local 
language 
41 Amir Zec Architect 12 November Architecture in 
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2015 Sarajevo  









Annex B – Interview Themes/Sample Interview Questions 
Financiers/Project Stakeholders (directors of BBI, SCC, MDC, etc.) 
• What can you tell me about the initial idea for the project? How was the project 
conceived? 
• Can you describe the privatization process for me? 
• What was the process for gaining the relevant permissions? What phases of 
construction required which permissions? 
• What kind of obstacles did you encounter along the way? 
Urban Professionals/Architects 
• What are your thoughts on the urban development of Sarajevo since 1995? 
• What are the main problems in urbanization and architectural development? 
• How are politics enmeshed in architectural development and urban planning? 
• What do you think the city needs in terms of spaces or buildings? 
• What kind of solutions could help the current situation in Sarajevo? 
Institutional Representatives 
• What can you tell me about the link between politics and urban development? 
• What can you tell me about corruption in Sarajevo? Are there links to foreign 
investment? 
• What can you tell me about press freedom in Sarajevo and media campaigns 
against certain foreign investors? 
Journalists 
• Do you think there is a link between politics and investment in the urban 
environment? What do you think this link is? 
• Who do you think might be behind such investments? Why?  
• What can you tell me about the property holdings of politicians in Sarajevo? 
• What do you know about urban planning in Sarajevo? 
Activists/NGO Sector 
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• What can you tell me about the environmental impact of new construction 
projects? 
• What can you tell me about green spaces in Sarajevo?  
• Do you think Sarajevo lacks cultural spaces? Why or why not? 
• What kind of spaces are needed in the city? 
• Why do you think people are or are not active in the urban development of the 
city? 
Real Estate Agents 
• Why are people from the Arab world buying property in Sarajevo/BiH? 
• Do you market in Arab speaking countries?  
• Have any of your clients complained of discrimination? 
• Do Arab buyers prefer to live amongst Bosnian neighbours or do they prefer 
Arab settlements? 
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1. On a scale from 1 to 10, how successful do you believe urban development 
(new investments in architecture, urbanization, and reconstruction) in Sarajevo 
has been since 1995? 
 





2. What is your opinion on the number of shopping centres in Sarajevo? 
a. There are too many 
b. There are not enough 





3. What is your opinion on foreign real estate developments (shopping centres, 
private villas, tourist villages, hotels, and other commercial properties) in 
Sarajevo?  
a. There are too many 
b. There are not enough 





4. If you believe there are too few or too many, are there specific countries that 










6. Do you believe the style of new architectural developments (shopping centres 









7. Do you believe new buildings and mosques should follow traditional designs 
seen in Sarajevo? 
a. yes 
b. no 





8. For Sarajevo City Center, BBI, and Bosmal Centar, Hotel Bristol, do the 
investors’ regulations banning alcohol, pork, and gambling on the premises 
affect whether you go to those spaces? 
a. Yes, I don’t go to them because of the ban 








9. On a scale from 1 to 10, how do you feel about the banning of alcohol, pork, 
and gambling in shopping centres and other privately run commercial spaces 
such as hotels? 
 
 





10. Do you believe Sarajevo City Center, BBI, and Bosmal have improved 








11. What is your opinion on the development of mosques in Sarajevo? 
a. There are too many 
b. There are not enough 
c. There is a good amount 
























14. Do you think only certain nationalities/foreigners should be allowed to buy 








15. If yes, which nationalities/foreigners should be allowed to buy property?  
 
 
16. Are there any nationalities/foreigners that you believe should not be allowed to 
buy property in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
 
 













19. Do you believe the origin of financing for urban developments (shopping 
centres, mosques, private villas, and tourist villages) can have an affect on the 









20. Do you think real estate development is affecting the identity of Sarajevo as a 








21. On a scale from 1 to 10, how do you feel about the construction of tourist 
villages such as Buroj Ozone that cater specifically to Arab and Muslim 
tourists? 
 

















24. Do you have any other comments about architecture, urbanization, and real 
estate development in Sarajevo?  
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What do you think about shopping centres in Sarajevo like the Sarajevo City Center, 
BBI, and Bosmal? 
 
 
What do you think about banning alcohol, pork, and gambling in spaces such as the 
Sarajevo City Center, BBI, and Bosmal? 
 
 




What do you think about exculsive residential communities such as Poljine Hills? 
 
 
Do you think foreigners should be able to buy property in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
 
 
Do you believe there are political motivations behind foreign investments in Sarajevo? 
 
 
If yes, who do you think is behind them? 
 
 
What kind of buildings or spaces would you like to see developed in the city? 
 
 
Do you have any other comments about architecture, urbanization, and real estate 
development in Sarajevo?  
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Annex E – Table of Codes and Themes 





• Blurring of sacred/secular 
• Tawhid – Muslim idea of oneness 
• Umma – transnational identification 
• Bošnjak nationalism 
• Islamism 
• Radicalism/terrorism 
• Islamophobia/Fear of Islamism in BiH 
• Islamic financing/Halal investment 
• ‘our’ Islam v. ‘their’ Islam 
• East v. West 
• Visibility of Islam 
Political themes 
• Bakir Izetbegović  
• Fahrudin Radončić  
• Corruption/Government Misconduct 
• Interests of international actors (Saudis, Turks, UAE, Russia, etc.) 
• Anti-Russian/Anti-Arab 
• Power/Wealth Statements 
• Luxury projects v. general poverty 
• Crises in the Middle East 
• New Arab demographics/refugee crisis 
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Urbanization 
• Illegal constructions 
• Investor-driven urbanism 
• Urbanization laws/amendments 
• Permissions 
• Privatization 
Foreign Influence in BiH 
• Tourism/Arab tourism 
• Inter-referencing Dubai 
• Turkish Influence 
• Saudi Influence 
• Russian Influence 
• Generic ‘Arab’ influence 
• Western influence 
• American influence 
• Sacred v. secular 
Mentalities 
• ‘Multiculturalism’/new multiculturalism (new demographics) 
• Arab hysteria 
• Arab discrimination/trust issues with Bosnians 
• Short-term v. Long-term thinking 
• Arab ‘c-class’, inferior investment 
• Global v. Local  
• Urban v. Rural 
• ‘Bosnian’ mentality 
• Exclusion 
	310
































Signed:         Date:  	
 
